STATUS OF TALKS BETWEEN MOSCOW AND THE BALTIC REPUBLICS

Created: 5/3/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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of Talks Between Moscow and the Baltic Republics

Summary

In their renewed talks, the canter and the Balticreached tentative agreements on certainbut remain fundamentally at odds overshould be the aim of talks and whetherbe conducted outside the onerous Soviet Despite their wariness regardingBaltic leaders are likely to continue todiscussions for now, but they will probably pull outbecome convinced that Gorbachev is not seriousor if the center's continuing pressureserious unrest in the republics. For theGorbachev will probably continue to seek tohis terms and to rely on limited pressurepril agreement with Yel'tsin and other Over the next several months, however, ifas expected, continue to insist on achievingon the basisrocess very differentonerous secession law, Gorbachev might againousting tha republic governments withreal movement toward conclusionnionthe center, Russia, and other republics mightto soften his position, paving the way fora negotiated settlement stipulating thetransition to independence.

yew Negotiations

Following his failure in January to dislodge the Baltic governments with limited force, Gorbachev shifted tactics, appointing USSR deputy premier Laverov toelegation for talks with Estonia and USSR first deputy premiers Velichko and Doguzhiyev to head teams for talks with Latvia and Lithuania respectively. High ranking representatives from military, security, foreign affairs, and economic ministries war* selected as delegation members. In response, each of tha Baltic republics resurrected its own delegation which had been formed for talks late last year that went nowhere, with Estonia naming Ulgo Nugis, speaker of the republic legislature, to head its team; Latvia, Ilmars Bisers, tha republic's first deputy premier; and Lithuania, republic President Landsbergis, although his deputy Ceslovas Stankevicius sat in for hia at tha first

(bill)

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sassion. Asay, Gorbachev's teams had met withtwica, and with the Latvians and Lithuanians

Limited Progress Made

Progress thus Car has been limited to tentativeprocedural questions. The center's delegations areat leastonth withLatviancounterparts and at laaatonth withdelegation, but individual members of thacantar teams will meet regularly to discuss progressagenda items. In all three of tha talks, groupsfrom tha sides are to consult frequently tosessions involving delegation members.

[that tho Soviet delegations also

agreed witn tnexr Estonian and Lithuanian counterparts toumber of substantive issues, such as:

-- problems regarding the Soviet military praaence in the republics, military service, and maintenance of the parties' security

surveillance and maintenance of borders

ownership and operation of all-union enterprises and facilitiaa on republic territory

financial, economic, and commercial relations

rights of ethnic minorities in the republics

legal rights of the parties

Although lass is known about the specifics of theagenda,

Ithe Soviets were vary concerned about economic issues andboth sides agreed that at tha next meeting in lata May they would focua on the stabilization of bilateral economic relations and banking questions.

1 ^na^ BO ^ar certain

issues aVa not slated to oe discussed in all throe of the

talks. Estonia and Latvia, for example, secured Soviet

consent to discuss tha question of independence, while tha

Soviet-Lithuanian agenda indicates only that tha talks are

intended to redefine relations between tha republic and the

center. Only Estonia and the centar have apparently agreed

to discussvents surrounding the incorporation

of tha republic into tha Soviet Union, which are key to

Baltic claims that thay hava Continued to be legally

independent. The demarcation of borders will apparently

only be discussed in tho center's talks with Lithuania.

Toughest Obstacles Remain

Although the onset of talksmall stepolitical resolution to the conflict between tha canter and the Baltic republics, the sides remain fundamentally at odds over the ultimate objectives of the talks and over their groundrules. The Baltic republics want to negotiate their independence outside the onerous Soviet secession law. Despite tha willingness of the canter's representatives to put independence on the formal agenda with the Estonians and Latvians, the weight of the evidence suggests that Gorbachev still intends to keep the Baits in the union, or,inimum, require them to pursue independence through the secession law.

After the Estonians' second session with the

center's delegation,

the Soviets had insisted that the resolutionhe Baltic problem could only be achieved through the new union treaty now being debated, not through outright independence.

Soviet negotiators told their Lithuanian

counterparts that they intended to do all they could to persuade the republic to remain in the union and rejected Lithuanian proposals that the talks becondition that would support Baltic claims of legal independence and exemption from the secession law.

Another formidable obstacle is the center's continuing use of economic and military pressure on the Baltic governments apparently in the hope of demoralizing them without attracting significant Western response. The center's tactics have been especially tough toward the Lithuanians. In April, Soviet troops occupied at gunpoint facilities in several cities that had been taken overoviet military support group andepublic bank and the local branchentrally controlled bank that had allegedly come under harassment from republic authorities. Believing that the Estonians are more willing to compromise, the center has been least coercive toward that republic.

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prospects

despite their wariness regarding gorbachev'sleaders are likely to pursue talks in order toportrayed as intransigent and to testdesireolitical solution,

|the republic delegations will probably work on smaller issues in hopes of moving soviet counterparts toward accepting the inevitability of

independence. "example,

that the lithuanian team will first press the soviets to renounce use of force, end the occupation of lithuanian facilities, and give at least limited recognition to lithuanian passports and visas. if moscow shows flexibility on the question of independence, republic leaders may respond with significant concessions:

nevertheless, if the republics' leaders becomegorbachev is not serious about tcixs or if thetactics precipitate serious unrest inthey will probably pull out. despiteconditions, public support for holding firmdemonstrated by the results of theindependencestrong in all the agreement signed in late april byleaders of nine republics onnionindicated that the baltic and other holdoutbe forced to pay world prices for imports fromrepublics. the baits want to negotiateprior to independence that at least topreserve subsidized prices for their supplies,are prepared to pay higher prices as part of theindependence.

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In the near tern, Gorbachev will probably continue tonegotiate on bis terms while relying on limitedsuch as using Soviet force in the area togovernment operations and Baltic citizens, andinterethnic tensions. The center'sprobably make other tough demands of the Baits. Moscow will almost certainly raise the statusand surrounding areas that were part ofthe wars in serious substantive talks, at leastleverage. It will probably insist on hugepayments for its economic and militarytha republics. I '

Over the next several months, however, if the Baits, as expected, continue to insist on achieving full independence on the basisrocess very different from the onerous secession law, Gorbachev might again seriously consider ousting tha republic governments with force. Kowavar, real movement toward conclusionnion treaty between the center, Russia, and other republics might lessen Gorbachev's concern about the potential disruptive offsets of Baltic secession and almost certainly would greatly limit his ability to apply military pressure on tho Baltics. In this situation, Gorbachev might regard the price of keeping the Baits in the union as too high, paving the way for progressegotiated settlement.

The United States faces the probability of repeated flashpoints with Moscow over the Baltic issue. As long as Gorbachev and Baltic leaders remain so seriously at odds, the potential for major violence and further increased tension in the region remains high, and Baltic leaders will press hard for US political protection and help in softening Moscow's position. While Moscow has developed an increasingly thick skin toward US support for tho Baltic cause, substantial criticism of its commitment toust settlement in the region would be seen by Moscowerious irritant in the relationship.

Original document.

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