Chile: Consolidating Civilian Rule Oer the Milium |
KeyPresident Patricio A> I- in. at the beadultiparty coalition
has presrded over the transition lo democracy after moreood start In asserting civilian control over the
armed forces, win nine strong backing from three of the four lervioe chiefs and holding in check the obstructionist General Pinochet. Opting tohowdown with Pinochet that could rally the general's supporters. Aylwin is using the government's investigations of charges tying Pinochet to financial scandals to undercut the general's backing from the military and the political right, Key lo the success of this strategy is the support thai many senior officers- while still suspicious of civilian nolitshown for the restoration of democracy in Chile. Aylwin, moreover, has gained stature with the armed forces at Pinochet's expense through his adroit handling of many contentious issues, including high-levelas well as from the general's political|
Pinochet, who is constitutionally protected as Army Commanderpparently has abandoned for now the overtures he made late last year to the government suggesting his voluntary retirement in exchange for protection from possible prosecution. Nevertheless, we judge thatsapport has been steadily eroding since Aylwin took office, and that therecttcr-than-even chance that he will retire during the coming year, possibly under pressure from senior Army officers and rightist politicians. J
The Aylwin administration also has taken important steps -within the legal framework the governmentconstrict the military'a broad national security mandate and to test the limits of some of the military's prerogatives, including its domestic intelligence role and control over promotions. Accordingly, the President has transferred Armyrelated to Internal subversion to toe police forces and has begun reforming the service academies to decmphasite internal security issues Despite the web of restrictions left behind by Pinochet to safeguard key military equities from ctvilian control, the government has been able to assert some executive and legislative authority over the military budget and hasegal reform package reducing military jurisdiction over the justice system. The legal reforms will helpestering obstacle to improved US-Chilean relations:6 murders in Washington of former Foreign Minister leleller and his assistant, allegedly by Jigcnts of
then President Pinochet. Aylwin. however, has delayed any effort to dismantle the elaborate organic law statuies and decrees that protect thesututional prerogatives and political authority, jading thatolitical influence must be marginalized first.!
The Aylwin government clearly recognizes thai careful handling of the erosive human rights issue in coming months is critical to protecting its fains on the cmtailiury front. In an effort to defuse demands from the far left, victims relatives, and some members of his own coalition for trials of persons accused of human rights violations during the Pinochet regime. Aylwinpecial investigatory body, (he sooallcd Rcttigtasked with identifying abuses and determining compensation for victims. Theeport, published in March, detailed atrocities committed by members of all (he armed services and has led to renewed calls for trials of military personnel. Aylwin will have to call on bis considerable skillsonciliator to manage these pressures without increasing the armed forces' fearsitchhunt or forfeiting support from key parties in the coalition for his handling of the military.
Although we expect Aylwin to make substantial progress towardthe military to civilian rule over the remainder of his four-year term we cannot rule out developments that could derail or delay hisignificant escalation of terrorism, although unlikely, could encourage increased meddling by Pinochet. In the even less likely event of serious economic deterioration, the military's confidence in the competence of civilian government could be severely shaken, although we doubt (hat this alone would spur an effort by the Army to reinsert itself in politics. Moreover, even Pinochet would have little hope of returning to power by force unless he dramatically broadened his power base in the Army and won the support of (he other services, public support for civiliansignificantly deteriorated, and the political landscape becamezed finally recognition of the deleterious impact on foreign relations and the likely public outcry would no doubt leave many officers unwilling to support a
Long-term prospects for building an apolitical Chilean military will depend ononsensus on the role and mission of the armed forcesemocraticrocess likely to span several successive civilian administrations and to affect domestic policy and relations with the United states in the interim. In our view, the armed forces would be most receptiveew mandate focused on external defense. Although any suchission would include circumscribing the military's domestic
Contents
*m
Key
Scope Note
Introduction
Reasserting Ctviliaa Aitfhority andtc Pinochet Factor
Pusatng Presidential Prerogatives
Handling Pinochet
ine Piaochc;'* Exit
Managing the Volatile Human Rights Imuc
Narrowing the Military's Mandate
Reallocating the Annv'i Internal Security Function*
CaaHeng.ng ine Military's Legal Prerocatlrt.
Moeitoring the Bedgpt
Ccnufang MJrary Powp Qrw Um Jodfckrr
Protpecti for Sueemi
Implication* for US IntereiU
Appro**
Overview of the Chilean Armed
Scopepaper assesses President Patricio Aylwin's success lo dale in asserting
civilian control over the military and restructuring the armed forces along lines compatible with democratic government, as well as the prospects for further progress over (he balance of Aylwin's four-year term. In particular, the assessment looks at the impact on civil-military relations of forme* President Augusto Pinochet's continued rate as Army Commander, and at the government's progress toward reducing his influence in politics and then securing bis retirement before the end of Aylwin's term. Il also examines the Aylwin administration's efforts to reduce the military's broad
Chile: Consolidating Civilian Rule Over the Militaryl
Chile's return to democracy in0 marked the endear detour from the country'* loot tradition of elected civilian government and military nonintervention in politics. The period of rule by ArmyPinochet beau inhen the armed forces ousted the elected Marxist gcvcrrancBt of Salvador AUeadceriod of political andchaos. The military regime was quick to stiBe Buccal domestic opposition to military control, whilefrom the passive support of the large number of Chileans in the political center and on the right; many citizens considered even military rule preferableeturn to the chaos of the Allende yean.|
(most Chileans,
!eturn to the country'* liberal democratic traditions, tbc long period of military rule has left emotional, ideological, and institutionalbetween the armed forces and the rest of Chilean society. Some civilians deeply distrust tbe military and fear chat it would be only too willing to reassert itself in politics. For their part, military officers arc more anxious than antagonistic toward civilian rule.
cers were at IcasTreecnciledTiTf not supportive of. the return to democracy and foundolitical moderate, an acceptable presidential candidate.the armed forces, particularly the Army, arc unsure of tbe new "rules of the game" and wary of any infringement of the autonomy and broadthey have long enjoyed. Many officers also view their countrymen as Insufficiently appreciative of the Pinochet regime'sH
These divisions underlie the challenge facingAylwin in consolidating civilian authority over the armed forces and restructuring them along lines compatible with democracy during his four-year term. To reintegrate the military into Chilean society.wilt need lo win the confidence of the armed
servjoci, evco as he begins to dlsmanlle (he numerous legislative ind administrative measure* imposed by Pinochet to impede civilian control over tbe militaryragmatic leader. Ayhrin hasthat tbe arduous task of redefining tbe military's misiioa depends partly on deesoosirnting that the executive and kegistatm brioche* are "worthy" of increased oversight duties. Al the same time.continued tenure as Armysanctioned1 leave* Aylwin with the vexing problem of coping with his troublesomewithout damaging fragile civil-military relations]
Rnuniac Ctribaa Arnibottiy imiWith ik IWbet Factor
PioaahagPrerogative*
Rocomlilnf ifae military's unease with civilianhas picked hi* initial battle* carefully, forpart poitpcoiog challenges to Ibebe inherited from Pinochet. Much ofeffort to far hu been devoteddrtlian control over the militaryoffice* of the President and Defense Minister.Ihli hu entailed curbing atlempU by theto question eiccuu'vc policy initiatives,those dearly outside the realm ofsecurity
Upon taking office, Aylwin quickly demonstrated hi* intention to subordinate the armed force* command-enriliaa defense establishment, naming a
of his own party, moderate Christian Patricio Rojas, as Defense Minister and (breach
He wa* earcfal, however, to select
D had not deaocratratedtoward Ibo oiBoed forces He aha accordfrom the Cocmnooders of the Air ForceCanUDoros (the national police force) to staythereby peeveeiing Pinocbet from being the only comounder with experience from the prrvi and gained their public pledget to reaped civilian rule and support improved dvil-militaryAll of the chiefs except for Army Commander Pinochet have refrained from publicly cnliciringpolicy initiatives.'
Handtlng Pinochet
Since the outset of the Aylwin administration,not unexpectedly, has frequently demonstrated hi* diiuite for dvilian authority and made himself an obstacle lo the exercise of dvilian prerogalivet and ih- enabhsnmeal of eonMructive retatiocs between the government,be Army. Pinochet ha* tried to eoatinae eaerting political inflttenee, flaunt Log hit opposition to the Presides! by provocative commeou to the media and absences from importantfunctions. Pinochet'* dedsijo to maiotain hu
Advisory Cceunrssioaroup ofersons headed by Army Gee. Jorge BaUerino that develop! political lira teg? fora further indi-cation that be hat not resigned himself to an apolitical
Aylwin has avoided provoking either public or private confrontations with Pinochet, answering lib obstruc-twnlat tactics by asserting presidential authority and publidy calling on the general to hdp in the process of national reconciliation. Pinochd bat responded by tempering his critidim of the government, but he Hill
drcumvent* the chain iAyiwia (Dili SFtnllont^over the Army promotion* process last November by vctoiag two of Pinochet'* candidates amountedigatficaet victory in the eogotog battle of wilb -iih the general
of Cbwrt umti tom. nt
EncoafiflBs PbocbH'i Eiit
Having concluded lint Pinocbet'l political mcddl:D| it insufficient basis for enjuseerinj hit removal, ibe Aylwin government has sooiht to huther discredit him with the military and bis rightist political Mp-portcn in ibe hope tiut they eventually wiD prou I
Daring the past few months, the scandals appear to bsvco itekiwl of political fallout toe jovc-imcM wants, indeding damage to the Armyeputation inroogbooi (be rank* and tr porters on the political right
Thl Aimy Financial Scandals
Since September last year. Chile's Congrest and fudiciary have beenultimillion-dollar Investment embesilement Scheme,nvolved manyeri Tke txttitro-llom of tht xxalled Cuiufa scandal, which Included ihr apparent murder of at Itail one Investor by former Intelligence agents, kai led lo tht Indictment of si* former officer* and ike forced retirement ofthers, including ikt Intelligence chief and ihree other ft neralt.
Two other investigations have uncovered financial irregularities by Pinochet's relatives. Oneayment of SS million to the generals eldest son last year for Ike Army's acauisitionankrupt arms manufacturing company. The governments behind-the-scenes Iniervenilon resulted In an anodynereport, which connected Pinochet's son to Illegal actions but Stopped short of directlyikeongressional committee also is investigating tke tale of more0 hectares of public landuch discounted pricehemical and mining association tkat was privatised. The sale, which Involved Pinochet's son-in-law, was permittedaw passed by tke Pinochet regime shortly before the general reltnavlshcd the presidency.^
Public allegations of financial misconduct against Pinochet and hit family, combined with evidence of bis eroding support, reportedly led the general in0 to rend out feelers lo the government offering to step down in exchange for immunity for himself and his son from potential charges of financial malfcaiaacc Pinochet ooickly scuttled thebo-woer. and we believe preas reports of the discussjons caused him to discard any plans for an imminent departure. Pinochet's aborted negotiations with the government have, in our view, reinforced both the Aylwin administration's determination tohowdown with the general and Pinochet's desire to control the timing and conditions of bis exit.
Maniging the Volatile Hunan Right* Issue
Although buoyed by its progress in undercutting Pinochet's base of political support, the Aylwinalmost certainly recce rurcs thai carefulof the human rights issue is critical to protecting its gains and building an enduring relationship with the military. The swiftness and force with which the emotiorjill) charged iuae of Pinochet-era human rights abuses seized the national political suge in0 caught the new adrninisuaiMa somewhat offguaxd, in our view, and has complicated Aylwin's strategy for managing civil-military relations. Upon taking office, Aylwin facedbarrage of demands from the far left, victims' relatives, and someof his own coalition for full investigations and trials of individuals accused of human lights viola-Uor
Army hierarchy is particularly concerned about the possibilityull investigation of6 murders of Orlandoformer Foreign Minister under the Allendehis assistant, whoS citizen, which led to indictments in the" United Slates of high-level Chilean military officials of the former regime.I
Aylwin has carefuujiddle road, allowing thc left and the families of octimi to air their paaiaaiLi wtik reffiiBinj from using (he issue to challenge the rnflitary's igritotioaal Unsure .ad
make public tbe discoveries in0 of mau graves of (hose executed afteroup,hoping, to give vent to public frustration! and defuse the issue early. The President has stated (hat,the process of national reconcihation demands inquiries into past abuses, rtlUll be odd accountable. He also has bold oul the possibility of granting pardonsndividuals, however, recognizing that many in the armed services would see prosecution of senior officers as an attack on their institutions. Finally. Aylwin has refrained from using the human rights issue to try lo unseal Pinochet, calculating that the Army would notan attempt to make the general personallyfor past violations. |
In an effort to defuse the emotional human rights Issue. Avhvm in0 created the Ret tigby former Senator Raul Ketiig aad gavearrow mandatenvestigate abuse* from the Pinochet era thai resulted in deaths or disappearances and to compensate relatives of victims The move initiallyave of pablK criticism
ie publication in March this year of tbe commission report detailing armed force* complicity in moteeaths it testing Aylwin's conciliatory skills and the commitment of the ruling coalition to bisuman right* strategy. Some coalition members on Ibe left initially reactedbe commission report with renewed calls for Pinochet's removal, which the Army high command answeredublicof onconditiocal support for (be general.pubbc criticism of tbe armeda turn, put their alliesbe defcssive^^H
Narrowing Ihe Military* Mandate
asaasainatioa by leftist terrorist* ia early1rominent conservative ally of Pinochet in response to the publication of tbe Retlig report has heightened political debate among centrist andpolitician! over tbe potential cost* of Aylwin's human rigbu strategy. The military's far-right nines are trying lo recoup their position by crltkiiine the lethal consequences of the Retlig report and ihe government's counterterroeism policy. Pinochetstated thai the assassination threaten*in our view, be may seize on public concern about terrorism to cnticire tbe government, play op tbe lew-and-order record of his regime, and pressenewed Army role in internal security, as onesenator from Aylwin'* party has already publicly proposed. For his pan. the President lias rejected the Army's and tbe far-right's dire ussemmeni of the security situation and underscored hi* determination not to restorehe Army the internal security function il had under Pinochet, while vowing lo crack
i wo iuiiri the imilimtuii* of it. unnetl>n" 1VII and-nvni I
In tbe cominghe faDout from the Rettig report will likely compel Aylwin to demonstrate how far he is willing to confront the military on human rights related abuses. In an address to the nation summariiing the report, Aylwin called on iheto speed up processing of human right* case* and staled thai8 amnesty law must not prevent investigations to establish respoosibUiiy for crimes.'
Closely tied to the sensitive human rights issue it tbe Chilean military's broad internal securityegacy of Pinochet's attempt to control political do-sentrime target of Aylwin's reforms. Tbe military'* sweeping definition of its national security role is enshrined in Ihe Constitution andariety of laws and procedures instituted by Pinochet. Tbe Aylwin administration so far ha* avoided tackling these legal and institutional arrangement* head-on. choosing instead to dilute tbe Army's internal security rose by upgrading police forces and reforming tbe
Reallocate* lb* Army's Internal Security Functions Tbe government's strategy has been lo strengthen the various policegradually sblfl to loan internal security functions long exercised by clement* of tbe armed forces, while eventuallyivilian intelligence agency. The government has expanded the national police force, the CataUntroi. and broadened its mandate over the last year to include more domesticduties to counter growing terroristtlans to transfer more intelligence rcarxsaaibilities lo the Invritlroeiones. the investigations police,In ihe counternarcotica area. Meanwhile, the Aylwin administration has reduced ties betweenand other military dements by placing the former under Interior Ministry rather than Defense Ministry controlaw can be passed forrnaliring the change (sec uttet on
The continuing terrorist threat, together with the human rights controversy,ikely to delay developmententralued nonmilitary intelligence agency, which is vital, in cor view, to civlliani/lng the internal security function. Before the democraticPinochet merged Chile's central intelligence agency-the National Intelligence Center (CNI> into the ArmyDirectorate in an effort to increase the government's ckpendcncc on the military
l"he government, in our view, has carefully calculated its decision to chip away at the military's internal security role rather than to attack the elaborate legal framework granting the military significantautonomy and political authority. Empowering Congress and the executive with greater military oversight authority, for example, would require changing the Organic law of the Defeaseontroversial bell enacted by Pinochet before the transition, which, in conjunction with related decree* and statutes, limit* executive cont-ol of the armed forces. The law loavesweextent of the President's authority over
The Risingeal in Chile
extreme leflnis still cling to their strategy of armed struggle despite the new political climate resulting from the return of democracy and from reformat trends In the Communis' movementTerrorist groups, notably she ManuelPatrloik Front-Dissident Paction fPPMR/D/ and the Lautaro Popular Rebel forcesave increased their attacks on public officials and govern-mesu facilities, employing assaittuotionj. bombings, and rocket attacks tonion rights abuses during the Pinochet era and to demonstrateof the Rettlg report The assassination In1 of Senator Jaimerominent ally of Pinochet, has heightened fears among others who served In the military regime of leftist retribution and increased public criticism of the government's eoun-terterro'ist program. Attacks on US Interests are also on thethe highest number of anil-US attacks of any country in the world duringalthough they have generally involved bombings in-tended to cause property damage rather thanaaaTfl
appear likely to encourage more terrorist acUviiy In the short term. Terrorist groups, dissatisfied that the mandate of the Rettig Commission did not include fudietal investigations, will remain determined to exact Justice on their own. The government is relying on the national police,rabineroa. to replace the Army as the chief asUiterrortst organisation, but the poller, will require some time to develop sources of information and effective couniertemirl.it operation*.
We doubt that Chilean terrorist groups willignificant threat to the Aylwin government because of their demonstrated Inabilityoordinatedeclining outside support, and limited popular bocklng. Although the groups reportedly maintain low-level contacts with each other, their efforts to unite in recent years have failed. Moreover, domestic support for these groups from far-left parties It likely to decline under pressure from the government and public, while the extremists face reduced financial and military assistance from Cuba and other foreign
growth of terrorism partly reflects the increasing isolation of extremist groups, as the organisedparticularly the Communistto stoke out apolitical role In newly democratic Chile. In our Judgment, the Communis! Parly's deemphaslr of armed struggle and increasing reluctance to sanction violent* are reducing Us ability to rein in terrorist groups.M
Presidentmoderate human rights polity and the disruption of the domestic Intelligence services caused by the transition to dvilian government also
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nomic circumstances. Long-term prospects forterrorist organtsatiems will depend on the ability of Ay twin's administration to give the fartake In the success of democratic government. Inclusion of the left In the political process and even modest progress on Us agenda of sotloeconomlc reform would help further Isolate tcrrortu groups and undercut their appeal to prospective recruits. Moreover. If the government succeeds in strengthening Us Intelligence apparatus and defusing the volatile legacy of human rights abuses, the terrorists would have reason to reconsider the efficacy of armed struggle, f"
r
such as the military budget,nd retirements Complementary statutes guarantee theixed share of the national budget and limit the right of Congress to investigate militaryules governing change* to these law* arc coenplieat-ed. reflectingfforts to safeguard bit au thoritanaa system from meddlingivilianFor example, certain constitutional amendment* wouldwo-thirds majority of botheonstdctably more vote* than Ihe governing coalition controls Although Aylwin recognizes that Pinochet has been able to exploit some imbiguibe* of the Organic law to his advantage, the President appear* determined to delay legislative action on the matter until the general has largely lost support from the political right.
Monitoring the Budget
While deferring action on the Organic Law. the government i* already testing lesser elements of the system tbe general put in place to limit civilian control For the first time in nearly two decades, tbe executive and legislative branches determined1 the overall budget allotments for the various armed services. Reflecting this change in polilical dynamics, each service went through the process of lobbying key administration officials andand cooducting briefing* about national security issues and eq-Jipnxal requirement* to justify budget recnis* ttH
Despite these inroads by the Aylwinwhat ha* Song bee*ilitarylaws place significant limits on theoversight of the military budget. Theis consiraiaed, for example, from dealingrelated to force structure and equipmentfrom budget cuts, guaranteeing itof tbe stale copper firm'snational budget. Finally, the Pinochet regimefinal month*umber ofproperties to the Army, providing itof income outside government control H
Carta!ling Military Power Over the Judiciary The foveratneat has been moreeven more successful- in reclaiming controlecond bastion of military power, the judicial system. During Pinochet's rule, the courts became an arm of tbe military government, inlcrpreling laws with littlefor civil or bnman rights and using broadly defined stale security laws to try many civilian* in military court* The President of the Supreme Court staled9 that SO percent of the case* handled by the military court* should be in civilian vcttucs, and questioned the impartiality of decisionsystem subject to military chain of
the pressing need for judicial reform in both tbe civilian and military courts, Aylwin early In bis termackage of legal reforms, dubbed Ihe Cumplido laws, after their chiefMinister of Justice Francisco Cumerino Pissed by Congress last December, the laws narrowed null, tary court jurisdiction, transferring most case* to civilianassage of the Cumplido laws bat strengthened due process and civil rights guarantees by expanding eligibility for release of detaineestrial and resolution of their cases.I
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of (be judiciary bis led to progress onthorny bilateral iuue. Iliai is. resolving (be murders of former Foreign Minister Letelier tod bii US, allegedly by agentsof ibe Pinochet regime Passage- of the Campudo package has allowed Use transfer of the criminal case to drihan courts and appointment by the President, subject to Supreme Court approval,pecial Investigatory nidge to study and prosecute the case. |
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Prospects for Sueceas
In oar view. Aylwin probably will oontinoeake solid pcocreaa during bis term on asserting dvilian aulborrty and nddining Pinochet,ll asthe military's rote in internal security nines The administration's gains in these areas will depend partly on how adeptly It manages political pressures arising from the human rights Issue Because strong public reaction to the Retlig Commission report is likely to pat (he armed forces on (he defensive, Aylwin will need to be especially sensitive to their concern! without losutg the support of his diverse coalition partners. Many orbcen. particularly within the Army, worry (bat the government it naive about the threat from the far left and will want assurances that Internal securitytheir ownweighed in developing human rights
' awaaawaawaawal
IX trials ofcrsikelyof the Rcttig Cocansrision'i report. Aylwin will come under increasing pressure to darify his position regarding the Amnesty law, rjrosecutions of individual officers, and the possibility of pardons. Although many officer* presumably recognize that the govern-mem cannot ignore past abuses, some may close ranks behind Pinochet if Aylwin appears unwilling orto deflect public demands for eihauaitve legal proceedings la our view. Aylwin. recognizing tins risk, may try toecret bargain with the military hierarchy whereby the inter agrees to the
(.rialw "expendable" officers in returnfomite of government amnesties and protection for the senior leadership. Increasing public calls forcould impede tbe government's abilityeal, however, as public confidence in the reformed legal process grows and more victims of human rights abuses seek prosecution of military officersandlbe annulment of8 Amnesty law.
The government will likely continue to let pressure from the unsocial scandals build against Pinochet in coming months in an effort to induce has retirement, while tfiaaagissg tbe investigations so that be is not prosecuted. Public opinion clearly favors Pinochet's departure, but the President reoognizes thai (herelircmcat as the resultrial would do grave damage to civil-rrrililary relation* To reduce the risk of Army officer* rallying behind Pinochet, theprobably will take steps to reassure tbcm of its sincere efforts to defuse media attacks against their Commander and service and soflen the impact of scandal'related congressional and judicialIn our view, this strategy would also improve the odds that Pinochet will resign within the neat year, oibcr vosssntarily or under pressure from fellow officers Should one of the invcuigatioo* result in indictment* against Pinochet, all key players the general himself, the military, the Congress, and thelikely to agree on the needace-saving formula torial. Although someof the Army might fault Aylwin for failing to protect its image, wc believe senior officer* would conclude that avoiding further damage to instiiutional prestige required Pinochet's retirement]
Over the medium term, we expect Aylwin's continued success in dismantling the legal basis of the military's political power lo depend largely on Pinochet'sfrom the political stage, through elimination of his power base or, preferably, hi* cetircmeni Efforts to change the Organic Law before this occurs could invite more political meddling by Pinochet, who would use the issue to stir up civU-miliury lexuiont. In the meantime. Aylwin probably will have to devote more time and energy to deflecting premature initiative* from the left wiag of the ruling coalition for changes to the Organic Law and other military stalute* as) election approaches.
Pinochet'* retirement or death would allow Aylwin to choose an Army Commander more sympathetic to civilian authority and receptive to military reform This In turn, would give greater influence to Army officer* commuted to democratic ruleore apolitical military establishment. Senators appointed by Pinochet during his presidency, as well as rightist politicians in general, would likely feel less boundardline position in voting on changes to tbe Organic Law. finally, the government probably would be more inclined to find training and equipment for the Army after Pinochet left power, perhaps using suc|argaining chip in negotiating reforms.
Although we hold the view that, overall. Aylwin's prospect* of making further gains on Subordinating tbe military to civilian authority during his term are good, we cannot rule out developments that could delay or derail his efTorii One such scenario wouldignificant escalation oftargeting militarythe wake of tbe Rettigevelopment that could impel the armed forces hierarchy to become more vocal in criticising Aylwin's human rightsramatic increase in far-left terrorist activities would expose the limited counterintelligence capabilities of (heforce* and could increase demands by tome on the right that tbe mJIHary resume responsibilities forave of assassin*lions of military personnel could even prompt some officers tocounlerterrorism opostiora without government approval.
A serious economic downturn, although highlyIn our view, could also shake militaryin the competence of civilian government,we doubt that tali alone would spur an effort by the Army to reinsert itself in politics. Moreover, even Pinochet would have little hope of reluming to power by force unless he dramatically broadened his power base in the Army and the other service* and public support for civilian government significantly deteriorated, and the political landscape became polarired. Finally, recognitioe of the deleterious ins-pact on foreign relation* and Ihe likely public outcry would no doubt leave many officers unwilling tooup.
our view, prospect* (or dcpoliiichiag the military will ultimately dependivilian and military leadenhared view of the role of the armed forcesemocraticrocess likely to span several successive covernnseais aod perhaps to require the rise to influenceew generation of officers For the near term it least, senior officers will want toay rcgardusg tbe military's rove in national affairs, particularly given the inexperience of the current civilian government and its limited knowledge of isatiocal security issues. The Aylwinlong-range efforts torofessional cadre of civilian advisers who can design andnational security policy may help foster military confidence in civilian autnorit) over the armed forces. Prospects for stable democracy should also improve as the military becomes accustomed to influencingpolicy by working through congress and civilian defense experts.
In addition to tbe general task of determining the place the Chilean military shall occupyociety, the Aylwin government and its iitccewors will steed to focus on the narrower issue ofew sTtJMioss for its armed forces. Moreover, as its mission changes, future governments probably will want to consider reducing the military's sire, in part for budgetary reasons. In our view, the Chilean armed forces are most likely to be receptiveew mandate that conceauatea on externalaccompanied by Unproved equipment, joint training exercises, aod educational opportunities with other professional militaries frotney have long been isolated Mindful of the US ban on military sales to. Chile for someears. Ihe Chilean military probably will continue to diversify its sources of arms and traimng. while maiotairung iu preference for Wee tern suppliers'
Implications for US Interim
The Aylwin govtrnment's continuing success inclvfl-niihtary relations and narrowing military influence will significantly advance consolidation ofhile, fulfilling an important USpolicy goal. Removing tbe military from the
political stage will allow civilian institutions toarger roleadonl security policymaking, tomilitary oversight responsibilities, andebuild public confidence In Chile's legal system. Similarly, the Aylwin admiriisirauon's progress in redressing military-perpetrated human rights abuses andthe Army's role in internal security shouldimprove Chile's human rights record as well as facilitate re Integra lion of the military into Chilean society. Finally, the gradual emergenceilitary focused on national defense rathe* than internalcouldalutary example to othercountries in South America]
The process of reshaping tbe national security role of the Chilean military will not occur without some problems and challenges for US regional and security interests, however. Tbe Chilean military may come to equate in changed role with costly impecwemeais to its eonipmcni and new acquisitions demands the Aylwin government may have difficulty reconciling with its oosrasnatpseat to devote greater rtaonrcca lo social programs whileound, free-market-oriented economy Any new pu refuses ofweapons systems also would risk increasing tensions with Chile's neiehUirs, particularlyand perhapsegional arms race While Ihe lifting of9 Kcsnedy-Harbn asnendmentUS military sales to Chile offer* Washington greater opportunities to influence the muitary through training, joint exercises, and weaponsay bring unwelcome requests from ihe Chilean armed forces for sophisticated equipment thai could urwet the regional military balance ladeed. although the Chilean Defense Minister has indicated (ha( the Aylwin government is determined to round out cur-real eqsUrencet inventories while avoiding major equipment upgrades, tbe Air Force bas alreadyinterest in lbsfi fighter aircraft. Finally, the Aylwin government and its successors may look increasingly to the United States for help in channeling the Chilean military's energies into missions that neither provoke regional conflict nor encourage meddling in politics.,
Appendix
Overview of (he Chilean Armed Foices
Toe Army is clearly thev;ce in Chile, comprising nearly half ofO0strong armed [orces. During the yean of (he Pinochet-beadedjunta, theapidly and receivedhare of military expenditures. Under the new civilian government, however, the Army has fared lest well, in1 budget it was the onl> force to inignificant cut. By constitutional statute. Pinochet became Army Commander upon stepping down from the ptewdeneyiolMO^sad his tenure lain crrtil
The Navy, numbering0 men. has long been rated as one of the mow effect ire in Latin Amenca. The service ptacca parties lai cmpbasii on professional training and has participated in annual UNITAStraininewith US forces for almost three decades-J
Adm. Jorge Martinez took command of the Navy shortly before the democratic transition. Although Martinez appears loyal to President Aylwin, in our judgment be would be the most Bkdy of all Use commanderslose ranks behind Pinochet if be concluded that the government was trying tothe Army in an effort to oust toe general. With the eicepuoa of Pinochet. Martina asnong all the service chiefs has been ibe least supportive of the Aylwin government in bit public statemt
man Air Fort* remains capable ofits uctical. air defense, and support missions despite restrictions placed on arms sales to Chileumber of countries, includi during the Pinochet
Air Force Chief Gen. Fernando Mattbei served on the junta, but was Pinochet's most persistent military critictrong advocate for the transition to civilian rule. Asked by Aylwin to remain in his post, Matthd has publicly voiced support for the adminis-iratioo and acknowledged the needommission
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member Carabinerosationalconstabulary subordinate to the Defense Ministry. Thar perform regular law eatforeexnenias wcDide range of nonpolicche Carabineros commander icrved on the military junta, although the military has traditionally viewed the Carabineros as subordinate to the other services Tbe Carabineros have benefitedenerally positive public imageompetent force. Growing crime and terrorism problems, however, threaten to erode the service's reputation, and President Aylwin has taken steps to bolster the force byen over tbe next few years while increasing its operation-al duties and resources, according to press reports.
Original document.
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