GENERAL- OPERATION MATTERS - SPECIFIC- INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Created: 5/23/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

MO. HUT^A- St.?

AY

(Specil'y Air or Sea PouchJ

T0 ACQS, Ouatoraala City

IHFO Washington

ftaj" UNCQLH

SUBJECT fSH";, Cperatlonal Hatters

Intelligence Roquireaenta

view of the events of the peat fev daye itlieved that

a review of our most important intelligence requirmente as of this time la in order. Basically, there ls no change from the directions which have gone oat to you during the post few weeks. lour primary intelligence task continues to be the procurement of Informationhe extent of the knowledge which the Guatemalan government and Amy have regarding PBSUCCESSxactly what they propose to do with respect to this knowledge. Also important, and this is connected with the oeoond point above, is information concerning the destination of the new arms and ammunition being obtained, that Is, are these arms staying directly under the control of regular Army units, or are some being distributed to such organisations ob labor unions or the Partldo Ouatemolteoo del Trabajo (POT)?

Possibly Guatemalan government snd Army officials did not have detailed information with respect to how. and when the arms on the Alfhem were to arrive. However, lt would seem probable that therenformation ln official files regarding this order and the neons by which it was to ba shipped. Certainly the procurement and distribution of arms Is one important method by which something is being done by the government to counteract opposition movements. As suoh, information with respect thereto ic, and hasrimary intelligence task.

It ie realised that the station has boon swamped with many requests for action and information. However, tha continued importance of this intelligence task is again emphasised. One ship Is In, but there may be others. Of particular Importance is the natter of anrfflin.ltion. Ton should exert all possible efforts to obtain information regarding orders for additional arcs and ammunition. Does the government expect more? If so, when and how are they coring, and of what do the orders consist?

h. Efforts are being made to place SEMANTIC and SECANT directly under

PAGE 2

porriBion and direction, but this must proceed gradually* In tbe meantime you should atteapt to guide them and tell them exactly what is vented. If possible ESCQBTLLA should try and talk with SEMAHTTC at length two or threeeek. In this way SEMAHTTC can be thoroughly briefed snd debriefed, snd we will not be forced to rely on scattered bits of information. If such interviews can takehort time before the

r

ch deadline, the results can be pouched, thereby reducing thetraffic* If you do not have tine toispatch init is perfectly permissible to send rough draft notes or.

5. Other assets of the station which might possibly be of somasn intelligence standpoint would appear to btE3PERASGE,

ESQUIRE, and ESCQHSGN.In particular, snoula oe informed of

tho importance placed on the procurement of information of this type. He probably bee access, or the means to obtain access, to the information ve need, and all possible pressure should be placed on him to get this material. ESPERAKCE, ESQUIRE and ESCONSON have government and military contacts which should be used to the limit of their possibilities.

C 2

JEROIS^C. DUNBAR

1

^BiCEffr/d

U

UAT

3-FHES

ktba:

Original document.

Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: