ROUTING SHEET WITH ATTACHED REPORT RE K-PROGRAM (DELETED) - FIRST MEETING

Created: 4/27/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Il-conoby u icUncc rov. rn-nt,oInfltJtJMleur.tr*. * jolyorcunl'allon of ltsidnd.

Z. YonaU vaiko of life, ail pooial. 5.

their personal,for

the purpose of unitinc und-sr the leaitonhip. a rvg.rdlni; theionalfncyn ortivr notnfeittej.ee key split in leadership

would dangerously ve&fcen trie li retUUnce potential *ndPUy into

5. re being nelped andyotftoed

with bwlMec intorvttJ in G. Theypollve noreorialn Ow future of 0. Theyt! In* under t'.S. Govt in* true lion*. It can behevt utiioh li flmly reo-ov-tirim ; rd ty all ivthodi thorilrli.hi InfefTCftttCCij vojldfirort cf Utoir jctivione is It dooBnot bocor* Involved.

4. The Juntafor oneonly: t'* de-

struction ofin 0. e ar* no other*nri vrequired i% Un-lropolitical sr

cwMlrlOCMlwea fcralp. Convortaly, Ibcr,ot Co-illted Jiltedl loJr. cojral "fC it five In rtlc-'ur, lw *coenliicd to

BOp^ori any iwlltlea]nfii-iOt-alu, in. laVft for plnxioni.'l e to OV tonti.vd typeople *no it* cKoecn itiout

o the treatment to be accordedrolfn-m^

5. untabocr.ir now. f its yrofclCMB htoo -pn-vrr.t ivated Coeraturrsly fcjiuec-wid : sccaeafal- iniid its control over allt gBttin^ iirOft^aray. The Junta is cUierr-lned not tot elf to be ruahed or provoked Intoonceived ventures. Therikftoon tie cf-snceec.dearlyrofc-eebe- o' ftilure not oneooner. Tno Juntaanxious to avoid prolonged bloodrhed tend relics upon the Inpcct of Maifeet aivd ovvrwhelKing power to onforcanniet surrender.

6. n not acquainted with tho Junta'* planningtoit of knO'-.'lcdpe no cuef. Junta if Jiw-ref irtwiUireAnd has tafcto elaborate precast lone to tn lo Lnou that tharevelations of tho Whiteere not ln any nay related to the ctlvitlas of the Junta. lsoact tnat the p'.ans or the Junta do not envisage afi Invasion ofw:;ich wv-jj undoubtedly rally all nationalistoeeabhornd trieoil.

7. In rtCGiitm-.crdSricufclrbe iniOvtrnMinVt ca-.p#rcacnln^Junta in ii-Jcrihtir unsvervinf, -jpo-.riict. -jvcip. tto -verocff&ed b; ecusation

t*ie t lit fftr off, oy ray rjivc- beenwnt for untavlvcri1ecent cj:.vi-rW wiSKOI Jvkk orv-.uiiiit lellou-tra-'Oilere -st-ortl. V,vre - 1 -it' Junta depends -jpor ilfe -j -ine irfll

scctptedmi cctlveees .ot enjoy tntir co^pi* tert.

8. Th* Junta ha* all aioog consideredanto it* objective. It Is confident that In anyt can call upon you Torp. Tour potiter of public rocord aad foM Q'a iaale poaitioo niva been aa forthright and oouraf.eoasamtn* tha oowiunlat tide, aa you bar* been. hara is feelii g* oi* tha blf-Jutat personal ragard for you. Tha Junta reallaaa tnat your ranee of aatlrity ln lie behalf ia of neceoilty restricted. It would have been lrreaponaible to Ret you involted inactivitiesoutine natura. Tha tlae haa now com where, the Junta wj nood your advice and help and where 'unavoidable risk* will have to be taken.

S. The Junta baa In* true ted am to put to you the foliowlnf,you prepared at tnls time toersonalXn orderlSFue*importance on which the

Juntayour help and advice?

aaded to (

q

1. in co-.plianceC-LH' irrtr.Krtif.ris,arrival

In Guatemala, took iwedi.ie etepsond-crk Had

been laid by Gua'cnala.StaUon Jln_de sloping/ _ Vo theerewillingwwtb-aseiat-TW-in the development of Uila project. support and without the information he aui lied, tba

operation would Ivave been fra'^ht with Incalculablecroven

a highly intelligent, trustworthy and courageous companion,rbodinentt>-pe of'ideologically motivatedcnt of whom our agency hat alas an whose perf-onal roots are deep in the. soil of his country ( has launched into thla perilous enterprise in an irpre'rive

spiritia agency, alttio.;fch no fvrKal

tsienta have bean rade or resetted, willoral obligation to shield him and hie family against harm and ditcrimination.

2, The baric conceptesolve to

ifo enllttVUltn objectives

predicate onderivedareful tc-tlytll of the -setto control in Sw. fieml.. -bile e debriefing of{ )

lent tuftenance to fJ-'Mf' clatra in contr.il off therrifone, it jetoi'.al and conclusive answer to our qaict for substantive information. *rOTa*llintr conditions in Guatemala Cltf fail to aururwift and blooolcj; nt of tbe capital. lalmr ny J! beat a In control of apyt= rili'.sr, ert-'uliihrcnt. fornut iVrefireill uivc cost attJIYraSuoing the trry titvr lo

o

v.t

jt_ip bcUgyed fiat.thcf PBTUgCEj^ enc^>aage.ata* tne. poaalMlityrolonged and efcnfculnaj. stiutftl^for the_capit-tl.

rapid fall would no ii-_bt clinch victory inhole of Guatemala and

i.j'-trof our nain objectsini nation of the nilltantlotii ry corps of Vit An atte-jthr re fore to bo _nc'ert_iccii to brini; under Junta control those Arty unit* stationed in tne City whlcbbo expectedrva ea tha uoveriment'a obedient tools in quelling ary up-rising) The Guardia de :ionor, tbe unit rtationtd at Aurora Air Flclfl andbase hilitar. ilin^lhcr site-pi had to be nd* to enrol ranking, officers of the Amyonrund, on thalhat they nay conceivably beosition to count-rnand the ordertby theioent, or It*confllcliTUT.r influence officerr under tholr comand to rise in rebellion. enetration of tfait- level of the .mid struct-re e bven acconpl'.r'icdes.lt of Mrh

a Honed ia iw city aay alif.ii ilfelf withprising provided theact ificularly in the provinces, bidsair to it-ad to tuccesp, e cM_rotfld out rvell hop*-,taction -ill or prevailed upon to coordinate Ita -iovcsrar-workar reason* which .ill

t->in -IV-ore avebe cased on trie ior. lhat norvll6 within 'he -nf will not at fie fintf local unrest be aeprreadadrtup, ihaniini off frone-rcite

of dfr*Ct covwAdvry ClcncnU en who*rn;,

. an fctUcr.went to thie -report you will findet- toRulde ln hie flrat exploratory oonUct

You will not* that thee* lnFlructlon* are -substantially ir> line with

on the rub/.cct put forward. Jt vn jur purpose to Mil condnnrod andor* aewith the -salient

elements of PD: bCCKS without, on th* otherving away vital secrets,

S. In determinliiR what could be conceded, we wereyof factors. Th*n which the flrittinfcidny of thef -i. cbueh, nor n'd

antecedents au-fxetfl Oivt rcinht lend blMtll* for that purpofe. Thereour hands evidence, tliouRh incomplete, that his wind -ad for somepreoccupied with problem* involved Jnhe rcfclao. In an -vrr saturated with ru^rs of iiencrdini; revolt or lnvjsion, any in foni orcvc"*nt ra-ic-re, or in lifeng up thetion off-lre alana* or abortive"livein Vie hurt. t analy.lt aatf boRM oatgenesis of our talks, lnsrauch-as irwwhiUbly wott beprewisd

erieing-.retenled to iir* ar finr.lv planted, with no Major deviation* acceptable and with Inexorable drivo bttlnd it.

6. artff, -e rhe'ng ti"-er.d iT*.

wo were notrwdnc- co-nlete irwith which there exceutlor* were eubetc^ieivtly voiced, ld, lovever, decide

3cv ;,

to i- el t'.rproblFMy in oldero rj.ton up as

to the firaneet of our rtsolve to hold on lo CALiloKfllS. (iiiyMda in deference tofeelings, were purely

Uetlcel and did not effect the substanceelationship with CaLLICFUIS.)

further, as it turned out rightly, anticipated lhatHr-clS' personal and politicalld cor* up In one forn Tho point was therefore cede in tho stronceBt terns lhat nohad boan asked of ufl, let alone had been proffered. Host ofrelsed byhi* first talk with-*rewill thereforelt with under subsequent heed'.rge. Jt abMjdths.t^ able to rcsd theverbatln, havingpreviously on the nxtct fceaijing of Ml technical injrtiMor.e, tothe purpot.rc of your evaluailou the brief cm be accented es havingIn toto *itd understood by{ ildetail,

ordor to Metobjections to CAL/.jO&jtIS, va retorted

to the adoptionerc.irioloi.ical distinction betweendnot haverita ofoutwe bwlleve, kit of ;ormeetting away from personalitiescu* ting on the essentitle of The "congejo".we excd itouron

hfuper-council, cooi>ceed enly of fourt th* roleoart ofa,on all InperUnt dPcialona uitd fir-lity. lfUnot fornthere Is theeapoetrd of the tew*ans,andthis um in capacity of co-equals. Then there le

ataff cf technicalican and Grate-Ulan, which give counsel to both the "concejo" and the "junta". JS thueual position! he is aof thene of fix Mi.tlwr( to U) liaot. And he- Ir Chief of ftaff and senior rllit.r. advisor and pjrving under (not in) thend In allo llic "con&ftjo", Mi lift Uil* prer.entation of the cr^fcii-.aiior.O. structure nay In one way detract fro* the conceptredominantly indigenous leadership,

i)

surrounded by Aiw-rlcan advltore and backers, it wasncant to _crve (andhave served)evice to place CA"osition in aarare palatable to .is friends. In theory at leastwould boosition to curb CAl1 IOVnlS' politicalhe try to launch UWH In the vehicle of tiltiltion. also the "coniejo" could establish reilitar-, and politicaltherea, withoutttini: in the "Junta".

9. tohis firstith

) aft lhatepresentative ofT.

menb-rship in Uie "Junta", ub*ecjuently this vcrrion wit tacitlyore convenient legend, rsakinr. ( ^one ofpecialty in poll.lealhichijt to tetalirfactory Uchdrop. The contradiction app.rtiilly nttheh. ice able Irani itl on, ( )rer^.d nadirect tie-in vith *it:xr CA. U ial t':at this

letter version will linger.

10, Terninj; to the actual COMrae ofbortrief and distastefulch brcug-ht underuiiJ.RO-botwt'cn. hat weighed vith ua in thla

choice via the certain thoughlef that ( Jinfi:overnnent provocation attempt would irvediately raise the Iffueand that the intercec-alon of an individual knownit

occupying an official position would put to rest any apprehensions. Wothat thie could be done without even by itepllcatlon InvolvingStates Government fa carefully devir-ed legend takiriR care of rief preparedexcluded allwhich could con-

ceivably bed*red controversial and oubts on that score hadfor byto the pointad little

more to do than to Introduce 01 Araurican who dielike* coamunlen. whoiatinct chill in rotations; betweon_hixi-

*elf and hie era twill' "friend*"hesited t co

to develop cold feet rn which charity rathy r_mpels " *

ct. Wot wanting to/even the reroteooi in,:

inept handlinr, we decided not to avail ouriclves oiservices,

fines hid urefulneserfored ended,e sped out of Any hla-re, if jt attaches, should go tc( e: trentope rational aotfrtial turned out to be inaccurate.

havinrvailable)elleve t; at fate NOahen It tn?Mback.

11, The nesting4 waa laic

ondeabeen oi:carded toompletely

coldthus aware of the fact that lliore hue been a

6

meetingwhat transpirednot beon

vocbcnfed tot least not byToe Latter io-tatisfied-that

harbors genuine hostility againat -and ail Its worksT

aid that he la not an lnctrunent of deception or provocation, Since healon^ the source of Information we vcroolition

to check on the accuracy ofortlanil it is fairale ihethad beon reporting the truth, rle will of course infer that southing le in the wind and is likely to probe for further Information. console ourselvea in th# thought tbat before this thing la over th- re are liable to be otherre devastating leaks.

12, The neetlng between^ heduled forpril

ISM. eeting place thehouse of

pretent unoccupied, was telcted.^ )svcnt the night prior to theone of Antigua's hotels and watpickod up inperationalnot to din in the front sett.

ort introduction,^ Joeing theoxp pro-

ceded to the Meting place. e weregna of hoitlle t'jrvfrill..nce.

Th* conversation took place in

Jailed.

15. ffir ii.viwtion,

< to Cu, te-a'a and Uwt reat rionor Indeed toface to fs.ee one ofataunchert ati ti-co.Tj-.unlits, < at thvr*ew perfone in leading pos tionp In Guatemala wbofXi invitationld have accepted or wbote invitationuld havedered an honor.

* rln eettle d, { )launcbedoncisethe substance of already communicated to

Th' re wire nrtlcatlonte prevlou* briefing had mink inad botn well prepared. Tna lirue if accreditation neverittle hetlUncy ln lilt-closing hit deep and abiding

aottilitv tcise and hie deep resentment at Ihe mesalliance itwith . .

M.

struck ( sut hardly endowed

with tuperior brainpower, without liavinr. euch background in rising up )would detcrihe him as the typical -reluctilitary school,the taboos and narrow jrojudices which ruch upbringing it bound toa ea-ntryrt.;ni*.ies orlf-developmenttdOCtirttSeta Imtlnai,t: e kind of , ileal

tchoollnc which ihr hectic history of wjaernoviOt for ail tnoee who IfOftOnc involved in politics.

1?. -vail* tlr* did notto delve li.to hisp-rt ;nal arc nferredm role in the opnspiracy which

resulted ln 'fOJCU'l fail and wnlch Installedadrunvi rate. lr dirflcult lo fatiMBi V* ideological noU of ni: nelirf, hi: dictator:r& tostrorv ftllho rh it ear notr-tched byfervent del rearliament* r> democracy Installed ln There can l* ne dsubtr. to Allubileoft bear: t'rom to ihe fact tnat it Itacademic. -ils faUinr^out withjrilcb io probably final

and irreparable^ may not have been over thessue alone. Certainlyj now bo considered irreconcilable polltioal antagonists, with no illusion* left .onr either side. ^

There can be no doubt thaicloie range {

' to keep ^

y It can

safely be assisted I '

his acceis to classified info mo lion is llaiited to what

he can learn through hia numerous clost friends still in responsible position.

17, In order toupproperly and in order to determine hie

potential in any conspiracy, it is Important to view him as afirst and foremost. ?le hat risen in life with and through theeverything he has eccoitplUheds to it. Owner of

i; bound to be aof wealth uno could live

osition in public life. sinherited, or

ike to many of hiee nan&fcod toortune on the flue, use not ascertained, apitalist of tow, ecu:nee he cannot pos-rlbly view the cepradaliont ut eewnUiiktd practice inter.alaa/iimity.

18, The basis forto oocrunlsBi mat be looked for

In hia militaryhich, even today, lr the predominantci'.di ticn.rv. both thought and ll alio dOCbtlfotice Atle ambivalence in his reascnin^ if it costs towhat he refers to the "conuueteria" of bom ranleer* vithespecially if ne tries to explain tlio phenomenon of hliritH, Th'n nilho_Army (and in UV oontextUcunion*never coimoirs the) if predoninantl; -re repeatedly .Ulcd. ven BMI: fleers v. en list?c ta the sui Ort if Uw- regime ar* "aiMl-ceeaeaniat".

obvioufly iecoi.n'.Kec tic aTbiguous position ine officers' cor;*alacedetail -j*taltire,

lr inclined to looif "or rhe root of thevll in ,ts .rets and i- ll< I l sioit rocr'icerf in keyo'a.jjutily ro^artfrj the

i*i ' to "iro^lcm, l

of i'wresident :ir*lv in the* die

av* in a CalltlOAkcicix*festive coe-and> reedof th* uprling (on evencapital -jjlo if.

affird him and his at.oolat**

j'

io

officlent

/breathing cpell lo vrest control frorc th*ould ruke prolonged, and bloody etr)gft iiaiyoldablc,s he staledRBENZ Is going to fightwill ro down flfhtlng.

it la quite impossible to weavetenantsAmyonsistent andlntelllgaable pattern of predictableof hie observations evince that hehrewd and discerningit COB.OB to fathom the tsoilvation of some of his friends endhla analysis of the situation, whileasterpiece ofdeserves scrutiny.

way of introducing the main topic of converrelion, ( ihe following estimate of the situatioai

Tne "Junta* believes that it la in affective control of aof garrisons to be able toilitary uprising at any tinelikelihood of success. The undertaking has been carefullynothing been left to chance. dbi.lve and timely supply of material The "Jonta" will have at it*ell-organised cownoniindependently of locally available cote-urdcatlon facilities. are undarg'-'lng training and will descend upon Gua to mala at thetoariety of functions. (In answer

what percentage of the ranking officers in the various garriions. co-ildaf under "Junta" control,^ ]any knowledge, buthat it right be- anly imprersed. J

21. It should be stressed that the foregoing presentation was not an inpromptu affair, but carefully weighed In the lightursber of pertinent

U.

rectors. oint of vU.w, it wos felt thflt In case of disclosure to une>ithorizcc persons, only the olcncnt of strategic surprise could,conceivably suffor, the elornent of tacticalbeing left unimpaired. Another factor, allowing considerableIn dlvullng the training of specialists for specific tasks, vas conditions by the realisation that this phase ofeprrationa has alreedy been subject to considerable corsprcilsc and thnt nothing

much would be added to whatvertime at already knows, rhe mention as

4 tha period during which the Junta would be striking, leftdote sufficiently vague and yet eerved thor sense of urfioncy, Tho nentloa of" control

in the gcrrisons was an indlsponsable prerequisite for enteringfruitful discussion of substantive Issues, such as controlArmyhole and the role of Guatemala City and the trayt.icrcln. The cumulative effect of the disclosures, asthey wet, was felt to le one o" counteracting the paralysiswhich is known to h'.vareat rsaay ?iilitantas the result ofany futlls hopes raised in thethis context, it shears significant,declined./ )

Invitation to talk things over, one of tho reasons beiry. that he frankly disbelieved tnc account of events to come).

22. sychological point of view, transce.-idlr.; e purpose of gettingcooperate, the plan in its above

version can therefore Inflict but little nana, should 11 divul,unauthoriseddnd toforel^ oT thoseway concern. It is Korthe course of tho

conversation harked back et leest four tiroes to the ev.phe.tlc statement rcade by Jthat no circumstances known to the Junta could possibly

0 u.

resultost-poncnent or abandonment of thelirres uACtrataa in? bo confir-*d. Ittpressiby{ hat thia one statement die? more to sway

then any othor issue raised during the conversation. A

further illustration of the pivotal importance ofcetln^(

for tho primary purpose ofe latter that we werein serious pursuit and that our singleness of purpose would not "oe dofleeted by any setbacks.

23. We hnd known from previous reportsnot

be party to an invasion of Gu^te'.cla. e had no difficulty.ui an invasion was not Ir. the cardsteuldlny. our strategic planning was Inextricably linkedan overthrow of cosnmnisirua Ural an effort, f^ the raisin of this issue and emphatically stated that anwas bound tobest elcrxnts in defense ofnullifying all ovj- efforts to vitalise itone^rovn resistanceeffoct tala ripeajoi co-raunist assaultof defendini, her national interactse

24. s felt that the involvementrleans in proninont positions called forxplanation in crder to rc-ioyo the

of A'XOPloan intervention. surprise

iY not raise thisone in fact die not itM tcort orcaenlaliori. -n

case, at Kast,ith events in jt.-ie-aia aid not see.', to cause any surprise orot whatecever. ( y way

of Introducing the iss'.c, rofntrc-to the Careens

resolution wv.lci. hot c c. al yj-^os* of rcllyln, etci-alncd effort to keepand of servln ot thoIdly by shouldn foot Ionass.out

t<.ctnta In U. aleorloue threat notaiar.butsecurityiit the

.nlted !itatco, faced with the cria prospect of involrajcr war couldatter of el.-ixantarynot afford to-lfocrc tho Inroads of coianunlsn intoverr.^ntolilnlstrc-tlve structure of .

2s. eyond fils,( at the United states rto everything in Its powersefc-oda short of director short of ccono-ilc proaeire, to help thet rid c" Jts tot loe'.eis. f "cynsejo" tl-er* Tore, thouioI.'oCiiiet ovrrn^cntals sctinr

In the at.rer ent.tn.. .nlleuforei.r. answerc-t) .m , eves ivenfhat

consejo" unant <mc in feeton

clsa.riedec. specific policiesoundwormvln, hoenlu-oraiin. on the role

u^ls aid ;riv* ely ownedontrolledtftlons In tie -rj-.tlon or ft liet'lo tc.vt wit fa isprttsionour ex-

planation was satisfactory to hi*. rhc unspoken .rcnlse tHa.1 the "consejo" while primarily devoting itself to ^ro-^otln; tha cause of

14

Ouatoxalon frccdort, also considered Itself charged withited States Interests in seeing norraall quickly osust have further,that the Africans joean-buainooa;-"

had been anticipated, the CAL' ZCCP.IS iasus loomedour conversation. In reportine on his first tall* w'th

)had- sum^od up hla Impression by stating t'.ot in hiskey to the whole situation wasemotional statement

that he would do anything if ho could, but that it Is impossibly to ally himself or collaborate with CAaXT&ftXS and that he had" reached an Srrevoca.-ln decision on the :natter." In vdeirv atronr dctostation

of CAI^lnrria and In ^do^Hnlng^r ofa bo ren ^with hiai^

) clalaed to be spoe3ciog_ also .Ir.behalflwhom he coiaita anong

is net possible at this stago to convey to you apicture of tha strength of this ^rourf what level inhierarchy is occupied bypurposeljidentifying hla friends and we for obvious wasid not secpress lis at this stage. Zoth In his talVe withwith

referenceroupwufllerfila.il officers

whotoundl oath to striveard oftalkin; arout this topointedraic gesture

toi* Qta'.bd-a areurtherthis ost'u bound each ofo kill any nencer ofe of

those who hnd__tfaker. the^qath..ievtr to mention

to anyone the existence of rhls group, nor the oath that bound then. This notwithstanding, he brought up this'ln" In the presence

o?( JthXa tine in order to underscore the point that hepossibly be party to any plot involving tho necossity ofany, pnop. Jle_ particularly stressedwere allof antl-communism, buttho question what vould happen if one of them threw in^ ^considers It possible thatin stating that

any collaborationL. IO^.IS would, in the eyes cfan without honor and that he would lose anyhe is still exercising among them, may have been referringabove-mentioned group, id ir-ply thatto it

end that he shares hislik:_of_CAL: ICSSIS.

stray re-narks nadethereattern

of conflict that is only too familiar to students of the morphology In

of personalightly knitaste-conscious society, suchorps cf professional officers. Added to this in the case of

should be the fact that the formative years of hiscareer fallarticuler turbulent area of Ousteroalanwhere violently and Irreconcilable enmities were the ordercay and had tc be Incurredrerequisite for oliticslphysical survival. y ie bestesent to you athevonto explain why collaboration with

TS Is% . ,

associated himself with Coloneln officer

had rescued his colonelcy tV-rou^r. the rioiks. an officer ofine andraduate of the iscuela "olitecnica, kith'A systeraa-tlcally degraded and Insulted nUH'sry school officers, favoring and promoting officers of the line. In this he was aided and abetted byroduct and formerf^thi Zscuela Foli-

16

tecnlca himself. Tills threatened to destroy the esprit de corpsofficers. In this connectionconsiderable bitter-

ness, referxed .t't-the. fact. ti;at he and his fcllov-off leers hadtis*-their cora-^ander-ln-chlef an old roan who couldnor write, Cenoralthat even today there

eon-sented struffle goln, oncuelo !'ol itecnicoand line officers, with tho former holding thend endto keep it.that CALLI^iuilS' removalscene had boon of considerable help in asaurinr. thecyschool elements. In speaking aboutpleasuread been killed anc etcphaalaod thatengagedonspiracy to.gain power for himself.

e wa3 almost the victime of aeoncelved by AHA vA and engineered by CAL ICi-SIS. TheIt failed to come off wasssassins (

t caution was t'-.e

t ol" valor.ia quiteatj;I3

wes behind this.

the ti.nelaunched his attacke

-'fleer in charge

). o ti-nc of the attack,

aa

to be>ir the brunt of the attack, s/well known, a

terrific slaughter took place an-,wounded. o

youwould

today wbre he asked to makelsq ritmtt- :

u, s

DULY

V

that he was striving for Just one2 tnet If

thererench in front ofnd he would have. Ithe would .dosited this incident as on example

to underncore hla contention thatOETilS would shrink fron nothing to achieve his own personal ends in any contest,

ay of explainingoint of honor waa Involvedrefusal to have any truckLbrought

up the point that ah *rmy court composed of the ranking officersArmy I'ljh Command had passed onS' conr'uet and hadhim unworthy to be en officer inlan Array* thet this point wEr-isdcimply thai st the

officers who -cde up the court of honorrdly betoown words is it irere an-: aubrtlt to the lv ac'ersL i: nhad striped of military In the context ofg what contribution

end Ms aosoc?'tea could render ir. hsstenlnj the fall ofbrought upofsking

whit sss-srsr.ee they could be givene-alet recide tr- continue thr. uprising.

rurtrertoning-ut th* fact thatconvinced

thatand the elements uncer his control woult proceed to occupy 'Suatareala City as the sc.it of political power, regardless of

0

AflDE^'Z ct that tlTvs was still in effective control ormeanwhile had been oustod by Army elements.un-

impressed by the argu-osnt tiiat the issue of political power and the

ambitions of CALLS!IS are completely beyond the pole of

Junta jurisdiction and that CALLIG'CtlS himself had never raisederrphstlcally stated that this proved nothing

and that he was absolutely sure that CALLIpDUS was bound to be harboring personal,ho- odljidnatloA--or_cam^-unl8iB.

S6ei ) pointed out that it waa the considered policy of the "consejo" to leave the choice of Guatemala's political leadership to the Cuateralans themselves. If In th- free play of political forces,come out on iop, the "consejo" would certainly not raiae objections, thislear vindication of its own choice. If, on tho other hand, the Guatemalan people decided not to electnd to entrustlltlcal fortune to someone else, that was ell right tooA hat the "consejo" wis era-iently oooessd t=tabli-ha; nt ofaactlonar7 military dictatorship. Vet fcr.rt cic not hLI that theould arrocate to itself the right to dictatela's form of -overnnent.

)stated aa hla own cersonal opinion, enphasizlnr again that thisad mveropic of discussion, that if it should bocone clear that3 .IS was using hia military -ositlon to izf/i'seite-alaictator, not afrordin; tuatny op-orlunlty tonown itsefe: erct s,eroOlal action night possibly beand could effectively be taken Inasmuch as theaa exercising lo. istieal control.

podded, in all ourithIS wo had never discerned any symptoms of consuming political ambition which.tout, It would bo Impooslble to concoal completely. On the contrary, wo had found CAbLIGHUIS at all tiroes dedicated to tho sole objectlvo of eliminating communism in Guat-eitala.

58. In ordor to clarifyon tho CALLlGBUS

Issue, ho was asked the following leading qu stlons t

A. Would be at this stage advocate that the "consejo" jettison CALUGEiUS, even if this would moan abandonment of tho wholo Tho answer wao that we could not very well bo expected to do so, although our choice was rogrottablo.

b. What would be his ectlon, should (as an academicgarrison commander come to him for advice on howcct toof aemissary, asking him to makewith the insurgents? This questionto snswer

outright,s ha putpoint of honor" wes involved, fhc rebuttalpoint of hon-jr" could hardly ariso as long as the futuro of his country and the destruction of comiiuniom woredid not apn ar to movo him. This more than any other in-

- ii i

oldont oonvlnood ( nd 'C hat tha CALUOEaiS laauo lawith irrational isman withUnited capa-

city for self-analysis and for logical development of thought cannot possibly be expected to resolve it within htasolf.

59. In order to enable you to view ln its trueeffectiveand hla friends can render it

may be ln order to set forth some of the ideas that guided ( this inforrMtlonyQWjien. aaked point-blank what he hadreplied thatends" could get into the

act only ath hour.. only after the uprlsln. hadMas showing sign* of success* Tn ot' cr-

we would be able to count onnco the revolution had succeeded. He_heatedly_ replied Jthat he had beon scheming against .communion long before^ jever appeared on the scene and that he did not foel he owed ua apologies. When pressedloser definition ofhe rather vaguelytt enable hln and his friends to wrest effective control of the 'my from AP.&DiZorehat they might be able to Induce certoln Amy units in Guatemalaot toivilian uprising,

^pointed out that, whoroas any contribution along those lines would be rsost welcome, its prospect wao xuch too voguo totho capture of Guatemala City to hln and his friends, herofessional ataff officer would -onrcciate that for the purposes of strategic planning that kind of An offer night as well not be mede at all. { urther stated thct he did rot wish to conceal fron ( l the problemsve concern to theecause there was at thiso assurance whatsoovor that theforces stationed in Strxta-rsls City would, rise concuirently with the -urriaons in the provinces, la other words, we hodn too successful inDetril ions of the co-rand of those Any unitsufficiently high level to warrant any optimism whatsoeverodicti'v whether they would throwclr lo:tho rest of the Vr-Ty.

)deli-.eretelyark picture of thein Sua re* is la City for the purpose of

military views on th< situationhat effective

FY

control over thla situation they wight be able to exercise. Itthat nothing would bo given away by such od-ilssion,could bo presumed rami liar with conditions prevailing In

the capital and might have been able to.unfoundedthis type of information If getting Into diewould tc rely serve to lull tha governmentalsesecurity ashc situation In Guatemala. City. ^ convey tothe local situation in Cuatonala City, and

more specifically tho strong control exercised by ARB8MZ and hio moot trustedover tho Array units stationed there,ide fiold of activity to him and hia friends, hut not onh hour basis.

ccessfully drove homo the point that tho Juntadisengage itself from iiamodiste concern with militaryCity if there was some tangible assurance that hefriends were effectively ensuring thorriselves in the defectionany units, in the absence of such intent or of successlines, the Junta vould hnve tc cope with the situation InCity in its own way, committing those, mostly civilianJt now haa and ultimately investing dualemala City bybrought up from tho provinces. were rally consciouslatter necosiilty might spell the prospect of prolonged andwari with Ar-ry imita fighting Amyrospect whichdetermined to Ceo* without flinchingmentioned]

that this solution would also placen effectiveall of fluot rata, as far as wo treecondarybut probablyittle morend amim^*-

22

'xl ho r;-jrcd byht !xvf stron; poli-

tical GS>lrM. ior.s, although thenseJo" failedrcas '. aur* thot thecons eJo" wouldyngineered byhis friends. He ahould,

however, benr In mind that tho_ncroreplf.of.ment ofby awithjMX utUl lurfcln^ in tho uitcchanbor,

uoulcLjlit.hen considered in acceptable solution of Uioand that our plans would thfcye to be implementedindicated that he was in full agxeoMgnt with

this point of view,

trice to convey the Imprtsslon that "they" (meaning hln and hiat can be staled lhat they probably confined themselves to debating aof possibilities without cvorirm conclusion, let alone over getting. t& tfc*ryin. southing. 'n thes tei* with t convincedrecipitaten his t heoc-cuuse there Is at thienothln- to -eve with. ft ray !vrlp your ovn evaluation topresentftd wits sono of lie : at whichup in theur conversations.

".on i'i:-cL asked bytell Manort oTC innd toabr.ut thehe ovarneant,rc-.arki-dcon-ralevault' do thociso t'C

'Kn ov:rn-nt hat civrin;r run eficitpointedc trouble, wir, that

waa thaticc o?e" reachedoint that not only woulda prosper, but the government would rroba'.ly oollec

s. c

ONLY

t 3

1 in taxes aa opposed to Vurlhei'more,ld backing oi* the quetzalthe iovernmcnt, wttliout weakening, the lntornal value ofmoney egainst Its gold

reserves. Therefore, while tho basic idea was ^ood, it simplyfit into the roonetery situation of the country, K Jon economic pressureolvent of theout that this would be tantamount to an abandonment ofof non-intervention and that once that decision hadthe more effective remedy would be to send troupa. This,would not be tho kind of romedy the Tnited itetes wanted. not serve to create tho atmosphere in which eachresponsibilityocal, national and world-wide readstatement dealing

with the Inadvisability of anvhile acrooing

thet thisoint welltated thtt "they" had been hoping, an invasion would take place, because the Army could lake advantage of tho ensuing chaos and tnke over tho government. He was sure that the syndicates and ca<gpealnoa would step into the breach. I'e conceded that an invasion (by an Army of mercenaries)ather fantastic nation, hut thatmpact, if tried, night propel the Army into action.

47, e reslistlc approach to the over-allecame discernible after^ )hadthe basic concept of

impr-ased by what he. ires tc-ld, especially by the stress placed upon winning over the ranking officers in the various farrlaons and to start from there. He indicated that thiamin his opinion, was an

m

s. crup^Cs mix :

eminentlypproach. Once it hoc sunk in that any realistic contribution by hi* and his frie:xis would of necessity have to do conceived within the framework of theconcept, he began think ing ^alohgf practicable atrctegy and nore productive Vlstauf Of fruitful collaboration bogan opening up. What developed will be discussed under the heading of "Guatemala City."

totodefection of the command

of the Army units stationed in Guate-inla vltj would meet withdifficulties, the reason bolng that the key positionsby officers irrevocably committed to upholding against all comers. Eothstated,

hadasy the, .'rca ent that houDpprli.aspirations.' Kith this carrot dan. ling before them,out of the question that they would Jeopardise tholrby entering into any kind of

turn were_ in cahoots wjth teecojjmar.ding off leer

woo withn ihe jreslueiicy could count on advancing into the position of Chief of the "raed 'orces and Chief of Gtaff, respectively.

)repeatedly emphasized that the defection of thewasetely out of tho cu st'on and that noor otherwise, could posalbly sway then in theirobe^ tho demands of the President.

also the uarcia Civil through his

henchman Ve did not discuss the position of tho

Base lilitaremark made byexact contents of

which ws fail to recollect) leads us to believe that one of itsmay belong to the circle ofTriends.

25

49v In answer to tbo question on how many ranking officers

absolutely depend upon ln ane stated thnt there _yore three of whom two were absolutely safe. Without uantlnf to Identify Mho they are, he stated that they shouirnot bo lookodong the aforementioned group of officers and that only one of themroun command. as one of'the three le undoubtedly^thero remain two unidentified. It should be stressed in this context that we were only talking ibout officers stationed in Guatemala City, not below, the rank of regimental commander or deputy commander and of the Army High Command. There can be little doubt that among the officers boundommon oath thero roust be many more whom he could point out to us as defectlble.

SO. Tne whole problem of what ti do about the Army in Cuatcsisla City mind tied up with tho homogeneity of the Amyith the fact that In hie opinion "the Arwy ia 9S% anti-coicmnltt. Too thought therefore that any uprising may entail internecine strife, with Army Wilts fighttnp etchnd with eubordlnale officers *Fi.es?inating their sup: rlors (eceie of whom iray be the very officers comnitcd by tpeclal oath to defends clearly abhorrent to then, tie repeatedly tried to elicitbow[,the) "Junta".proposed/to cope with that contingencyhether our plans called for the systematic elimination-of certain officersv believed uneyn-pathetic. Back of his mind may be lurking the suspicion that undcrjhejretext of enlisting..toe^Arny support, 'CALLIC"SIF is planning.,tolde, eliminatingrmycould conceivably stand-in th? way of his political aspirations* ( /stated that he vas not aware of any such plane and that while in fonto instances ofVlcers may have to be rmoved, thisisoct likely be the exception rather than the rule. Host of them,( re, would bo swept along by Wie momentum of Ihe revolution,

SI.positionieighly conolax one.

that

our inas two hours Uie andeft town Eight ^en were Involved in the conEDiracy.

)

"besix months aj;o

him to chair a

)

akeo him

to ould not accept tiie position became Ijc tould

not vork withni: ts .

52. archatboen

driventaio of utter exasperation andr.it friendship for tr.eha; -'rn thin, hovrevcr,cesearhas thought

out the oro'uleraJi one :snc ncKet the pnysical presenceCity vaa

bound to militate af.eiloodiest coop, uperytried to elicit hat plane ifd been laid toUie trai.-nt reply b pointing cut Uii&elasely Vied up with the overallof vii.fte-.ala City and, afterm'erlyinp.poee of theto learn

he and Jrfnelatest. * dad U'sst, if hefio-'iterjilan, oquestion *ouldse hin Any rticular

eciiicai.ly ttated that*to tin- best ofue AR3SHZ "nad not to far been tar.en under adviec-nent by thetd na vaa under theth,-t,bsence of ailhe contrary, its eolution one vny or Vie ofer was notte for success.

)con8idcred it inadvisable to dicousa tho proble* in^oncretoariety of reasonai

A, This haj.ianed. to bejor ii*ue not Included ln the provided by LINCOLN for our dealings vith

B. The breachand ARBEKZ at thie ttege oay not

have fully cryetallised and any. indication that the.elimination lrpart of tha "Junta's" plana (associatingwith CAL< JCERJfl' pereonaljght

weaken hie resolve to fully ae.oclete Idnself with our cause. '

54. There can be Uttle eeybta subject of discussion betweenand hla friends. Froa his

remark* it wac to draw any inference as to the conclusionreached.jtateixent: "Tou of course realise that

without ARUMS there would be no comuniit problem In thisay

av

een meant to furnish the cue. ^

v. -v.

SS.feeling* In regardhat bo re Tarred to as Ihe

"dignity or the Army0 case out whenthat the pi rt of Uie public

faela that tho Army ehould do aamethlnf! about the pretentanInvolved jiving up lte special privilege, rather than waiting to getUio frpoila of an inevitable uprising. se that the Arvy,

exceptew, were amongervanta the nation CCS, had not been raleed In epit*lclng coat of living andare living from hand to ntouth with no reeervea Co draw on. Iniery heatedly counted upon ecurrlloua attacks launched

byArmy paper, put outup of political refugees in Honduras, Pttfccking the Anyanner deelgned toroy the faith of the public and tothe control of the officers over the rank p.

SC. Only pat-singare rude to the existence of afie twice organi*stion in Gcalcr-ala and particularly In the ca.ital,

thereowerful :nd numerous rvilEtancc organization,

the strength of which it waa inper.siblc to estimate, the reason oeing that it la not too well organised aa ;et.|^ ^proceeded to -talc that big etrldes werede by itsleaders to tighten up Uie internal eecurity and the difcipline of the individual* afc.oolftted with it. The "Junta- wae confident that the civilian undcrfcpund wouldan excellent account of iteelf during the uprising. Quite likely It would be ths initial aeiault by civilian elenenta In Guatemala City putting tne rpark to the powder keg. Frees all available indlcaiions there would be ar uprliiry th* like Gam*teaselsver witr.'fted in its hitter* and it* very ixpect might eoneelvably luffle*convince AiiUF.rM that the gam* was up.

iwelt at length upon the importance of bringing all public

Slat*

life tonf forclru; th* resignation of the government, lie intimated that thieuoUut Aepeot wMcb he and hie friend* had been /ivlng considerable thought. Kansetally the purelyf all me ana of transportation wouldeal aire contribution to bringing downvemmenl, 1 / ot*atcd Ignorance of what had been planned along thoaa lineereiterated that the mala crphatle ofplana *ae on military aotlon, with all other conaidaratlona beln aubeldlaryi if he and hla associate* oo-ad acefeotive oeana of bringing aboutaralycle of the trantporta*ion eycUet, he "coneejo" would be nora thai happy to takeplaat under advite-.ent.

rteted that the arming of the ca-jxfbinoef the Mindlofttoi

ccuaed hiahiee cor.tlderablc alarm. He olalmedecent trial noblllaatlon in laqulntla proved that the communiat*be able to rally or.

w-ry iifiort notioo ir, that area aloney0 smd that tiieaeould be rot-illced aid committed should larntmInternal upriuLnR or un inon wj.Jd bvyendLowojbt Joinarked ( at provifederald made to cope

with that contingency. ^reiteratede had noaUovvcr of any tactical novee that may Le ecjitem^lated by the "Junta". couldImagine*( verred, tbat theailed to ratiM theprovisions to thwart ieffectiveu&ent of paramilitary effective* In Ouate^la City or in *nj otixr etratei.lc area. t following questionlatly occdcmSco! retmSccd planning of -he ^asksd wf.ef.er *attack by pla en against the truoki and railroad care carrying earpeelno* to (hivtWallii City weld not

w'.tbstfnlltUHof liven prevent tha effective ootmi.uu*nt ofthat et lreet it Kight re-ralt ln their temporary

t' f. an al. '

n the course of our oom-ercetlon, breached the question

whether anyof the.icIn thinognlr-ant of the "Junta'e" plena and authorisedeak in the "Junta's" bahalf. ( irnly and emphatically denied thie, adding that.lt vonld bo viie for any Guatemalan actively encased in conspiratorial totiviliestha Anerlcan QAaaey end ite^esters.wide, berth. The biiic policy decitlon, however, placing the United Gtateia into unyielding op,-eel tl on to Guatemala'r coraunlra and tha flna resolve not to allow tills cancerous trowth to leap fostering vaa known to the Anerioan Anbeeeador and,( aa euro, waa known to the Cuntenalan Government.

CO. 'm dlacuteifu? waye and Keane ofAnd hla associates

Into tbe framework of thade tins following etatereentt, pointingthat the. represented theolicy of tht

A. Ti-ebasic atresia conepto trlng about the liquidation ofinouldircuits Unces he eebjected to oaterlsl chaagee. Took ntd tone into it, too neny eoiwitmentsn Mde, tooparntory steps had been taVan beeidee ties vaa running chert.actlcable alterrative -Jid teen ru/roiled which co^ld aa-ire is* racioal elimination of eonamnlta down to its grassroots?.

y. Th- re could be only one Strategy with trie corollary ofcontrol. All diversity of of forty all^uncogrdi n- teduld

er

tohands. The "concejo" could therefore

not- to any endeavor ojteide the fr&mwork of the "Junta's"

piano. Tjt that reason aleo tha "consejo" Maa unprepared to countenat.oe let alone actively support two indapen dent revolutions, one in the provinces and one ln the capital city.

C. Without wanting to oowlt the "consrjo" to any euoh rolutlon,could poialbly be worked outndhie

group would be brought inton tact with tharather thin placed under the direct control of CAL-MCivRlS'. A

a

recoraendation along thoseuld be rubeiltled to thetheeffeetive and probably onlyof

strong objeetions to beocvslng aeioclatad with If the "consejo"ermanent representative inba designated who will he charged with the conduct of allbetween "contojo"

rill be expected to fira up his personal contacts in the

ndlitajy estshlir-hsent asas po.-elble anda available to tha "coniejo" all fr.foraatlon tnatn our Joint etilerprire.

f. Tba "consejo" ia turn through its representative willtoand hie assoc-atee all requlaita Jnfamation

ecllcaj nature, needed to enable the* to coordinateiming, of tlx lr move* with the overall plan of Uawill, whenever thla appear*jtin tone*

withcclUloratore or the "Junta-.

b

61. eeling between { JandAttending;

and interpreting, hen been echeduied fcfM'ay Sth. Jftt thin meting ittormstion of all. tha points at ice-ue on

which it is believed an understand! ng haa beenwill be

reoueeted to re-confim ojr undei-stand'mg oflingnefis to (ive Meto our endeavor, under tho aegif of the "confejo" and subject to ill furthrr be given an oral Reessge to be parted to

to tho effect that the "confiejo" appreciates the reasons for bisagpreelreet noeting with ite representative and is loath topersonal aeourity unneceizarily. o other hand, the "consejo"and hasilts allan active ejmpa thl.er of the movementattewpt to keep In touch with biro The "contejo" trust* that

any doubts regarding the genuinoneoe of cr effort which he may ctill bewill bo taken care of by the courfe of events.

C2. The next sreting i: likeiy too rore eoc^snt aouifyf thegained thus far,p-lcoenttry report will be eubfcittod to you. In view of cote of the ietues rajeed in thie report, it waa found advleable, however, to eend It ior-ard inresent raw forx.

Original document.

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