MfllSTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM ifi&ttSUFf* sf^/isf
Entire brieiing lop secret and more. Danger in relaxing security after operation completed, particularly If successful.
Last December pursuant OCB action. Initiated program to eliminate pro-Communist government In Guat.
. (JJ Plan contemplated:
(al Inlcrnnl revolution, epark-plugged by Colonel Caatlllo
Armae, moat available Ouat exile who together with hie group had been subsidized by CIA tor apprcatlmately two years.
Defection of Guat Army at highest level.
Defection of Individual garrisons at strong points.
Radio campaign from clandestine transmitters.
Subversion of Individual Guat leader a, military and civilian.
rogram budgeted atillion dollars. Actual expenditure, of operation will be In thia range,
nota worth of hardware taken
from CIA atockpUe, and subsidies extended eubaaquent aucceai of revolution.
In considering operation important remember U. S. government hand undiacloaable. Established theory of fictional group of rich Americana Interested in South America and desirous of eliminating Communism (United Fruit). CIAlways dealt with Armas and others as representatives of group and still are known by them in thia capacity.
Operation presented problems over aad above those of usual Banana Republic revolution.
Following fall of Dictator Ubicoendulum swang
far to left and Ouatemala under left wing leader4
whoa Arbens took over. Axbena able army officer
but slowly came under complete Influence of hard-core Communists,
particularly Fortuny. Pellecer, Gutlerrs, and others who trained
i. in Communiat school, frequant visitors to Moscow and aatellites.
Arbsna controlled army) hard-core Communists took over labor
unions, radio, major press organs, aad dominated Indian
peasantry who had little Interest in Marx,cetera. Foreign
properties taken over, lead divided up aad Communist formed fast
statejbelag organised. General feeling time running against us and faced early probability of purge in Army, arming of the laborers, and further liquidation of the Intelligentala.
eanwhile through Intelligencedetailed informationobtained regarding Arbena negotiation to purchase approximately
attempt trace theae analran down wrong vessel arrival of Alfhem at Puerto Barrios. This arrival really blessing in disguise since publicity brought entire situation Ouatead. However, resulted sever* reprisals and due Indiscretion one. of our ma'r Caaejfcsl within Guatemala completely liquidated and danger that our entire network would be rolled op unleas we moved rapidly. Further, summer rains Impending which would Imped* ground and air operations. Castillougmented by defections following Alfham incident but still the total of hi* forcesay represented less than on* hundred bodies trained In guerrilla operation* by CIA and approximately
additionalut obvious necessary move Immediately
or lose psychological opportunity, end reports from Goal and
outlying regions Indicated popular expectation built up by our radio and by events so decision made to move.Original document.