THOUGHTS AND POSSIBLE COURSES OF ACTION CONCERNING LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN PBSUC

Created: 5/18/1954

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of the continued delay la ear receipt offroa Oasteaala City sod other staUons la the rTOOcTMrequested General OsbsU yesterday andto assist la straitening this oat to the end tnat attoll got equal preoedanoe with Lincoln on tha reoalpt

Of these and other rltsl ooasnmloatlons. (Our oable of Sunder ef terooon to Llneoln apparently did not work, slnos thereong delay In our receipt Monday afternoonritical Intelligence aeseage froa Ouateaala City. Thie resulted In our being eeptr-hended when the Secretary of State called for assistance sod oonfiruatlen In correction with the etateaent be vaa proposing to sake.

Is Important that mo press te ecBolaelca the settersIn connectionthetaadng) a' C return tbe ways aad aaans bastputting into effect the aubstantlre proposals oontaiaed inof last 7riJej to Llnooln. Us bars not yet heard froaregards tha substantive aspects of this Batter. The only thinghave in la yesterday's aasaago urging tha re ten Uon ofheadquarters for an additional period ofays, hard to be allowed to return tc C Jto assistout tbe proposals Lnvolvinj: tbe ralgaf of tha situationnd also the awecWniag op of ERRATIC* fallingto let hia go back he haa asked to be allowed to eoter

the hospital at Fort Saa Houiton, Texas, leaving headqu.rt-rs soaetlaear. assured bla we will try to have see. thine worked out prior to that tiaeith Llnooln.

have askadet In touch direot withconcerningable froa Llnoolnsadouartera person who oan help out withmatter. Mr. t 4lM reached Kr. Barnes on tbe Uiea nomlnp.

U. Concerning the lnforaatlon said to have been provided byars about two additional ehlpaente froaave eaked Mr. C o get in touch with his contacts at OH thehine this

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morning la order to repeat, rooonflra and clarify too information and racjoeate mhioh mo passed to tho carl doty offleer last sight at about f On tho besia of ahat wo mora told by tha Cal man last night it aomma doubtfulaa any very strong eapabllitioa of eaoartalnlag information aboat tho other Wo ahlpe without better leads Visa wa are able to provideand it was iadleated that tbay may hare to go through their London offloe te Lloyda for help la identifying any Teasel or vessels leaning at Stettin. lso asked Kr. c ail sad clear ststement from Oil asval capabilities for maintainingreaonaalssaaoe of vesaala soterlng and passing through the Caribbean area* Otwreae we were assured in the case of the UUl/SBXOOK that serlsl reoonaalssaaee waa being oonduetad, ear first (and only) information concerning her arrival in ths Caribbean area oane via Europe ia ths form of information concerning the vestelteLitlnerary. aerial reoaonaisssnoe played no part.

I have asked Kr.this warning to take all of the Information which we and State have received eonoe ruing the two otherover to NSA to see what they can do to help us with the identification of the vessels. The USA research*re nay be abla to do something on the baala of the admittedly alight information we hake up to the preaent monent.

Tbe State Department (Hr. Leddy) has assured me that they will eontlnue to keep pressure on London to aaoertaia the eubeeqmant ports of call of tbe veasel (if any) so that we nay lay oa further Interrogation* of the crew and hopefully tbe skipper of tbe JlL/HXLH. They (Hr. Holland) are also continuing pressure on ths British to get the ehip ordered out of Puerto Barrios prior to tbe completion of offload lng.

Consideration of other possibilitiesPm* leaflets, eto. of disrupting tbe effleefliagthreats to stevedores, ruaorsime boss) in the ship. sensitive smmnmietakha* In osrge ate.

A message should be sent to Ambassador Psurifoy in reply to his personal message to me of last night requesting that the State Depart*int publicity release be held off. hink as should rive hia some of ths reasoning here sod point out that the Dspartasnt was determined to release tbe pabllalty and that the real question was whether tbe sabotage attempt would be called off. Xt was our feeling at tbe time that the sabotage should continue irrespeotlve

of the release snd that one of the rationalisations was as followsi If there Is in fast in being withinlgnifleant resistance organisation opposed to the government, then some sabotage of this Iron Curtain Communist origin arms shipment could be expeoted In the wake of an announcement of its arrivalPuerto Barrioa. The other side of this coin (Leddyl s that the Guatemalan army nay develop strong resentment against the persons responsible for the attempted sabotage of ammunition coming to them. It was even suggssted that we give consideration to having Llnooln broadcast that the sabotage bed been done by underground Qomaunlsts who were opposed to seeing the arms get Into the hands of the army. AMD felt that this was probably oversubtls but be did not rule It out entirelyonfusion element or device.

matter requiring very aloes consideration by us andis whether we are not beginning to slide into, orremature time. Lincoln's latestrail sabotage efforts callather substantial This effort once It le started will be without tbe benefit

of surprise and without the benefitpontaneous general uprising. At the aoaant and under present conditions, It is the Guatemalans snd notho have the moetest. Query also whether Haxskondbbt by engaging in all this paramilitary sabotage type of activity at this time we will not tend to arouse snd even consolidate the Quatern al an military to such an extent as toeriously adverse bearing upon the ohsnoes of success tn SUCCESS,

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