Created: 5/7/1954

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HDRKAflSDK FOBi Director off4

Position Paper oa PKUCOKSB

X. Appreciation ef tho Bitot loo

A. Coooluetone of the Board of antiocol satlaatea

Tho following estiamta of the sltwttaa ln Oaataaela aoi adjoining conntriee ie takenpecial aetiaatc prepared darlo* tha pant week by tho Board ef National Ketlaatea. Oeneral Boll haadad tha Special Panel and tha vleva of Stato (OH) and taa eervice intelligence ageaclee vera solicited la tha preparation of tho eattaata. Iba tana of reference of tho eatimtiae panal included tha following queetlooei

Vhat la tha pmant stroagth of tha Cojnaolate In OuataaalaT

what ara tin onmnt etresgtba aad httltadaa of Bondnraa,aad Salvador aad what ara tha aff ae tathanontinued march of Cooaamxan In Ouataaalaf

Cn whoee alda la tbnat

lba conolnalona of tha Board of mmilonal Katiaatas aa of* ara aa

Ve oooaldar that tha conolnalona ofraaala eaeeiit tally valid. In particular, ve laafflia taa flrat cooclaeioa, aa follovai

"Tha current polltlaal altaatlon In QoMtaaala la advama to LB intoraata. taa Canttaaalan Ceaaaatataolitical lnflueoca far out cf proportion to tbalr anall noaerloal etrengtfc. Their laflueaco mill probably contlnaa to grow aa long aa Praaldant Arbens raaalaa In power.

"2- Thanow effeetlvel* control tho political Ufa of coatonala. Arbens' deolalooa on doaaatln and foreign policy ara reached, not in tha offlolal cabinet, butitchen cabinet onapcaad af Coaeamlata and pro-CoBBunlata. iftere la ne proa volreak balaaau Arbens aad tbe Conaniete.

Ibara baa probably bean an lncrneee ln popular dlallluelcsnent with tha Arbena regiae. There la certainly liiciaaaia daaperatlon aaong oppooitlon ele-aente. In present clreuaetancaa, however* the poeaiblllty of effective internal political action to altar the altaaUoa deea not exist, ve believe tbat effective revolutionary action would require the active enpportajor portion of the Amy.

**. aispceltiou off tb* Aray tanri tb*la therefore crucial, wa aot* Indications off unrest, area off disaffection, within the Arey and coneider thatrevolutionary potential sov exists there, o not balleve, bomv, that tbe fnwteaa Tin Inv la likely to bake epontaoaou* actico against tbe Arbens


"5. Coanmiste will ho conesrss* to tntnllw tha revolutionary potential is tha Army, and, with tha passage off tiaa, may succeed lo doing so.

"6. The solidarity off th* otbar Cantral Aaerlcan states In opposition to Ouateaala has woshsasd daring tbs past year and aey fforthsr decrease.

"7- In viae off tbs foregoing ccosldsrationa, v* believe that tin* Is on tho side off tbs Coasmlsts in"

B. Assets Aral labia to PBSTJCCBSS

1. Inside ths Country

a. Paneral

safer* Ustlns spselfflo assets, th* population off Ouateaala should be uautlonedtrong, potential ssset. Predondnantly astt-Coanunlet thenee aroused froa their norsel political Inertia, couldowerful Mis against th* Arsons rests*. aa Ceaaealst brutality sr* baring their sfffeot evidenced iainstances off popular unrest throughout tbs country. ee typical sxasples taken st radon are th* iLgnsturo off sn antlHMssnialat petition byeople in Couan-nlatee vigorously antl-Coneunlat neuensaar in ntrtnjrlnWlei large pocket, off srsrred antl-Conuunlata st nuaeroua potatoia toe Maaateieugn sresi poblic nreUogs attended by sereral at Puerto Berries* sad the denial to tbs Conaunlete

Tbcngh only tied together infernally at present, considcrsble rocu. haa been given to the lerua catholic group by the extremely effffsettTS pastoral letter offssued by tbe Archbishop off tateael* ursine: nil Catholic* te conbat Coaeualea. This letter,

can, and It la

oexierea will.tln*lag afreet Iff its aessage la continuously replayed.

Additional unity off purpose is provided by tbe psychological asset* available in ffiurteasla ss sell as the eneonraaaseot geaer-ated by the vague but Brewing tea agnation that "soaethlng lo ia

eU-bachad aoveeent is areoad tbe corner. cslllserls* snnssapad TaartaiaMp snd weU-rocelvod political aanlffseto off 1st* February bare contributed to this. Xt has alsoonsequence off ths nerssdlitary pregrea, not presently unitary and fforaidabln, but psychologically parsuaelre.onsciousness off the sticktbe carrot tererequisite to creating anyopposition in Ouateaala, Ctasasil st-donlnataa as it is today.

Paychological oaaoU include neny newspaper* aad radio stations, not controlled or influenced by CIA, which an atill independent. "SIor eraople, ioenti-Cooaruniet. a OlaaaDta aarroonla Bojes, taa anat loflaeatlal Journaliat laCity. Adalttedly tbaaa laaagaaaaaaa anat aon with caution and taalr daya of independence any vail an noabarod but for the ao-aont thay *ervive. Tha utility af tha radio atatlooa haa boon aarrborily reduced by an overt epreraaant eanaorahlp which baa recently bean tagoaad.

A controlled croup iu aaataaaal Cityeekly, "Blirect* porter and leafletelephone proroca-tion teen, "goon" aaeado end rune Interaittent radio broadcaate. It aleoolitical organisation oonelatingoalition of nuaerooe political groupe known aa the Rational Antl-CoBaunlat Fronthloh provide* coverage of tbe entire country. Thle la aupplaaentedpeeiel group,ho periodically traral throughout tbe country contacting nuaeroue agaata.

Bereral otherantl-Coaaoniat publication* In various parte of Qaatasala receive financial aid and guidance.

c. Killterr and raraallltery

Aa abated above the Board af national Satlaatea conclude*evolutionary potential exlata In tbe dontcoalan Any. Specific data nay be addaoed to conflra thla eetlaete. then la evidence of oooalderable dlaaffeetlea aad dieaatln eepeclelly in the upper eebeloea. The Mlaleter of national Defonee, Joae Angel Seocbex, la aaaaaed te coaaunlat control over Arbens and then ia evidence the nlleblllty of which baa ant yet beta eatabllabed that ha lata atnngtben tha Any ln preperatlon far Ita nee agalnatannHta. the Chief of tha Anedolonel Car loa Satrune bias, amy be defeetebla. tbe Chief of Staff, Colcoal Bnlrcue Parlnello De Leon, the Chief of the Air force. Colonel Ijiia A. Oiron, end tbe Minister without Portfolio, Colonel Klfegoan all reported as disaffected.

In furtherance of the objective to defect th* Amy, two dletlnot opexetloaa an in progress) the JBHTa, through its military contacta ant aa iadependent effort by CIA targeted et key peraonaal. Th*leadereMp, being primarily aoaaeaaal ofAny offieera la exile, haa aeblevad certain eucoaes to date, the leaden of this organisational effort hen been eaaadned by polygraph and cleared as to the validity te* their etataaente. The Independent effort has just been ooapletadeaa officer in the fieldalxty days of lnteneive etady of the aon proalslng tergata of Ispertaace. Bis report is not yethird related effort to be aade within tbe next few day* Is an attenpt at tbe defection of Colonel Mas.

tire in

InUlUrj regnal ration af jxungrr Offloors poaltlvslv pledged to CeHlscrlso existence. Ttxj BOT*

contacted by Caliigeria' tUltor; irprtMnU-thnilganU organization prmnUy booIliilliM In tbe four sector, of OwsteewU. Cityoader In each of thetarget garrison.. Theoe leoktera eatlsnts that,ey, the? eon capture fron within ell too gsrrleone oxoopt Quich. endJcee, where sdded offorto to prepare capitulation ere la

At beat, tbe epperentlT "ears" garrisen. will be token withoutbet, where thle deee not work, correct dlepeeltloa of friendly alaasnta pine the deans! af weep out aad eananutlen to oaaaqr fereea ohoald quell wniUoi. If necessary, olwlllan para-alHtary aalta willo pro-lie eeereaelsnne. force -



thla clrllien yarasnUltary ccgealaation, ouhetentlal awxsera of acm la each of the nine garrlaon areaa ln fTealaaala ere already pledged. The ewssxcr ef waa arallable la eeeb garrison eree are Hated below, three rnlwaaa ara xiren to anew tha rarlowe oattoatea, ranging froa the aost eoaeerraUwe to the optlalstle.igures waanot, of course, he gxsranteed but are tha reeult of chscking caliigeria' flgnrog with individual leaders who hare bean exfUtratad fraa Oejabsaala. Theae flgeree bare beea suffioieatly ooaf iraad by anwerttaMiig, where poeelble, that It la the belief of tho UBCa* staff that they era aocurete. Ham, la ao lastanee has questioning shown Initial eetlaatee te be serious erroneous.

Total Which ThereClalaod

Sanson to relievePresently

tnreLraed but not

to Pelet Of Taking


Puerto serrloe



San Joae

tOTAL target










In addition to too foregoing civilians available in the garrison arena, four ether civilian organlsatlooa In in-portaattactical mo, ringing Ouateaala City, an envisaged. Strength figures In these trees couputed In the sene Banner ss foregoing are as follovsi



outer Org.

tn* entire oosplex of friendly enitary and* organised, finally trained and led on IMJoy, ey tne parenllltary assets developed and exlatlng outside GueteBela. These assets are dlscuesed nnderelov.

d. InteUlgaao.

TpM^IgM'ithinrovided ealnly by the Juravlee located In Hooduraa and discussed in the next section belov. In addition tha Ouateaala City station la pro-

at ion isgood lBtelligance on political and psychological Oororaatat, Aray snd Coaamlat Party. intelligence Is provided by the propagandaabove as well as by the State Daparteent end tbe

2. Outside tbs Country

a. Cenerel

One of the nejer sssete of the GROQp outside of Ouateaela la th. baching provided by other countries.

rfOu ?aftfrf Ti

Ta addition to Independent eadls, external PB assets are aval labia I

Publleatioae aad Radio

tha following controlled

dal Ceuage 0 copnto OaataamU)

Publlahed weekly in gooduraa by controlled antl-Ccaaamlat group of tTiinf neslen exllea.


Leaflata and BuUatloa

U Coabete

Badlo Broadcasta

(Criital 1ST)


Bulletin for the Liberation of

Hoaduraa (vsnggled into QoaTawnle)

50COaugglsd Into Cue taenia)

Seecbaa abouteyondborder

Bewapaper, just began Diatribrtion la Beat aweT>

being developed. If possible

Anti-juircx bat alsoommie t

group. Beee group.

Published weekly in Salvador by antl-CiawaiLlet front group (PAfli).

ess* group.

Published la Rexleo by enti-

Published in Mexicoew reached Ouatasele) by Cose, for the Liberation of Qoataaale (UCaTTZai).

A principal, if aot tha principal, peycholoelealclandestine radio atatfon in

which firat vent on the elr Kay let. Broaacaex tapea are pared at LDCOLB. The station la beaned at Cuateuola and la purportedly hroadcaatlng froa within theeception haa baas good and It haa begun to aronei conslderabla public convent. This radio will also, provide tha radio support needed lanedletaly prior to the uprising unless It Is Inoperative or its use la undaalrahls in vhlohontingency atatlon fully under our control vill be used. Preparations for thia Installation are substantially eoaplated.

A writing staff of Quatenulene haa been lnetalled in eafe boueas near LIKOLH to provide tho support needed for tho above Bssete aa veil as preparing additional propaganda material for field dlatrlbutlou. eporting systea has been devised for paychologleal pui poses which Is providing substantial raw notarial for tha writers- This is supplaasstafl by hourlyervlee and tha receipt withinourn of publication of dally newapapere froa Ouateaala, Costa Bice, Kcaragua, Mexico, Salvador and Honduras.

To buttress tbe effects of ths Camcaa antl-Ccaeuniat resolution two conferences in Mexico City have bean arranged. The first, opening on May 1st, vee sponsored by the "Latin Aaerlcan Laborers In Exile" Largely under the susplcee of OR IT. Though, not directly targeted at Ouateaala, It waa quite eucccaa-ful. Tor the firsteputable Latin American Labor group publlalyosition critical of aad In oppoaltlon to the Arbens reglae. Tbs second to beay will be called ths "Congress Against Soviet Intervention In latint will be attended by xnny proainestfrca erery country in Latin Aaerlca and vill have aa its wain object tbe focusing of the attention of Latin Aaerlcans oo tbe coununlet altuatloa in Ouateeala therebyall for all antl-Conaunlsts to aid in the struggle*

c. PmraalUtarr

la tbe psresrllltary field Calllgaris la, of course, the leaders and haa with hia anenlor Colonel, plus four ex-officer personneltaff. In addition there arerainee graduates of one of oaradio operators and crypto clerks la trainingore on the way, who are already experienced. Recently about KO aore aea arrived froa Gnat aaali ae eub-unlt lendare or special teak personnel whileen vlth varying degrees of experience and different capabilities are availabletand-by bee la and will provide tha nucleus for variousforoaa. Adequate provisions has been ande for logistical support.

d, intelH gam-*

Tha prlaary Intelligence)ex* thoea lafclallythe Jinn* (Headquartera In Head ores) bet new sufficientlycoaparteeaited end polygraphed to be legitimatelyequivalentirectsset. Thle separateservice ban penetrations ln the najor (Taetanelandopai tawuito. all nilltary earriaces, tbe CcesannletS See-

uoa oea seen,xagnaauM wlet ponetretlcce of tbe JTBTh, condocttng investigation* andKctoctot, radio operators will noon bo deployed attain (barters lan target areas tooBwunlcaUona for Intelligence end BZZ's.

C Security

Brer ainoe tbe work was first started on the preparationlanUUUSBS It has bean fully recognised that the. would be accused of being the stain sponsor of nvst if not all activities directed agalnat tha Arbens regine. (written atateaesta to this effect were included ln thesnritten In BauaaturlaHwr written laaeealod to the Bocrotaiy of State sod there bare been aaaaroue other oral reports to the aaae effect.) wore ever tt vaa asanas* that ln enof this scope eon* evidence supporting the accusations would unavoidably beccae available to both ftrienda end eneslee. Nevertheless, lt wee concluded that the aawnaaa ef prevent lag the discovery of Irrefutable evidence ware good enough ao that the advantages of the project outweighed tho risks and its imder-taklag we* justified.

A careful review of all dsvelcnaeota te dataearing on security Indicates that thia Judgment wee aecnrate and that security has been aa well Balntained on this project aa was, or aa could reasonably be, expected. The following specific developments nay ba aentloned la support of this conclualoni


a. tn loudursa ths U.abessadcr errangad for an lntervievBet. ostensibly the

roup of privatei. CiteMOesifferent conversation vith

the Chief of ths Bondurea Air rmree, tfax-U. s. Ambassador aade soea reference to the bringing of adlltery supplies Into Bondurea in black fllghta. the clr-cunatancee vere such, however, that the Aaeassador can plausibly olala to have been referring to tee receipt of uilitary equlpaont overtly purchased by tbs Honduran flmeiuaant froa tha Doited states.

roaehother Blcaraguan

officials has been aade at any tiae bywas Bade at

a critical tiaebaa considerable knowl-

edge of Calligerislor muin ffliatrsala and undoubtedly. support but hss no evidence to prove it except ae noted in sub-

psrsgrsph f. belov.

Balvader le search

of support for Calllsaria will be aade eiwsr by

or by an Aaerlosn privata citisso oeteosifa/,

affiliated with theof privata beakers In the United State*. Bo black

flights of military supplies will be aade to Salvador unless and

peralsslOB has been obtained in this So approach to bla or

his officials has been or vill be Bade byovernaent official.

nuaber of penetrations of Calllgaris' organisation have been It aust be assuBBd that they have yielded Information to thethere are Americans, ostensiblyroup of privateare interested in tha project and that military supplies have beenftloaragua on black flights, together vith sobs informationorganisation and tbe general nature of his plana. There ie nobelieve, bossier, that any evidence ef. Gcvernasutal backing couldobtained froa this source.vith the exception noted la the following paragraph.

eeapremlslng incident Hakes it necessary to qualifyendbove, tak transcriptsasker of cables verethe hotel reeaIA agent in Haraqua. Although they were laterthey any here boom seen either toyc romber oflater dissevered te be la all prooauiify an agent of Arbens. Theyhave been photostated by any Interested party vho saw than.

oprtalng there will bo no centaet betweenprlwatoSTwlll


ttributloo to the

n*be to indict.

and thu. to

Support in the uinda of both frtenda and emit.. Aunng theta are the following*

probablyorernaentfor the loan either of

aooitlcaml planet, or of llcareguan crave, or both.

CtlUexii orC iU be enkedetter to be uaed by

. group to elicit additional fund,ebi. lltt of Averlnuu. of knowniev aaltS^SuU

efugee iwoluticnary group

here ueyor ^overthrow of thT^

OJJ. WPPort. The exception eupcrtunltie. inherent in thia altua-tion are being exploited ae effectively ae potalble.


Buna a. It Is, the meat prrtBHira Indication. Ocveriseent eupport

Sfa alli^S. and

roups ara dlreew*

**amlafYn-aaaisljle cixcuaeteacee except

*pbrnape tnetuecoaaful rorolatlea la ottbar country. Callisnrls -tilB. support haaeaai. Beyond thea* throe groups tha present Qaataaajaa reglse bee better ground*

s they poeaeea

fiery will andoubtodly exploit whether PagTJXttB le continued or celled off. Their

against the U.ould, heearver, be grerely

lapalred If thewere overthrown, Ita records) captured aad Ita laedori ecetxerea.

erelrflaamte bearing oa the eocurltyoperation and of poeelble aouateraaaaegVMi to fta-eatall nersueaiv*to the. justifies

the Bloeraguan and 3onduraa


? %WtaT la respc^tto*-Xdb* aa.*cially true if the Ouataralaa roglae had been effectively ovva-tbrewn and Ita laedera aeettared.

cebt thrt If the ocereUonarried throgb aaay Lstin Anerlcene. But It la

in abort It alght

to naaa aure

ould see the hand af. ia eny uprising ebethersponeored byarticulerly elace. haa aade it clear iaeaya thet it heartily dieepproree of the


fl. eoleien to tarednata or aubetentially to aodify the preaentthe ground that tbe hand of tbe UJ. win* too ciUsrlyh#r operation of thla kind can appropriately be

included la the cold eer etrategy oft leant in tbenatter hoe great the provocation or hoe favorable the '

IX. Poeelble Coaraaa of Action

ite preaent fore, bending every

effort toward tbe earlieat faeaible concluaion. gone edfeatneat efth. rfaaoirt

ie. of tbalS^hu. far enccStered In the tiaeteble of scheduled aceonpliebaenta and develcpaenta. there would, of course, be aa oanerataadiiig tbe* tbe final pheee weald not be authorised unless and until tbe Director had aatlafled hlaeelf tbat condition, vere favorable for the success of the operation.

Adoyt *codified ton of tho plan, accentuating tho la-

telllaaneo, propaganda,ction, and doftotloo aspect, thsrecf, end

rigorous ond coordinated program of official and orert action and covert operations.

C. Abandon tho present plan and rely upon orert diplomatic acUonminor poUtleal apd psychologies! warfare activitiess to begintrong

LCf ^toward thaWmt reglnTln

OBr" Caracas majority

at an OASIn September for the epplleatlon against Ouatemala of the sanction, envisagedla ths lie Past.this would involve an ecuoculc

and coajumlcationa bleekede of Ouateaala By OAS aeabars or st least by those

neuters willing to support and Join la the action.

in. Conclusions

A. The best chance of reaovlng the Arbens reglaa is to proceed asas Possible sloag the Unas of the present plan. There ishologlcal unrest within Ouateaala and of growing boaillity to the reglaa.evolutionary potential exists la the amy. Cootlnued eppliee-Irt^retea preeeares should fore. progressively* * rUl^atly str^gtben the opposition sad discourage or dlssffsst allies sod potential allies.

, evidsnce tying the project

to. Government is la the heads of the enaey. foe security of tha project Isss good es can be expsoted sad fully la keeping with the eetlaates aade and reporteduaaroas occasions starting vith tha beginning of the project. Any settee, against tha Arbens reglaa will ba charged against ths united states whether or aot It has say responsibility far It.

neUvewhich would substantially postpooe tee target data

Offers few advantages but has nanrroas disadvantages, saoag then; poaslblshrough dlssffsetloa or laaecurity (ties snd^oaur. belagla directoss ef support froa other nations, alaost surely ftcudarae which would bealtete to support near ite elections, even assuming it still haastable and friendly goveruaautiBlcarugnaa support would dlamish if it could be counted

on et all; disruption ef the present defection program, both ailltary aadlow of Intelligenceesult of the effect

of farther srldeaos ef inability to set oa tbe part ef Calligarlai similarIn tae effectiveness of propaganda! danger of an early, abortive coup by inpatientnd strenfithsuing of the Arbens team since tiae is on ite side particularly if prsoouros ara relaxed.

Alternative lie la cutslda tbe Jurisdiction of CIA but presenta difficult questions requiring answers not presently available. Some of these arei

1. Will evldeaae ofmat domination In Ouateaala be arallabl* la such convincing fcra aa tc sake It difficult. If not lapaaatbla,atin Aaerlcan politician, aot vlablna to recognize taa faat, ta avoid eelag aat

?. Bow eaay af tha eoantrlaa that ratad for thas la tbs ua fashion. If saoh vots Involved taking eotleapsgslast ftaataaalsT

3. iMUutag aaoted, when wm it ba posolbl* and Will It be affective In denying (a) aoosss to Guatemala of non-Vostern Hemisphere shipping adoquata for Its trade, (b) aceeas to Iaporta of Mexican petrolsva, (e) aceeas to Iaporta ef Argentlnan grain and (d) acceta to Berevaaa aum aaa of supply for Industrial goods? Would such aa mm ft* close European, Asiatic sad soviet bloc aarkate forffset

*. AaeuBlBg failure before, win It be peealble toany action along the Unas presently cooteaplated or will our hands be tied?

9. Zs It eoabaaplated that our BATO alllee would he asked to recognise that the (Mart aaa laa reglaaerloue allltery threat and therefore to join In tha laposltloa ef eceooaio aanctlonst

lie vmi

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