Created: 5/31/1954

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status and possible future courseUCCL5S.

1. Mr. Barnes has reported his very tentative viewwhich is hia own estimate of the situation and vhich lucks tha baiiafit* report from

3(who will return to LINCOLN Mondayhat the original

para-military plan nay not be capable of fulfillment and that wo should consider now an alternative approach which would not depend absolutely for tha success of the operation upon getting all of tha ducksev as originally conceived and having everything cone to pass and go off according to the large plan ofcompletely integrated pura-military tet-'en. Hr. Barnes' thought is that we should endeavor to proceed ir.ay as tc continue to build up pressures both internally and externally and that we should employ certain of tiie assets of which we presently dispose for this purpose. We should workituation on the psra-nllitery side of tfiis operation which would have two alternative possibilities, viz.:

The devtlopnentituation which would enable thea-miHtary planubstantial oort thereof to function lore or lassreviously envlsirnei; and

To xn so conduct the operation ss tooursolveseslticn to goonger-tern resistarre type activity within Guatenala, having tha ordinary and usual alas, objectives and methods as is consistent with trua resistance operation*everywhere.

2. The virtue of the second alternative,ea it, is thst it allows for and permits of the use of assets during the veryr the hulld-up of prei agaL-st the retfue which, in their euirtPatlre effect, might very well accomplish the desired result,tirring or thead forces to rise against ths regineoup of their own making. It is, ofundamental part of bothactine qua non of both,ery substantial part of tha Ouatonalan ai**ed forces wi'l move against the Government. This being tiie casa, if It. *s

possible to get thoa to move with sufficient strength to overthrow the rogijneanner other than that which was originslly contemplatedsnd rspecially if this can be done at an earlier date than would ba necessary to perfect all of the arrangements required under the original conceptthis ehorld be all to the good.

3. UnderonccDt or approach, there wouldorresponding willingness to divert the amount of strength froix the central pars-military operation to enable the harassment actions contemplotede acconoliohed, PlrMoMUj this uo-jld wan that ifere deemed desirable to un^erta* specific sabotage set'ens in thi- near future,would be permlssible. Tha same would aiply to other tynesharassmenthe acccnpli s! Tisnt of which would require tha se cf oristing assets.

li. At leastof Mr. Barnes1 reasons for arriving at tli.ll conclusion

la the increasing disappointment of IIKCCLN (and lieadq-iarters, for that

matter) in tha apparent capabilities and strength of Armas himolf. Arras

has baen given the moat extraordinary amount of assistance, support and jv.idance

through PBSVCGESS, and if he had any rsal strength and caoacilitys he

own/should by now havereat, deal. ver, as time hs3 (one oi, he ha* emerged merea clearlytan, having very_ little ability of Ms own to translato Looas and tho-girts Into concrete oction. More and more we have bean holding uo hia Sand and more and core our roaourcas have be or. Mploycd to Co theh he Shoulddpne. In addit'on to his other woaknessea, lie hacarked lack of, *nri this is nowhere more cloarhe casestoward parsons within his own rahks who have betrayed him. lie has beer, far too gullible and txjo&HXyA* trusting of the neople around him. was evidently either unable or unwilling to spot tire bad actors vitMn Ms own cntoura,-ewhene to do this for him hemost lanth to take any pnniVve; notion against these persons.

Ii. Our actual hardoncemln, the rlre and s'ronrtl,e claimed Internal organization 1sslight. We lmost entirely upon his rcDresentaUcna 1 this. thure >arwc-uate opportunity tc test the ex'stsree or s'renrth of 'Hsa ti According}?,

there ls another virtue In the pro'iosnd new Alternative approach in tret wc Hill actually have an opportunity to cause tho ebUltyru to deliver on specifico then.

5. Finally, tha stale of tension and tun oil in vue'rmola Hps siresdy reach-idoint rs.rUln It at just the proper pitch snd intensity for the Mount of'.icb Mould be necessary to conplete the preparations for readiness under th* old pie-.. It reeis that one of Out tvo devolrpnents will occur; either tVereelaxation of tflMleaeeoling-off of tswpsrt, or the pressure will continue to mount rapidlyoint of explosion. It is consideredelation and cooling-off Mould be Tar more'& thanrrocd build-op to thof boiling over. If thlflorrect asi'nate, sort we should continue to apply our efforts to thehat pressuresrease and theill continue to rise. ie happens to be theof tbe station as veil as of JMBLUQ. Also toiaic'erod in this (MUinactfon is the report of the milltar: person Hoioh, if any subatantla] credibility ii tosttecVd t it, wovld 'nd'.cnte that Us*lan o"n *hico it nay he on theOf putting Into effect. Addou pressure* voisla seem to be tho best way cf effecting this.

Original document.

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