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Iraq's Shias; Baghdad's Albatross I-
Shia Muslim opposition lo Sunni Muslim political domination hasecurring threat lo ihe stability of Iraq since0 revolt against ihe British-imposed mandate government. The antigovemmeni motif and preoccupation with oppression woven into Shia religious traditions have been ihe basis ot the community's activism since ihe seventh century. Although Iran's appealshia revolution have helped io rally ihe Iraqi Shia opposiiion, Iraqi Shias have their own strong traditions separate from Iran and oppose becoming its loot. In addition. President Saddam Husayn huystem of rewards and punishments with ihe Shias to trylunt this threatvemment's ruthless crackdown of Shia unrest in the south during the current insurrection will further embed Shia hatred for any Sunni leadership in Baghdad with ties to Saddamong Outside the Mainstream
Iraq's minority Sunni Muslims, who view the Shias as dangerous heretics, dominated Iraqi political life throughout both Ottoman and British rule in Iraq. Shia Muslims compriM aboutercent of Iraq'sillion population and arcentral and souihera Iraq near major oilfields and along ihe major roads and railroads to the Persian Gulf. When the British look Over the government from die Ottomans following World Warhias for the most part were less educated, poorer, and politically weaker than the Sunni minority. Most Shias had deliberately chosen nol io participate in die Sunni-dominated political system or train in military colleges. Up to the end of World War II, only three Shias served in Iraqi Cal
Since Saddam assumed direct powere has launched economic, social, and political programs to deflect Shia discontent and to helpense of national identity. The Iraqi Government hasonsiderable portion of lu development programs at ihe Shias. During the Iran-Iraq war. the government
Shiaeel of Frotestplinter sect of Islam originatingisagreement among Muslims over the selectionaliph, or successor, to the Prophet Muhammad after his deathD. Supporters ofousin of Muhammad who had married Ihe Prophets daughter, objected to the selection of Muhammad's uncle, Abu Bokr. as the first caliph. They believed Muhammad's sons had the right io carry hit "divineuring the rule of the next two caliphs. All'sShiat AH as they becometo press All's claim to the caliphate^^
. AU was proclaimed' the fourth caliph after the third caliph. Uthman, was aiiasanaicd. He moved the seat ofthe caliphate from Al Madinah to the Iraqi city of Kifa, where he lour was murdered. All's death instigated fighting over the succession to ihe caliphate, which culminated in the Sunni massacre ofAlVs son, Husayn, and his followers ot Ihe Iraqi city ofKarbala. Husayn's death scaled the division between Sunnls and Shias and became the catalyst for Shjapreoccupatien with martyrdom and perjccuiion.^t
/VESA NESAXS1
Today. Husayn's martyrdom is commemorated by Shias onhM uharram. the first month of ihe Islamic year. This year Ashura falls cr.uly. Devout Muslims reenoct the events leading to his deathassion play, and young men practice ulf'fTagelladon. Shias worldwide revere Iraq's holy cities of An Hajafand Karbala. Alt is buried in An Nejef. now the seat of Shia spiritual guidance. His warrior son. Husayn. is buried in Kc
Shia participation in lhe government and military has expanded under Saddam. Inhe government strongty encouraged Shias io join ihe Ba'lh Party, which resulted in Isonaniiii increases in Shi) representation in lhe pany at ihc grassroou level as well as in ihe party's ruling Regional Command. Forihetr overwhelming warconuibulions. some Shiu were promoted to senior military positions. Shias dominate the junior officer corps as well as make up aboutert en: of the rank and file in the military. fs NP>
Kcpuoiican Tongsi-ind
Despite these gains, the Shias remain second -class citizens. Shia dominated southern Iraq is still considerably poorer than the Sunni heartland. Shias still are undemprescnied in the government. They holdandful of nunistcnaJ and Revolution Command Council posts. Even increases in Shia membership in ihc Ba'lh Party have been offset by ihe party's loss of power to an increasingly presidential form of government Sbiaj also are virtually excluded from ihe Republican Guard. Saddam's elile military force.
igslanding Tradition of Dissent
Iraqi Shia diisidence is grounded in longstanding Shia clerical opposition to Sunni government wilh its secular trappings. Shia clerics believe Islam provides lhe only legitimate ideology forsuie and society and reject jecuUr nationalism, socialism, and liberal capitalism. Under Lhe rule of lhe Sunniinh cenLiry, leading Shia cierKS^ftosi of themto cocpefaie with the Turkish governor innd instead looked to Iran for inspiration^tdguidance. Shiarebgious leaders also rejec^oerDie Sunni monarchy installed by lhe British in
and subsequently many were eipcKcd lo Iran Shia clerics from prominent Arab and Per van families in Iraq's holy does of An Najafakim. Shirazi, Khallsi, anda long history of oppoiition to the centra] authority in Baghdad, and members of these families are well in the Shia dissident movement today.
Shia clerics began to organise an underground poiiu'cal-religious movement in. According to an Iraqi academician, the clerics were concerned
Iraq's Shia Clergy
Shia clerics traditionally haveajoreadership in the Shia convnunity. but many of the clerics hec refrained from political ociirism. The religious leadership in Iraq Is lonexnaatedtMi of respected clerics who primarily live Ia An Najaf, Korbala, and Baghdad and who come from oidAine Arab and Persian Shia families* Theyolio* by virtue of their long years of study, their upright Islamic lives, and their "just" and apolitical standsissues of ikeider group ofew the nscnd Shia teachers, or nullahs, is responsible fc preaching in mosques. Iran's late Ayatollah Khome_ spent iken exile in An Natcf.^M
The Sunni leadership has actively sought to limit the influence of Shia clerics among lhe majority Shia population.3 the Iraqi Government notional Shia private schools and replaced many Shio teache wiih secular Cbrir-ians. The government also corM
Shia religiousthrough ihe Ministry of
Religious^
Grand Ayatollah Abdal-Qasim Musavi Khu'i is one the preeminent spiritual leaders of Shia Islam today his loie nineties, he is probably the mostrand eyatollahs. Evenformerhim as Shia Islam's foremost authority.esult. Khu'i. the only grand ayoici in Iraq,arge following among Iranian. Gulf. Iraqi Shias. He has long been apolitical,oddomls reoueti lo bless Iraq's elghhyear war wi Iran}
Iran
Where Ayatollah
Where Ayatollah Khu'i stands in regard to the Shit rebellion is unclear. According to press reports. r> prominent clericeligious edictommittee of eight clerics to administer civil servi, Shia eitits. In March the Iraqi leadership televise alleged condemnation of Shia unrest byAyOtollohropagtinda ploy to reassert control of south/ Shia cities. According io press reports. Iraqi Shia oppoiition leaders charged that tht Baghdad regt hod arrested Khu'i and forced him lo matt the statements.
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thenterest in observing Shia religious Cirftoms and ihe pronounced Sunni lone of ihe lovemratsgThe largest and most infiuer.uaJ Shu opposiuon group formed was ihe Islamic Call (Dawa) Parly. The party's founders included the late Ayatollah Muhsin al-HakJm. ihe Shia spiritual leader in Iraq,0 until his excuu'on by Baghdadnd Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr. Sadr's ideas about Islamic government and economics and his call for social revolution appealedhia activists unhappy with Baghdad's continuing pattern ofd
Tne Dawa Party has faced brutal government repression for overears. In ihehe sons of Muhsin al-Hakim fled Iraq wiih other Shia dissidentsarsh government crackdown but continued lo dominate the Dawa Party. The group, whkh claimed membership in Iraq00 in ihe, erj in significant lerrorisi'aciivitie*
Baghdad
responded by expelling to Iran0 Iraqi Shias of Iranian origin and imprisoning or executing Dawa Parly member
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Although many vie* the establishment of an Islamic republic in Iranodel foractivism, no Iraqi Shia leader talks about makinguppet of Iran. The Shia community in Iraq is not controlled by Iran and bas its own historical traditions and religious institutions that predate these of Iran. Dissident leaders probably want lo follow pro-Iranian policies but are aware that the presence of sizable Kurdish and Sunni Arab minorities in Iraq probably ruleshia government in Baghdad like rhe one in Tehran!
The Dawa Party competes with other Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia factions for military aid. financial support, and encouragement from Tehran. These groups arc heavily influenced by Khomeini's teachings and favor creationlerical-style [llamic government modeled after (ran. Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim is head ofmcmber Tehran-based Supreme Assembly for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, an umbrella organization created by Iran! for Iraqi Shias and Kurds to cootdinaa cUssiOCni activities. AyatoCah Khomeini chose Muhammad Baqr. believing the Hakim name lould attract widespread support among Iraqi Shias.
Many Iraqi Shia dissidents favor greater independence from Iranian influence and reject Khomeini's doctrine offoqih. political ruleupreme religious figure. Elements of the Dawa Party and other Iraq Shia factions have claimed the Supreme Assembly is too subservient to Iran and ihat Muhammad Baqr has sacrificed the autonomy of the Iraqi Shia opposiiion movement. To put distance between ihemselvcsran, these groups have set up splinter organizations linked lo the Dawa Party but based in Damascus and London.l
London-based Iraqi Shias publicly espouse politically moderate aspirations almost certainly hoping to extend iheir support beyond radical, sectarian lines. Croups such as the Rabitat Bayi al-Ahl led by Husayn al-Sadr generally Oppose the inierventiojof the clergy in ihe political life of the ccir.uy |^
Popular support for pro-Iranian Iraqi Shia dissidents peaked immediately after Ayatollah Khomeini assumed
power in Iran and waned throughout the Iran-Iraq war. Iraqi Shias demonstrated an even greater hatred and fear of the Iranians during the war than they did of Saddam's Sunni Arab-dominated regime in Baghdad. The government'! propaganda machine helped by playing skillfully on longstanding ethnic animosities between Arabs and Persians. The Shias bore the brunt of the fighting, comprising threeof the Iraqi troops at ihe front andimilar share ofead, wounded, and missing. The llakims and other Iraqi Shia dissidents who sal out ihe war in Iran probably losjcopslderable credibiliiy In ihe Iraqicy .Wt H
Saddam's rronTsi
Despite opening up some political and military postshias, Saddam Husayn has vigorously repressed Shia opposition activities. Security officials have direcied their efforts against actual and potential Iraqi Shia leaders such as teachers, professional people, and students, while Saddam's propaganda apparatus extolled ihe quality ofhis leadership for all Iraqis. Perhaps the most significant example of Iraqi determination to destroy the Shia opposition was ihe execution of Ayaiollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr. who was strangled in prison along with his sisteraghdad used ihe execution of ihe religious leader to emphasize io Iraqi Shias that the regime was prepared to use brute force against prominent clerics lo maintain control. The execution probably also demonstrated lo Iraqi Shias that Iran could not protect its supporters inside
Iraq's security service has hunted down Shia dissidents who flee the country and also uses threats against relatives still in Iraq to cow other Shia activists abroad. For example, in3 ihe Dawa Party was implicated in two icnorist bombings in Baghdad. In reaction. Saddam ordered the arrest ofembers of the Hakim familyonth later executed six of ihem.raqi agents assassinated Mahdi al-Hakim. Muhammad Baqr's brotherawa Party leader, in Sudan.esult of ihe regime's rigorous suppression of Shia dissidents in Iraq and abroad, ihe Shii opposition leadership and support network inside ihe country have been severely weakened)
f April 1/
Th* Current Unrest and Beyond
The Shia opposition has tried to exploit Saddam's defeat in Kuwait to improve its political position. It is trying to play down long-held aspirations for an Iranian-style Islamic regime and accept in itsoalition-style government that would include representatives of all ejhnfcjprtjccaaan groups.'
[Press rcporu suggest lhal the Shia dissident bloc has beenajor role in shaping thedoubt with strong Iranian backingflB
Since the end of the Gulf war. ihe Shia exile leadership apparently has liken advanuge of spontaneous civilian unrest, the breakdown in civil order, and lhe influx of thousands of retreating Iraqi soldiers into southern Iraq lo atuck regime forces!
lite Iranian
involvement, Iraqi Shia civilians'may not be coalescingechcosingtosupportncw local Opposition groupsuea:..
Al lhe same time. Hakim and other exile figures apparently have decided io remain ouiside Iraq and enlarge their international role as spokesmen for the Shia rebellion. Emboldened by civilian unrest, they arc publicly calling for Saddam's overthrow and requesting
international assistance to stop widespread atrocities by regime forces againsi Shia civilians. Hakim undoubtedly fears the regime's residual strength and probably has decided lo wail until he believes Saddam is aboul to fall before reluming to Iraq. We bclicvc|he exile leaders' unwillingness to return io Iraq limits iheir ability to organ ire and lead ihe rebellion and also
jndennines their credibility as opposition leaders.
In response to regime repression. Shia dissidents could follow ihe example of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's retreat from open opposition after President Asad's massive use of force to quell Sunni unrest al Homah in
everal thousand Syrian ireops moved into the city and crushed the insurgents during two weeks of bloodshed, leaving as many0uslim Brotheihood leader said in3 thai the opposition would have to adopt new tactics to avoid pacing the civilian population in acrwsfjre between ihc militants and ihe government. H
Jmor.-occupied i
Saddam's brutal crackdown in Shia cities and towns throughout the south is likely lo permanently esrage lhe Shia community despite his public promises of political and economic reforms in March. In the past the regime generally has ferreted out suspected Shia activists while making conciliatory gestures to the Shia community at large toopular backlash. Now. however, ihe scope and intensity of governmentfar exceeding Syria's brutal crackdown inlikely totrong sense of revenge in the Shia community. Iranian. Syrian, and Western press reports indicate that regime fortes are indiscriminately attacking civilians and destroying Shia mosques andthe sacred shrine* in An Najaf andquell the rebellion. Large numbers of refugees from the fighting have streamed into coalition-occupied territory seeking food, medicine, and safe
Regardless of lhe leadership inHusaynuccessor government made up of military and Ba'th PartyShias are likely to harbor strong antircgime sentiments. Many probably will look for ways to avenge regime atrocities. Government and Ba'lh Party officials trying to reassert control of Shia cities are likely to be high-priority targets of individual Shias or organized opposition groups. The ability of Shia rebels in maintain ever, low-level resistance against regime forces over the next few months increases prospects thai Shia dissidents will strengthen underground networks and establish new groups. The brutality of lhe government repression almosi certainly has hardened ihe Iraqi Shia clerics and mayew wave of Islamic-based opposition to ihc rc,;im;.f
Original document.
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