CUBA'S NUCLEAR POWER PROGRAM

Created: 6/20/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

The Director of centralm

1

Wilioonl litf1

exectjttve brief

Cuba's Nuclear Power Program

The completion or lhe first of two Soviet-supplied nuclear reactors at Juragua will probably slip to45 because of construction and supply problems,

Webout tbe quality of the coastrocikm and more serious concerns about the ability of tbe Cubans to maintain and safely operate tbe facility over the longer term. Nonetheless, these reactors have adequate containment structures, and we believe that an accidentassive release of radioactive material Is unlikely.

The Soviets are likely to reject stopping construction of the Juragua plant, but they might be willing to slow construction to allow safety Inspections.

It Is unlikely that the Cubans could complete the Juragua reactors without Soviet assistance, but if they managed to arrange for new suppliers and advisers from other countries andakeshift facility, the prospecterious accident would substantially Increase.

We do aot believe the Soviet-supplied reactorsuclear weapons proliferation threat. The Soviets require International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on reactors and fuel they supply to other countries; the Juragua facility Is ao safeguarded.

This Executive Brief was requeued byAstisiant Secretary of Stau for Inter-American Affairs Bernard

Arotuon, It presents (he findings of Intelligence Cornmunty representativeseeting held

ta produced by lhe National Intelligence Officer fee Latin America with lhe assistance

of me National Intelligence Officer for Science, Technology, and Proliferation and the National

Intelligence Officer for USSR and coordinated with representatives ofSuae/TNR, DIA. NSA. CIA. and the

Services.

All portions cUwificd

"SEQ4EX

Castro is firmly committed to completing the two nuclear power reactors under construction at the Juragua nuclear power plant near Oenfuegos. We believe that tbe basic reactor design is sound. Tbe reactors are similar tothereactors that have been operating successfully in the Soviet Union, Finland, and East Europebe Cuban reactorsundam.er.talr/ different design from the reactor that exploded at Chernobyloreover, the Cuban reactors are being upgradedoviet-designed containment structure. They meet Soviet safety standards, though they would not fully satisfy standards enforced in tbe United States and West Europe.

Progress it the Juragua Plant

0 Cubans-includingkilled workers andworking at tbe site. Aboutoercent of the work on the first reactor complex bas been done, but even at the present rate of construction it will not be completed before the ende believe, moreover, that the completion daterobably slip to45 because of cortstruction problems, as well as more assertive enforcement of safety itaridards by Cuban officials. In addition, construction will probably be slowed by delays in shipments of parts and materials from tbe USSResult of the economic and other problems there.

oviet specialists tnduding engineers, welders, technicians, and mechanics were present when construction began at Juraguaheir numbers increased to moreast year, according to press reports, and were expected to increase further as tbe planned start-up date approached.

a large

nmnber of Soviet advisers were withdrawn from Juragua thiss not clear how this might affect the quality and pace of construct inn.

Safety Concerns

Although large numbers of Cubans have received nuclear-related fraining in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and

many have acquired practical experience working in power plants, we have tome concerns about the quality of construction and particularly about the ability of tbe Cubans to maintain and safely operate the facility over the longer term. Nuclear facilities require constant equipment checkout and preventive maintenance.

[doubted the ability of the Cubans to operate the plant and criticized their preventivepractices.

Cuban workers had caTBCOJty UncTeTstanding Soviet requirements for the reactors.

Tbe Soviets are committed to completing construction at Juragua. Moscow is still protective of its relationship with Havana and is likely to reject ending its nuclear cooperation with Cuba or its construction of the plant.

Soviet leaden hope to export to other countries nuclear power plants based on the Cuban model and have consistently defended the safety of the reactors under construction. They emphasize that Soviet experts are training tbe Cubans to operate tbe facility and will oversee the start-up, testing, and adjustment periods. They also plan to provide technical supervision to the Cubans for two years after start-up.

Because of recently revived international concerns about the safety of the Cuban reactors and sensitivities about Chernobyl, however, Moscow may agree to press Havana to purchase Western technology (some of which is protected by COCOM controls) to improve the safety of the Juragua facility.

In return, Soviet officials may expectStates to enter into athe Castro regime about tbe safetyreactors. They would hope thatwouldeneral thawrelations and possiblyUS certification of the safety of

Moscow Might Slow Down Con struct Ion

Soviet leaden may agree to deliberately slow down construction and allow an inlernational safety inspection, thus pushing the completion date into the mid-or. This would be more likely if Cuba's Caribbean and Latin American neighbors and the United States expressed strong concerns about the safety of the plant.

Soviet officials Insist that tbe reactor is safe, however, and would not agree toengthy list of safety concerns. Furthermore, we believe that on-site inspection of construction problems by objective outside observers would require as manyechnicians and expertseriod of six toonths.

If the Soviet Union terminated its support for the construction of the Juragua plant, the Castro regime would be very bard pressed to finish it. It would require advanced technology from countries with nuclear power programs.

Oechoslovakla is tbe best alternativeechnical standpoint, although Finland also could provide some technical assistance. Neither country would be likely to help the Cubans for political reasons. Even if willing, both countries probably would insist on being paid in hard currency-which Havana could not afford.

Alternatives to Soviet Assistance

Hungaryuclear power program and is active on the export front but could not by itself replicate the Soviet rok at Juragua.

China bas not yet demonstrated tbe ability to export nuclear power plants. It could supply substantial technical assistance to Havana, but It almost certainly could not complete Juragua.

Argentina and India probably do not have the appropriate technology.

North Korea is believed to beuclear weapons capability but would be unable to provide significant help to the Juragua program.

Thus, we believe, in the absence of Soviet assistance, that it is unlikely that the Cubans could cobble together suppliers and advisers from elsewhere to complete the Juragua reactors. If they succeeded in doing so, we believe that the chances of serious accidents would substantially increase.

Tbe Difficulty of Acquiring Nuclear Fuel

Even if Havana were to complete the Juragua facility-either with continued Soviet support or in some other manner-it would still have to acquire nuclear fuel to run the reactor. Moscow would be likely toeriod of safety and operational certification before shipping and loading nuclear fuel Soviet bureaucratic entities responsible for

"STfCftfiL

nuclear safety probably could block tbe initiation of the reactor until officials were convinced that the plant met Soviet safety standards. Rules aad enforcement procedures have become more stringent since the Chernobyl disaster.

Fueling the Cuban reactor couldolitically sensitive Issue in tbe USSR. Toe Soviet public some officials, aad influential spokesmen have become more concerned about nuclear safety issues,ublic debate over providing tbe fuel to Havana would be likely.

If tbe Soviets refused to supply nuclear fuel, Cuba could go toew possible alternative suppliers.

sonsignatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NrT>-would be tbe most likely supplier of fuel The PRC has exported both natural and enriched uranium in the past, but their fuel rods may not meet tbe technical specifications of tbe Juragua plant.

a The URENCO consortium (Great Britain, Germany, and the Netherlands) could supply the fuel but international restrictions aad tbeir adherencc to full-scope safeguards on their exports would preclude them as suppliers.

a France also could supply the fuel, but the French have promised to require full-scope safeguards for their nudear fuel exports.

Argentina's ability to fabricate fuel that meets tbe specifications of the Juragua plant is doubtful

Weapons Proliferation Implications

It is highly unlikely that the Soviet-supplied reactors at Juragua could be used for nudear weapons development. The Soviet Union requires that reactors and fuel supplied to other countries be placed under IAEA safeguards, subject to periodic inspections. The Juragua facility-is safeguarded

Original document.

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