IRAQ'S GROUND FORCES: AN ASSESSMENT

Created: 5/1/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

national intelligencehov

Iraq's Ground Forces: An Assessment!

memorandum

National

Intelligence

Council

3

Iraq's Ground Forces: An Assessmentp

Information available as ofn the preparation of thiswas draftedCIA. This

Memorandum was cckifughout the Intelligence Community by the National Intelligence Officer for General Purpose Forces.

iraq's ground forces: an assessment

coalition forces and ('nitcd Nations units were withdrawn.

Iraq's ground forces currently do notegional threat and are capable only of small-scale offensive operations beyond Iraq's borders. Baghdad's military couldhreat to Kuwait if

Iraq's ground forces could successfully defend Iraqi territorial integrityingle regional opponent hut would be severely strained by an attack involving more than one stale. The Iraqi mililary remains capable of suppressing internal opposition. even simultaneous rebellions b> the Kurds and the Shia following Desert

Sturm.

Operation Desert Storm significantly reduced the combat power of the Republican Guard, but the (Juard tipped the scales in favor of Saddam Husayn's regime against the insurrections in both northern and southern Iraq. The Guard remains tbe regime's principal guarantor of internal security, and Baghdad will make its recomti-

Iraq's Regular Army suffered most from Desert Storm: many divisions were virtually obliterated. Army units have fought with some success against the ill-equipped and poorly organizedmostly when stiffened by the presence of (luard units.

Iraqi ground forces already hate begun to regain some of their lost capabilities and will recover more through reorganization and repair activities. Even after the UN embargoes are lifted, however, tbe devastation inflicted on the Iraqi economy and the drain of reparations make it wilikely that Baghdad would be able to rebuild its ground forces' combat power to prewar levels until the latter half of the decade at the earliest. t

Discussion

Storm decimated Iraqi ground forces and destroyed much of their equipment Because oflogistic capabilities and command and control networks. Iraq's military is at present incapable of signincao: offensive operations beyond its borders. If all coalition and United Nations forces werefrom Kuwait, the Iraqi military could conduct offensive operations against Kuwait snch as seizing the Ar Rumaylah oilfield or Rubiyan and War bah islands. Nevertheless, the Iraqi military retainscombat effectiveness to quell insurrections and to defend Iraq's territorial integrityingle local opponent.|

Reduced Capabilities

Although Iraq's ground forces could not stop aadvance by coalition forces, favorablethe sheer size of Iraqi forces, and the limited offensive capabilities of iu neighbors suggest that Iraq still couldajor incursioningle regional adversary. The ground forces' reducedand combat strength would make defending against an attack by some combination of neighboringuch more difficult proposition for Iraq. So long as they remain focused on internal security and military reconslilution. Baghdad's ground forces also would have difficulty in preventing temporary incur-stons or clandestine infiltration of Iraqi territory from neighboring stales. I

A Smaller, Weaker Army

Iraq's combined ground forces currently consist of no moreen,rtillery pieces,ersonnel carriers. Iraq lost most of its best equipment in the Kuwait Theater of Operations (KTO).

Severely disrupted Ihe Iraqi military command and control network.

Severely damaged the Iraqi distribution system.onsequence, Iraqi units 6ghling the insurrections initially suffered from acute shortages ofand other supplies. I

At its height inhe Iraqi Army hadombat brigades, most of which were subordinate to SS toivisions. In addition, the Republican Guard comprisedrigades, most of which were under the command ofivisions. All of these formations apparently still exist, at least on paper, but some probably have been combined and others probably will be disbanded. Since the informal cease-fire onebruary, surviving units have either been fighting the insurgencies or attempting toNo moreandful of units, however, have even half their auihorizcd strength in men and equipment, and some possess lesserceni of their full strength.!

Republican Guard Weakened But Sllll Key lo Regime Security

Operation Desert Storm significantly reduced the combat power of the Republican Guard.the Guard has tipped the scales in favor of the regime against the poorly organized insurrections in both northern and southern Iraq. Elements of all eight of Iraq's original Guardbadly underbeen involved in combating the insurgenis. Overall, they have continued totheir loyalty to the regime, performing very effectively against the lightly armed insurgents and frequently succeeding where Regular Army units had failed.l

Desert Storm:

Destroyedercent of Iraq's combat power.

Significantly reduced the combat power of the Republican Guard.

After tbe invasion of Kuwait, Iraq created as many asew Guard brigades, most of them subordinate to four new Guard divisions. The fact that these new

Secret

'Three infantry1st 2nd, and 3rd Special Infantry Dimior* may haie been dbbondedraq demobilized and "ikeletonieed" approximately IS dh'iitoni iall of these division* remainedtteee tutus and were available for rapid reroobiliiation. Iraq remobilbed these uniu

' nmparatlve Iraqi Fquipmenl and Formations

0

January

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di.Uions

to

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brigade.

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Manpower and equipment narriber* are preliminaryand are subject lo ronton, they are current ai of) ol that dale, mwt Iraqi doiilom and brigades were badly underrenal h-

* Signitknnt number* are aonoperalional due to poor maintenance* age, and canolballiatlon.

" Inc'ixlei troop carrier) and other armixtc fighting >ttilelu. Does not include armored vehicle*eccoei} tchielu. imntunitkm carrier i. etc

formations did noi fight in the KTO allowed the regime to deploy them against the insurrections while the original Guard divisions regrouped. These new Guard divisions haveajor role in the regime's success against Ihe insurrection in the south. The Al Nida and Al Quds Infantry Divisions, for example, were the major forces responsible forthe Shia insurgents in Karbala1 and An Najaf. These new Guard units apparently were formedadre of veterans drawn from the original eight divisions: however, the bulk of their personnel probably are Guard reservists and new conscripts singled out as being Guard caliber.

Regular Army Badly Weakened

Iraq's Regular Army forces in the KTO suffered most from Operation Desert Storm. Many divisions were virtually obliterated by desertions and coalitionaction. Almost all of the divisional headquarters

previously in the KTO have resurfaced since the cease-fire, and many arc operating against theNevertheless, these units almost uniformly are severely under strength, and many probably consist onlyeadquartersattalion's worth of troops andandful ofas the 5lsi Mechanized andh Infantryin the northern KTO were able to escape relatively intact. These were the first Regular Army units Baghdad committed against thein the Al Basrah area.I

The Army units haveixed record lighting against the insurgents and primarily have enjoyed success when stiffened by the presence of Guard units. For example, the 4th Infantry Division, one of the best remaining Regular Army divisions, attacked the

Si

city of Karbala' and waa defeated. This forced ibe regime to send in the Guard's Al Nida and Al Qtjds Infantry Divisions and elements of the Guard Special Forces Division, which regainedof the cityloody battle.^

After the invasion of Kuwait. Iraq probably formed as many asnfantry divisions and one armoredfrom reservists and conscripts These divisions were created in several coses by combining existing independent brigades into divisional formations. Most of these new divisions were committed to the defense of the Kuwait Theater. The remnants of ihese units are generally even more under strength, under trained, and under equipped than older Army units-

Border Guards Shouldering More of the Load Tbe broad scale of the insurrection and the heavy losses sustained by tbc Regular Army and Republican Guard caused Baghdad to press its border guards into service as combat forces as ihey did in the war with Iran. Iraq currently has al leastrigades of border guards equipped initially with little more than small arms. Baghdad apparently ha* organized theseinto five division-level Border ForcesThe regime committed the border guards against the insurgents in many areas under the Border Forces Commands or existing Army commands,them where combat troops were unavailable or too few io handle tbc insurgents unassisted. Many border guard uniu now also are badly under strengthesult of combat losses against the insurgenu and desertions. |

and logistic elemenu to fight Ihe insurgents. The Iraqi ground forces will turn increasingly towardus the counterinsurgency campaign winds down in coming months. Tbc large number of surviving unit format Mm almost certainly will be prunedto consolidate troops and equipment into full-strength units. By pooling iu remaining equipment. Baghdad could reconstituteoull-strength divisions II Baghdad reduced ibe amount ofassigned pet unit, or created infantry formations with link or no armor and artillery support, it could create several dozen more, but these units would be useful mainly for internal security operations. The future organisation of the Iraqi ground lorces, bowevci, wilt dependarge degree on the lessons drawn from their Desert Storm experience and the regimes goals. Q

Even after Ihe lifting of the UN embargoes, the devastation inflicted on the Iraqi economy and the drain of reparations make it unlikely that Baghdad would be able to rebuild IU ground forces' combat power to prewar capabilities before ihe latter half of the decade at tbe earliest. Iraq's ground forces will be able to recover more of their lost capabilities quickly by reorganization and repair, bul Baghdad still would need extensive foreign ninintcnance aid because many of the major repair and replacement requirements of iu ground forces are beyond domestic competence. Iraq would bare to import large amounts ofio supply new heavy divisions. Because of Iheir critical role in maintaining ihe regime's security, the Republican Guard almost certainly will receive precedence for mililary reconstitution.|

Despite the devastation inflicted by coalition forces during Operation Desert Storm and rebellions across Iraq, Baghdad's Army has shown considerableand ingenuity in organizing iu combat forces

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