A HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
. 1. To airlift men and supplies Into Los Clpre Sales Airport, Guatemala City, which may or may not have been previously seised by friendly forces.
2. To give all possible air support to:
Cipre Sales during airlift.
objective of airlift.
3. SITUATION AND COURSES OF ACTION:
1. Considerations affecting the possible course3 of action:
a- Weather: The main hazard to flying in the Guatemala City area during June and July la tropical storms end frequent thunderstorms. At land stations, such as Guatemala City, thunderstorms are most frequent during the late afternoon and early evening. Daring June and July rains occur most frequently fron the middle of the afternoon through early looming and thereloseassociation between the occurence of rain end low cloudiness. Fog has its maximum occurence during April end has been nuch more infrequent during the other months. At Guatemala City the occurence of fog was confined alnost exlusively to the hours0 tolocal tine. There should be no restrictions on visibility due to smoke at this tine of year. all weather factors the best hours for air operations -during June end July are00 local tine.
2. Hostile Defense:
AA -eported flsl: mediumccurate flaklaces Aurora Airport
lak In city light. Flak at Aurora Airport5 reported AA fire from SE corner city, larger amount ne comer
eported tracers fron Palace and itorth of Hailrocd
station. largern accurate firing. 1
oning over0o flak.
P-l, ff-Jjll to Guatemalao flak reported;
Various other reports hare bees received on two lOaa batteries at Aurora Airport, some at Palace aadother locations'. Guatemala should be queried aa to tbe latestefore operation begun. All reports on Soviet arms shipment show no heavy AA, but quantities of Ml which could be used.
Pighters Latest estimate Ouat Air Forcend6
all amedal guns. Top speediles per hour. J'o evidence of any attempt t< cove up against alxoat LO missions to date.
hbbile ground Several light tanka and Mobile -Ta squads reported In general area. Snail contingent approximatelyenl at Loa Cipre Sales.
3. Opposition Capebilltiesi
a. Attempt to destroy transports before they reach airfield:
By fighter interception.
to deny us use of airfield:
Py restraining and/or regaining control of airfield.
A fire fron outside confines of field.
to smash pound operation:
By use of ground troops.
By use of fighter support.
U. Our own courses of action:
landings at dawn with fighter support.
landings at dusk with fighter support.
landings during night with fighter support.
landings during dry *ith fighter support.
above without fighter supoort.
above without fighterabove without fighter support.
above without fighter support.
. ANALYSIS OF COURSES OF ACTlOiJ VERSES OPPOSITION CAPABILITIES:
Own coursenemy fighter capability no threat with own fighter Opposition course support. AA limited and can be avoided orl) : by fighters. Surprise attack at dawn should catch enemy unprepared.
b(l) : Troops involved in initial surprise landing should be able to overuhilic weak opposition forces at field. Fighter support should be able to knock out any strong points in vicinity of field and prevent most outside support such as tanks fron approaching field.
Initial surprise of dawn landing and subsequent flak suprcssion should minimise hostile fire from weapons now in vicinity of airfield or available to be brought up.
Dawn attack should minimize effectiveness of hostile ground forces end fighter support should be able to suppress najor ground support such as tanks and troop trucks. Strong points in city can also be effectively eliminated or rendered ineffectual by air support.
Status of hostile air force is such that with friendly fighter support present any attempt at hostile fighter activity will be decisively negated. 1Original document.