Created: 5/14/1954

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Meaorandum for the Record


The following comments aad opinion* regarding CALLIOERIS arc being submitted for the record to asalet ia any possible future evaluation of bis personality. Tne basis for these remarks is ths following 1 on day personal association ia Januarya six dayaeeociaUoo iaeview of Sub>ct'e correspondence vitWthe perioday XfSkgesume ofc emarks during the above noted period.

CALLIOERTS, Initially an unknown, undistinguished Lt. Col. in the Guatemalan army, beoajh involved ln the Juntathe military leader of the anti-communist Guatemalan forces in exile.

Prior to this time CALLIOERIS' most overt act against tho regime had been anrevolutionary movement which waa triggered by the asaasinatlon of Col.lose friend of CALLIGERIS. CALLIOERIS' coup against ths government became known before any action could be taken and resulted in hie imprleonmeat. subsequentescape from prison was arranged entirely Safebouve personnel hare testified that outside forces even knew the exact hour when CALLIGERIS would be eprung and were waiting for himar outside of the prison area.

fa. It was not long after thisin search of an army-

leader vbo waa willing to Join an anti-government

CALLIGERIS as the battle leader of ths anti-canmninist forces within Honduras. That this group, with CALLIGERIS as its military leader, left much to be deeired, is clearly evidenced by three separate, costly abortive attempts by the CALLIGERIS forces to succeedoup


sirat tha Guatemalan Oovenwienti all of these attempts failed at the th hour because tha promised military elements inside the country did not fulfill their reported promises to support CALLIGERIS.


determined to Assure all possible controls end support be givensince be vas no longer certain that CALLIGERISbackgroundechnical, For thesethat CALLIGERIS

follow the ordere of thedvisers, whether they be military, Intelligence, or propaganda.

brings toALLIGERIS personality traitnov clearly recognisable. lieirmly stubbornin the face of indisputable evidence ia pronehis own point of view. The manner in vhlchhie own decisions is interesting. Personalhas shown that CALLIGERIS will yield readilypoints and appear to be most willing to conciliathat changes es suggested will be carriedhie execution of the datelle of anybe as he seee fit. Thle completely modifiesagreement with general plane. Hisplus the Lackroup contact with him who

can effectively assure his completion of activities, has given him reason to believe that he oan modify to an**-

his own deelree any orders or

or the group. It ehould be pointed out that CAIXIOERQ has not developed this line of thinking with en altogether malicious intent. Delays, lack of decisions, reversal of decisions by tha Oroup have tended to increase his necessity to take tbe initiative vben he, from hie Honduran outpost, saw the necessity for some courss of action.

undersigned now realise* that CalXIGERIS, when shornand propaganda responsibilities in Januaryreeented this decision to which he agreed withoutenthusiasm. His subsequent actions soon abrogatedinirect manner that hie excuses of aadequate cosmninlcatloKC made theobvious. In the end the uroup yielded tothus givinglear idea that If heideas vould be accepted*

es This same trait of stubbornness has carried over into his defense of his subordinatesi in many cases he baac

J'cjt ln other outs landing cases his closest advisers have proved to be outright traitors or at best dubious recipients of the high confidence he has placed in them.

In th* two known cases of DELOADOC ATRA,CALLIOERISunder the increasing pressure of the group or subordinates in his group to examine mare closely their loyaltyhaa become proportionately mare loyal ln defending the suspects, or at Isast he was In not vay willing to sever hie connections with then. An explanation for this perverse loyalty is the fact that both men in the past mads many open and also fervent pledges of loyalty to CALLIOERIS. These demonstrations apparentlyreat deal of Influence with CALLIGERIS and have clouded his logic, lhe important lesson to be gained from these examples by ths Group la that If ln ths future CALLIOERIS is elevated to high responsibilities, seXflsb and cunning men will soon grasp this key of obtaining and maintaining favor with CALLIGERIS. By their constant demonstration of loyalty, they can maintain positions with little or no real talent. It will behoove the Croup to aid in every manner in order to see that CALLIGERIS ls surrounded by sincere men.

6. lhe undersigned believes tbat CALLIOERIS has the mentalitypersonal ambition to aspire to tho Job of being the newman. lie has previously insisted that tbe temporary governmentyears, preferring the three years period. Steps to simmer domnshould be Initiated at ones. He should be confronted,as soonwith the outline of tho temporary government tdilch willlimited authority.10 process of preparing this,

fully aware that strong personalities will be needed to

Surround CALLIOERIS andIn the midst of re-

cruiting capable Individuals. The Group should maintain at CALL^IGE)(IS,enior Representative who in effect would be the "stern" man iho Is primarily coneernsd with the political and diplomatic activities of the CALLIOERIS Headquarters. Remembering tbat CALLIGERIS operates on the principle of extending where there is no barrier, the submission of the temporary governmenth solid backing from Group to supportovernment and nothing else, should be hammered homeapable representstlvs of the Group who would be stationed at his ftoad-quarter 8. This action constitutes one effective step which oan be taken now,ay. Also, tbs immediate inclusion of other Guatemalan military man of stature as may result fromrogram in the Junta Headquarters will tend tojeducestature.

a. The above suggestions are no guarantee tbat CALLIOERIS will remain bounded by any agreement reacheday but it will considerably Increase the moral force which can

be brought to bear upon him after he IS Installed.

CALLIGERIS, In thopinion, could not last toothe rough end tumble of Guatemalan politics without the support ofthe visible support which he has re-

ceived tc date, he counts on not too many military men. He couldsuoporv from tho elements of the present regime. Any alienationestTaX0 bia immediately with individual* more

ccnTervetlve CALLIGERIS would tha re fore be

defendantery small base of people who here resided with him In exile. It is not logical tbatnail element of people, few of whom have had political experience, could long survive the ordeal of righting the "mess" made by the coemmnists. epresentative from Group, properly lnetalled, could easily ln the courseew weeks, mate the above points painfully clear to CALLIOESIS,


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