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Soviet: Scaling Back and Taking Risks
an intelligence assessment
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of Intelligence
Soviet: Scaling Back and Taking Risks
An Intelligence Assessment
ili'- paper wu preparedoinl working group of Ibe Office of Scientific and Weapons Research and the Office of Soviet Analysis. The chairmanSWRi members were
. OSWR,OV A. Analysts and managers in OSWR, SOVA, and (h<
.contributed to tbe paper
Comments and queries arc welcome and may be Steeled to tbe Chief .OSWP
)
HX
Soviet: Scaling Back ami Taking Risks
Keypart of an overall downsizing and restructuring of the Soviei defense es-
the Soviets for lhe firsUime 'n overears are culling
I. Jul.researchand development J_
conclude that lhe Sovieu sinceave made:
Small5lhe development of military systems. Ofajor systems we have identified in development, most seem to be progressing on schedule. Systems evidently affected by the cutbacks include the Madcap airborne warning and control aircraft, which probably has been canceled; the Ulka wing-in-ground-effect ship, whose production evidently has been deferred; and two new nuclear-rwwcred attack submarines, whose development may have been delayed because of demanding technical requirements and tigtal resources.
Substantial15ibe development of military technologies, apparently by pruning parallel and alternative technological approaches to meeting military requirements. Although no major mission area has been immune lo cuts, we judge lhat lhe Sovieu are maintaining strong efforts in the .development of the technologies lhai we view as critical for future Soviei military systems.
Urge, across-the-board40military support for basic research. These cuts were swift and deep, and no major area of research appears lo have been spared. Nonetheless, wc judge lhai the Sovieu are continuing sirong basic research programs applicable to antisubmarine warfare, directed energy, low observables. counter low observab.es. and other technologically challenging future military capabilities.
Our quantitative estimates of theffort include considerable uncertainties, bul the downward trends are clear
The course of Sovietver the decade ahead, however, is far from clear. The nature and extent of change binge on the strength of the Soviei economy, ibc resolution of who will determine security policy, aod lhe view those leaders will have of miliiary threats to the country. Furtherudget cuu probably are occurringut ihe miliiary leadership is fighting to stabilize funding
1
On balance, given current policy directions and little further ^m'c decline theSovieU inrobably will finish the developmentT "umtfof now and modified weapons and military proltbly somewhat fewer than the historical averageer decade. Siven the state of the Soviet economy and tight defenseSoviets probably will not move all of these sterns into production and deployment. The vast majority of the new systems that doproduction will typify ihe historical Soviet approach to weaponsthat is, evolutionary improvements to preceding systems
We would expect that the Soviets by the end of the decadein full-scale development than they do now. Fewer systems of the century, as projected,n
the ecoTmy and miliury policy, will mean fewer new systems fielded during the
We also would expect some further reductions in military-sponsoredand the development of military technologyFuture cuts probably will be small compared to cutsthe Sovietsalready in these areas- The pruning of alternatethat the Soviets have done to date and that we beheve theyover tbe next few years will still leave them with^technotogy for system development starts inwouW be deployed- Because of theirSoviets probably will have somewhat fewer chotces
systems and may well have some gaps in capabililies to meet future miliury requirements
Systems to be fielded0 probably willmaller contribution from mniury-funded basic research than Piously.Ibe net effect* on system capabilities are unclear. The cuts the Sonet.ha made lo dale in basic research essentially foreclose long-term contnbuuons in manythat at present lack clear miliury relevance, but which probably have some potential applicability for systems to be fielded0
In scalinghe Soviets undoubtedly are uking greater risksihan they have in the past. The cor^uer-ces of RAD cuts for futurewilf depend in part on the success of Soviet efforts to offset their impact. Thus far. the Soviets appear io be ma.ntain.ngusound standardized process that defines the steps, sequences and use to develop miliury technology andlun the bounds oftandardized process, wc expect the Soviets to lake greater nsks in the selection of technologies to be included in system designs. Although this
m*
approach probably will result in program delays, in most cases tbe earlier selection will more than offset the delay. The Soviets also hope to gain greater access to Western technology through both legal and illegal means.
Dramatic change in Soviet defense policy and economic performance could produce very different futures for Soviet military RAD. If traditionalist leaders were able to reverse the decline in forces and defenseif economic prospectsSoviets probably would bold system development, technology development, and basic research to levels near thosee would expect to see more system development programs started in, but they would field new technology at about Ibe same pace. Economic stringencies probably would serve for at least several yearsrake on efforts lo increase efforts8 levels.
If lhe economic crisis deepens and radical miliiary reformers gainover policy, we would expect to sec further large cuts in system developmenl. technology development, and basic research during the
, Cortscquenily. the Sovieu would develop new systems and field new technologies at muchtile new military technology would be available for systemse fielded
Most frightening lo Soviei miliiary leaders are prospects of an economic free-fall or ihe political disintegration of lhe USSR. Three-quarters of all Sovieiacilities lie in Russia,uccessor state might successfully bargain for access to key research institutes, design bureaus, and lest facilities thai lie in seceding republics.fforts could suffer much more lhan current trends would indicate for the USSRhole, Civil warfare, widespread civil violence, or economic free-fall probably would leadffon much smaller lhan we would expect under any other conditions.
Contents
This paper assesses Ihe changes ihe Sovieli have made inince thehen President Mikhail Gorbachev redirected Soviet defense policy. It rilso projects additional changes likely to occur duringnd discusses the implications of the changes for Soviet miliury capabilities. The paper addresses three key questions regarding changes to date:
Arc Soviet RAD resources being protected?
Are specific program areas or phaseseing sheltered?
'Arc tbe Soviets modifying their RAD process to do more with less? The paper builds on several Dl reportS'P
Sovieioinire
Soviet President GorbachevS inheritedeconomic and politicalconomic growth was declining, and living conditions were increasingly wretched compared to the rest of the industriatiied world. Ethnic unrest in the USSR was growing, and resistance move menu in Afghanistan. Angola, and Ethiopia were imperiling and increasing Ihe coal of key foreign policy objectives.
Concurrent -itb these economic and politicalthe USSR in tbeaced increasingly robust US and NATO miliiary forces. The buildup in Western military power in tbe earlyadvances in Western militarydemands on SovietndThe costs of supporting the USSR'smiliiary strategy were growing rapidly.
After Gorbachev's ascension to power, the Soviets began to articulate new concepts ofsufficiency" aod "elcfensiveheseargued that Soviet forces should beyet still capable of reliably defending theat lhe same time postured to reduce the offensive threat tbey appeared to pose lo other nations. i
When earlier attempts lo mciderriize lhe civilianbase failed. Gorbachev8 redirected Soviet defense policy to embrace Ibe new concepts of reasonable sufficiency and defensive defense.clearly viewed the defense sectorource of support for the faltering Soviet economy. He ordered major cuts in Soviet defense spending and directed major changes in Soviei force structure,lowdown in planned strategic force modernization, deep unilateral cuts in conventional forces, aof Soviei forces from Eastern Europe and Mongolia, decommissioning* of general purpose naval ships and submarines, cuts in weapon production and procurement, and conversion of weapon production facilities lo civilian purposes ,
ilemma: Do Moreoncurrent with ihese fundamental change* over the last few years. Sovieilso has come under fire.stablishment hasrucial contributor to Soviei miliiary power, but lis successes have comeigh cost (secver the past two decades. Sovietis relied on:
A consistent high level of commitment by the military and civilian leadership.
Steadily increasing resources.
Priority over other entities for scarce goods and services.
An emphasis on long-range forecasting, planning, and resource allocation.
A rigid, butrocess thai is well suited to five-year plansentrally controlled
0 the Sovietsudget cut of IS percent for1 (seedditional budget cuts probably are occurring
1
defense budget presented to the Supreme Sovieteduction in constant rubies ofercent for militaryGorbachev's argument thai expenditures1 should be kept at the same level as
Supreme Soviet in January voted lo reduce Ibe total defense budget1 byercent below tbe requested level.
' CIAl independent mtmicaof Soviet apandina on miliiary RAD
eicecdmie bvij.fl hewn byact Or of two. Sonet twd*ei Siurei Oo not CDCOMpau the whole rant* of military
RaD aetiviiiea. bulbalieve thai they do reflea reneeal trenda lii
Soviet Miliiaryliiearieal fret peer ire
Miliiary RAD Has Delivered, Large Numbers ef Systems. Tha Soviets im.i fielded about IrO mew and modified lystemi per decodef these per decode represented slgmfieanl Improvements over previously deployed tyiiems; by companion, the United States inajor new and modified systems eachThe Soviets achieved their rate by routinely reassigning design teams to new developmentupon completion of project t. rather than disbanding the teams
Timely Responses ta VS Develepmenli. The Soviets over the lost two decodes often hove demonstrated on ability to field timely and effective responses to US systems. These Soviet successes have hinged on two factors- early knowledge of US design goals and ready availability of design teams to undertake an eSort in response
But at the Can ef...
A Massive Infrastruclnre. The Sennet military RAD infrastructure comprises0 organisations and anillion people Thishas accounted for aboutoercent of Soviet defense etpendiiurti andercent of Soviet GNF By comparison, the United Slates in thepent aboulercent cf Us defense budgeterceni of Us CNF on military RAD.
Sorrow Design Objectim Ofr so major new or modified systems the Soviets have fielded per decade, many have been designed io fulfill perhapsingle, narrow mission assignment. This has been manifested In the developmentarge number of weapon systems within general mission areas. For example, for the Strategic offensive mission, the Soviets inompleted the development of four completely new ICBMs and three new SIMMs, plus II modified ICBMt and six modified SLBMs. The United States over the tame lime frame fielded tvns modified ICBMs and one new SI BM
Conservative Technological Advances. Tkehe development of military system! has been characterised by gradual, but continuous.through the fielding af modifications to systems already in the field. In many Instances the Soviets hove begun the developmentmodificationystem before the original system has been fielded
Driven by incentives lo meet development schedules. Soviei designers over the last two decades have been extremely conservative In selecting technology for new and modified systems. The Soviet miliiary RAD process requires proof of producibilllyechnology before lhe technology may be selected for useuture military system And Soviei designers for the most part over the last two decades have employed the moil stringent criterion in Judging proof oflhe technology be certified far series production ol the limeelected far useew design
Fear Efficiency. Soviet military RAD it inefficient by Western standards in part becauseath of modem equipment and support services. Largeof Soviet engineers are employed in modifying and copying designs and technicalthai In tht West is largely automated. The lack cf computingnumbers and lists ofthat Soviet designers ofitn are unable to perform quick and inexpensive mathematicalof new systems
Soviet miliiaryas been Inefficient In par! also because of bureaucratic ossification Soviei design teams have been granted monopollttlc assignments of specialisation and guaranteed continuous workapproaches In Ike development of militaryhave bten fully funded, evidently with little regard for likelihood of success of iht alternatives. Basic research has been supported by the miliiary by providing continuous levtl-of-effort funding to large numbers of research institutes, and no competition for funding was required i
SftSef"
Military Acknowledges Can in RiD
Spending Of certain major defense projects,research and development. It lower (la0 budget/ thanlthough ihis Iso noi agree with, we cannot helpeduction In research and development spending is very but, It became necessary to revise theof research and development work under way, so asocus
Army General Vitally Shabanov. Soviei Deputy Mlmster af Defense.
lea iter
The approved appropriationsreto finance tke optimal volume of research andizableas effected bynd also by switchingrojects from the experimentalStage lo scientific experiment status.
Gen. Col. V. N. Babye*'. Chief of the Central Finance Directorate.
Soviet Ministry of Defense.
ntnaupnat
Minister of Defense Yarov km! ibe Soviei General Surf it trying lo reverse the current downward trend in spending on military RAD. In0 General Mobcycv. Chief of tbe General Suff. argued. the development of military science snd eiperimental designannot lag behind the leading states aod iheirn tbe same monthen. Yariy Yashin, USSR Deputyof Defense, stated that,ousda'l wantbask, and applied research and ciperirncaul
design work to be reduced in anyof
the main way* to achieve reasonable defensetoday is to carry out research and developmentbe Defease Ministry Draft Reform Plan presented by Yam* in0 ealb forercent more spending on military RADhan. ,
At the same time the Soviets are innouncing cuts in spending for RAD and debating additional cuts, theyproclaiming an increased com mil mem io improve ibe Quality of mililary equipment and to be preparedew type of war in tbei century:
The Resolution on Restructuring fromb Party Conference.tated. "All defense building mast henceforth be geared predominantly to qualitativeregard both to equipment and mililary science and to the personnel of the armed force* "
High-ranking Soviet military officers have openlyhift from the traditional Sovietstyle of developing weaponstyle marked by qualitative leaps in capabilities
In open cachingea wiih US military esA'seers in the summerigh-ranking members of the Soviet Genera) Staff presented their visiont century battlefieldthat is markedly different from that envisioned foro terms of weapons and techrvjlogics. a* well at in forceand operailori*;'
War* determinedingle massed strike by petsasion guided munition
Greatly improved coerveniioeial munitions
Greatly improved systems for command, control, communications, and intelligence, including new families of space reconnaissance systems
a virtual ibseoce of traditional force* equipped wiih infantry, tanks, and anilbtry.
The retention of strategic nuclear weapons, but only in numbers necessary to attack tbe most eAiensively hardened targets.
Laceruiattea Abound
Great uncertainty eaists regarding the futureofSoviet miliury in general and RAD In particular. Growing economic problems, republic
'Sow ilcnti af ifcwmny nni mmi nagag*Sanay in <Kc rtaalunictory aval Iran;
echo ewnwnuonuwty ait int-imcdme fume*
bcyono ihe Im* of (ka
Seeier
drives for Independence oi greatly increased lutono-rny. snd public opinion arc pressuring the miliury to institute radical internal reform* and arc endangering the material and manpc-*er anarripticau of the lateMilitary RAD ia further threatened by:
unpiedictable proccu for setting annual budgets and Ihe lackive-year economic plan, wbkh toscihci pose particular difficulties for planning RAD peoyects that require multiple yean of funding.
Tbe conversion of many RAD facilities to self-financing, which means thai defense planners will lose control of RAD assets that receive contracts from csuloeiscts other than the Soviet mililary.
costs, particularly wages for scientificwhich will put further strains on financing future RAD programs.
To deal with these key 'arables, we rtced to consider not only current trends in the USSR's military policy and economy but also mayor deviations from these trend. Current trends, including Soviet statements, force developments, and changes in military RAD. indicate broad directions in Soviet GeneralT plan nineonly forut for the early decades of the not century at wet! At the same lime.believe that the alternative paths presented below reasonably bound the possibilities the Soviei Ministry of Defense would envision for the future
Cuts Taken hs
tn stark contrast to the steadily increasing Soviet effort ia military RADe believe there hasignificani reduction in total effort over the last three years (seeur undenursding of the cutbacks It derived from our assessnscnu of several hundred individual Soviet RAD programs. Our estimate* of the Soviet cuts in military RAD0oughly coosiauat wiih openly published Soviet information on the USSR's defense budget, but arc not based on these dau. Tbe cuts in RAD clearly are part of the overall downsizing
ind restructuring of the Soviet military now under
Jwe conclude that tbe Soviets have madeSmall5the dcvclcjeancm of miliury systems.
SubstantialIJtheof miliury technologies.
Largen miliury seaport for basic reaearch.
Our quantitative estimates of the Soviet RAD effort include considerable unccrUinties. but ihc downward trend) are clear.
In scaling back miliury RAD the Soviets arc Uklng greater risks thin tbey have in the past Tbey arc gambling thai they will have the weapon systems. Ibe miliury technologies, aad the basic research they will need to meet miliury rcquiremenU. Thus far,the reductions the Sovietsmade in their large RAD base appear toational attempt to maintain an effective RAD effort in the face of declining resources
System De.etopeoeot: Fast Cuts So Par
We believe the Soviets have made relatively small Cuts over Ihe last three years in the development of major miliury systems. Our best estimate Is that the Sovietseduced their systemeffort byercent Thisated on our assessment of the tutusayor Soviet weapon and space systems in development. We believe these systemsarge aad tcpreaenuiive sample of the total Soviei system development effort.ew exception* thcec development programs
seem to br progressing oti schedule
The Sonets undoubtedly have in development doadditional
During,bey fielded about ISO new and modified systems per decade. At any given time duringe had evidence ofnajor lysteans in development. Therefore, we believe that Ibtmber of Soviet systems currently in devesoptrscat is not subaUntially different from the historical average
ii'I aboutl* these systems are scheduled to
I
' . _ operational tn theor the
r" the system, we have.be Soviet
resources for clevelccenesst. Foe meat of these systems, we believe the Soviet military will coatiaac to try to fund their development througho preserve the option to produce snd deptoy them later in the decade. Given the Hate of the Soviet economy and light defense budgets, however, tbe Soviet* probably will not move all of the systems into production and deployment.
Over the past two years, several prominent Soviet officials have said thatsignificant number ofdevelopment towim>konilukte*skya rabota -OKR) programs had either been canceled or pushed bach to the less expensivef Ra"tf>
Two senior Soviet military otTscialt in0 claimed during an interview with reporters from the military newspaper Krainaya Zvtxia thai mareKR programs bad been canceled
L -a
0 declared that about JO
OKR programs had been shifted from OKR to NIR because of economic or technical considerations
Although we have been unable to reconcile Soviet claims of large numbers of cuts with t
the cumulative evidence leadselieve ihat some major weapon system* have been canceled and that others arc ateviewJ
Our information shows tbat most of the weapon systems currently evident to us entered development innd. therefore, should be ready for deployment by tbe turn of the eenlury. {We estimate
* la cUlnaac laret watntun cf protram oats, (he Soviet! may be
rtterrio* ia part lo east in tbe ctcvetocrinrftt ol mull intn. communications geir.ther imlitiry cQvprncntoi (nrlvcltd in our Huummta of So-ici iteveSromcnt o( major miliurybo pcwifcle that ibr So-tcl ethcitli arcin
tan tolletaaortlittonof etfoetiiode'tion lubsyiumi mini thaa
yitemt ihe Sovitti *cCoaat (or many of tbtte labiyiiem
devekemem cflometa rait OKR
ontinuing
A0 key Sovitt mili-
tary RAu Jatllitles showed construction activityfacilities. The conjtructloaunder way In8 were consistent wiihexpansion of Soviet miliiary RdtDtheverall Increase ofand teitjiructurei of approximatelyper year
Halted beforeL
^continued L aay af these projectscompleted Work on construction prefectsHopped
construction projects were started aftertome have been completed
ew exceptions, lhe construction projects started, slopped, or continued since8 involve relatively minor additions to already extensive
Although construction at RAD facilities Is notlinked tospeilfic RelD projects, historically, much of Ii hai been. The pattern af const ruction sinceuggests thai, although some military RAD projects have been cut.those in the advanced siagei of development that require extensive testcontinuing
The Soviet Navy probably decided to delay or forgo procurement of the Utka vring-in-ground-clTect vehicle. Accordingecently published Soviei book, the ship is loo expensive lo operate and its reliability it questionable.
5 me aevetopmcBi of iwo new nuclear-powered attach submarine* (fourth-general ion SSNl) may hive been delayed because of demanding technical requirements and light resources.
Recent change* in Soviet planning for future military force* evxienily are aba shaping weapoa developme nt inor cisssspic. Soviet writings and other evidence point toward smaller general purpose naval forces lhat will conccnirate on the protection of ihe submarine-launched ballistic missile forces and lhe defense ol the homeland in waters close to Soviei territory. The leccni decline in produeiion aciiviiy for of surface warshipsack of con starts for additional classes arc consistent withi planning and suggest the Sovieu arctheir surface ship RAD resources toward the developmeni of civilian vessels. The Sovieu may have made Other changes. ieKfwdiag toe cancellation of system development peogratas lhat are no longer relevant to currentbut we lack evidence of such changes
Derelopcnent: Substantia! Pruning
Soviei cuts to dale in technology development appear consistentubstantial pruning of parallel and alternative technological approaches io meetingrcquircmenu. The Soviets in ibe past have more often than aot tasked several research institutes for development ofparticular lech oology They have abo fully funded mssltiple technological approaches to meet military requirements; examples include ibe development of both infrared and ultraviolet scosort for ballistic missile bunch detection, lhe development of sled, titanium, aad fiberglass for submarineand the devesccsrnent of both diescl and turbine engines for lank propulsion The Sovieuhave concluded thai ihey can no longer afford io
r
J
oviet
military technology development programs. These programseatercent ofotal we believe the Soviets had ongoing in thee believerojects areof tbe whole and tbat the sample is large enough to form the basis for scene conclusions (see
table 2)
Tbe data show ihat no mayor mission area hat escaped cuts tn technology development The number ofwe have in each of the variout missionoohowever, to estimate what areas if aay are
being cui more ot less than others C *
shows cancellation* in tech-nologj programs that supporl the development of
Doth strategic and tactical system*.
Both offensive and defensive systems
Air. land, naval, and space syturrts.
r
r
Partially offsetting tht ctTecu of cuu in technologyn incrcaaed ability tinder per wo> te for research institutes to week more ck*ely and cooperatively with other orgs tiita lions, For example.
(be Yefremov Institute of Elee-
trophyiical Apparatus in Leningrad hasighly beneficial cousorlium with several plants thai supply critical malcriaks and equipment needed for ibc institute's ckvelcpeneot of high-current power-generatioe and swiuhing technology applicable to directed -energy weaponry.
Al the same time the Soviets have made substantial cuts in tbelr technology development programs, they have continued most of their ongoing prog rami and have itarted sornc new programs. (The number of reported new programs is too small to form lhe basis for an animate of which technologies arc beinghe combination of cuts, continuations, and new starts seems toational attempt in maintain an effective military technology effort in the face ofources On tbe basis of allInformation, we jodgc that the Sovieu arc con unuing Ihe development of all technologies lhat wca* critical for future Soviei military systems.
Bask Research: Heavy Cuts
indicates lhai lhe Soviets,avereductions in military funds fot baskbest estimate rs thai the Sovieu duringmilitary support for basic research bypercent
relevant to currently perceived military requirements. An intent to make Soviet basic research more relevant io berth lhe economy and ihe military was evident in ihen lhe uubiiihmcnt ot" new monetary incentive* for technological innervation Gorbwctoevi crToruo channel Soviet science toward specific technological objectives and theof new organisation* (Inter-Branch Scieniific-Teehnical Complexes -MNTKs) that have both Reel) and manufacturing responsibilities arcwith this aim. For lhe moat part, however, these initiatives failed to make Soviet basic research more dearly relevant to requirements of en her ihe economy or ihe military
The culling of Ihe miliiarys budget in therobably provided the leadership lhe opportunity toealon basic research. The culling of miliiary support for basic research was swift and deep The loss of level-of effort funding has provided unprecedented incentive* for research insulates io seek coniractthat invariably is more applied than whai lhe institutes' researchers had been doing. Against the strong incentives that now exist is tbe reality that few initnutei are finding new sources of funding for any work- no mailer how applied and relevant io currently perceived reqoirerncr.it
A top-down view of culs in military support for banc lesearch was provided in speeches by leading Soviet scientists al the annual meeting of Ihe USSRof Sciences In0 (seecademician M. V, Popov stated lhat the order for rcdoniooi in basic reaearch was issued in8 during planning9 Other speakers noted thai state budget support for many institute* had been cat Servers! speeches referred to problems in compacting existing exploratory research and in financing such research in ihe future. Cuu in basic reaearch at university inili-tule* were noted in the ipccchc*
"7
ty Soviet Ogneials ma Call iatile Research
A numbermporlombasic programs lupported by defense sectors of Indusiry erasrdr financedam.
arkov. Chief Sciemtfic Secretary. Presidium of ihe USSR Academy of Science,
esult of converncm in the defense sector.
fineruring of university research has decreased and it
creating an "alarming situation "
R. A. Papilov. Chairman.
Central Committee of
Public Education.
Science Workers Union
A numbercademy) instilutci and design burtaui previously were foul no longer art) concerned with
problems of defense.
K V. frolov. Vice President. USSR Academy of Sciencei
For overears the Institute'.work under contract with the defense sector This contract work was educed fromillion rubles8illion rubles9
V. Ye. Zuyev. Director.
Institute of Atmospheric Optics, Tomsk
A reduction In funds from the militaryorced the Institute to eliminate the tupport of "researchers outside the instilutt."
A. N. Dremin. division head.
Institute of Chemical Physics.
Chermygolorka
provided detail, of wholesale cut* in militaryipecific basic research protects, si well as cutsof-effort funding by ibe military ofuniversities
/cant ventures to gain ootswJe funding forinstitute*
disruptions ofnstitutes doing basic research, to the extent that laboraloriea have stoppedcquipnseat and materisb while drawing clown landing reserves to cover salaries
Partially offsetting the adverse effects of cuts the Soviei* bare made in basic research ii increased civilian funding of some work formerly iappealed by the military. For example, key crcntsograptucin the General Physios Institute in Moscow apparently now hat civilian sponsorship In general, however, research capabilities forma ly supported by the military do not match well with the needs of the civilian sector.
In other area* of military research, including th* development of advanced armor materials, the output of basic research institute* hatipped theof tbe Soviets io more research results through the levbnosogy development phase of RAD. Cats id basic research on armor material* will have hi lie if any effect on future military capabilities, given tbeof the technology development bottleneck
In spite of tbe widespread cuts to bask research that are cvideal, the Soviets clearly are maintaining *otnc military support for scientific iivesi.ganonsL
1 wa judge that tha Soviets arc continuing strong fSslc reaearch program* applicable io antisubmarine warfare, directed energy, lowounter low ooseivabies, and other technologically challenging future military
r
lhe military almost certainly hope* Il can use contract funding to maintain the ongoing research it needs
On tbe other hand, the current state of di* nipt ton ot* Soviei basic resesecli could eitcad for many years, diminishing the value of what research the military is continuing to fund Moreover, forcing Soviet task research into more narrowly defined areas will blunt ibe ability of So*iet scientists to do good work in areas being researched nowhere else in thethat potentially could scadaiqueapabilities with crvikaa as well as military
In any event, Ihe cuts lhat Ihe Soviets have made lo dale in basic research will have little effect on fielded military capabilities until well after tbe turn ofanceled ot disrupted basic research that might have contributed to the development of military technologyrobably would not be seen in heided systems0 or later
More Cuts
The course of Sovietver the decade ahead is far from clear The nature aad cstent of change hinge on the strength of the Soviet economy, the resolution of who win determine security policy, and Ibe view those leaders will have of miliiary threats to lhe country
The means by which Ihe Soviets attempt lo control the RAD process is likely to evolve over the neai few years. The recent conversion of some icsearch insii-tutes and design bureausither partial or total self-hnancing means that these organiialions may become accountable io customers other lhan, or in addition to. Ihe Soviet miliiary. Moreover, the yel-to-be-adopted Ministry of Defense reform plan apparently would give Ibe Ministry tbe ability lo contract directly with RJtD byiuiiifii theCoramrssion (VPK) and indusirtil ministries This would threaten the ability of ihe Soviets so commandkey historical strength of theil couldto be mote efficient in responding lo military
requirements. The net crTecIs of these changes are unlikely to be evident to cither lhe Soviets or ourselves for several years.
The increasing disruption in the Soviet economy, as well as social and politicalatentndermining the ability of the Soviets to conduct smataryJt*D. but wc arc unable loeatioiaie how
' isr upiioni in institute* doing bask'research areand severe. And environmental activiils have severely resiricied the ability of ibe Soviet miliiary to cooduct underground nuclear tests. Other Soviei work in technology development and system development also appemt! affected, butesser degree than bask research.
On balance, assuming current policy directions and little farther economic decline, we believe the sovietsmake additional reductions inwer lhe neii decade We base this lodgment onf^
3 Soviet staiemenu regarding ihelr eipeciaiions forn the future, and our view of what the Soviet miliiary and civilian leadership realistically hope to achievever the nestoears.
in projectingsmaller effort iny ihe end of the decade, wc assume the Soviets will develop their future forces in tbe direction suggested by existing miliiary programs, recent policy declarations, and ongoing arms control negotiationi Wc assume that tbe economy experiences oa growthh.Se svackocoasomk pressure* force continued defense spending cuis and prompt ibe conversion of defense-ind nil rial facilities lo civilian production We assume Soviet military requirements evolve inconsistent wilh Gorbachev's miliiary polkacawiih (fcrccplionseduced threat bounded by arms control agreements
Under ihese conditions,utbacks proba-bty will 'all most heavily on ibe development of system* We expect lhat ewer the next decade ihe Soviet* vail have decreasing number* of military systerns in full-scale development:
We eipect lhe Soviets duringo atari fewer system development programs lhan ihey have started duringyear perkdi.
For lyttemt rearing ihc end of dcvelopmcni and testing (IOC*e expect lew. if any, cancel la lions before ihc result* of full-tea le testing arc in hand. The Sovieu may chooteorgo produciion and fieldinf of tome of (heat systems.
For systems midway through the develop men! cycle llOta scheduled. we expeci is tee aocne cancellations, particularly of irsjcms thai ibeview at having narrowly defined missionor at providing marginal improvement* in capabilities over existing systems.
For systems that entered lull-scale tsevelopment daring ihc last five years and arc still in the early stages of doe'opmcnt (lOCs schedulede believe many will be vulnerable lo
Regarding resources for military-supported basteand tbe development of miliury technology, we believe that the Soviets over the neat few years probably will make further reductions. We expect these cuts io be relatively small, however, compared to cuts they appear to bavc taken already in basic research and technology devetoemerii
The Soviets almost certainly will want lo maintain miliury lupport for selected basic research clTorts. We expect miliury sponsorship of basic research increasingly to focus on specific topics at theof long-term level of-effort funding of institutes
Wc expect the Soviet level of effort in Ihcn icchrsology development ta be closer to8 level than will be tbe case for either systemor militarily supported bask research This lodgment is based on the fad that the Soviets evidently are scrupulously continuing development work in criticalthnologic* even though they may be pruning patallcl and alUrrsalis-c- -and on Sovietfrom csflicials at all levels tbat affirm the itnpcsrtance the Soviets place on maintainingvigorotis technology deve'ep-rncnt effort
The reduced numbers of Soviet systems wt cipect in fell-teak deveksptoent iarc consistent with our understanding of General Suff planning for smaller forces. We believe the Staff is planning on:
Smaller and increasingly mobile strategic offensive forces that will be able to meet damage goals because of imrxovemcnta ia weapon lethality and reliability
Smaller lira logic defeat! v< force* thai willbut isot prevent, damageargc-tcalc strategic attack.
Smaller restructured ibcater ground and air forces deployed on Soviet territory for deeply echeloned defense of ihe bomelarid
Smaller general purpene naval force* that willon the protection of the SSBN force and defense of the homeland in waters close to Soviet lerritory
If our view of Soviet ptanning is accurate, we would expect to see two changes in Soviet efforts to develop miliury icchnologies and systems:
emphasis on defcniive systems, spaceand command, control, and
com munieu emphasis on naval surface ctwnbaianii and offensive land and air weapon*)
A more mullimission approach lo weapon* deiign ins also very likely lo contributerop in tbe numbers of Soviet systems in development. For example, the Soviets may cbceae to devesop and deploy combat aircraft that art capable of both air-to-air and air-to-ground mtstatsn*
Offsetting tlx Cotst Acquiring
Western Technology and Accepting Creat-r
Risk* la Syttites lievfUntaeal
The Sovieu hope lo gain greater access* lo Western technology through both legal and illegal mean*.
u
Hfiure2
Sovietsn Rigid but Sound RAD Protrts
CrUcal nJr.Mi itua mane<)
Suae mail lot proaceyp*rial production
'iQ'^'ddi'
JJScwie* iatetntioaM
of long-term third-conntry agents lo illxritli acquire sensitive US technical informationperations will focus on putiing in place agent* whoae work will bear fruit in the neit century. The Soviet*eriod of several rears before agent* arc fully productive Thiaonsilient with aby tbe USSR to absorb advanced US technologies that may emerge in the first decade of the 2ist century
Wc also expect ibc Sovieis to take greater risks ia the selection of lechnologiese ieaduded in system designs (sechey can do this without modifying their so far unchanged standardized process lhat defines tbe steps, sequences, and procedures they use to develop technology and systems (see figure 2) /
Taking higher risks in the selection of technologies foroffers two potential benefits
ew cases the Sovieis wouldarticular level of technology significantly moreperhaps five yearsthey would have using their historically coniervaiive approach.
Assuming an unchanging threat, (bey Could more readilyiven military requirement through the developmentingle new lyston instead of the roKcessve developmentcries of new and modified systems.
KM Taking la Selection of Treknotagiri for Military Systems
We have known /or some lime thai the Soviet RAD procestadiot productionechnology to prove ill produeihility before it may be selected for useiliiary system beingfor development. We knoweernl analysis af Soviet technical literature that the Soviets Mew ihe selectionechnologyf Its produclbilily Is understood only through pilottin the developmentS system,election would be viewed as "low risk.The Sovieuechnology as "moderate risk" If it is In irlal productioneries-production line and as "lowf the technology is already certified for series production
Our recent assessment of technology selections for Soviet system development programs shows that over the last two decades the Soviets for the most pan hare selected technologies already certified for series-low-risk"selections (seefigure Sf But on occasion they have made higher risk selections For example, the Sovieis In ihevidently began development of both he Pechora large phased-array radarodifiednterceptor (Fox-bai Dl. ihe designs of which included use ofchips thai were in pilot production at the lime development of ihe radar end modifiedechnology selections. Tkeeached IOC in the, probably on
schedule, and about five years sooner than Ii would have reached IOC if tke Sovieis had wailed until Ihe microelectronic chips mere In series production before beginning development af tke aircraft. The Pechora radar became operational In the, about five years after the scheduled IOC. but probably no later than It would hove been completedpproach.
The risk taking that was demonstrated occasionally by Ihe Soviets innd lhat we project to be more common ins In reality quite conservative compared to risks laken In tkendt the insistence ofDuring these years the Soviets siaried several very ambitious new programs lo compete with West-em advances. The Soviets chose to begin many of ikese programs by Including In ihe designs technology whose feasibility and produeihility had never been demonstrated Significant numbers of failurestn space, aircraft, and missile programs:includepace launch booster, theupersonic transport aircraft,olid-propelleni SLBtd. Under Breshnev. the Soviets adopted lhe acquisition process curreusly in use. which allows for risk taking, albeit carefullyrisk taking
the other "una. Ihii approach probably will nrauli in programn nvnl caxi the earlierof Ibe technology probably will more than ofTtctet gainear orew program! probably will be delayed toe extended periods (by five or more yean)
Attorning the Soviet! lake greater risk! in tome of their technology tclecliont in the, the retailing lysietm could be fielded is tbet ihe earliest. We tack evidence of specihe risk* lhe Soviets have taken or plan to tnke. bet wc would anticipate Ihe "high-risk" selections would be for
systems whose mission requirements COSH be me', only with higher levels of technology; suchinclude peectsion-iuided systems, reconnaissance systerns, and systems for command, control, and communications
Im plications for Fume Weapons
Even greater than our uncertainty in predicting the course of Sovietver the remainder oft our uncertainty in predicting the
Kisjure 3
v- if' Soviet Risk Taking In Selectingfor Mililary System*
Bforjuakai
Given these long stretches of time, any prediction* of future Soviet mtliUry capabtluie* are fraught with uixotamty.ee believe thai tke broad scope and sheer site of ihe Sovietffort, coupled with our long history of assessing Soviet RAD programs and the Soviet RAD process, enable us to make some general projetniOu
The Soviets in Ibeill fin.ih ibe cleveLopmeniarge number of new and asodined weapons and mililary syiicim. asauming current trends in the
Jsrtt**
and military policy Nevetthelen. fewer suru of programs In theo modify older systems and the cancellation of torne oe going proprobably will result in fewer than ibe historical averageew and modified Soviei system- per decade reaching the end of tbe developenerii process. Andn (he stale of the Sen-set economy and tight defense budgets, the Sovieu probably will not move all of tbe systems into production and deploymeni
The systems thai will be fielded inre mm: Iv systems lhai were designed insing wchnology that lhe Sovieu had in bandhe vast majority of these new systems typify the historical Soviet approach to weapons development- -evolutionary improvetnenU to preceding systems.
development. Risk taking in selecting high-payoff technologies for systems will give theew capabilities substantially earlier lhan would have been lhe case using tbeir highly conservative approach. The risk taking probably will also cause many program delays, but most of lhe delays probably will be more than offset by the earlier sckciion of technology.
The fielding of new technologies, although likely to occur overallaster rale than in the past, will become more difficult for tbe Soviets to accoraptttb on predictable schedules This lack of predictability win,ertain estent, disrupt the ability of the Sovieuccurately forecast the liming of future Geldedand to readily integrate new weapons into coherent forcet substantial delays inewcreate tigmtV cant gaps in previously planned military capabilities
to be fielded in tbe first two decades of the nest century probably will reflect scaled-back Soviet military strategyared last of minions. There probably will be many fewer tytiemt deployed per decadehan was the case in. Many of tbe systems are likely lo include technologies thai were selected with "tnedera-tc- or "high" ritks
Tbe pruning of alternate tech noi ogictl approachca that the Sovieu have done to date and that wc believe ihey will do ewer ibe nesi few yean would stillem with asornewhai diminishedarray of miliury technology from whkhotc foe tyiiem rJrreloprnerit staruhese tystems would be fielded. Because of iheir pruning, lhe Sovieu probably will have somewhat fewer choices in technology and may well have some gaps in capabilities to meet future miliury requirements
Notwithstanding Ihe possibility of tome technology gaps, the Sovietsrobably will be able to Geld advanced tecbetologyomewhtt fatter rate than would have been tbe case using ibeir former highly conservative approach to weapons
The heavy cull the Sovieu have laken in basic research bare implications for miliury capabilities to be fieldedystems to0 probably willmaller contribution from miliury-funded basic research than previously, bul the net effects on tyttcm capabilities are unclear. The cuu the Sovieu have made lo date ia basic research ettentially foreclose long-term contributions in many(hat at present lack clear militarybul which probably have tome potceiial
The long-term impucationi of military RehDconduct-ed during the remainder ofary widely, depending on tbe political and ecowomac conditioni tstumed. On ibe basis of current (rends, wc would ctpect lhe Sovieu io maintain strong efforti in areat of basic research that have clear miliury apptkations; thai work would feed Soviet technology development after the turn of lhethai would be incorporated in Soviet tyttems fielded
Alirrnallir Palhs
Dramatic change io Soviet defense policy andperformance could produce very different fu lures for Soviei military RAD. Traditionalist leaders could work to reverse declines in Soviet forces and defense budgets, especially if ceocsomie prospect! brighten. On the other hand, pressure* for even deeper cuts in military RAD could well intensify if reformist leaders gain power or if Ihe ccortorny continues the sleep decline thsl is occurringoreover, mibtary RAD would be severely disrupted by the ecoriomic or political dbuttegtatkm nf the USSR.
S-.lalning Military RAD
If trt^ilionaUst leaders were to reverse the decline in Soviet defense budgets, the Soviets would probably bold system devekspersent. technology development, and basic reseaich to levels near thosehey probably tvcwld finish the devekssrneat of more ne-ayttems than indicated by current trends but would held new technology at about tbe same pace Weould expect to see more system developmentsuited innd few new cancellations. Economic stringencies probably would serve for at leati several yearsrake on efforts to increase efforts1 levels
The major long-term benefit* ihe Soviets probably would see for military RAD in an attempt to ball the current downward trend would be greater stability in programs and ii cater control of the RAD process Renewed tight control of the RAD process wcsuld diminish the prospects of the chaos and inefficiency ihat appear pouibtc based oa current trends and highly probable If deeper cuts occur.
Cuts
A. Items lively, the Soviets could confront aof Iheii deepening eccescwtic crisis, while rnilitary force developments proceed in accordance with the more radical Soviet views onenign international environment codified by arm*ew European lecurltyprovide the rationaleuch-reduced Sovietapid transitionarket economy might cause rsconomic dislocation ind forears drsrupt the defense industries
ai*>
frightening to Soviei military leaden are the prospects of an economic free-fall or the political disintegration of tbe USSR. In dlher case, the Soviei military couM capeci unpredictable and potti Wy iaco-hereai addilional cut) in Rif>
eaceful devolution of power in the republicsucccttor Russian stale, some IJ perceni of all Sovietacilities wouM fall
lhe new Russia, but key lest facilities and design bureaus would remain outside (seeconomic and political developments willffort more (ban will the change in political geography. Indeed,ew Russia were tiicccssfulbargaining for access to (est facilities and for the services of key insiiluies and design bureaus outside
Original document.
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