EL SALVADOR: ASSESSING THE IMPACT OF REBEL SURFACE-TO-AIR MISSILES

Created: 6/7/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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EI Salvador: Assessing the Impact

Rebel Surface-to-Air Missiles!

Summary

In our judgment, the Farabundo Mini National Liberation Front (FMLN) insurgents' acquisition of surface-to-air missiles-SA-7s, SA-Ms, Redeyes, and apparentlyrom Nicaragua and Cuba hai eroded Salvadoran military capabilities. The loss of three government aircraft lo missiles since last November has prompted the Air Force lo reduce the Dumber of sorties and limit air support to ground forces. Although the Air Force has adjusted somewhat to the threat, the use of surface-to-air missiles could significantly degrade the government '< counterinsurgency effort and give the guerrillas freer control over larger areas of the country. The insurgents intend to continue fighting while negotiating peace terms wilh the government, and some hardline FMLN units nay retain and use the missiles evenease-fire agreement is signed.

APPROVED FDR RELEASE2

I Oil

^vl0or'Air Force

yrole.nd close air suppon

Types and Numbers of SAMi

lthougheportedly were delivered lo the guerrillas in presence of SAM, in rebel hinds before J

lv fiuernlla .nveniory has grownncludeew

SA'U firin*

Wc believe ihe insurgent, have anywhere from SO toISO SAMs; the paucity of ewdenaore precise estimate. In latea vrouu

Sources of Missiles

Air Force Roporuc

Siunned by the gwtrnlna"ofnneForce drastically Cut back on

Pilot uaining in cvai.uhie iniroCucllonoT ujuiiiriifieawre lyiKmi, and tbe failere of the FMLN toit ceipiic teverai SAM finngi. oowevef. gradually reitoredhe Air Vurce aUo wu buoyed by ^formation that Ok North Koreaa-rnadeonly known SAM in Ibe tixmlla arxnal at that titne-are ooionoutiy toaccuralc.

ground fire.1

While still wary. the.Air Force has begun to recover. Recent guidelines from the Armed Forces High Command prov.dcore conservative use of aircraft lhat reduces mks; for wample. most medical evacuation and reapply missions are flown at night, and close air support is more carefully rcumsenbed. The new rules, combined wiA Air Force directives to avoid

V, SS^S^ confidence. Since November. US pilots in Panama have trainedefensive tactics against missiles, and the United Stairs has providedwcil as briefings and techr.cal data on the vanoui SAMs. In January, the Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, turned overircrafi and fiveelicopiai to the Salytdomn Air ForceeU-publicixed ceremony in San Salvador.

Nonetheless, the iniroduction of SAMs clearly has eroded some of their adyutage. Sortie rates have not returned to the levels common before the first rebel shoot-downAM. and ihe perception of marry ground force: commanders is that the Air Force has becomeWy cauuoui and less effecuve. Moreover, we believe further losses to guerrilla missiles would restart thecydeof low morale, loss of confidence, and hesiunte to fly on ihe part of Air Force pilots andtatements by Colore Maurice Vargas. Vice Chiefof Staff, categorizing the SAM threat as immmal almost certainly do not reflect Air Force thinking Snd reinforce suspicons that the High Command takes the risks |

J Ooe US and two Sehadowi etlKecttn hmbnao downrebeltch cam, ih.flying la*cetibk uuek. wrfhTbe rebdi .tau^two ofU* threeraotxrt ofSwet eWned la January. [

Implicit ioru

The use ofnd -lei by the guerrillas could significantly degradeof theouteriniurgeric, effort. Tne rebels,could encase grocM forces and (hen use missiles to ambushin for ground support. Similarly, the guerrillas could mass SAMsrwo airtwes and ruthey take off and land,

?Cwould likely adopt in even more cociervaovt; posture thereby giving the FMLN freer control overhe Air Force already his reduced flighis over territory where it beUevra

consiuerlng themselves secure from aerial attack-to mass in Utrgcr numbers in those areas. The rebels couldrolonged absence of air power by Ato (he news media or byfiringoachiing

Tbe missiles couldontinuing threat even after the government and the FMLNease-fire igrctmeni. f "

ANNEX

Insurgent Surfacc-to-Alr Missiles

Tnehean-porubte, shoulder-fired, infrareddesigned tj die Soviets inor Lie against low-flyingsystem consisue (coniiriing onenpsxock.thermal battery. The gripnock auaches to the launch lube and housesand tracking electronics as well as the firing mechanism.and guidance-cotUol electronics on the missile guide It to thefmng. Both the launch tube and the battery are expendable; thebe reused byt toired roisaue. Tbesseveral countnci other than the USSR-including China, North Korea,has been exported to more thanountries.

Several factors probably have contributed lo the insurgenu lack of success with this weapon thus tar:

Because the gunner must visually spot and identify tut target, thes limited to daylight use.

The missile basireued capability to arrack oncoming aircraft.

Thes susceptibleide range of counterm assures; flares, infrared jammers, heat-iupprcssion devices, low reflective paint, and evasive maneuvers.

Thehile similar in many respects to theheisecond-generation SAM with greater range and an enhanced ability to attack aircrafi flying in any direction, including head-on. Although flares can decoy thenfrared pulse-type Jammers currently used on some Salvadoran aircraft will have no effect on the missile. The missile is manufactured only in the USSR and Bulgana; in this fcem.iphere, it has been exported only tu Cuba and Nicaragua.

Theheuch more effecuve weapon than theadromas ocveloped. Il hu tonga range, greater accuracy, and better electronics than the older missiles, and. although it can be defeated by flares, it is not deterred by the Jammers used onaircrafi. In scene ways, theomparable to thedel US Stinger basic surface-to-air missile The SA-I6 is ekuufactjred only in the USSR and. like OKas only been exported ia Bus hemisphere so Cuba and Nicaragua.

The Redeye. The RedeyeS-manufactured, iRU-Kmblc. shoulder-fired

wKtefn0 Mt"ibeen^ratio'Si

wilh US forces for more lhan two decades and is also used by scveraJallied

Moons, Although the missile is electronically complex,esignedple. reliable operahe field, can be made ready to fire in seconds and requires little training. The missile comes encasediberglass launcher equipped with carrying strap and sight. The supersonic missile carries an tnirared sensor in its nose and homes In on the heal of an aircrafi engine. Like thecannotorrung aircraft and can be decoyed by

Training, Although the, and Redeye are relativelyan effecuvc training program for SAM gunners must usepractice the acquisition and engagement of maneuvering aircraft Cubaboth have such training devices,

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Original document.

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