CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
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on whether or not Lincoln reachos tho coDclusion thatond psychological) damage Inflicted by the compromise ofin WSBurnt can still be, the objectives find methods of Emay havo to beevised. Tho abandonment or retrenchment
of PBSuccess would be likely toreater burdenrorran than heretofore envisioned.
following tentative conclusions should be viewed by you againstof the limited availability of reliable dato regardingin this countayi
may become necessary toodified departure from thenon-attributability, ones the approachrograjn personality targets
cn no longer bo exclusively predicated on the existence of aa offeotlve underground movement. In that case increasing stress would have to be placed upon the probabilityast resort to unilateral united States intervention.
practical terms, this would meanho individuals into be toldhe united States, while rendering support toopposition, is by no means irrevocably committed to pursuingcourse in an effort to dislodge in tenia tiommunismThe United St-tes, in fairness to Guatemala and in keeping withof good neighbor policy, has afforded the Guatemalan people oneto put its house in order.
on the other head, it shouli turn out that tbe Opposition eitherstrength or the determination to unseat the Arbenz regime, then thewould find itself placed before an ontiroly now situation, calling for
a drastic revision of the poliry of non-intervention heretofore pur sued. At tho end of the road the United States would be forced to have recourse to military intervention.
V In ourith individuals of tha calibre ot KILAXa atriotlyccount of tho effective strength of PBSuccoss
I *mr .' r. U
-jye-nnot beindefinitely. Sooner or later they arc bound to arriveindependent estimate which, if it radically differs from the one imparted
Js &ovDt to shake their faith in the United States.radual
shift from exclusive reliance upon PBSuccess capabilities toward an ing
enphania upon United States intentions my become necessary in cur futuro dealings with them.
v. U. The "nownot be developedolitical vacuum. While it is jjV possible and justifiable to giveotional buildup, conveying a
moderately exaggerated pi :ture of its potentialities as an inducement to Join A< up, thef ultimate United States Intervention will have to bo carefully
. 'jk concerted with our foroign policy. In othor words,the proud boast'AUnited States will under no circumstances put up with rampant cc
V" nited States will under no circumstances put up with rampant coamuninm in
Guatemala, ought to bo backed bygiblo and conclusive jlof American resolve. Conversely, shoul'3 our actions tend U> prove that tho
United States his become reconciled to sooing Guatemala go down the drain,ood prospect that other Central AraeTican nations will, S her cxmple, thenPAGE would scon find himself in the invidious position of the * _y Emperor In Andorsen's fairy tale.
of "PP^ring our main leverage the
STiwtked upon winning over the Arty High Conmlnd,willhe ArSy into Wdng
i? 1 hove to bo put to the test. Given that constellation!
SKnSf I acttte^ at defecting the issue of OALLIGKRIS'i?<tlon-
dly un.etisfactory solution, involving ouriliUjy dictatorship, would at least constitute some
alLit ry intervention ana all thvt ent-ils. Thisontingency you Jn1 to face up to if PBSuccess has suffered fl material setback.
Jlatapiaiysituation *tfe it will not oU 4dvanM notice of strategic detours forcednS.nn;e-Urespatch will serve to acsurintf OT alternate frame of reference. Pending furSe-concausivo indications regarding the future of PBSuccess, we shallS Jl > S TThere has bam no major change in our
VY"* 'Action of Colonel l V
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