Created: 6/7/1954

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The Intelligence Advisory CommitteehU estimatehe FBI abitamed. the subject being outitde o/ IU jurisdiction.

The foVenMng member cwganteattons ol the Intelligence Advisor* ComwlIIee participated with thehe preparation ol this estimate: The intelligence organizations ol the Departments ol State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and Tht Joint Staff.



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of Natal Inielligence, for the Department of tho Navy

of Intelligence, USAF, for the Department of the Air Force

Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff, for the Joint Staff

ot Intelligence, AXC, for the Atomic Energy Coznmlssian

to the Director, TBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation

n Assistant Director for Collection and Dlsserninatlon, CIA, for any other Department or Agency

This copy may be either retained or destroyed by burning ln accordance with applicable security regulations, or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency by arrangement with thc Office of Collection and Dissemination, CIA.

The overseas dissemination of this intelligence wDl bo limitederiod of one year or less, at tho end of which time It will be destroyed, returned to tbeagency, ot permission requested of that agency to retain It tn accordance with


material contain* InformaOoa^ tho^nntoERl Defense of tbeJfcdwo State*heof wWch Thsany nauUKHtsed person Is nronlblOJfrfiT law.


Kanoaal Security Council De^ajtraent of State Department Of Defense Tortlgn Opera Uoua Admin UtraUon Operations Coord inaucg Board atomic Cnarg? Commission Federal Bureau ot InvesUgaUon United Btatei InformaUoD Agency



To esUmate Soviet capabilities and the main lines of Soviet strategic policy through


We believe that the stability andof the Soviet regime will not be affected during the period of this estimate by conflicts for power or differencespolicy within the ruling group. Soviet authority over the Satellites will almost certainly remain intact. There are potential conflicts of interest between the USSR and Communist China but we believe that during the period of thisthe cohesive forces in thewill be far greater than the divisive forces. .

e economic policy of the USSR will probably continue to place primaryon the rapid development of heavy industry and war potential, though with more attention than in the past toof agricultural and consumer goods production. The high rates ofgrowth achieved in the immediate postwar years have been declining. We believe that the annual rate for the next two years will beercentercent.

3.'We believe that if current economic programs are carried on as planned Soviet

defense expenditures will have to remain approximately constant in terms ofpower, at leastowever, military procurement, even if it does not rise above the high level reached2 and maintainedill be sufficient for continuous qualitativeof the armed forces inequipment, and training. Apart from this general qualitativethe most significant changes in Soviet military strength during theof this esUmate are likely to be as follows:

in the nuclear

in the capability toweapons by various methods;

in weaponsair defense;

Allhoueh Ihu paper li concerned primarily wiih ute USSR. strengths and capabiliUes of the other members or lhe Soviet Bloc (Communist China. Eastern European Satellites. East Germany, and North Koreai are referred to where these add signiftcanUy to Soviet power. CorulderaUon is also given lo possible Chinese Communist courses of acUon which mayirect bearing on the main lines of Soviel policy.

d. Increase in the long-rangeforce.. ' ,

We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at leastear or two, to avoid courses of action which in Its judgment would clearly involverisk of general war. Bloc leaders will try to foster and exploit politicaland, as opportunity offers, armed insurrections within the non-Communist world. Soviet leaders probably believe that, by alternately easing the tension and applying political warfare pressure dexterously,they can increase the chances that in time there will arise newfor Communist strategicwithout substantial risk of general war. .

While the Kremlin may continue to follow generally its present lines of policy throughout the period of this estimate, it should be borne in mind that thebeing made by the USSR in the development of nuclear weapons, and the increasing Soviet capability to deliver these weapons, are changing the world power situation in important respects. Under these conditions Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the US and its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greaterof action to pursue its objectives without running substantial risk ofwar. Thus the Kremlin will beready to apply heavy pressure on thc non-Communist world upon any signs of major dissension or weakness among the US and its allies. Wc believe, however, that the Kremlin will continue to be extremely reluctant loontest In which the USSR would beto nuclear attack. At the same

time, we believe that the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction" against an action by the US or-its allies which the Kremlin considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. We believe that the extent to which the Kremlin uses thefreedom of action which itsnuclear capabilities, appear to give it, and thc success which* it achieves, will depend primarily upon thestrength, and cohesive:less of the non-Communist world.

e believe the Chinese Communist leaders in general share these Soviet views about thc world situation and aboutand methods of advancing Communist interests. During the period of this estimate, Communist China will probably be reluctant to undertake courses of action which it considers might involve substantial risk of provokingwarajor power. The major deterrents will be: (a) China needs time to consolidate the Communist state as well as to modernize her economy; (b) China's strong ground ferccs arein service and support units, China's expanding air force has certainand China's navy has extremely limited capabilities, and China willmilitarily dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and naval(c) China's industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of available resources over minimumrequirements will be narrow.China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of its capability, any action which it considers toilitary threat to its borders or to constitute an imminent threat to its vital

interests, accepting the risks of warin such action.'

oth Soviet and Chinese Communist leaders probably feel that Southeast Asia offers particularly favorablefor Communist expansion, not only because of the vulnerability of the states in the area, but because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and its allies. Continued Communist successes In Indochina, or the consolida-

tion of present Communist gains Inwould probably lead the Chinese Communists to expand their "efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political infiltration and covert support of local insurrections, though probably not by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces. The aggressiveness with whicholicy would be pursued would depend on thc vigor and effectiveness ofreaction.



The regime now in power in the USSR, or any Uiat is likely to succeed It, almostwill continue for Uie indefinite future to consider Its basic objective to be Uieand expansion of Its own power, internally and externally. In pursuing this policy most Soviet leaders probably envisage ultimately: (a) Uie elimination of every world power center capable of competing with Uie USSR; (b) the spread of Communism to all parts of Uie world; and (c) Soviet domination over all other Communist regimes.

Soviet leaders probably are also committed to the following propositions concerning the expansion of the power of the USSR:

a. The struggle between thc Communist and the non-Communist worlds is irreconcila-

' The Director ot Intelligence. USAF. believes thathould read as follows:

"Wehat Chinese Communlit leaders ln general share these Soviet views about the world ill us Hon and about opportunities and methods of advancing Communist Interests Communist China will probably not choose knowingly any courae ol acUon likely to expose its fundamental nalional strengths In warajor power However, we believe thatChina's aUength for conducting various kinds of warfare are such, and the motives and judgment ol iu leaden are auch as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of anymagnitude "

ble. with one system eventually destroying the other;

struggle may go onongperiods of strategic retreat possiblybefore Uie final Communist

struggle between theUie non-Communist worlds will notinvolve general war;

Uie period of "coexistence ofcamps" of Communism andCommunists must steadily build upand military strength of Uieits Satellites while trying to dividethe non-Communist world*


he regime committed to these basicis controlled by Uie small group of less thanen In Uie Presidium (formerlyof Uie Central Committee of theParty. Most of this same group of men exercise authority in governmental policy-making through their ranking positions in Uie Council of Ministers. Uie formal seat of execuUve authority in Uie USSR Their joint control over Uie apparatus of Soviet power is absolute, and the primacy of the regime's interests continues to be enforced rigidly by elaborate party, government, and police controls. The regime may exercise its police powers somewhat more moderately and

less arbitrarily than In the past, but thiswould derive from conviction that the regime can best attain its domestic objectives In this way. not from any fear of popularor any reluctance to use force if necessary to maintain government authority.

ll! The 'most powerful Soviet leader appears to be G. M. Malenkov. ranking member In both the Communist Party Presidium and the Council of Ministers. Party First Secretary N. S. Khrushchev has risen rapidly,since the elimination of Beria, and may now beevel with Malenkov. Probably, however, neither Malenkov nor Khrushchev, nor any of the other Soviet leaders,osition as an individual to exercise power indepcndenUy of the group. The party has so thoroughly penetrated the security police, government machinery, and armed forces that independent action by any one of these organisations at the command of an individual Soviet leader is nearly Impossible. We therefore believe it most unlikely that any struggle for power among Soviet rulers will lead to overt or widespread civil strife.

hileystem of Joint authorityotalitarian society tends to bealance of power among the various leaders may, nevertheless, last for some time,if most of them feel that their interests require its preservation. Now that power has been successfully transferred after Stalin's death and Beria has been efficiently disposed of, the Soviet regime may continue withcomparable to thc current modusfor some time Changes may take place in the composition of the ruling group or in the relative power positions of Its members; one man may even succeed in gaining absolute power. We do not believe, however, that any significant disruption or weakening of theof Soviet power would accompany such

shifts In the roles of leading personalities.


e believe that whatever conflicts for power or differences respecting policy may develop within the ruling group are unlikely during thc period of this estimate to affect the stability of Uie regime or Ita authority within the counUy. Moreover, we believe the regime will not be significantly Impaired in

Its ability to arrive at policy decisions and carry them out effectively. These policies and their implementation will continue tothc fundamental agreement whichobtains among the leaders concerning the basic objectives of the Communist


appearance of new leadership inhas had no apparent effect on theof the relations between the USSRSatellite states in Eastern Europe. Wethat Soviet authority over thewill remain intact (hiring thethis estimate. The existence ofdiscontent and serious difficultiesup the Satellite economies willto delay Lhe process of Sovletizationarea. However, during the next fiveSatellite contribution lo Soviet powerincrease. Soviet control willto depend primarily on the presenceof Soviet armed forces, and inof general war popularcertainly will not develop beyondof sporadic noncooperalion.


relations of the USSR withChina are markedly different frombetween the USSR and anycountry. Communist. Chinaa Soviet allyatellite. Itsome capability for Independenteven for action which thedisapprove but which it wouldto repudiate. However, the mainof Communist policy in Asia aredetermined by Moscow andthe Soviet voice presumablyCommunist China appearsincreasing its stature within theSoviet propaganda andhave reccnUy given great emphasisclaim to an acknowledgedinternational affairs, and lhe USSRevidenceillingness lo haveChina assume greaterfurthering Communist Interests lnparticular Communist China seems toIncreasingly important role in the execu-

tlon of Communist policy in North Korea and Indochina.

he national Interests of the USSR and Communist China are In some eases conflict-ing. and constitute potential sources otbetween the two powers. We believe, however, that throughout the period of this estimate the cohesive forces In the Slno-Sovlet relationship will be far greater than theforces. The USSR and Communist Chinaommon Ideology. Both of themthe US as the chief obstacle to their objectives, and consider that their interests are threatened by US policy and power.each partner profits at the present time from its alliance with the other. Communist China receives essential Soviet political,and economic support and assistance Soviet leaders recognize inaluable ally, which provides the USSR not onlystrength and defense in depth in the Far East, butase for further advancing Communist aims ln Asia

V. SOVIET ECONOMIChe USSR haa maintained Its basic policy of forced-draft economic expansionthe postwar period, reachingprewar levels of output8 and steadily expanding ln nearly every field since that time. Thc rate of growth of the Soviet economy, however, has declined in the past five years.80 Soviet gross national product (GNP) increased at an average annual rate ofut this rate fell oil loercent per annum in the three-yearnd is estimated lo have been onlyercent in thehehigh rate of growth0 and the slower rate of growth thereafter were due to several factors, chief among wliich were: (a) during the earlier period the Soviet economy was still being reconstructed and hencewas brought Into operation bylitUe investment; (b) average growing conditions in agriculture were more favorable90 than1nd (c) the non agricultural labor force grew less rapidly0 than tneriod. In addition, the rate of growth of

Soviet GNP3 waa reducedesult of the adjustments required by the revisions of economic plans Introduced in that year.

It is estimated that In the next two years the rate of growth of the Soviet economy will beercent per annum and lhat in thet will decline toercent per annum. The higher rate of growth ln the near term is expected tofrom the resumptionigh rate of increase ln total investment, Includinginvestment In the traditionally lagging sectors of the economyagriculture andgoods industries. On the other hand, the rate of growth In theill be somewhat retarded, in part becauseecline In the growth of the labor forcefrom lhe low birth rale during World War II. Even so, the average annual growth rate for the entire period of this estimate will be nearly double the long-range average annual increase in GNP of the US economy of 3and substantially above the annualof Justercent which the US economy has shown Ineriod,

Trends for the USSR determine thecharacter of economic growth rales for the whole Soviet Bloe. Even though the rate of growth of Bloc GNP declines, this rate will almost certainly continue to exceed that of the US and NATO powers. Thc US-NATO growth rate for GNP ts estimated to haveercent per year during the first half of the twentieth century If lhe latter rat-should continue throughout the period of this estimate, then the ratio of Soviet to USproducts would Increase from aboutercent3 to aboutercentnd the ratio of Bloe to US-NATO national products would Increase from aboutercent to aboutercent, respectively. However, the absolute difference between the totalof the Bloc and that of US-NATO (as well as between the USSR and lhc US) would be somewhat greater at the end of the period than it is al present


present regime In the USSR haschanged the traditionalpolicy of placing primary emphasis

on the rapid development of heavy Industry and war potential. The new regimereat deal of its attention and energiesevision of current economic plans aimed at speeding up the production of agricultural commodities, especiallyand manufactured consumers' goods. Soviet leaders have stated that this goal Is to be achieved without decreasing the tempo of heavy industrial development, but theyintend, at least for Uie next two years, not to increase defense ouUays above the high level, reached2 and maintainedhis modification of Soviet economic programs is designed to overcome Uie lag in the growth of certain sectors of the economy, particularly agriculture, and to bringelter balanced economic growth over the long run. i -

he promise of Soviet leaders to Increase Uie volume of consumers" goods iserious effort to fulfill orexceed the quotas in thc Five-Year Plan as set forlhf successful, Uie regime would thus reverse the persistent trend of recent years whereby this sector of the Soviet economy slipped well below planned levelsesult of the priority in the allocaUon of economic resources granted to heavy industry and defense producUon. The heart of the new economic program Is the effort to increase agricultural output by: (a) providing greater incentives to lhe peasant population In the form of goods and payments: (b) channeling greater capital investment to agriculture in the form of mechanical draft power,fertilizer, and building materials;he farms with an ample supply of qualified technicians; (d) improving farm organization and practices; and (e) bringing under cultivation vast areas of semiarld virgin land in thc eastern USSR and central Asia.

n'important concern of the Soviet regime is lhat the Inadequacy of agriculturalhasritical contributing factor In lhe slowdown in Uie rate of growth of Soviet industrial labor productivity. The Soviet Union has been getting more and more out of its industrial labor force each year, but the annual increases are getting smaller and smaller. The new economic program aims at

increasing thc urban supply of food and other consumer goods andwith this Incentive for industrialraising the level of labor productivity in Soviet industry. The new agricultural program of greaterand Increased investment may mark the first step along lines of economic development Uiat Soviet leaders will find It advisableumber of years. They will almost certainly continue them5 and In view of Uie likelihood that achievements will fall far short of plan goals, they may continue them during the whole period

e believe that agricultural producUon is unlikely (even with normal weather) toby more thanercent annually during the,otal increaseercent for Uie wholes contrasted with the original Five-Year Plan goal of aboutercentfor the. Even so, the annual Increment to Uie total Soviet gross national product will be large enough tomoderate increases in standards of living and greater investment in enterprisesconsumers goods (including agriculture) without jeopardizing heavy industrial growth or the maintenanceigh level of military expenditure.



e believe that if the new economicis carried on as planned, Soviet defense expenditure will have to remainconstant In terms of purchasing power, at leastudging by theof budgetary allotments, Soviet annual defense expenditureill bethe same as, whereas It increased more lhanercent0e believe thatdefense outlays of all categories3 amounted to aboutoercent of total Soviet GNP and that thc proportion will slightly diminish for at least two or three years and possibly throughn any case, over-all war potential willesult of Uie growth of the economy.




scientific and technologicalare sufficiently well developed toeffective support to industrial andresearch and development. Atscientific assets of the USSR (thequality of trained personnel,and financial support) arethose of the US, and the assetshole are far less than those ofThe consistently strong supportthe development of Soviet science andhas resulted, especially sinceII,apid increase in Sovietin this area. We believe thatwill continue to have aIn the allocation of Sovietduring the period of this estimate.



the postwar period the USSR hasits armed forces at high levelsand combat-readiness. Duringof this estimate militaryif continued atate,sufficient for continuous qualitativein weapons, equipment, andApart from this general qualitativethe most significant changesmilitary strength during the periodestimate arc likely to be as follows:

in the nuclear weapons

in the capability to deliverby various methods;

in weapons systems for

in the long-range

v -

Nuclear Weapons

an estimate of the status ofresearch and nuclear weaponsfor the4should be made to

'See Appendix for tables giving estimated strengths of Soviet Bloc ground, air, and naval forces.

There is no evidence available whichthe course that the Soviet atomic energy program will take during Ui67or are there any specificwhich can be considered as limiting on the growth of the program during this period. Nevertheless, long-range extrapolations can be carried out on the basis of assumptions of the growth pattern the program might followthe period in question.

Alternate assumptions, whichange of growth capabilities are:

expansion of Soviet fissionableproduction facilitiesr

expansion of Sovietproduction facilitiesame rate as estimated in NIEthe4 tor

of the Sovietate which will increase itsfor uranium totons per year

Soviet fissionable9 on the basis ofcan be expressed in termstechnology Indicated by their Examples of such conversion follows:

IPSO Assumption Assumption Assumption ABO

n boosted weapons

Total yield (million tons



KT each

Boosted PU SO KT


Total yield (million tons

alternate assumptions on whichtable Is based do not consider theof rapid technological advances inof fissionable materials, norreflect major advances Inwhich must be thermonuclear weaponswell in excess of one million tonswhich could possibly be testedcould increase the total energyfrom the Soviet fissionablestockpileactor of five toover that in examplen addition,nuclear capabilities may be Increaseddevelopments which will permitof nuclear warheads to manysystems. .

Jet Bombers J

It was previously estimated that the USSR would produce:et medium bomberpeed ofnotsadius/range ofautical miles, andet heavy bomberpeed ofnotsadius/range ofautical miles. At the Moscow Afr Show on Mayhere were observed in flight nine twin-engine Jet bombers, designated for Intelligence purposesand one four-engine swept-wing Jet bomber, designatedn the basis of preliminary analysis' of the photographs and observed characteristics of these aircraft we believe that their performance does notand may fall below, that previouslyrespectively for the jet medium and jet heavy bombers. It is estimated that bothare powered by enginespound thrust.

Whether or not theow has the performance characteristicset medium bomber set forth above, we believe that the USSR will have aboutombers in operational units byyndyhis alters previous estimates to advance by one year thc appearance of jet medium bombers in the Soviet Air Force. Whether or not the

' Analysis of presently available evidence on these aircraft Is sUU In progress.

ow has the performancewe have estimatedet heavy bomber, our estimate as to the development and Introduction ofomber remains unchanged, thatew in operaUonal units byndyhese dates resultrocess ofwhich we believe to be basically sound but which in some Instances has failed to keep up with Soviet progress. ConsequenUy.numbers of jet heavy bombers may appear In operaUonal units prior tond possibly by

Guided Missiles1

We have many Indications Uiat the USSR is devoting great effort to its program ofof guided missiles. From anof over-all Soviet technical capability, and assuming reasonable progress in Soviet programs based on Uie World War II Germany effort, we believe that the USSR could within the period of this estimate have considerable numbers of guided missiles in operational use. The type and characteristics of Uie missiles produced would depend upon Uie Soviet assessment of military requirements and upon the allocaUon of priority among Uie many possible types to be developed.

We have no firm evidence Uiat Uie USSR has any guided missiles ready for operational use at the present Ume. The most reliable information concerning Uie Soviet guided missiles program relates to development and Improvement ofodels acquired at the end of World War II. Based on this Information we believe it likely Uiat the USSR will haveype of guided missileangemilesuarheadounds.

'Detailed studies of this subject are currently in progress and will provide the basis of, "Soviet CapabiliUes and Probable Programs ln the Field of Ouldedcheduled forin Uie third quarter of

Director of Intelligence. USAF. believes that the range of this missile would be on the orderauUeal miles; however, he believes It is likely that the Soviets will have, by this date, other missiles with ranges on the orderautical milesound

Development ofissile Is well within Soviet capabilities. It is also well withincapabilities to develop numerous other types of missiles within the period of thisbut we have at present no Information as to which of these various types the USSR may be developingriority basis. Our estimate of probable Soviet militarysuggests that the priority accorded the developmenturface-to-air missile would be at least as high as that givenurface-to-surface missile.

believe that it wM not be9 to attackStates with guided missilesSoviet Bloc territory.tpossible for the USSR to startilotless-aircraft type ofcould reach the US from Blochave no evidence of such developmentunder way. Even at thc presentwould be technically feasible for theatUck targets within the US withfrom long-range aircraft orWe have no evidence atthe USSR has developed this capability.

Air Defense Weapons

present, the USSR does not havecapabilily sufficient tobombardment missions underconditions. However, anequipped with AI radar is probablyproject o( Soviet weapons It is expected thatuchwill be in operational usey With thefighters available in greateraboutlong within early warning and GCI radar andsurface-to-air missile capability, itthat Soviet Bloc air defensewill be improved substantially


Soviet Navy is apparentlyon the construction of two long-rangetypes developed since World Warare equipped with snorkel and have

operating radii ofiles respectively. By7 of these had joined the fleet and the building rate isaser year. The Soviets are known to have continued development of the Walther closed-cycle engine for submarine propulsion and this engine could be operational byt is also possible that, byuclear propulsion for submarines will have been developed by the USSR.


making their estimate of thesituation Soviet leaders probablythat: (a) the US is irreconcilablyto the Soviet system and is intentorld-wide(b) the US will meetin attempting to create andsubstance tooalition;of this effort might lead thetoolicy of isolation or topreventive war; <d) fears ofparticularly as Soviet deliverygrow, will increase pressure in theavoidance of war with the USSR;onflict with the US can beto areas and issues Involving lessall-out military effort, in which casewill eventually triumph.

Kremlin probably considers thatatough strategic equilibrium

between the Soviet Bloc and the US-NATO coalition. On thc one hand. Western strength in air and ground forces has grown, over-all Western naval superiority has beenand the US has retained its superior nuclear capabilities while improving itsposture. On the other hand, the Soviet Union, while retaining its strength in ground forces, has reduced the margin of Western naval superiority, and has built an air force capable of using nuclear weapons In attacks on US allies. US forward air bases, and evenunder comparatively difficultcircumstancesin attacks on theUS. Soviet leaders probably believe Uiat they cannot be certain ofar, but they show no indication of feeling that the

balance of world power is developingto their basic interests.

'Vl^We believe that the Kremlin probably will continue, at leastear or two, to estimate the relative military capabilities of the Soviet Bloc and the US-NATO coalition substantially as described above. The Soviet leaders probably believe that general war wouldazardous gamble for them, possU bly involving the destruction of the Soviet system. On this basis, the Kremlin probably would conclude that the USSR should try during this period to avoid courses of action which in its judgment would clearly involve substantial risk of general war. The Kremlin will, however, probably continue to consider generalossibility that cannot beand the USSR will almost certainly continue to build up its military and economic strength against this eventuality. Wethat the Kremlin would not be deterred by the risk of general war from takingagainst an action by the US or its allies which the Kremlin considered anthreat to Soviet security.

the period of this estimatewill try to foster and exploitand, as opportunity offers, armedwithin the non-Communistencouraging political or economicamong them. Soviet leadersthat, by alternately easing theapplying political warfare pressuresthey can Increase the chancestime there will arise new opportunitiesstrategic advances withoutrisk of general war. Meanwhile,almost certainly continue to devotetoetter balancedmilitary strength in thc Soviet UnionSatellites.


Kremlin may continue to followits present lines of policyperiod of this estimate. However,being made by the USSR in theof nuclear weapons, and theSoviet capability to deliver thesechanging the world power situationrespects. As these Soviet capabil-

ities increase, the US Isreatwhich it has heretofore held In theUnless defensive capabilities develop beyond the degree now foreseen, both the US and the USSR within the period of thisprobably will have sufficient nuclear capabilities to cripple each other, though only at grave risk of receiving crippling blows ln return. (

rulers will almost certainlyas Soviet nuclear capabilitiesaversion of the US and of its allieswar will correspond irrglythat the Kremlin will thereforefreedom of action to pursue itswithout running substantial risk ofwar. It may employ the threat ofdevastation as an instrument ofIt may attempt to gain some ofby local military actions,that the US and Its allies will bethan before to keep such localfrom expanding into general increasingly ready to apply heavyon the non-Communist world uponof major dissension or weaknessUS and its allies. On the other hand,that the Kremlin will continue toreluctant to precipitate awhich the USSR would be subjectedattack. We believe that thewhich the Kremlin uses the increasedof action which its increasedappear to give It, and theit achieves, will depend primarilydetermination, strength, andthe non-Communlst world.

Chinese Communist Courses of Action

believe the Chinese Communistin general share these Soviet viewsworld situation and aboutmethods of advancing CommunistDuring the period of thisChina will probably beundertake courses of action which itmight Involve substantial risk ofunlimited warajormajor deterrents will be: (a) Chinato consolidate the Communist state as

well as to modernize her economy; (b) China's strong ground forces are limited In service and support units. China's expanding air force has certain limitations, and China's navy haslimited capabilities, and China will remain militarily dependent upon the USSR for logistical, air, and naval support; (c) China's Industrial centers will be vulnerable; and (d) the margin of available resources over minimum domestic requirements will beHowever. China will probably counter with military force, to the full extent of Its capability, any action which lt considers toilitary threat to its borders or to constitute an Imminent threat to Its vital Interests,tlie risks of war Inherent In such action.'

oth Soviet and Chinese Communistprobably feel that Southeast Asia offers the most favorable opportunities for Communist expansion, not only because of theof the states in the area, but because of the possibility of exploiting disagreements between the US and Its allies. Theof Communist successes in Indochina or the consolidation of present Communist gains

there would In Communist China's view open up enlarged opportunitiesorepolicy In Southeast Asia. "Chineseleaders would probably expand their efforts to subvert neighboring countries by political Infiltration and covert support oi local insurrections, but probably not by the commitment of identifiable combat units of Chinese Communist armed forces. Thewith whicholicy would be pursued would depend upon the vigor and effectiveness of non-Communist reaction.

'Tho Director ol Intelligence, USAF. believe* that paragraphhould read as follows:

"We believe lhal Chinese Communist leaders In general share these Soviet views about the world situation and aboul opportunlUes and methods of advancing CommunisUommunist China will probably not choose knowingly any course of action likely lo expose Ita fundamental naUonal strengths In warajor power However, we believe lhatChina's strength for conducting various kinds of warfare are such, and the moUvei and judgment ol its leaders are such as to make Communist China's courses of action dangerously unpredictable under outside pressure of anymagnitude."




Occupied Europe West. USSR Caucasus Central USSR Far East

Satellites (total) Albania Bulhechoslovakia East Germany Hungary Poland Rumania

Communist China North Korea Viet Minh

5 11






Divisions by Type.






3 l






ToUl L'nc Divisions Min-lQSe



3 II 14

7T 13

3 6






' Thisavalryncludesrtillery andAAavalry divisionsountainavalry division.ountain divisions.






Jet (Day)






Bomber: Jet





Medium Heavy




Medium Light

Reconnaissance: Jet








Figures include Naval Air.

SSR ngures are estimates ol authorisedtrength, except in Uw categories showing introduction ol new aire rail types, in which case* the build-up phase in new types represents estimated actual strength Present actual strength is estimated to be. lor the various types of aircraft, the following percentages oftrength:ercent. Pislonercent;ercent. Jet lightercent. Piston lightpercent. Piston mediumpercent; Tranaporpercent; Jetpercent; Plalonpercent. Bated on presenitrends. It Is considered lhat the over-all operaUonal establishment will be at aclose to full authorised aliength byhe possible effect which Introduction of guided missiles mighl have on aircraft strength In Uie latter part of the period cnnnolbe estimated.

c Actual over-all strength of European Satellite Air Forces Is estimated atf authorised strength intcicenl lorndercent lor

d Actual strength of the CCAF-NKAF il aboulercent ol authorised atrength Inlercent forndercent lor

'May includell-weather fighters

Figures lor medium and heavy bombersentative revision of previous estimates pendinganalysis of recently acquired Information See discussion in paragraph J3 The turbo-prop bomber


(old) . .








Vessels . (No substantial change

Mine these figures Is ex-

Amphlblous Vessels peeled dunng the pe-

ol this estimate.)

The table gives Soviet vessels only. TheSatellite and Communist Chineseto total Bloe naval strength will continue to be of minor Importance and the only probable additions to their strength would be by transfers from the USSR. Present European Satellite and Chinese Communist naval strength comprises six old destroyers, seven old submarines, andinor surface vessel*.

* Up to six may be Destroyer Leaders (DL),

"Up toay be Destroyer Leaders (DL).

'These estimates do not predict the possibleof older unlU. although recent evidence hasimited retirement of units constructed prior to World War II. The number of long-range submarines given0 is basedontinuation of the present building rate. If this rate continues and If thc Soviets retire all pre-World War II units byhe composition of the force will beong-range.edium,oastal.

'Aboutf these represent the two new types developed since World War II.

NOTE: Possible Capital Ship (type unknown) may be added

Original document.

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