CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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subject /general kuocwn
UIC Possible Attacks against ARBEIZ
INFO: Chief of Station, Guatemala
a vedgs between ARBENZ and the Guatemalan CP appears to be one of the major possibilities for reducing the government's ability toay. This could be done either by arousing distrust in ARBENZ against the CP or by arousing distrust in the CP against ARBENZ. The purpose of the present dispatch is to review several such possibilities and to obtain fron you soonest Information as to their technical feasibility. Chief of Station, Guatemala, is invited at the sane time to submit his coamente to LINCOLN.
We might make it appear as if the Communists consider ARBEHZ as some kind of Korenaky or like ono of tlie non-communist figureheads used in the first coalition governments in the satellite countries, usefulnited time and purpose, but then definitely to be disposed of. This allegedot necessarily of the Guatemalan CP leaders, but ofight be documented, in one of two possible ways i
KUBARE has anywhere, perhaps in Europe or in Asia, anaccesseftist,ot outright CPor periodical, we might plant through that agentreviewing developments in Guatemalaeftist,viewpoint, recognising ARBENZ* past merits, but
that his usofulness is rapidly coming to' on end# that'Ho'has'not the requiredeninist training nor the leadership qualities to complete Guatemala's developmenteople's democracy and that be will therefore have to be removed;
If (a) is not feasible, welippingoviet periodicalpreferably one which is not likely to be oo file In Guatemalauick check, such aa thergan for cpsu partyhe AGITATOR'S NOTEBOOK or the LITERARY. -GAZETTEft which the same thoughts as under (a) would be expressed.
It would riot seen absolutely necessary to reproduce the entire periodical bat perhaps just tbe clipping withparts of the paper.
In either case, (a) orhe articlepanish translation
attached might be transmitted to one or several Guatemalan diplomatic missions abroad, requesting that it be brought to the attention of the President, but also givenuitable Latin American news or feature agency for distribution to the press of the hemisphere,
3. If we have anywhere contactecent Soviet defector who wasosition where he could possibly know aboutommunist plans in Latin America, we might induce him toublic statement as outlined inbove.
b. If, on the contrary, ve want prLnarily to arouse distrust on the part of the CP, ue should take steps to nake it appear as if ARBEHZ either
preparing to flee from Guatemala, having begunhis considerable financial assetsafeto; or
Increasingly uneasy about the ascendancy ofallies ana has therefore begun to engagenegotiations either with President Peron ofwith unspecified officials in the US.
Alternative (a) might be started by an ite*oeaip columnewspaper in Argentinaprovided, there isolumn and we can gain access to itperhaps asking "Which leading personality freeorica lasell-known real estate firm toacienda for him under an assumedhich could tehn "finds its way" into
papers closer tof not rightlternative (b) might be implemented byetter (perhaps to* Mrs. ARBENZ. from some alleged "go-between" in those alloged secret negotiationsnay that it is likely to be intercepted by Guatemalan censorship, thus coming to the attention of the CP leaders. Another way might be touatemala exile (or some other likely informant)uatemalan diplomat abroad Jto be selected for his CPfferingeport on thoseions.
inor irritants, to be thrown between ARBENZ and the CP might include rumors such as the following:
a. The C? Is demanding that ARBENZ' hugh real estate be made also subject to the agrarian reform, to sot an example;
b. The CP has more confidence in Mrs. AR5ENZ than in her husband, realizing that his morphine addiction makes him unfit to preserve the innemost secrets of Soviet-Communist plans for Guatemala.
6. Irritants, as suggested in the preceding para, could be released immediately, p Implemented in part by cartoons in our controlled press etc. The majorowever, suggested inbove, should
be tined to become effective not earlier thanut they will require time-consuming preapations and we request therefore
that you give this matter your immediate attention, informing us of the existing possibilities, operationally and policy-wise and assisting us in implementing the selected alternatives.Original document.