APPROACH TO COLONEL CARLOS ENRIQUE DIAZ

Created: 5/6/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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MEORANTJOK TOR: DLTOTT DTJffiCTCTt (Plana)

Approach to Colonel Carlos Enrique DJAS

io proposed that Colonel Carlos Enrique ^LSLfor defection, utilizing initially' theand followed up bycleared fVirrican if eat. DIAL is presentlyourArwrica and could be interceptedCaracas, Venezuela, tf:ere ouldeasier access then in Cuatcoala anaon neutral ground.

Jjould contactirst and determineattitude toward tha situation in Cuatenala andsound him outotential defector. If the resultsinitial approach show that DIAZ appears to be receptiveapproach, the actual defection offer will be made by

lose and friend-

ly associationin

.end stateswith himasis

touch wont foraT ormalities* sand wDuli be authenticated tohrough

staff officeroulc oc sent to _

Caracas to direct and coordinate the activities of

C 1

initial talks with MaZ ^oulcl emphasiseconcern with the present Ouatesalan situatV & 1

r -i,

When e pitcht vill be on the basis that he le in touchroup of serious buninossnen who are aware of the dangerous situs-ion in Ouateraala and who would beosition to assure DIA2 that, should he act decisively toho present Guatenalan0 would bo deposited ononytraiEly tc an account in his naocidss bank and coulrf not be traced.

1*. The beet abroach to DIAZ la believed tc be one which deals with !daconcern about thethat the Guatemalan arey Is not g< ittdnj. equipment which DIAZ feels Is necessaryall equipped modern army. DIAZ la renolnely interested in protesting the professional coepetence of the army, and haa also expressed the nee of the Guatemalan army for ams with which to counter-brdance tho coraainists who have lately been obtaining arms for thensolves. A2 has expressed to is personal concern about feminist infiltration andatemale, he has also continually omphaaieed t'.te "apolitical" nat'.rc of the Cuotemalan crny and has so far demonstrated continued loyalty toE<IZ.

basic problem in defecting DIAZ is to showif he means what he says about disliking Coaxial am, hoto change this situation even 'if itevoltarmy and perhaps tbe downfall of his close friend His reason for taking this action, which wouldbe his own, must beense of duty toward both

tlie amy and tho country and tho knowledge tliot aGuatemala would then betrong position to esk for and receive the much-neededrms which its artTj Presently lacks. This whole program will be discussed by uatemalan problem which the ruatenalana must solve and atroee to DIAZ the importence cfd for positive action bv DTI' before tbe Cotermints gain complete control, not only in the ejoxratlve branch of the Government, but also ln the army itself.

nosslbillty exists that XUJ. may interpretas one which is directed toas much as ill discuss the Guatemalan situation and thea solution in terns which will allot: MAS io nakc suchif ho wants to. Mowever, it odoulo bothere la no assurance DIAZ would inform L f tbe

fact that he intended to talk tide over with ARBEIZ. chance existsiscussion with DIAZ willf relayed bys applicable ln reality toas well. However, t as pointec out thatat DTA2re some difficulty intfiBEXZ. privately since the Communists an extremely warykSSFN2 epeak orlvately to anybody for fear ofclose control over hln Anotlier reason whynot acntlon this discussion withothat DIAZ

docs appear to have preaideitial ambitionseel that hie action ot this time would not only solve the problem of putting Guatemalaosition to receive tie enthusiastic cooperation of. armyia'dng arms, but would also assure his becoming the next president. This presidential ambition could be ployed upon from the point of view that by

OT

RBFSZ may be so completely under the control of the Conrauilste, whether willingly or not, that they would be the ones to choose ARBEHZ' successor, at which Juncture Communist control of the army would beatter of time.

7. The cover^to explain t resence in the areathftt he is ontaking hia to tbe Antilles

and the northern part of South America after completion ofof Central Africa last month.

that af ircraft be put at his disposal to lendto me survey nature of his work since his tripAmerica was made byflights which partially

ha-npered hl3 freedom of movement. At theime, such ircraft couldossible excuse forto DIAZ if the opportunity arises. Inuse cf ait vould be important to have

Jassigned at"vo alio* hin the authority

alter the route or the itinerary as required operationally.

8. t Jestimates that the best place to intercept DIAZ would be in Uiracas where DAZ is scheduled to arrive onay. If for sone reason this does not prove feasible, asecond choice, Parana, where DIAZ is scheduled lo arrive on l'j May prior to leaving for Guatemala the next day. Although BIAZ will go to Barranquilla onh enroute froa Caracas to Pana-ia, this aopears tooown to conducteeting. Due to the short visit planned in Manama, as suggested that heesident WOK, an old friend, and request him toarty for nd DIAZ so that Jwill be assured of getting together with DIAZ and have the opportunity to sneak to him after the dinner.

ould leave for Panama on orarrive in Caracas on or0 May. He wouldin Caracas on the 9th ifcould find out in

advance where the DIAZ party had nosei reservations.

. KING CUB

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