OPERATIONAL - NOTES FOR GRAHAM L. PAGE

Created: 5/16/1954

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Chiaf of Station, Guatemala

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Operational

Notes for Qraban L. PAGE

ttached pleaaa find sterile notes for Orahaa l. PAGE. Thosa notes respond tohey aro to ba returned to Station file* aa soon aa PAGE baa studied than.

Please inform PAGE that his field cryptoa are being need in tbe attached notes. For convenience, ESQUIRE ia designated "Roland.'

For the information of Guatemala Station and PAGE, Head quarters wae informed by cable on IA Hey of the agreements reached onrogrsa atay meeting between BANNISTER,AGE end RUTTING. It was pointed out in the cable thatrogrem originally comprised intelligence, defection, "prising" and labor defection, but that it would hew, for purposes of security end concentrationkey issues, be restricted to intelligence snd military defection. of control over ESQUIRE and his high regard for ESCGifts's ability were noted.

threefoldKICCWli appeals to the Army and recruit-

ment InThintemala Citylisted. It was explained that BURNBTTE would handle the backs topping and coamo for PAGE, and that BURNETTE's diplomatic status provided PAGE aore protection then CLCUEft,odyguard, couldeparate cable was sent on the use of CLCWEh aa the case officer on ESGCSILLA, SEMANTIC and SECANT.

LINCOLN would appreciate cabled confirmation that BURNETTS has taken over the baokstopplng and como responsibilities for PAGE.

5. BANNISTER is hereby informed that the reaponsibilltj for coordinating CE Information ia Ouatemala, regarding government knowledge of end counter-plans to FBSIKCESS,oa Mm- He is to coordinate and evaluate both the intelligence reports procured by PAGE fromQ Jaad the information obtained by regular Station assets.

Attachment JCD/JTN/eef4

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- Washington

- LLSJOLN

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1. lour letters ofnd tho letter you wrote to Holand on Mayave been read with great care and lntereat. The followingnay be of help ln pushing your thoughte further.

2. Sineo Mac is worried about the peasants. It nayoodintimate to himand Major Martina* are well oa

the way to being boughttne consejo. You might sayertain vestigial loyalty to labor leftism still hindara thaertain allegiance to Mr. Big the latter, however, their opportunism exceeds their loyalty; tho problem remaining before the oonsejo is only how to aaalat theae individuals in rationalising their defection. This much may suffice to elicit Mac's views on these men and their availability, you can evade details by saying tbat you are only generally informed of those negotiations and are not conducting them yourself, and have obtained the foregoingto allay Macls concerns, (it may help to suggest that tbe approach to both men waa madehird country; both of them have been abroad in the laat seven months.) It ahould be added that no political promises have been made to theae two, nor will any be made; the approach to them, distasteful aa lt vaa to the coneejo, vas made only in order to avoid the bloodahedeasant revolt. Both men have boon given to understand that their Job at the opportune moment is to keep the peasants quiet.

Tho foregoing paragraph ia, of course, untrue. Mac's investigation of its accuracy should be discouragedecture one should not pursue the matter personally, nor would the tworeveal their intentions to him. On thisumber of things, none of them unfavorable, might happen. If Mac ia not with us, his leakage of the information would -at least embarraae the two men. If ho talks looesly, the leakage would be equally eabarrasaing to them. If he is with us, be ahould feel encouraged.

Aa regards tbe matter of arming and training peaaante, you mightroposition to Mac. hen ambers tho Martlnes- rellecor clash in aoculntlai hareaseovernment officialooauniBt, both of thea with evory reason to think that they had Mr.aesalng, colliding on the specific issue of land allocation. Both of them could afterwards maintain that they were right, the one in keeping order, the other in pushing "socialist construction" forward. This parallel can be applied to the case of tbe evident conflict between the Army end tbe Communist partisan forces. No doubt both are blessed by Mr. Big, and both of thea are working on the assumption-thatave Big'a support. How, why cannot an Army detachment, where ita forces are manifestly superior

and where the antl-Coasiunlsm of the CO is assured,erfectlyraid cnommunist partisan training class or arms cache? The Army

detachment caaaander could blandly state afterwards that ho had received urgent reportsevolutionary group was plotting In his area of command, snd that ha took Immediate steps to quell the affair. Be can even be "sony" aftervards. If necessary. However, because of the duality and Inherentconflict. It would eppesr likely that hr.in the Hsrtines-Pellecerhave to concede that raider sad raided were both right, end would make no reprisals. In the meantime, some useful results might hove been gained, the army would have shown its superiority topower, tbe partisan training program would have been exposed, peasants would possibly be dissuaded from further training, etc. Naturally, all this could also be presented to Macery preliminary test, both of his assets and his claims that tho Army can stop tha peasants. Mac's reactions ax to this one should be interesting.

for transport workers, take an optimistic view, as In thsthe peasants. Point out the strength of aatl-Communlsm in theirhint at negotiations going on with the labor leaders, bitnames. It would then be very useful to drew Mao out on his ideas at

as to how transport should be paralyzed at the right moment.

the foregoing, you will note, is half propaganda, halfMac and drawing hia into operations, how comas the moment when thein the water. Get him and keep him on the issue of defection ofIn the cspltal. Stress to him that we are not Interestedfficers whosympathise" with the consejo, buten who can and will lead forces Into the consejo camp

at the righthis point has been well covered in your letter to Roland, but ve wish to underscore It. We ere far less concerned with Mac'e spreading the gospel (and indeed believe that his roleeroave hazards) than with Mac's actively marshalling forces, he is not to go after people who eree is to go after people we need. uhat it boils down to is thi81 Mac must start toterms of the capture of the capital. This, after ell, is what Mr. Big did ten years ago and on that his power still rests. Mac mustard and fast operation plan, choose the officers in the capital to Implement it and plan thoir respective duties. This la what we need: not defection for defection's sake, but defection for the sskelan. Iou oaa tell Mac with full honesty that the consejolan, as he knows, and the consejo has adequate information on which to makelan, however, as previously stated, this plan, because of tin balance of forces, would probably lead to considerable blood ah oed. We are not disposed, on tha basis of our brief acquaintance with Mac, to reveal to him our plans and assets. What we do wish to see is his plan, aade in total ignorance of what assets ve have and only on the basis of what procedures he considers sound and what assets he haa. When he has submitted all that, the consejo will have its experts check the plan for soundness and his claims ofnentlng assets for veracity. That dons, if ale plans and assets are valid, tho consejo will probablyorm of joint operations between Mac and Castle.

7* bove ia the bard core of your current assignment. Paragraphe,re important, but onlyo this. We oust concentrate on defectionurposelan.

note the smtter of tho oath to defend tha country ao ato officer recruitment. This la inevitable. Mae ahould boon the Ruernberg theory that obedience to orders froa anla treason and punishable, In both domestic and internationalstated, officers must put the interests of theiregime that ia against the intereeta of the people. There

la do need to elaborate on this point to you, but it mayhile to move Mac1 fairly conventional military wind on tola point.

to aid Mao in recruiting people who are against Mr. Castle,

it might be useful to remind bin that, historically, the revolutionary Juntaa undergo changes in the period of consolidation. Right now, all snti-Cceraunlata, whether pro- or ejitl-Cnstle, must stand together and win together. They can settle their family quarrels once the Communiata are defeated. Xou might toll Mac that there ia an evident contradiction bo two en bis contention that ve oust appeal to tho "unity of the army" with hia assertion that tho army la split over tha Castle issue. Castle already baa many followers and is daily getting more; therefore, "unity of the army" necessarily means atodus vivendl of other officers with him; and if Mac ia not willing to push this, Castle will enlarge his following and control until the "unity of theaastleew unhappy carpers on the outaldo looking in.

Thle aatasago, while concentrating on the defection aspects of Mac's work, is in no way intended to minimize the Importance ve attach to the intelligence and propaganda duties you outlined ln your Mayetter to Roland. Instructions cn Intelligence procurement fore Part Two of these Motes.

Ten- letters are excellent and exhaustive. It would help us to help you if, instead of reporting play-by-play, you would focus on several key points on which you either wish us to take ether action or on vhich you weehaye our comments and guidance. These notes attempt to respond to what we deem tho keyou have raised, and to press forward, but our aasistance would probably be more effective if you stated precisely what you wanted from us. vati Good luck.

PART TWO

As stated previously, it Is of extreme Importance tbat we axart all efforts toward improving the procurement of intelligence concerning the enamy'a kacvlodge end plana. TJhis for ve do not hare adequate Information on this natter, and lt la obvious that such knovledge la essential for tho successful completion of this project.

It appeora that first efforts ahould be directed toward Mac. If >lac is sincere In hla desire to cooperate, this la the best Banner In which he can prove it. There are two basic points in which ve are vitally interested; 1} how such does the government and Arm? know of our plena, and 2) what moves are planned to roper oon tain any oppositionrobably the most direct route to information on the first point la through If Macave any means for gaining acoeee to the information in that department, they ahould be naked to make use of those contacta at once. If not, Mac ahould be asked to obtain aa much information aa possible through all available InfomaStta ln the government. It la likely that many persona In high government aad Apmy position*mi liar at least te acme extent with Information which the government baa on opposition plana.

Ueart from tbe White Paper. Tho government obviously bad considerable information at that tine. Has It been able to bring that Information up-to-date and if ao, to what extent? We also know that

an enemy agent known to you by name waa in dose contact with Panchomonth ago. how rauoh Information did ho pass on to the Guatemalanthis stage ve are primarily interested in learning how much tbeknows. Of course, ixxif if It is apparent that currentstill finding ita way to the government, ve are most anxious toeouree of thle leak.

A. With respect to plane of the Army and government to counteract any moves of the opposition, this iailitary matter, end tola informatlc is probably concentrated for the moat part in the minds of high level Army officers. Perhaps these plana are in tbe development or discussion stage and are not written down completely. Whatever the situation we need to know these plans aa accurately as possible. Thus far there seems to have been little overt activity on the part of Army or police units. Why? Is the government uncertain and pussled about what moves lt should take, or is this partlan to simply sit back and bold on to tho strong points? No hardware has been moved into the targot country as yet. Does the government plan to take action once such movements start?

5. As Mac seems tc be the best bet at this time be should be approached first. hbvever,it is obvious that time is important, and that each day counts. The exact phrasing of the questions, within the context of the matters desired covered, must be loft to you, as it will obvious*py be necessary Lo follow Mac's line of thought. In the event that Mac,r other contacts in the Army, is unable to obtain the information desired, or ia able to procure loads only, the matter ahould immediately be followed up through other agents of the Guatemala Station.

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