Director of Contra! Intelligence
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS9
Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the0
National Intelligence Estlmato Key Judgments
These Key Judgments represent the views of thc Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligence Community.
The following inielligence organiiaiiont participated in the preparation of these Key Judgments;
Thentel tier net Agency The Defense Intelligence Agency Tbe National Security Agency
Tbe Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Research. Department of State
The Director for Intelligence, Department of Energy
alsa participating;
Thc Deputy Chief of Suff for Intelligence.
Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence.
Department of tbe Navy
The Assistant Chief of SlatT. Intelligence,
Department of tbe Air Force
The Director of Intelligence,
Headquarters. Marine Corps
The Nalional Foreign Inielligence Board concurs.
The full text of thit Estimate is being published separately with regular distribution.
Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WN INTEL)
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Soviet Forces and Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the0
The decline of Ibe Soviet Union has caused its leaders to limr (heir national security and superpower status as hinging more lhan ever on strategic nuclear power.ollapse of central authority or thc economy, we expect thc Sotiets to retain aad modernize powerfiii, sumvable strategic forces throughout the next decade.
faare evidence that roe new strategic ballistic missiles are intwo land based and three sea launched. If these programs continue, four of them would begin deployment in tbc.
Neveriheless, we bellcte that poUtical upheaval and economic decline will lead to tbe cancellation or serious delay of one or more of these programs. The Soviet economy will be unable toustained military production and deployment effort inomparable to (hat of, even for strategic forces.
Production and deployment rates of some new strategic systems bare been reduced as the Soviets adjust their programspercent reductions in both launchers and warheads under START. These force cuts would enable them to realize important savings in spending.
Soviet nuclear controls appear well suited to preient ibe seizure or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. The ability of the General Staff to maintain its cohesion innt, for example, of citil war or collapse of the central government, wouldey factor determining whether nuclear controls would break down.
W'yr
Key Judgments
New Policy Context
We confront divergent trends in Soviet strategic nuclear policy. On one band, tbe diminished Soviet conventional threat to Western Europe has significantly lessened thc chances of East-West conflict and thus of global nuclear war. On the other hand. Soviet strategic nuclear forces remain large and powerful, major modernization programs are in progress, and Soviet nuclear strategy evidently retains its traditional war-fighting orientation.
esult of the crumbling of many other aspects of Ihc Soviet Union's overall superpower position, current Soviet leaders appear to view tbeir security and superpower status as hinging more than ever on strategic nuclear power. Over thc past year, statements by various Soviet poliiical and military officials have emphasized thc increasing importance of Soviet strategic nuclear power.ollapse of central authority or the economy, it seems clear that Soviet leaders will conlinuc to try to shield their strategic forces and programs from Ihc impact of political unrest and economic decline. Ai ihc same time, strategic forces have not been exempt from defense spending cutss procurement spending for both strategic offensive and defensive forces has fallen.
Wc have significant uncertainties about thc future roles of icformers. separatists, hardliners, and the Soviet military itself in charting the course of Soviel strategiche possibility remains, therefore,eformist regime might challenge tbe need to maintain strategic nuclear forces comparable to those of the United States to ensure superpower status and might settleower level of force solely for deterrence.
In light of the grave economic, political, and social difficulties afflicting tbe USSR, we arc more skeptical than we were last year that the Soviets will be able to implement fully in the coming decade their modernization plans
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Conaanaatly beneves captures lbc ir.t, lmei lor hom ihc Socicl pobficil ind economic titaitm mifhl ocvelop ever thc next five yean, seemputations of Alternative Soviet Futures,1
for Iheir strategic offensive and defensive forces. The Soviet economy will be unable toustained military production and deploymenl effort inomparable to that of, even for strategic forces. Indeed, the defense sector is already experiencing some of the disruptions that beset the civilian economy. Some facilities for strategic forces seem to be affected, but these difficulties do not yet appear to have had an appreciable effect on the production or deployment of strategic forces. Observed reductions in Soviet spending on strategic forces appear to be primarily the result of prograrnmatic decisions rather than unplanned disruptions.
Separatist pressure in some republics raises thc possibility that the center could lose control over certain strategic production facilities, RADand testoss of control would at least complicate and could severely cripple the overall modernization of strategic forces. Moreover, thc ability of the central government to fund defense programs depends on economic revenues from thc republics, particularly the Russian Republic, some of which are withholding substantial funds. Separatist problems could also affect thc deployment and operation of strategic forces. The Baltic republics, for example, are key to thc strategic air defense of the northwestern approach to the USSR. We judge that, even if the central government eventually grants thc Baltic republics greater autonomy or independence, it would seek to negotiate basing rights with them to preserve these defenses, at least until they could be relocated or replaced. Gorbachev as well as Yeltsin and other republic leaders are working on arrangementsew union treaty, bul we have large uncertainties about relations between thc center and the republics over thc long term, and how strategic forces might be affected.
Nuclear Security and Control
Thc Soviels have established physical securily and use-control measures lhal appear well suited to prevent thc seizure or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons. These measures minimize the risk that renegade military officers or other dissidents could gain access to nuclear weapons and threaten to use them. Since the, heightened concern about potential internal threats has prompted thc Soviets to slrcnglhen security, including removing some warheads from areas of unrest.ilitary coup, the collapse of the central government,ivil war mighl threaten the center's ability to maintain these controls. Because of the General Staff's crucial role in controlling nuclear weapons, maintenance or its cohesion in these situations wouldey factor determiningreakdown of nuclear controls would occur.
A
START
Atroad array of both strategic offensive and defensive systems arc in various stages of development, production, or deployment. The rates of production and deployment of some new systems, however, have been lower in the past few years than we anticipated from past practices.esult, strategic force modernization has slowed somewhat. We attribute these trends primarily to programmatic decisions made in the, in particular Soviet preparations for an eventual START agreement that would allow savings by not building forces beyond START levels.
Soviet political and military leaders have strong incentives to sec START implemented. Political leaders perceive an opportunity to reduce military expenditures andlimate that fosters foreign economic aid. Military leaders sec an opportunity to modernize their forcesreaty that would preserve the relative strategic balance between the United Slates and USSR, introduce an element of predictability in strategic force planning, and bolster US incentives to reduce spending on strategic and other military forces.
For several years, Soviet military leaders have been adjusting their strategic programs to fit START limits. Soviet strategic intercontinental nuclear forces currently stand ataunchers0 deployed warheads: under probable Soviet planning assumptions for START, these forces would decline by someoercentaunchersarheads to comply with tbe Treaty.
START II
C
forceeapons would require the Soviets significantly to revise their targeting strategy, but they still would be able toevastating couiilcrmilitary
s unlikely ihat lhe Ocncral Staff would gear its long-term strategic planning to such an uncertain prospect as START II, although they probably arc preparing comingency plans.
- Socrot
Strategic Offeoshe Forces
The Soviets arc movingorce of which nearly half consists of silo-based ICBMs to one consisting mainly of mobile ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missilesnd bombers. Under START, well over half of all Soviet deployed warheads would be on mobile systems, although wc projectarheads would still be on silo-based ICBMs. Five new ballistic missiles are inland based and three sea based. If these programs continue, we project flight-testing of four of them to begin within tbe next two to three years with deployments beginning in tbe. In thc midst of political upheaval and economic decline, however, we believe that one or more of the five programs is likely to be canceled or seriously delayed:
ICBMs. The Soviets continue to deploy lhc newilo-based ICBM, which enhances capabilities for prompt attack, and theoad-mobile ICBM, which significantly improves force survivability. They have apparently completed tbe deployment of theail-mobile ICBM and theilo-based ICBM. Follow-on missiles to both thendre currently being developed.
SLBMs. The Soviet SSBN force of the future will consist of considerably fewer submarines than today but will be equipped mostly with modern, long-range SLBMs. The Soviets arc modifying Typhoon submarines to carry theollow-on missile, which is being readied for flight-testing within thc next year. In addition to thc seven Delta-IValready built, four additional submarines, which are probably modified Dclla-IVs, probably arc under construction. We project that these submarines willew, liquid-propellant SLBM, which we anticipate will be armedingle warhead. (Therehance, however, thai the Soviets aie noi building any new modified Delta-IVhere is evidenceew SSBN is being developed and that il will be armedew, solid-propellant SLBM.
Bombers. The Soviets continue to produce the Blackjack, their new strategic bomber, al the rate of three orear. We project aboutill be deployedower total than we previously had projected. Production of lheruise missile carrier has slowed and may soon end
The Soviets have enough warheads toomprehensive attack againsi fixed targets worldwide (while still retaining weapons inhether theyrecmplive strike or launched On tactical warning They would rclain lhc same capabilities under proposed START consiraims, but ihey would have fewer weapons in reserve.
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HeavyCilMs will remain (hc primary and most effective weapons againsi US missile silos during ihc nexlears, but sornc SLBMs and other ICBMs also will be able lo destroy hard targets. Thes about twice as ctTectivc against hard targets as thehat it is replacing; this difference in effectiveness probably enabled the Soviet miliiary to agree to halve theorce under START.
Strategic Defensire Forces
The Soviets will continue to devote considerable resources io strategic defense, at least through thc. Nonetheless, with Soviet military resources declining and arms treaties and budget cuts constrainingcapabilities, pressure is increasing to shrink Soviet strategic defense programs. During the past year, the level of effon has decreased somewhat but with little effect on Soviel strategic defensive capabilities-:
Ami submarine Warfare The extensive Soviet ASW program has made some gains. The Soviets have an improved, although limited, ability to detect and engage enemy submannes tn waters adjacent to the USSR. In the future, the combined effect of multiple layers of ASW systems mayignificant challenge In Western submarine operations in Soviei-controlled waters. Wc judee, however, lhal through at least the nextoears the Soviets will remain incapable of threatening US ' SSBNs and SSNs in the open ocean
Air Defense. We project considerably smaller, but heavily modernized strategic air defenses,oubling of deployed sysicms with good capabilities to engage low-altitude vehicles. Modernization programs include deployment ofoxhound and Ranker interceptors withapabilities, and Main-Slay airborne warning and control system aircraftversions of Ihese systems also arc in dcvclopmenl. We judge Ihat, in the eventajor US nuclear allack, lhe current Soviet air defense system would be unable lo prevent large-scale, low-altitude pcneiralion of Soviet airspace In lhe coming decade, however. Soviet strategic air defenses will be much more capable of engaging tow-altitude vehiclesesult, penetration byeployed US bombers and cruise missiles will become more dillicu: i. particularly in ihc heavily defended wettern USSR Ifomber and advanced cruise missile achieve ihe desired level uf reduced observability, using ladies appropriate to stealth vehicle) ihey probably would be able io penetrate most of the Soviet Union at low ainiude The capabilities of Soviet air defenses will place sonic liimiatnw onol"omber, however
Ballistic Missile and Space Defense. The modernized Moscow anliballis-lie missile (ABM) system, which will eventuallyilo-based interceptors, provides an improved intercept capability against small-scale attacks. Through the, the Soviets are highly unlikely to undertake widespread ABM deployments (hat would exceed ABM Treaty limits. Current Soviet antisatellltc'Capable systemshreat to US low-altitude satellites, but the only Soviet capabilily agaiast high-altitude satellites is electronic warfare.
' Directed Energy Weapons. The Soviets are continuing eiToris to develop high-energy lasers Tor air defense, antisatcllitc. and ballistic missile defense applications. There arc large uncertainties and differences of view among agencies, however, aboul bow far the Soviets have advanced, the status and goals of weapon development programs, and thc dales for potential prototype or operational capabilities. Wc judge that within the next two decades the Soviets are likely to develop air defense lasers, ground-based anlisalellite lasers, and ground-based ladiofrequcncy anti-satellilc weapons. The Soviets continue to be interested in developing space-based laser weapons.
Leadership Protection. Forears, the Sovicl Union hasast program under way to ensure thc survival of its leaders in ihe event of nuclear war. This program has involved lhc construction of an extensive network of deep underground bunkers, tunnels, and secret subway lines in urban and rural areas. There is recent evidence that substantial construction activity continues, and we expect the program to move forward along traditional lines
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