GENERAL- K-PROGRAM-OPERATIONAL - SPECIFIC - VINDICATION OF THE BASIC CONCEPT (W

Created: 5/28/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASEAS SANITIZED

I Il^tfEt "PBSUCCESS RYBAT

classijication

MAY4

It

from Chief of Station, Guatemala CHIEF, WHD

rogram-Operational

sNCHc- Vindication of the Basic Concept

Enclosed for receiving stations la one copyocument prepared by Graham L. PAGE on above subject.

Clara M. Heagey

as noted4

CKH/cmh

tt

PBSUCCESS RYBAT

ClASSIFiCATION

K-Progran

Subjeoti

Vindication of Baaio Concept

owhat now must have becomerogran will never fumiaha vorkeable substitute or alternative to PBSuccese. Aa pointed out inpaper, the underlying concept of JWrogram is schooled In FBSucceas.attained thus far can bo attributed to the inherent persuaslveneas ofprograsi backed by the United States and praasnteable In terms ofdirected resistance organiiatlon In being which has all thesupport It requires. Do avay with all that and the indigenouswhichery large extent aeons to reside ln theatherthe wills of the people, will no longer be realisable.-: oaso in

point. Despite hla toooIabout GALUGEBIS and altho he dreads the prospect of prolonged oivil utrlfo. Is suboonsclously at least subordinating himself to the strategic concept of PBSuccess. It la of the very greatest importance that la your assesaaont of thehaopta and prospectsrogran yon do not indulge any wishful Illusions as to its independent viability. The situation ln Guatemala has boon allowed to go beyond the pointonsplraoy not dixootod and sustained from tha outside has still an even remote chanoe of suooeaa. The leadership of the regime is much too flnaly entraaohed and oonoalvahly commlst aontrol is lodged in too many of its vital organs as to permitevolution from the top. s convinced that tha removal of tho three leadera of tho Armed Forcesr Arbenz, Sanohei and Diaz, would Erase*ituation affording hla and hi8 associates and opportunity to overthrow the regime on palace level. In his opinion any communist uprising could and would easily bo quelled by the Army. Ue are inclined to doubt whether even In the most favorablo of circumstances tho

oancer of coranuniat penetration can bo removed without the draatio surgeryiviprielng.

eilxceptecent briefing by SBTTDC, we havepretty auch ln tha dark aa to dOTelopnents on the home front. Evenexoegesls of your policy cables does not permit anywhether yon are still operating under tha aegis ofe trust that ln denying ua moreew crnabs fromyou aro profitedesire to save us the anguish of vacathe same token you will appreciate that it is not easy to fit

andater date possibly SMILAX,trategic concept whioh byremember in blurred outline only. Operational guidance provided bybeenut not good enough. In developing

wa cannot confine ourselves to purely notional gambits. Securityahould be able to provide himairly aoourate estimate of thingsOnce SKI LAX haa boon enrolled, factual Inaccuracies could provethe operation, Th order

to oope with this and kindred problems, you nay wish to consider the inaugurationeekly news latter to keep us abreast of important developments. Especially In the field of SXEOGX evanta, there are painful gaps In our information, compounded by the fact that In many lnntanoes In struct Ions to the field ignore^ the established teneta of English} usage. Since we are not read in on the overall picture, the prevailing and probably completely unfounded imp re oal on Is thatrnoor. procraaJg. hr""yBnd_way behind schedule. We are naturally concerned about developments in Honduras which for all we may know may have ployed havoc with our logistics. Ve have of course been puttingold front, pointing out that Ouatemalan interference in the domestic affairs of Honduras merely reflects the regime's exclusive preoccupation with thocontingency. All this, hoover, is avowedly conjecture and may be demonstrably poor conjecture.

our latest Instructions regardingboen noted. In line with

your request we propose lo and artake further attempts at reconciling

to the role of CALLIGERIS. However, it should be pointed out that thehardlyajor nt ambling block in tho case of

Tt remains to be seen how strongly 3KILAX feels on the subject. In termsmilitary strength ,beajor

asset, is pointed cut before, ha may or may not be prepared to subordinateCALLTGHUS. This could probably be determined if you consider it anWhereas ln our deliberations withraising of political,

post-liberation lacues has thus far been avoided, you should not gainthat those Issues have boen laid to rest.atter of faot,that SMILiX will have acme very definite ideas on the subject. Uoknow how large SW>eHt looms in aTJHOOK planning. If he iopivotalpecialould ba build around hia, designedany independent military potential he may have. During tho Initialwould have to be conducted throughbut preBumably direct

contacts between ESQuTRS andooUU ba laid on. Please bear in mind, however, that once we start dealing with, we nh*ll have to get down to brass tacks. If, for Instance, you propose to vast Infan responsibility for the neutralixatlcn of regime-controlled military effectives, he would presumably have to be fitted into the existing KTEOQE structure which nay involve the disclosure to him of certain of the assets wa now control. All these are specific issues on whioh we shall require detailed headquarters galdanoe.

L. As It nowrogram has been considerably reduced in scope from its original concept. Por reasons communicated to you in our last pouch, the priming project had to be abandoned. Pull responsibility for thef garrison asaota thus rests with CALLIGERIS. Ue are unfortunately in no position to provide

you with Independent clues as to the effectiveness of controls allegedbean estsbllshed over garrison staff personnel. Ve would presumea numbor ofommitoento made did not go beyondwith tho objectives of PBSuccesseneral assurance ofat least non-interference. is stated once before, we arethat the momentum of the uprising during its initial phase is boundin what direction the officers' corps will swing. Ve are inalinedalong withestimate of the situation ln stressing the overwhelm-

ingly antl-coamunlat sentiment among Guatemala's officers. However, you must bear in mind that officers are bound to be moro impressed by tangible manifeetatlons of strength committed according to plan than by pious expressions of dislike for communism. It is for that reason that we have requested you to look into the question of eliciting more forthright oxpresolons of PHPrime determination to see this thing finished once and for all. Ve would further recommend that you go to the very limit in leaking plauslblo items ofindicating tho scope of our enterprise. While this may stimulate the regime's vigilance, the bracing effect which such disclosures are bound to have upon themajority of the Guatemalan populace should not be underrated. Even the White Paper, as you may recall,errific upsurge of aonfidenoe that at least somebody was doing something.

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA