structures aad toranupportagonalmutton Bothi'p^.tM theuicklym, structure based primarily oa itw interests of the region and noted ih* rMc for the UN io help create it.ASS fjyjfj
Belonogo* and Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Va'wi abo discussed Afghanistan and agreed lo exchange delegations lo eiamine the issue In ih< near IMm By the and oT March. Soviet Ambastador at Lane Koiyrev arri.ed in Tehran for hu first round of latks: he emphasized Ihal Moscow considered Iran keyny Anal political solution in Afghanistan, accordiniress reporti BBB
A Soviet radio commentarypril noted thai Iranian agreement io receive ihe Foreign Minister oflocks after US interests in Iran-signaled ihe beginning of the normalizationUS-Iranian relations aadimprove conditions ia the Gulf region. The comsMatary abo suggmcd- however, thai Tthrta wtMld not accept an enhanced US military presence In the Gulf ia ctchange for improved relations WBmm
Moscow apparently believes-ai apparency doeathe Gulf oar haa given Iran and the Sovietommon interest in limiting US Influence in the Oulf. The two countries also have found common ground In their desire lo prevent the dismemberment of Iraq, as Fravda noted during Iranian Foreign Minister Velayatii meeting with Gorbachev In mid-February. In his mid-February speech before the Supreme Soviet, Foreign Minister Bcumcrtaykh applauded Khame-Nf'i nscrilon thai ih* Oulf war -asight between Muslims and non-Muslims and appearedhis as rridenee that Tehran -ai moderating iu funds me nial is: position.
So.ni-Iranian cooperatioaew levels during the Gulf ensu,read thai began9 Moscow drew upon Tehran's goodwill in allowoviet specialists and Embassy employees to leave Iraq by traveling overland ihrough Iran. The Soviei leadership quickly dispatched Bclonogovehraa in early February to consult with Iranian leaden on Iran's pcaca initiative and to re-iterate Moscow's desire lo play an active role in medUiina^MUkrnemJ
, sviat civilian
cspons to Iran increased threefold to0 million ia
Moscowove agg wely io further strengthen iu tica to Iraa this year by stressing mutual interest ia keeping foreign military forces out of the Gulf aad Moscow's desire for
Iranian panicipeUM in aay postwar multilateral security syitcm to try to reduce US influence in ihe Middle Easi. Moscow win continue io offer to Mil large amounts of advanced weaponry toT-7Igain hard currency and favor with Tehran. Despite Moscow's support for arms conirol in th* region. Soviet offlciab will most llktly argue lhat these arms arc defensive and that any limits on them should be partultilateral agreencluding all sellers, not ,usi the USSR. Moscow also probably hopes that better relations will restrain Tehran from fomenting unrest in the USSR's Muslim dominated south-era repc- gajfj
The Sovicli will continue lo enlin active Iranian participationolitical seitlemenl of Afghani!lan. Moscow probably hope* to undericore Ihc needegional solution lo Ihe Afghanistan problem and further limit US leverage. Moreover, the Soviets believe Tehran may be able to help gain ihe rcleaie of Soviet POW'i in Arghaniilan faTfl
Nonetheless, Moscow will alio have Io be wary lhat improving relation! with Tehran too quickly will undermine other Soviet effort* in ihe region. The SovieU undoubtedly understand thai the Gulf Arab itaiea will fear significant Soviet rearmament of Iran. Moscow probably hope* lhateutrality during (be Gulf criiii will lessen ihc Gulf countries' fears of Iranian hegemony and allow the Sovieu to punue good relation! wilh all aides. To reassure ihc Arab states and io help maintain the balance of power In the region, the SovieU will ureas Iraq'sInlcgrity.HH
Original document.
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