via
CLASSIFICATION
date;
to : LINCOLN
hief of Station,NTO: Chief, WHO;rogram
Second Meeting
Reference:
Attached la an account ofmeeting with
Information contained in this dispatch will not be* communicated, with or without source attribution, to personnel outside of KUBARK, without theapproval of Lincoln, I G
o
84
tt
att^
tt
=&/ J$JTWLY
S.
eeting between^ place on
5ain attendedaa an interpreter,
in Trie meeting lasted from
. until. Its purpose was to communicate to
)the views and comments of the consejo made Insome of the basic issues that had come up during Mswith3
/ >Kiould be bacK from abroao with the consejo'sa meeting was laid onay. At thenothing or Importance
transpired. It may be significant though
to the impression whichhac made upon
* reply stated that thn very circumstance, that
/ sack toecond tlrae seemed tothat the consejo does not entertain any doubtsbona fides,more briefly alluded to the
et( )and ln this correction
mentionedreferred to3jailbird."
The brief pi^rnortedlj reflecting the views ofonsejo/
)was rcaJtotC* Re did
notxception to any of the specific pointa raised and it ihoyV be'Jlarl7 Gr3tlfy*nfc that, innt!aie observed that this ves "ctriiin^ the Apparently, therefore, he nc longer believesp-'nt of honor" Is involved. Only actual pari*orewMOav'-sthcr this inference is correct.
seir r>prrhetw? testa? ofl citi/er.i, cr.ergeu with havingout o" thory.itlaaad2 re-
nort,d tic day Oefort, rovee under -iAH-i* 3RIS'C its notiar withbui yoalfi not denyhn reportany nor* recruiters in Oua ce'^aj a, acting or.of CfiLLIOESlS, and It could not be aval Sec* thatall by the tfityalda* ( )tO?fc thla opportunity tohe not cr= unduly impressad byiji'Jsh in an operation ofo a. snterprise in vhlch weat losses of this tyie, psinful-ay be,c 'asilythe other )pointsd out, tho to rise jo resented cesply that somaco-wcrkers had been adjected to torture by thea charge wh*r> eoul<clearer laid at theof ( )arHacl that tfcareserveo for ( - cirhest lamp. C )commented Jfrcm personal knov.ieuge.ue anew th**
he was nowisway of the corenunists.
Lst-intive rrableould
hat he would dodlcate himself to the
task of spreading trie gospel of reslstet.ee amonj,whose antl-eom-iunlsm he could rely. In fact, hedone so prior to meeting ( y way ofhe could accomplish, he mentioned that holose Jrland (unidentified) who had
urged hi* not to tako "no" for answer but really gp to work on him- TheH incidentally is ore-sumsbly one of theff
) By way or expatiating upon tnepersonality informatlan concamlnt officers,<f casewho at one time had colla-
borated with cne Americans, aoout whooeoimunis'a atno possible doubt could be entertained, but who Inhad beenaij;niric.int symptoms ofobserved that he know( ho had
i neteso;
j naa at one time nitctieciw ami-ormsr cnief of the amed forces namedXr'AZ, Tejada u'ios* 'ortuo-Ji political career,isit behind the Iron Curtain which aptarently renovad his last doubts about cottuunlsa, evantuelly landed hl-
?AZ Tftjada, en^lieor by training,
atj Official position. atter of fict, as far *swas conrgned, he was washed out for iood.
( hoa ha considers basically; inw'At anbl^uous attitude reflect th*of hla former chief and close friend PAZ
ta fld^ltloru( ^Cha followingupay ufflcora ucreo*-
and not
to ll'ustrOC* che aoiicitide wit:'. which
the 'r*ricRTis will be Matchingpersonal
tlru. or scec an 7
unofflci
t'vr Americans, using
ojitect jxf
secy la theOOt'ooal) incidentetween hitn it-lean (not ise-ir.jflind put whether t
eco.-jr.enc in- to the Ar*ricap
-1
esunilaaini;. story tho
.xerlcnn disavowed allch eonteota and Lninspired no confidencessevar.
preased by thif story and Itur
reeling chat Intended poin; wascross.
bv^H n excessively ditr. view of him.
He has strong presidential aspirations, isva professional
Intriguer and should under no circumstances bo)conf!raed that this uu also the consejo'sadded,otional account, thatin the
presence of various people mentioneda pro-
minent foe cf the regime.
He Is an entl-communist, butan who
would take any chances whatsoever in standing up for his principles. He failed miserably during the AHrisis.
d. Colonelopez. t trusted
ouble game during his tenure as militaryn Washington where, instead of contracting for military supplies, he kept plying Colonelith confidential information.
As you will :ic:te, none of the individuals rnentioncdin any way associated withS. It is
beliefthe further development of our
operational relstl or.ship, con be brought to the pointcertsin individuals singled out for recruitmentnot wnt to go ahead with this scheme
without prior headquartersou no doubtwouldinto the very vitals of Our
enterprise. It furthermore wcv'Jirectwithand tuw voir: ably tic offsfactjoined the tear: (this latter con-
sie'ent'on should, ho-;ever, not be considered overriding).
In the course of ourumber cf rathertopics were discussed,cf vi.jcV. incl-arly point along whrthes^ilit ies ested. Although the cintcsde-ric, it slioulc be noted thatf Jonesu- the issue of CALLIOIMIS. After flativposition of the consc-jof; the issue, prefacing his remarks bythat itt his intention to do anyor,( at he was fullyf thethethatertsinthe Guatwmalan generalidac. However,C ightknew that C )initial approach wasritten report submitted bycompletely unequivocal terms thst C eriod, ( )vas mom-sritiritakenerocee-;ed tolight deviation from hisposition) th-st personal issues were not actuallybutst'onsl problems weren( id not choose to inquire; "whatalthough very likely this derives fromthatS is in this primarily toown ends. ( ^further stated that he could well
IMA^rSe whatIS to express such CALLIGE^IS, like others, raust be aware ofthatnot and never has been motivated Ly
political ambition. may, or raay not, knowfully informed about the planned prison break,
three months before it took place. Thiring CALUGERlS'CAL1IGEHIS' wife lookedto ask for advice and intercession,brusquely wound up our discussion of this issueembarrassed him) by stating that he certainlvopinion of himself. C /stated; egretam prohibited from passing on your sentiments." It isf that the dominant role played by CALLIGESI5 in is nonsuperable birrier as far as thecf ( y. ccoparation is concerned. econtinue to tread gingerly anda mind thatis coveredery thin scab indeed.
3. father out of contest,of C hat he
about thettrla (
Janswereu tnat ail he Knew AUVut cnat iracaso wasbsen ledrominentublicist, nowin the Unitedwhether certain
Guatemalanico had oesn
/considert thishod.ins'irr.toc by th*rder t- rlia in onof its quellin^? , However,( ^was awareverc convey by subtle"thor :new all nhout it ande stopped it." ti.it hv was certain "hat thisfiasco couldla'd ataffir.-ati
Theontext, uss whether
was fi-iill:v'urrc^iridinj thsi? tfo. )ever heard of events thstin Fstzicia at that time? >'o. Lir-ed lately after thec rises in that particularhad -assacred the ladlnos, at least out instanceafamily. It had been noted before by
r.di cat!
rlsir,
tech meting,
senceissue came to'ore. in mo case o:
ur-risinj, appenedOZ hadcultivating, their. thrt particularholding cut all hind; of" promises, UiienPonce was overthrown, it wasi tively easythe canpeslnos, convincing them it had beenyrotresri vo ar-presch tc their problems thathis fall. Ifails to recollectthis agitation to communists).
It should "oe notedItt the three*,
pesed b; an aroused peasantry iron two anglea. On thehe is aware cf cor-sunlst plans tcarenilitery force, to be committed Ina csumer-rovcLutiontry uprising. Thisfeels, tho Aran;vepe with andhe in factthat the quailingsmpesinc uprising, more-nay sclidify the -limy In Its oppositionregis*. 3ut he Is also concerned about thelocal, possibly spontaneous, campesincs uprisingsin the massacre of outnumbered ladinca and In ( pinion, this droad of unleashedforces,ery real one among thi stillof Ouatusala, less In urban ccnterr. than in thehopes that the Junta'swill take cognizance of thia very real danger. { whether assurance; that the "igrc-rion Reformbe undone night help, andccmc-antcd thatt assvxar.eecope witn any emergencyon the belief that they had been successful Aathehat all they had -eer.ovld be lost in car' of successfulintervention. /urged us net to uiiderestimc-;ccesao3 of the bcvomnont alcn^ those lines. C. to pass on his cbservrtions verbatim to the consejo.
Zt. the course of ourthat
curing the last three ye*ratudyingvwry closely. ia connection. It appearsthtt ha refers tc the fuatontlau ^overnMnt asfiiovernmei:t, vithout cual'. f
election organic issooe:
ir?he co.vnuiirts ire onedcccss and that theirr of pervirting thefor their mm ends had been eminently succosaful, so much so that the fomationfront populalre" is nowuestion of tlrsc. hislready, the coallticn mrtie? could no lor.er putandidate for congress! cna!
thout the approval of cno of the communistns. tct
hat ARSr'Z will succeed hlnseif. at- Is cert*s that the coanujiists will organ!publicesctrily ccnstituticvisl) referendum,spontaneous demandonstitutional AmendmentPresident to succeed himself. There if. In
opinion, no one who cculd possibly succeedand satisfy CorsaUilat insistenceredominant voice in tho management o" thes cf the naticn.
that he had learned from an absolutely re-
source that the communistsindoctrinating canpeslnos from the nationalized, but also from privately owned fincas,hem specific Instructions on what to do during anagainst the regime. These indoctrination classes are
HZIiitoit the headquarters of the CGTG intatement made during the previousthat the Esculr.tla mobilization of campe-
sinos took placehe ASA!'A crisis. Thecregstherec from theEscuir.tla, but vere not Issued arms.
was consulted at the time whether the csmpeslnos shoula b* brought to Oua testa If City to strengthen the Government's hand in coping with local unrest resulting from the liquidation of Colonel ARAI'A and he immediately vetoed the plan.
cnvinced that lurger.cy the camposinos will
1
be mobilized, not only in -scvir.tla. He also believes, "cutconcrete evidence tc bad: this up, that the ccmmur.Iststraining special ihcck troops which will put in anand which may be used to stiffor; the backs of the In answer to specific questioning,the
following:
c^mpcii-cs, esvecis?ly in the Escuintla area,*to hmdlerifel, because of the factot ofis _oing oa In that area.
campesincs ir* net capable of human wave attacksUJ vritr.j resistance ere hound to disperse.
ooncelvalba ns cf transportation will be usedtheto te'.alav, but mostly tfca railroads
'rrc avnib hie.
In cfrc-ri:t_-a line which, innta ahovlSstressed as important
to ;Iughen*. Ai-thcughenfthe underlying tr.ovght appears to beYhe ^revest threat to the success of birr endeavordivlc* c*aa If. trrsj'nt the importancesolidarity of tho arncd forces, ani3hfiel:-iing anil-communistthe ;rmcc forces, cur preplan da will strengthen thewithout inciting to rebellion or att*cVln- theether wor.-'s, hehe slogan of "Armywill perhe President'sover the Army, vided (this isit
has been made cl^ar tc they that the upiisinr iscoranusJsm. Cc.vertcly,( linfers,hit
ould resent the plugging of any themes, suggesting ithat theorrs has sold out to cc-munism, thereby attestingedge cetween officers and enlisted ranks.
2 Ins true tfurnish In-
formationpeclfiecas arplalr.ee tL
the following lines: The Jtinta was In need of up-to-dateindicating tho sters the government proposes totake in case of an uprising, what advance information thenment hps been able tc gather on our plans, what outside help" from
Iron Cttrt*l& and other countries the government iser.pccts to be getting. ay of illustrating whathas in nlnd regarding "outside help,nf /relatedthere hadecent flurry of rumors re-
garding the alleged bringing in toala of planes(or 3erman) manufacture, flown by Czech pilots,runways had been readied to service thoseoutthat this type of Information was
reaching us all the tine and while we were Inclined toits value, we could not afford to ignore it. Th* Junta was -Iso conscious of the exlstonceovernmentdesignsd to spread cecep'. ive rumors for purposes ofand to saturate tha facilities of An. rican information services in trying to track them down. For that reason the consejo wishes tosollclt his cooperation In reporting such rvmers and ir. advising us whether serious consideration shouldven to their possible truthfulness.
onceding that war materials could be brought
intc the country withcut his ever finding oat aboutoubt regarding the foundations of theruttor. To the best of his knowledge, the onlyreachingrecently had bean twowuns of Suedlsh manufacture, which had beenthe Cuardia Civil. He knew that -rms were on ordararrs shipments had allegedly beenconfiscated ir. "uropes
oulu keep his eyes and ears open and reportinforTation.that arms could
'accomodate jet planes he wasenya did not knowwould he needed.mentioned tne
octfir
;.osIt'cuffine crinas-ueh kindotate) would ce needed. (
facilities of the Saratun Siver.io:seterstfi^atle,expressed the op-
inionore lik'.ly location for hidden crws, planawoold be the fines of "resident ISSSSZa Suaors,the Improvementscac".with,
plans to import lot planes, filled to impress ^
though this sertievtar road happened tc bo completelya totel length of* (with only one bend at thenark) it had netet been asphalted, althoughis information
uus based or. persona: observations and on talks with the engineer in charge of the project.
'fl the subject of armshat certain 'mericans in und fined positionsapproached by their Guatenalsn friends with thekind oT argument; "You Americans are fools. 2yGuat en Alan Amy suppliese weakening andvery element on whose support in defeating communismh-.vi- to count." was prompt and out
spoken. The withholding ol arms, he stated, may antagonize
FT.Y
be cached Ir. FectCui In com, ar at ive mcr?c; inasmuch as this location Ii-Tt* been corTls tely abandoned. Whether the air-
T-r? Arr>y. Eowovar, it would be extremely unwise at thisfurolahrms whatsoever unless the finer leanshey will not be used in defensecocmunist regime. ( "Commented: Can such assure netsin the negative. Any shortages,
s hould not be blamed on the Arerlcens but on
tne improvidesice of the government which until recently hadii necessary to budget for arms purchases. In uestion whether the armed forces with equipmentnow on hand could successfully cope with acfti-reelno uprising,that in the
ft-sence of reli'jlo information regsrclng the strengthcf communist shock troops, he could not give aprognosis. rle deniedofflc-'x>type of Information and was unable tr. answer C )whet potentially friendly sources in the governmentpreavxwd to know about the so natters. I> did request,thrt anylng to paramilitary activitiesic.ihoi so* couli tiese on co-rritting hi-isalf on V. Sa Lssua.
( . is>galn that the consejo had absolutely no misabout hla aom^unlcnt "n- fraaly Cno aajor
h'sit was tho in-
tc whom h<
sl!;in>
c
jly any recy.ert on theth hi-.not to
to talk
assuredposs
nimseii care .lull; ild ccrcc tc aass.
3ftfe In
meeting withthis
farer.co was mada by( o toe mtlitury assistance
pads concluded with Honduras nnd Nicaragua. Just in case -pointed cuthla friends should cite this in
*vi ence. intent to goad "ur. terrain's neighbors intointervention, he vould go safe In assuring them thatnot so. For the very purpose of reaseurint, thea strictesteliveries of
uppilaa Jiau been dsrorrati or broker cown into small Installments.
asked whether it was true thatwas living the
life of RileyThe Sustt-nalan Military
n reports toffect. ( J
"Isurecithis wis complete "rot." fnasmuen as
closely with, we ought to know.
21
( was not in any way linked with
the Junta, although ho nay wish to convey thatturn renarked that he had .- well and
that he considered hin an incurable egocentric tor wordseffect). uring'"fi unpleasantness,( all the fighting was over him.strong
doubtsagain would set foot on Guatemalan
soil. (In this connection it may be appropriate to supplyariganatiac with anwho knew
"Ha likes to eat his dish, but he doesn't
Like to prepare The aubiectsecurity cane upumber of con-
texts.loath to nava any further meetings in ^
J where, tho governor knr-ws him. C ointed out to hireof future .nestings between himwould
be the channe' between hir. and the consajo, should be workedthen jointly.question whether there would be any
further nestings with/" rs answered in the negative* Ithits that meetings with^ uld augment the
security hazards which normally attend to an operation of aa emphasised that&fl fullest confi-
dence c' tha conaeje.request for infcrnatlon would
tf met t? tha best of our abilities. ?I* need not worry about
security of the communications betwesi consejo and
this being i fte felt confident tc handlerofessional and secure33. Tite seating endedote cf cordiality.
) C arriedhe strong; impression
tJ5r_cauae. Thus far sy.^ptonsdoublebeeo in evidence. Do.ibtlossly, if this bo apun operation, the government would not chooeeabout an early eenojemeal and continued vigilance willorder. Kow3vor,( ^louhts whether thehe capability and can xustsr sufficientfinesse to carry thrown an operation as intricate aswould bo, without showing its hand sooner or lutar. would be nothing shortstorpieco of defection, tonanantecendents to the point where he is willing
tox<uelf in behalfause which, his wholeshows, he detests.what the wages ofwould be. Ke is certain tnat assassination rather thanbe resorted to. Heamily
nd is notommy wna.cn wouau oe the rsult should he betray the cause.
i inhearefully
/has tol^ hins oout pasrCCESS and that aajor deviations'.resentctions will be noted by him. areour go-between who has shown on intelligent
appreciatilr. oxssues involved and who can be reliedinterpret, any instruction in the spirit it waswould be premature to base on our talksar.v
cstimate Of our chances of success in attaining There is little doubtthat the
FBSUCCESS encept as explainedas complete
activity is
XOK are hereby requested tc allocate for this projecttc cover all cperatlorjil expenses This allocation will serve to
coverture* such as transportation, entertainment,safe ho'iscs etc. Should the need arise,ehicle, and authorization Is
hereby reo>or its procurement at the station'sformalts hrve been made,informed
orally byC /that "we" consideroral auty to aidhis family, should circumstances resulting from hiswork force him to go into exile. Should he getline ofwe would undoubtedly roider equitablehis wife and children. You may wish to set asideor future contingencies in order to meetobligctions the agency is prepared tocommitments wore madedoubt, under similar
jcircutnrttances, the agency will see to ite is accorded political asylui and that he does notublic burden.
ar
news to hir. and that, if it weren't for the bitter pillofrol'. in the Junta, he night havereat deal hot finally awayed him, we believe, was thefor theorkable concepttqj.ln as.tawe of advanced implementation. he my have realised the futility of embarkingperiph'- al enterprise rather than aligning himaelfrosscc himorkable scheme. Underisastrous consequencesiiSlc (notan abortives far as the continued willingness ofto ;oin in any further kird cf consniratorial
nct'vity ir: concerned, need not be clabor?tec upon.
ONLY
29. Ho operational equipment la required at this stage. Wehowever, that Implied in tho approval of thisthe authorization to issue
and to Instruct him Ir. its use. We
ncadquarters could look into the question of availabilitvoncealment device for non-bulky documents, C
f available
lorwar'd it soonest.
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: