Yel'tsin's Political Objectives (u)
Yel'tsin's Political Objectives
Judgments
itaS* at aflS1 wai Hi nf ia this itport.
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Yel'tsin's goalsoherent Russian democratic alternative lo Ihe imperial authoritarianism of the traditionalists. These goals include promotion of the material well-being and moral regeneration of the Russian people; an approach to marketization that is little different from capitalism: constitutional democracy; national self-determination; and insistence on nonviolent solution of societal conflicts. Yel'tsin understands how these goals are interrelated and what their implications are. and he has integrated them closely with strategies of implementation. Moreover, in test situations he has consistently pursued them in practice, even at substantial political cost. The often-heard charge that Yel'tsin is an unprincipled opportunist whose future behavior is thoroughlyis not borne out by his actions. J
Yel'tsinajor part in turningituation that looked grim in January, and he has made significant steps toward realizing his strategic objectives. He has helped avert repression of the democrats by Soviet military and security forces and has initiated processes that may in time give the Russianhare of control over military and KGB elements based in the Russian Republic. He has overcome traditionalist resistance to creation of the post of an elective president of Russia and looks nearly certain to become the first such president. He has also had some success in beginning to build Russian Republic power in the economic sphere. Finally, he has apparently managed to maintain momentum in cementing "horizontal" ties between the RSFSR and other republics despite differences of political and economic interests with variousand their leaders.^
Once he is clccicd president of Russia. Yel'tsin will seek to move ahead with rapid marketization in an environment of accelerating economic chaos, social turmoil, and political struggle with the Communist Party apparatus. He has expressed interest in Ihc talks now under wayajor, "Marshall Plan" type of Western assistance package in return for radical economic reform and might welcome IMF condiiionaliiy that placed some of the responsibility for painful steps on someone else's shoulders. He is certain to emphasize that aid should be channeled primarily through Ihc republics and to specific projects, not open-endedly to ihe center.
Yel'tsinundamentally reconstituted, decentralized unionbelieves this is in Russia's interest. Bul his approach to Ibe unionudgment Ihal non-Russian nationalismeality thaidisappear, thai attempts to suppress ii will be counterproductive,such attempts will spread repression to the RSFSR and haveconsequences. The "order" and "stability" projectedGorbachev's vision of ihe unionin Yct'isin's
unstable because il denies ihe striving for national self-determination. True stability now will come onlyenuinely voluntary association of republics, and this inevitablyajor devolution of power and acceptance of secession for those union republics that want il. |
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How to handle nationalism isardinal concern of the ccnlral and Russian governments. The problem is how toourse between the re-imposition of repressive imperial rule and the possible "Lebanoni/ation" of the Soviei Union.ey aspect of (his problem is (he "autonomics"in the RSFSR. This spring, in attempting to stop Yel'tsin, Gorbachev and his allies were preparedhile lo applyhe Russian Republic the "divide and conquer" tactic of exploiting minority nationalityalready practiced by (hero io ihe non-Russian republics. Bythe possible separate membership of current "autonomous" ethnic components of the RSFSRuture "renewed" union, they were in effect calling into question the territorial-administrative integrity of the Russianinvitation to endless cthnoviolence. Al the moment il appears that Gorbachev and Yel'tsin may haveompromise political solution to the problem. Gorbachev himself may either have come to appreciate the danger of playing with fire, or simply have been forcedive in to reach accord with Yel'tsin and olher republic leaders onpril in the "nine-plus-one" agreement. Nevertheless, (be "autonomies" issue willossible source of major trouble in Ihe RSFSR for the foreseeable future.
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even more explosive dimension of the "Lebanon" problem for Soviet leaders is protecting Russian and olher minorities living outside Iheir "native" republics. Success or failure on this score will go far toward determining whether endemic communal violence is the future of Eurasia, or whether there will comeore peaceful dismantlement of the empire and the establishmentelatively large and siable successor formation lo the present USSR. One approach, toward which Gorbachev has leaned, is the wager on external intimidation, provocation, and limited intervention. Yel'tsin argues that this tactic will not work, offering instead an approach based on legal protection of minorities Ihrough treaties signed between republics. Such an approach, which accepts rather than denies republic sovereignty, offers at least ahedealing with
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ethnic minority problemay that docs notycle ofretaliation, and Bight of refugees. The costs of miscalculation and failure here are very high indeed, for (he West as well as Moscow.
How the process of arrivingew division of power in the USSR comes out will be determined above all by negotiations between republic leaders and Gorbachev begun onpril, which arc intended to lead to signaturenion treaty. These negotiations represent the most recent and important elementtrategic retreat by Gorbachev to positions that may permit him to defend his type of union and the "socialist choice" more effectively than would continued adherence to inflexible unitarism.apparently made this latest move because he had become convinced that he would have no chance of preventing economic disaster and social upheaval unless he obtained cooperation from (he republics and aid from the West While Yel'tsin came out somewhat ahead, perhaps, in the Joint Statement ofpril, much of what he claims to have gotten from the talks took the form of promises not recorded in the text. Gorbachev has not agreed with Yel'tsin's characterization of the talksorm of "round-table" negotiation, and Yel'tsin's success will depend greatly on the results of the hard bargaining that lies ahead.
Yel'tsin's Political Objectives (U)
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Mote lhan any current leader, Boris Yel'tsin has inspired passionate feelings of approval or reprobation among Soviet elites. His supporters sec him as the best hope for democracyeaceful dismantling of the Soviet empire. They acknowledge certainflaws, his socialization in the authoritarian milieu of the Communist Party apparatus, and his penchant for impetuous action at home andabroad; bul they point to his capacity to learn, to maneuver skillfully in the new Russianarena, and to assemble and listen lo colleagues and advisersthose of Mikhail Gorbachev. Yet. even among those closest to him programeally and politically, some areby what they see as his readiness to compromise unwisely. Others have doubted his commitment to democratic values and detected lurking authoritarian tendencies. Yel'tsin's pastommunist Party boss, and fear of an unhealthy yearningtrong leader they attribute to the public at large, weigh heavily on the thinking of this
Most of the journalistic and analytical attention devoted to Yel'tsin has focused on his personality, his conflict with Gorbachev, and his tacticalhis larger-than-life persona and remarkableodysscy invite this. Yet, important as tbe person-ality and behavioral issues are, no less important are Yel'tsin's goals andtend to bet is this dimension of Yel'tsin that led President Nixon to observe lhat the biggest surprise of his recent trip to ihe USSR was Yel'tsin, whom be found toan of keen understanding andto reform. The present paper takesiven lhat Yel'tsinomplex individual who is personally ambitious, egocentric, impulsive, perhaps insecure, and sometimes difficult to deal with, and concentrates instead on his political objectives. Contrary to tbe stereotype, Yel'tsin does have goals (hat he has been consistently pursuing, and strategies for realizing them. These arc important not only because they drive his actions, but also because they reflect in broadoherent Russian democraticto the imperial authoritarianism of theI
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criticize Yel'tsin as overly ambitious,volatile, intellectually shallow, politically opportunistic, and lacking in any stable policybesides opposition to the powcrs-that-be. Some argue that heloset Russian chauvinist who will reveal his true colors once he has the opportunity of replacing Gorbachev. Most of his critics characterize as "demagogy" what is seen by large numbers of ordinary citizens as lhat rarest of qualities among Soviet politicians, the capacity to speak (be truth. Weighing heavily on the thinking of detractorsossible future of popular upheaval andretribution they believe they see reflected in the image of Yd'uinjB
Goals
Yel'tsin's public statements over the past year, bis political behavior, and intelligence informationthat he has been pursuing four or five major interrelated political)
Russian Welfare
Yel'tsin's paramount objective has been to promote the material well-being and moral regeneration of the Russian people living within the boundaries of what is so* the Russian Republicis brand of Russian nationalism does not seek to impose Russian domination on neighboring countries or on the other republics, not to discriminate against (he non-Russian nationalities living in the "autonomous" ethnicand elsewhere in thealthough it doca imply the incorporation of the "autonomies" within an integral "Rusuan" federation. Yel'tsin's promotion of Russian welfare means rejecting the burden of empire; where conflicts of economic interest among the republics are concerned, it opposes "subsidiang" other republics at the expense of Russia. Internally, the goal of Russian welfare means more butter, fewer guns; externally, it implies integration with the West.
Effective Marketization
Yel'tsin's record of supportapid approach to marketization involving major privatization and not simply "dcsiatization" is clear. He barked the Shata-lin Flan, and he helped push through the Russianaw on Undownervhip. which while not as radical aaajor breakthrough. He has been campaigning vigorously for the establishment of private farms He ha* avoided bashing the co-opss supporting the legal reform necessaryarket economy, and has encouraged the creation of free economic zones in various parts of the RSFSR. He has supported joint ventures with the West. And he is currently pushing, with Chairman of the Russian Council of Ministersenewed radical markeiizaiion initiative keyed to enireptencurship |
Political IMM
Yel'tsin's critics, who accuse him of seeking tothe union of Soviet republics, arc both right and wrong. Yel'tsin believes that Ihe existingeprcsenled by the present power structure In Moscow
IUI and the central economic and securitybased on coercion, is incompatible with theRussia and other Soviet nations, and is doomedsooner or later by ibe dynamic* ofHe wants to liquidate ihii unionhe also favorsew political unioncertain conditions. The building block ofis the "sovereign" republic/state,agrees lo associate itself withompact formed by agreementelected governments of theunion Ii formed "from the bottom up."of ihe union authority at thel by ihc member states and areThe nature ofnion, implicitly,Yel'tsin has avoidedterminologyI ill
Workable Deatocracy
From Yel'tsin's perspective, establishing democracy in Russia and the union requires first dismantling the Siill-existing totalitarian political structures andihe traditionalist forces thatbeen intent on destroying him and his pluralist allies. Yel'tsin's subjection of himself to three elections already is prima facie evidenceommitment to democracy more impressive than that of leaders who have avoideda lest. Yel'tsin has, lo be sure,eadiness io exploit tbe opportunities provided by an embryonic parliamentary culture to weaken his opponents, but probably not as much asas Chairman of the USSR Supreme Sovietk'yanov. The special provisional powers he sought and obtained early in April, which his enemies claim areave controls on them and are noi comparable to those enjoyed al ihe union level by Gorbacbev. And his approach toihc central and local government of Russia indicates an appreciation of ihe need to balance strongereadership and hierarchicalwith enhanced democratic checks and bal-anccs and institutionalization of tbe rule of law.
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Nonviolence
Crosscuiting his olher major political goalssystematic commilmenl to avoidingseeking consent in ihe solution of societal prob-
rS lems. From his standpoint, state violence andgenerally have highly counterproductive ef-
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Strategies
Yel'tsin has pursued strategic objectives thai follow logically from the goals sketched above. Grouped under the appropriate goals, these strategies are as follows:
To promote markelization:
Liquidate the central command-economic bureaucracy through fiscal noniupport and avoid re-creationimilar structure at the republic level.
Use taxation and other financial mechanisms to steer the economy.
Pursue rapid privatization ofegulated and democratic process rather than through spontaneous arrogation of property by Communist Party officials and incumbent economic managers.
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promote Russian interests:Seek to reconfigure the unionoluntary
ederal solution to the problem of "autonomous" ethnic componenls in theRepublic.
Transfer ownership of natural wealthominant degree of government supervision of the economy from the center to the republics.
Shift resources from military spending to consumption.
Reduce Russian Republic transfer payments lo other republics and channel them directly to recipient republics ruthcr than throughrder lo enhance Russian negotiating leverage.
Gear foreign policy initiatives to the promotion of Russian "sovereignty" without feedingsuspicions lhat ihe Russian government is "breaking up" the union, emphasize ihecomponent of foreign relations; aadgeographically on three concentric fields of activity: the other republics of the USSR; East Central Europe (includingChina. Japan, and South Korea: and the United States.
End government price setting exceptery small class of goods; rapidly allow market-determined prices,
Encourage foreign sellers to enter the domestic marketeans of combating monopolistic pricing.
Seek to retain existing inlerreptiWic production tics and expand the "common economic space" by distinguishing between economic union and political union and encouraging the former without requiring ihe latter.
encourage economic lies to iheo promote new political union:
to assert the principle of republic sovereignly.'
' Ycritin ha* omtnoi met oat. Rhumb OTTrritnlr. bul iho ibatcaberoiliW principle sndertjuf tbe Stilthe fMidy%mt Mibe ku ecfotiaicdcahtrFor IfcriifiiaM. Yailua'tin ia NwnWeiiracrdiaatj tyibiinbetaxBoatraetnine ji ibr fciilor) IhalRuiuan hod of itaie hadof the Llraina and Rwuia Mora recently,Ln laich ihe Geo>|iin leader Zvladlo cooperate in pacifying unlawful fcemaiaoni oaof the foiaisio.ih Owtianpremiicdmertuniy deipiir prtdici-
political fallout huiiite lo Yrl'uln aciou the beriSer in IheiianW ihi Roiiim Kcfvblic and among other* in RSriK BBBBBBBBBl
Accept secession thai is supported byepublic's population and demanded by the republic's legitimate government, and move on to economic and other forms uf cooperation.'
Deal with the "minority" problematter of second-order importance. Renounce transre-public intimidation to "defend" minorities, and rely instead on bilateral treaties amongto protect minority rights.'
Develop "horizontal" political and economic tics between the RSFSR and other republics.
Seek to prevent the cenler from dominating the framing of the union ttcaly, and insist on final approval of the treaty by the supreme elected republic aulhoi illca.
Gain agreement between the center and the republicsivision of powers and property before signature of the treaty.
Create the postopularly elected president of the RSI SR lo serveocal point for tbe assertion of Russian national interests.
"mmediate reipnnic io ihe Bain crick down in January wu to go to Eitonia and ngn eknumtnu thai is effect publicly rrjiiru'ct BiIik independence He accepted ihe deciiioc uf legally elected repieieniativeinal. Thai Map forcseeably (molted major political coau for him heavy triik'itmmilitary; altacJu oa Mi pttrlouun bt RuMiane in the RSFSR; md criet ol betrayal from lomt Ruaaiana living In ibe Baltic repobTict.
nth imptiea four imperaiiici- (I) attempt loil* ruHui.jii tepubllcs of Ihe RSfSR'i good faith by accepting thenndeprndetue/Mtcreicnty and by accept,ng eiBimieek to protect RuvUn minority lighti by cEtTcuchinc themNigalkoof bilateral uretiri between the RSFSR and eabn rcpaMtcs. and uaereaty nghu caceeetiiw the calmaticrtb In the RSISRitomn eoBuQwuc leverage as aalaI atienre uaaiiM 'be Ratal minority that the Itltiy ntncit of aa attempt to defend their ittta* thrcugh force Bill be an imensB-ciiiun ofperioration. bfciriilud. and-theiright a* refugee! back to Ruuia;ry to head off provocation and omnia ihsi will undeiminc ihe rxuibillt)eaceful, neiotiatedaaaaj
toairly weak,leadership structure al the center in the new union.
To promoie democratization:
Ward off repression by the army and security sen'ice*.'
Gradually establish some RSI"SR control over military. KGB, and MVD forces based in Russia.
access by democrats to radio and TV.
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' MWh of YeltiVi lutui be banc* between Jiaaary aad April iwi cib beaiitcd by percece-ont ttaditiccjloo. abetted by Gorbachev, wen coadwcliag eecbtai'ited attact itahnl him and it* other democieta. tbe outtcne cf *hka -ai Picfjuccii in ibehysicalended, and byot entirely clear- illhouab contideiablc oideMC dora rapporl (he propontiun that there vnw planning for such anWhei iahai therenam media campaign charging YeTuialeakingem-fcer Iheonceniraud effort to deny icceti by democrat* to the media; moblliiaiioB uf upecottion lo Vet'tun "iihin key bureon-cmciet. especially ibe military and the RGB. ttimulMioo of upptnitioB to Velumthe Ruaaian Congreu of Peoples Deptitici and Supreme Soviet, nctivnilon of efforti by provincial organi ofilan Contmunlit Partyndtttai Yet'tiin and demociultc forces; varxim domeitic KGB operation- to imdeimiDC Yel'uin and hnanipulation of poliiici in IheegMmieaken Ihe political cohesion ol the RSFSR; and the conduct of "active meataiea" abroad dnignrd lo vriken foreign
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the mechanisms of residualParty control over the Soviet system through liquidating Ihe parly structure in key security bureaucracies and even workplaces in general, terminating combined occupancy of party and stale leadershipndfractionation within the party membership at large.
Accelerate ibe removal of traditions lists from elective office at all levels of authority: union, republic, and local.
Introduce direct popular election not only of the Russian president, but abo of the chairmen of Soviets at all levels. This Hep would stiffen resistance to Communist attempts to reassert lateral control over government bodies and strengthen responsiveness by these localto laws enacted by the Russian government.
Butld pressure for real power sharing between Gorbachev's regime and pluralist forces insociety iJJJJJ
Yel'tsin's Achle.enwnM
Yel'tsin hasajor pari In turningituation that looked forbidding in January and has made some progress toward realizing his strategicapart from the gains that flowed from the process initiated by ihc Joint Statement of nine republic leaders and Gorbachev onpril. Of five major achicvcmenti this spring that Yel'tsin can poutey one in his eyes is probably helping avert large-scale repression of ihe democrats by Soviet military and security forces Bj
Closely associated with this achievement is his success in initiating processes thai may in time give the Russianhare of control over military and KGB forces based in ihe Russian Republic. In late January Yel'tsin managed to gain tbeof Col Gen. Konalanlineputy chief of the General Staff and RSFSR people's deputy, as
chairman of Ihe new RSI SR Council of Ministers State Committee for Defense and Security. Along with this appointment went agreement in principle by the center to allow Russia (and other republics) to participate in certain functions heretoforeby unionalks that had been going on for some months between Yel'tsin and KGB Chairman Kryuehkov and between Yel'tsin's security adviser. Col. Gee Dmitriy VoUogooov. and Kryuch-kov over shining KGB asseU to RSFSR control culminatedreliminary agreement signed by Yel'tsin and Kryuchkovayussian Slate Securityareer KGB officer. Maj. Gen. Viktor Ivancnko. wis appointed acting head of this new "union-republic" (that is. jointly subordinated) body. Commentary suggested that basic issues of defining "security" andpowers and functions between the RSFSR and union KGB organization! remained lo be settled.
Yel'tsin's third urea of achievement lay in hissuccessful campaign to overcome traditionalist resistance lo creation of the post of elective president of Russia, and to what now appears io be his near-certain success in gaining election as president The legitimacy he will gain wilh election, and the major powers with which ibe position has now been vested by law. should give him significant new leverage to accomplish his objectives. I
Grarrala..rf eWary thai
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I SSR sccuiiir. cf i'.iiFf defenaa and iht lenkuhtp ol ibe LSSR wed fcrca tad USSR frtcOatoopt, mural
m! i'"mldeii*"ri|lod concluding peaci tie
McluiivTlyiht USSR'sut ihe icpublx* wcii Id enjoy competencepaitxipatlng in "ttabniaiiae union's miiiiaiy policy, implrnwalingrania and ensure defense, retailing questions of ihc deployment and activity of ironps and miliuiy Installations oa their republic's territorv,nibed pioccdiirt for (he draft ind th* perfomttnee of miliuryganiilna ibt national tciwmy's prtparaiMn for mobiliiaiioB. shaping Iht union's defense budgei. and allotting material and technical mniiA fnt defenseja_
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Yel'tsin hat aUo had iomc success in beginningRussian Republic power in (he economicforced the center to allow the Russian Republicits own budget and retain major taxhas increased Russia's input to spendingassuming financial responsibility for fundingeducation and science programs and bya greater voice in allocating funds forSoviet troops in the republic. And hissome union enterprises, includingmetallurgical plants and mines, to "defect"jurisdiction even before the miners'resolution of (hat strikeey sector industry (together with its massive financial and social
uui*nInd accelerated the jj| ' Transfer process in other sectors as well |
Finally, Yel'tsin has apparently managed toin cementing "horizontal" tiesRSFSR and other republics. There havein these relations, reflecting theand economic interests of varioustheir leaders in such areas as budgetaryprice increases, and the status ofThere was sharp disagreementdemand onebruary forand transfer of power to theYet by May it seemed thai Yel'uinto reach substantial agreement on thefuture unionthekey republics (the Ukraine.l
Tbe balance sheet oo Yel'tsin's recent achievements ultimately depends, however, on one's view of what be gained and conceded in the process that began with the Joint Statement ofpril, which is intended to lead to signing of the union treaty in July. Yel'tsin's critics on the democratic side have attacked him for endorsing an agreement Ihal. they say. sacrifices the workers' movement (by incorporating an aniistrikereserves the command economy, commits the RSFSR lo cough up funds for (he ccn(er mainlyupport military spending, and guarantees retention of power by Gorbachev and his teamotentially endless "Iransllion" period all for smoke fromYel'uin, not surprisingly, pictures himself as winnci HHbV
In the text of the agreementorbachev did gel important up-front commitments by the republics lo lake near-term action lhat the center desperately wanted, primarily in the economic sphere: to fulfill their obligations to the all-union budget and extra-budget funds: to support "aniicrisis" measures; to consentspecial work regime" in key sectors of the economy; and to agreean on strikes and on incitement of civil disobedience and appeals for the removal of the USSR Government. He also got the symbolic concession of inclusioneference to bis referendum on the union.
On his part, Yel'uin got from the text of theat least Gorbachev's implicit agreement on three important issues: that there would be no impositioniate of "presidential rule" while the union treaty was being negotiated; that Gorbachev would reverse bis attempt lo weaken the Russian government's hand by playing the "autonomies" card; and thatwould no longer insist on the priority of USSR law over republic law, Yel'tsin also got two major symbolic concessions in the text: acknowledgement of republicnd use of (he word "state" in place of "republic" in the title of tbe proposed agreement. He also got promises by Gorbachev of actiononger tune horizon that oould have profound consequences: namely, "radicalof the union republics'estructuring of the USSR Government with national elections, contingent on signature of the union treaty. |
It has also been argued, not least by Yel'uin, that Gorbachev committed himself verbally at thepril meetingumber of other poinu, including: (he sovereignty and right to secede of ihe six republics that chose not to sign the agreemenl; nonintervention by the center in (he internal affairs of republics; acceptance of the needivide property between the republics and the cen(cr; an accord on dividing up hard currency and gold reserves; the need for republic
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Spf-tex
agreement with decisions by the center lo issueassignment lo republics of the rightlicensing of products for export; the rightto retain bard currency earned onno hindrance to enterprises shiftingepublic subordination; and the mht of
I.IIcMtWIVr! republics lo adopt their own prof rams ofion. |
In tbe time that has elapsed sincepril itapparent that Gorbachev has indeed givenand Yel'tsin has made some gains, but itbecome clear that the sides stillon where the whole process is leading,questions are still undereeting between Gorbachevrepublic leaders onay suggests that Iheof the division of powers between Ihe centerrepublics, the center's capacity to tax. and the
(talus of Ihe "autonomies" in the future union arc still un resolved
political strategies andinally. Yel'tsin has repeatedlyillingness to seek compromise, whether the issue has been dealing with the slrikers. the extent of Russian presidentialthe transfer of powers from the center to the Russian government, or even the final character of the future jnict.|
Second, as Yel'uin himself asserts, his achievemenu and those of the Russian democrats this spring have been based to no small degree on the deterrent influence on traditionalists of mass organizedto the center, and their fear of what might follow. Demonstrations in support of Yel'uin. such as that ofarch in Moscow, were significant. But it was clearly Ibe persistence of the coal miners' strike, and the strike activity in Minsk, that brought home to traditionalists the magnitude of repression that would be requireduccessful "crackdown" and theandwould have to be
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for Yel'tsin's Success
The critical factor behind Yel'tsin's relative success this past spring has been the great political skill be has displayed in building popular support for his cause, maneuvering in what initiallyighly adverse parliamentary situation, rallying democratic forces, dividing his opponents, and capitalizing on counterproductive moves against him by theHis charisma, candor, capacity to cornmumcate credible moral outrage, empathy with theand ability to elicit public sympathy for hit own perceived human weaknesses arc well-known aspects of his leadership. Less obvious but veryhas been his ability to combine accurate political analysis, clear thinking about his objectives, and political strategy. Yel'tsin haaeen and hardheaded understanding of the shifting political dynamics of the domestic environment in which he has been operating. This realism, in turn, hasto an appreciation of ihe intcrdependency of goals thai provides coheicncc and balance to his
Third, Yel'uin was aided in no small measure by the intrinsic weakness of the traditionalisu. their lack of popular legitimacy, Iheir absenceompetitive program and strong leadership, and their own inner divisions. This weakness was graphically displayed at the CPSU Central Committee plenum in late April when the Latvian Communist Party boss Alfredfriend of
'Aof Yrl'tsin'i
calct hiiof theTfT>ta>inSol|iiTii jud analysis: HjOne eannoi promote Riuilanwlihcwl la)ie butdea ot tmplie, (b| maiketuing the eeooomv. and(c) rotllr.fi oUiur>et. tJloa* ctnaol mart*tin if one does ne* ul diunantk tbe Sialism intern andlimate af tecalitf. (b) cut bad the mibury-iftdaitna! ccenplet. Ic) rcactae societal probkmsnd id! aiia Wrawrn ecavmic, one ctiaa achieve neanioknt udttkaw to recil ptoHeaa Whew ta) ebananaiianj iculitariaa wacurrea.a* nkauiy tex-'u'Ha of ethnic CKanfacat. and <cl ueptcwbj Iniagne Ganaca ica-oereaohatioa ca* erhrac cutflxti aubcul (ai iciuiee iilfrin.irpliei (bi jccer'i'i ihe seceuam of ihcm reptNio thaito mede.ne cannot conductclation* that lUieavsfuJIt prcenecc Ruaiaa welfare "iihuut ta) (taraetiratui. (b| democratiraiion, (e) noaaiolcnt solution uf aocietal itanat, and (dlresolution ot ethnic <
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"Mikhail Sergeyevich's departure from cither of the posts he holds would lead to the devastation of Ihe Communist Party in the countryo the revivalational bourgeois dictatorship in ihe republic and the completion of the restoration ofravda article onardline secretary of the Russian Communist Party, Alcksandr Mel'nikov, observed: "The situation within the CPSU is,critical. The poisoned fragments of politicalare doing their work. Organizationally the party bas been reduced to the state of 'jelly'. There is no end lo the breaches of partyel'nikov may well have had in mind the formation by Col.RutskoyCommunists for Democracy" faction that helped fracture ihe Communist vote and promote Yel'tsin's stralegic victory at the Third RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies in early April.
Fourth, Ycl'isins success has hinged on theshown by other republics lo protect their ownor example, despite conflicts ofand ambition with Yel'tsin, the Kazakh leader Nazarbayev recently criticized Gorbachev for the "dishonesty" of bis attempt to manipulate theissue against the Russian leadership (which also cul against the interests of the otherel'tsin has stated on several occasions recently that the solidarity of Russia and the other fourey role in forcing Gorbachev toat his meetings with republic leaders onpril anday.J
A last factor, but not the least, in explaining Yel'tsin's achievements has been an evolving recognition by Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders of themass repression istrategic retreat to positions that may permit them to defend their type of union and the "socialist choice" more effectively. Thus, behind the Kobets appointment as chairman of the RSFSR Stale Committee forand Security in January evidentlyolicy decision by Gorbachev, Minister of Defense Yazov, and Chief of the General Staff Moiseyev to seek to preempt the creation of republic armies and achieve military objectives by agreeing to the formation of these republic committees,ertain division of power between republics and the center in military affairs, and to the creation of "defense councils" at
the republic and local levels chaired by republic presidents and chairmen ofhe preemptive motive is probably even stronger in the decision to permit the crcalionussian KGB. Kryuchkov has made no secret of his intention tonitary security system, and this objective is clearly expressed in the Law on Stale Securily Bodies signed by Gorbachev onay: "The USSR Stale Security Committee, the republics' state security bodies, and ihc bodies subordinate to themingle system of the country's state security
The crucial phenomenon inducing Gorbachev to agree to what Yel'tsin has characterizedorm of "roundtablc" negotiation, however, hasbeen ihc mounting economic disaster. All the elements of ihc problem appear io Prime Minister Pavlov's speeches over ihe last two months. They include a:
Critical shortfall in agreed republic contributions to ihc USSR budget, leaving planned income for tbe first quarter less thanercent of the target,eficit for ihe same period equal to that projected for the entire year.
Sleep and accelerating decline in industrial and food production.
Serious drop in hard currency earnings,imports of foodstuffs and light industry' supplies, andritical debt position.
Projectionituation by year's end markedrop in national income accelerating tooercent perecline in per capitaof at leastoharp rise of unemployment leaving up toillion peoplemeans of subsistence,social explosion Ithal] will take place long before ihe calendar year expires."
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>as publicly observed thil "it Is virteally impossible toihe tasks that -ill.esult of ihe union iicaiy, be placed under ibe joint jurisdiction of ihe union and ihe republics, without creatine structures of ihi* kind.'-
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has repeatedly acknowledged lhal, basically, force will noi solve these problems. The twofor dealing wilh ihem are an accord with ihe republics, without which there is no hope of restoring elementary order,belatedlylarge-scale foreign assistance.
Problems and Prospects
Dcspiie his achievements, and even with the Russian presidency in hand, Yel'tsinifficult path. He will still confronl an enemy that has dominantwithin the repressive machinery of the military, KGB. and MVD, and also wiihin the partyhis inroads in iheseHe and his democratic allies arc physically still terribly vulnerable: "We are completely unprotected inardline elements in the military could still overwhelm moderates. And, of course. Yel'tsinheassassins
After ihe election onune. Yel'tsin's battle with ihe traditionalists is likely to sharpen. The fact that the Communist Parly apparatus has come oulagainst him in the election will simply intensify his interest in eradicating its political influence. And his effortromote (he privalization of agriculture, where ihc party retains some of its strongest roots, will accentuate his conflict wilh il. Meanwhile, he has already given noiice that he intends afterune to proceed withihe process ofCommunist Party organizations and party diktat in all government bodies and law enforcement agencies (tbe MVD. KGB, procuracy, courts, and so forth) and granting enterprises and other workplaces the right to decide themselves whether to evict partywould lead lo the collapse of party influence and disintegration of the party. Theunderstands ihe mortal implications of "dcparlyi-zation" and will fight it tooth and nail.Bfl
Yel'tsin's assessment appears to be that Gorbachev's behavior isnotby whatever political pressures are most threatening to his continued tenure of office at any given moment.
He also probably believes thai Gorbachev's power, despite short-term ups and downs, is programmed for longer term decline. Yet, at the same lime hethe fact that Gorbachev's presence may provide ihe democratsertain element of protection against the extreme hardliners. Also, he has taken aboard Ihe public's revulsion with what it sees as personally motivated "squabbling" between himself and Gorbachev. His handling of the Gorbachevihus, has been highly tactical in nature. He believes ihai Gorbachev was forced to shift course in April, and he is prepared to work with thisas long as ituntil he gains the Russian presidency. But he certainly understands that Gorbachev's vision of Ihe future union remainsdifferent from his own. And he can see that Gorbachev continues, even in the new "cooperative" setting, to seek to advance this vision. |
There is every prospect that the economic situation will continue lo nosedive over the next six months, and public discontent will rise. Even if Gorbachev accedesajor transfer of economic administrativeto the RSFSR, the Russian government will not control all the levers it needs to cope with the problems it will face. Moreover, if ihe Russianproceeds with ihe new version of Ihe Shatalin Plan thai premier Silayev has been talking about. Ihe dislocation is likely to be stillYel'tsin has not prepared the population for what is in store during Ihe transitionarket economy. Before all or this comesead, however. Yel'tsin is very likely lo confronl major renewed industrial unrest for failing to fulfill promises he will now be heldfor by miners and others whose trust in him was significantly undercut by his endorsement of the antistrikc pledge and his reversal on Ihe demand for Gorbachev's removal.
Oncc the election is over. Yel'tsin will still lack an effectively organized, united, ex Ira parliamentary mass party base. Compromises he made in negotiating the terms of ihepril agreement with Gorbachev.
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ihe expediency suggested by his selectioniberal Communist as his vicc-presidenlial running mate, have alienated some of hit supporters within the Democratic Russia umbrella group that now provides his main backing. This group itself is beginning to fractionate as political orientations crystalliic within it. The absence of disciplined parly support will continue to make it difficult to achieveof republic decisions by local government bodies. Yel'tsin has contributed to this problem by continuing to support the principle that the president and local soviet chiefs must not bold leadership positions in any political party- probably outactical concern to weaken the Communist Party's influence. Thus be finds himself in the contradictory position of seeking to strengthen hierarchical responsiveness by local officials who are in principle accountable to popularly elected
Yel'tsin cannot expect smooth sailing with other republics cither. Despite efforts to fulfill the terms of bilateral economic agreements, tensions arc likely to build as noncompliance continues. Differentto marketization will produce new strains. There is an inherent conflict of interest between tbe RSFSR and those republics, especially the Central Asian bloc, (hit arc highly dependent on assistance from "thend the status of Russianin other republics, whom he mustlmost certain to get worse before it gets better however successful YeTtsinb in signing treatiestheir rights J
Implication* foriled Slates
The political values espoused by Yel'Hin are closer to American values lhan those of any other major Russian leader: nonxcnophobic. nonaggrandizingconstitutional democracy; an approach to marketization that is linle different from capitalism; national self'determination; and nonviolent solution of societal conflict. The charge that Yel'tsinolitical "opportunist" whose future behavior is lotallylhal his behavior is uninfluenced by these principles has been disproved by his actions lo date; he hasommitment to Ihesc values in
situations that have involved political loss. He has been "opportunistic" on promises to the electorate and on some tactical issues, however, where he bas alsoenchant for snap decisions sometimesby
Because of the coincidence of his value* wilhvalues. Yel'tsin looks to the United Slates for support. He faulu the US administration forin hisunderstand sufficiently who its true allies and what its true interests really are in the Soviet Union. Once elected president of Russia. Yel'tsin will almost certainly use this victory to underscore io the United States ihat-
Whatever reservations Washington may earlier have had about treating him as an important slate figure now lack justification.
The republics are now where Ihe action is. And the one republic whose future is truly critical to global security and US interests is Russia.
He has. in any event,eal willingness to compromise and work wjih Gorbachev.
Deeper US contact with Russia need not imply abandonment of Gorbachev and sacrifice ofUS foreign policy interests. On the contrary, such contact might strengthen Gorbachev'slo traditionalist
Yel'tsin and his government arc likely lo attempt lo introduce radical economic reform measures soon. He has already expressed interest in ibe current Yavlins-kiy-brokercd negotiationestern assistance package, but only if there is strong conditionality. He is certain to emphasize that aid should be channeled primarily through ihe republics and to specificnoi opcn-endedly io the center. He mayIMF "directives" that would absorb some of the heal generated by painful Steps required by market-
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a fundamentally reconstituted union in which the republics act independently within broad areas and delegate only limited powers lo the Center because he believes it is in Russia's interest. But this position docs not mean, from his standpoint, that Gorbachev should be praised for preserving "order" and "stability" in the USSR and that he (Yel'tsin) should be attacked for undermining what the United States sees as its interest in the country. Analytically. Yel'tsin's approach to the union issue is groundedudgment that non-Russian nationalismeality that willmany well-meaning Russians seem loaway, that attempts to suppress it will be counterproductive, and that such attempts will only spread repression to ihe RSFSR and have other pernicious consequences. The slightly altered union "order" preferred by GorbachevYel'tsin's
-inherently unstable because il denies the striv-
ing for national self-determination. True stability will come onlyenuinely voluntary' association of republics, and this inevitably implies major devolution of power and acceptance of secession for those union republics thai want it. Where precisely the point of equilibrium lies appears to be negotiable for Yel'tsin and probably depends in part on the positions adopted by the representatives of the other major republics. In theay round ofto boost his electoralagreed lo Ihe formulation thai the union shouldfederation" ratheronfederation, suggesting that he may believe he can get workable arrangementsomewhat less decentralized configuration than he was earlier dc-ng
A central concern of the West in the future of the Soviet Union is the possibility ofhich is already occurring both across republic boundaries and within republics and could easily expand to include many areas in ihc RSFSR. One aspect of this problem, as already noted, is tbe "autonomies" issue in the RSI SR. This spring, in aitempting to stop Yel'tsin. Gorbachev and his allies were preparedhile to extend to the Russian Republic the "divide and conquer" tactic of exploiting minority nationality aspirations already practiced by them in the non-Russian republics. By promoting ihe possible separate membership of currentethnic components of the RSFSRuture
"renewed"thus outbidding Yel'tsin onwere in effect calling into question the territorial-administrative integrity of the Russian Republic. At the moment, il appears that Yel'tsin has been able toolitical solution to this problem, whichifficult one for him both because he had to explain why what is necessary for union republics is not applicable to "autonomous" republics, and because it was unclearumber of cases bow much ethnic grievances were simply being exploited by traditionalist local leaders on cue from the Russian Communist Party and the center.himself may also have come to appreciate tbe danger of playing with this potentially dreadfulto ethnic violence, or be may simply have been forced to give io to reach agreement with Yel'tsin and other republic leaders onpril. Nevertheless, Ihe "autonomies" issue wiltossible source of major trouble in the RSFSR for the foreseeable full
An even more explosive dimension of the "Lebanon" problem for Soviet leaders is how to protect minorities living outside their "native" borders. Success oron this score will go far toward determining whether endemic communal violence lies in store for Eurasia, or whether ihe United Slates will be dealingore peaceful dismantlement of the empire and the establishmentelatively large and stable successor formation to the present USSR. Onehas been linked tonitarythe wager on external intimidation,and limited intervention. For reasons noted above, Yel'tsin argues simply on empirical grounds that this approach will not work. Instead, hereaty approach that accepts republic sovereigntyathance ofwith the ethnic minority problemay that docs not reinforce the cycle of repression, retaliation, and mass flight of refugees. The cosis ofand failure here arc very high indeed, for ihe Wesl as well as Moscow.PJ
Rmiir Kick
Original document.
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