Created: 4/22/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


joifmp ^mV1 in tho "TO" column. Under each commentlino thou Id to drawn acrooi ohooi end each comment numbered tocarrai^rm riht^Ke number in tho "TO" column. Cach officer should initial (check mark iniu'ficient) befom furtho roulinfl. This Routing and Record Sheet aheuld be returned to Regiitry.



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Items for Inclusion in CE Report

1. The following items aro considered worthy of consideration forin the CE report. dinner.

A. The fact thatSierra, nerhaps the best Informed ranoperations In Nicaragua, uppril arrears toidentified with the Honduran aspect of tho operation. arett.hat Calligerls has notresults of the colygraph examination conducted Inconsequently has not Interdictedhe nlsn suggestedin the above reference to have Sierra conductto Minogua for polygraph appears to be unsound. Equally unaound

in the writer's opinion Is tho suggestion by Calllgerls that heconduct the polygraph 'nterrogatlon. Refusal to accept


C2 3? Tne Duarte incident (the NicarAguan Immigration officer who

ook ftsylum in the Guatemalan Embassy in Hlcarogua) points up the fact C uateirola nay have widened their knowledge of the current operational

Gj^evidence cannot and will not Improve tho status of

thlp operation. It can only serve to lead us blindly into the

enemy'a camp.

in Nicaragua, Whether Duarte was knowledgeable of the

and eomrmnlcation training areas is an unknown factor.

OrM That particular information, however, was available to Raulhave 'mown:


(l) how the black flights werehe contents of theationality of the crews;

he fact that certain Americans were coning into

Nicaragua. corrainlcatlons people for Sherwood.

C. It is interesting to note thatfael Alvarado Velverde, the man recently removed from the Scranton training area for security rearons is listodormer nearer ofruardla Popular (VP, CoranuniBt Party) in Costa Sica. This information, coupled with his action at Scranton, clearly indicates the wisdom of Station Lincoln in preventing this man from returning to Costa Rica as ho desired.

Thisepetition of Calligerls' position when he first learned of Delgado's defection. Only when confronted with the most conclusive and damning evidence did Calligerls reluctantly accept the fact that Delgado had sold out to the enemjt.

was received from the Guatemalan Stationhat Carlos Enrique Loronzano was apprehended on.lust orior to his take-off from tho Guatemala City airport The police searched his baggage and turned upto Calliperis. On the afternoon ofuatemalan

newsreper made mention of the episode and hintedew plot. nrll ESSENCEable) through the station requesting that Calllgeris send no more letters to group members unless the couriers were completely reliable and able to avoid seizure and body search. These two cables evidence the fact that Guatemala has been readingortion, at least, of the current operation.

relative footer worthy of consideration is contained insent by Cadickpril from "Am convinced that U Jean and will make someto counteract Calllgeris if droppedatter which must be given careful consideration or ittoital factor in tho security of the oneration.

P. The quer.tion has been raised from time to time as to whether Calllgeris might be awn re of the fact that. Government is backing PT1SUCCESS. Two instances are uorthy of note:

fl) When Calligerisrip to. at tbe end of January, he carried withetter uhich Jacob R. Seekford requested be delivered to Lincoln. The letter was addressed as follows:ass to the Director.

ome weeksackage of nhotopranhle materialto Calllgeris by the

af the touch "ranifest was left with the material. The document contained on its fact the statement 'Via Diplomatic Courier". This document may have givenretty good indication that he had. backing.

G, The writer has analysed the information contained above In addition to other information not contained In this report. esult of this analysis the writer has developed the following hypothesis:

That the Guatemalan Government is well into the details of PBSUCCESS and that they have decided to let the operation proceed undisturbed until they have prepared andrief for presentation to the OAS. This brief in the light of Mr. Dulles' statements at Caracas properly presented could cause irreparable damage. rrestlge in the eyes of the non-Communist world. The writer considers that Guatemala hasalculated risk in allowing the operation to proceed Itisk, however, that they are apparently willing to assume, probably based on thoir estimate of the Calllgeris operation.


Original document.

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