Sul'ject ' Sh/US
PLACE ACOU4RFD .'-
Source he* beea engaged in journalism end free-lance vriting Id Guatemala for many year*. He tooX an active-part in the overthrow of the Ublco government aad during that period waa closely associated with moat of the preeentratibn leaders. He turced against tne government when the Comanists began tc gain influence. He ieeater of the opposition movement.
adalaistratlcn to previat us from
Ihe action taker by the goverotent against tbe opposition inerlouaevolutionary organization, but will have no lastingh* reason is that the opposition It organized on something similartea whereby person can kaov zot. nuch. This ie amabined with tightly dsttnedetailsd plan for the rotation and substitution -cf leadeishlp. thiook its January action on the baois oflon it bought from ope of the oppocition leader* forhousand. This -traitor nshigh-placed to knowdetail? cf the plotting and tfc* namesut .far from enough to wreck the organization. Actually, there-amyial licders and so many alternate plotst will bo kiB-js-for rhrnwing the goveraaeat vt?n. the ti*
oaary or( Slaceira*
Party. Each member of tbetaal, true Communists in Guateoala.y io detail the habitsctl*an groupa which will each be
oaary're^found aeutraloroonunlet*w who :werethe mosthem send' theircere-like the itndependently'jiihici mnuniotfl- to bbtaioj t'ii" yeilLrbenft; wit'b: vhpo^B
once very friendly, can do nothing to change the eltuation, aince anynow would mean unbearable loss of "face". Bo can only try tothe preaent balance aa long aa poeelble.
. Our group feels that Communist activity la becomingerioua that we oust moveear. Otherwise the Coxauclota say be able to consolidate and extend their lnfluece through their control of labor unions, the land reform organisation, tha radio, etc so that their ouster night be far acre difficult. As It Is todaynly the leaders of the unions are Communist and the Communist spokesmen among the Indians have no real following, who would not turn readily to otber- if the Communists were removed. The Communists doairly large supply of rifles, as welley machine guns, but these arms would be totally ineffective agaiost the army or evenetermined civilian uprising.
Much of the strength of the Communists stems from the fact that it is at least temporarily profitable to deal with tbe government. Bence many Individuals are cooperating wbo otherwise would oppose the Communists. This Is pirtlcularly true of the large landowners wbo deserve euch of tbe blame for the present The opposition has received no cooperation from this group, ve have documentarythey are giving financial support to the Communists. In3 one landowner offered the equivalent of USA5 in responseequest for funds of An antl-Communlat newspaper. It vasew days later thean gave the equivalent of USllCOommunist paper. Shortly after this and similar Incidents an opposition leaderroup of landowners that they would be considered equally as guilty ae the Communists, aad would suffer tbe same consequences when the revolution comes. This is tbe establlshsd policy of the opposition, and the landovners are veil avare of it. Incidentally, the agrarian reform program haa done ouch to strengthen the Guatemalan economy since it has led to tbe diversification of erops and generally Increased production. It will undoubtedly be retained ioformuture government.
from the point of vlev of the Guatemalan opposition, ID policy, particularly at the Caracas Conference, has been helpful to the Communists and the Arbeni government. It has bad the effect of rallying support for the underdog. The OS shoux- bear la mind that true diplomacy lies not in the obvious remark but in voicing kind compliments to the unattractive woman.
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