W^CWOBT BAS BUM ap
/ft fl^ car l
Acta of Forceay
-1. Ia view of repeated observations by .Guatemalans to tbetbe antl-Ccoaunist forces cust prove their strength by deedsas words, as well as the need for accelerating theon Guatemalans, certain limited, specific acts ofprioray arc hereby
2. The acts are es follows:
ombination of arson and demolitions work, but shouldpersonnel. It should be conducted in the absence finca. The rAirpose of this raid would be to focus publicthe fact thatf, Jis the enemy of the anti-CoErauniats anddire things are in store for him later.
3 This would be the firstaction. Itstnat of helping to paralyseis to show tbe
public that tba anti-Ceanuni sts resent the Soviet-style
system andprime symbol of oppression.
2 for the same reasons as tbe oisposai. oi The aisposal
make the anti -Conaunirotest against
theof the Arbenz regime perfectly clear.
J Tbis action
documents the anU^cesBunist cnaracter ox tbe revolution andoaderless.
Disposal off itt this,to bothand the
regime will aave been effectively displayed.
f. _y before HJjour. Disposal
apparent, iroaj^ Jdebrleflngmany other indications,
that the fate oT[ Jaay well beHSeheay >tlll on me scene, he would undoubtedly be able tosupport which would render the task of friendly forces aore If tbe Issue were la doubt,the scales unfavorably, la attempt should therefore be aade togrow out o; the disposal (_ j, rather than reckoning Jefter victory. This acUon must be carried out as close topossible; otherwise, Dcabtrs [ 3ornight fill the vacuus before CAUlo-wo couio.
3. In any progrsa of this sort, the possibilities of reprisals and their danaging effect onay objective must be considered. The "stove actions would undoubtedly invite soae reprisals and load'to an atteapt.on the part of the government to tighten security, fcbvcver, such government actions in theey must be expected aayvay. On the other hand, successful accomplishieat of tbe above acUons should cause panic aaoag the government sympathisers and possibly negate their increased vigilance. At the sane tine, friendly forces should be greatly heartened and mobilixed. The program as described above would give enough tine Tor both enemyend friendly noblUraUon prioray. Oa balance, it is believed that these shows of friendly strength and these efforts to "soften up' the enemy would be beneficial and would decrease the risk of putting all PBSUCCESS eggs iaey basket. It may also be that the government reacUoo to one or the other proposed acts of violence vould provide significant guidance to existingay plans.
It should be emphasised that the success of only one or tuo ofactions vould te insufficient and would five ato the pubUc. Execution of the whole program, withwould be not only physically impressive but psychologi-
st allyxpUcit and significant.
If the foregoing program isshould be immediately
I requested to obtaio, under the directionrequisite inforaa-
J Uon relaUve to the personal habits, movements,f the personalities and appropriate data on
/ Guateoala, has indicated Us ability to procure such information oo snort I notice. The first three proposed acUons have been suggested by him,orally or by dispatch.Original document.