USSR: BREAKUP OF THE EMPIRE

Created: 8/26/1991

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Special Analysis

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Failure of Ihe coup has dramatically accelerated the democraticrevolutions in the USSR. Breakup of the Soviet empirerapidly, and achievement of even the qualified federalbyeek ago is now beyond reach. Secession ofrepublics, the transformation of Russia, Ukraine,nto largely independent states, the replacement of the once

centralized economyoluntary economic union, and

formationesidual central political authority with limited functions and power are all likely in the near term. Breakdowns of social order are probable, but most leaders are working to guide this process in an orderly fashion.

The Democratic Revolution

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iheir actions, the coup plotters created the opportunity for the stunning triumph of Ihe Russian democrats and dclcgitimizcd the core of traditionalist extremism. At the same time, the complicity of the Communist Pany apparatus in the coup has made ihe rapid meltdown of the pany irreversible. These developments have eliminaied the basis for effective traditionalist opposition to reform. They, together wiih measures now being taken to establish firm control over the army and the security services, reduce fear thai military force or police action could be used against the democrats in Russia or to proicci imperial interests in ihe non-Russian republics.

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Nationalist Revolution

Yel'tsin is exploiting the current vacuum of power at the center to equip his government with the authority and resources necessary to rule Russia. He is in effect taking into receivership various assetselegilimized and immobilized Soviet Governmentransfer of functions to the Russian Republic, direct intervention in all-union agencies, and the filling of key posts in the central government wiih his own people. I

Yel'tsin's record and his current suppon of Baltic independence suggest that his aim is not to reassen Russian imperial dominion but to advance the interests and welfare of Russia. Nevertheless, the

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of Russia unleashed by ihe coup failure has heightened fears in ihe non-Russian republics of Russian hegemony and undoubiedly will spur national.

Other republics are rapidly declaring independence, seizing control of union assets, moving toward ihe creation or expansion of national armed formations, and neutralizing their own Communis! parties. The most important instance is Ukraine's declaration of independence and nullification of the USSR Constitution on Ukrainian territory,not yeta watershed event thai renders highly unlikely Ihe establishmentederal USSR, whatever happens in Moscowj

The nationalist revolution places ihe task of slate building on ihe immcdiaie agenda of all ihe republics. Acceptance of Baltic independence is certain, whether Gorbachev agrees quickly or not. No basis of support remains forepressive Soviet military presence in Azerbaijan, and without this. Communist rule there will be replacedegime committed io independence. In Central Asia, ihe status quo will crumble, as these republics begin their own voyage of political self-discovery. New ethnic violence in Central Asia and the Caucasus and further forced migration are sirong possibilities and may revive ihe danger of an authoritarian reaction. Expanding external activities by the new slates will complicate regional geopolitics in Europe and Southwest Asia.

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Center

Discussions among the republics about their future relations will resume, but ihe contexi now is radically changed. Before the coup, constraints on the writ of the Russian government, the strong residual authority of the Soviet Government, and apprehensiveness about instability and military* interventionompromise union treaty providing for still significant central power an attractive path for Yel'tsin to enhance Russian authority. For otherespecially in Centralof the old draft promised access to subsidies and sociopolitical stability. Now, the sharp reduction in the center's authority makes such concessions unnecessary for Yel'tsin and will change the other republics' views of what sort of center they might buy into. J

Agreement among interested republics probably lies in accepting the distinction between economic and politicalstep Gorbachev has strongly resisted. Most republics could agree to join

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kind of economic union. Some probably will find il in their interest tonion political authority with jurisdiction sharply limitedewof all securityit would share with the republics and exercise under their supervision. Such an arrangement wouldtrong Russian role.l

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The new military leadership will clean house quickly and solidify its operational control over all central military forces. It will move, in discussions with republic leaders, io clarify authority over central forces stationed in republics now declaring independence and over emerging republic forcesJ

The coup has thrown economic policy making into chaos. Although the assertion of republic sovereignty may improve reform prospects in Russia and some other republics, it will severely impede restorationnified economic space exceptommon market basis once participating republics have established their own statehood. Rising trade barriers among republics will compound the unemployment problem lhat will be generated by rapid marketization, producing new instability.y

The Soviet military-industrial complex hasritical reversal because of its links to the junta. General Shaposhnikov and other military reform advocates in the Ministry of Defense will move to assert greater control over weapons acquisition and delivery. Direct control of resources by the republics and marketization will accelerate defense spending cuts and dismemberment of military industry.

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Silayev Russian Republic Premier, Chairman of Interim Committee To Manage Soviet Economy

Gorbachev yesterday named Silayev to chair committee to organize management of USSR's nationalis deputies include Arkadiy Vol'skiy. reformist chairman of Scientific-Industrial Union and Gorbachev confidant, and free market economist Grigoriyilayev will seek other free-marketeers for new USSR government, but committee's members all will be engineers accustomed to central planning, with no experiencearge economy.

issued decrees severely weakening ooviei government's control over Russian Republic'sill focus on stepping up privatizationood relations with Yerlsin for two0 appointment as premier, had served almostears in dcfcnse-indusiry

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