Director
Central
Intelligence
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED 9
Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures
National Intelligence Estimate
This National Intelligence Estimate represents the views of the Director of Central Intelligence with the advice and assistance of the US Intelligenco Community.
Director of
Central
Intelligence
1
Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures
Inlormailon available1 was used in the preparation of this National Intelligence Estimate.
The following intelligence organitanons participated
in ihe preparation of this Estimate:
Tho Central Intelligence Agency
The Defense Imelfcgence Agency
Theal Secuntv
The Bureau of InteU^ence and Research.
Department ol State
The Ofhceol intelligence Support,
Department of the Treasury
The intelligence OviSion. federal Bureau of Investigation afso part/ccetiog
The Offte of ihe Deputy Chief of Slaff for Inteihgence. Department ol the Army
The Office Olector of Naval Intelligence. Department ol the Navy
The Office or the Assistant Chief ol Staff. intelligence, rjtepartmerit of the Air Force
The Director of in:ehJgence. Meacquarters. Manne Corps
This Estimate was approved lor publication by the National foreign InieBigencv BoaiO.
1
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Figure I
Scenarios for lhc USSR Over Ihe Next Five Years
Cbnrinuation of currcrM situation
Neither entire collapse of system nor substantial progress toward resolution ofroblems
Cootinued devolution of power below but unable lo govern Poliucal gridlock
Economy would verge on breakdown bul somehow manage lo limp along Scenario unlikely to last not five years
System lepUced-iih relatively Utile viole bob
Slavic and Central Asian core state; smaller, less militarily powerful, more pluralistic ihan USSR
Bal be states, Georgia. Armenia, and Moktova become indcpcndeol
Economies of all troubled, but moving rapidly toward market
Government increasingly reflects popular will, but may not survive economic disarray
Hardliner* in miliiary, secumy services, and CPSU impose martial law type regime
Democratic reform and republic independence drives halted Strong nationalist and reformist picture? remain Economy's downward spiral accelerates Scenario unlikely io laai long
Violent, chaotic collapse ol system Republics become mdependenr
Some governments reflect popular will, other, more authoritarian Warfare within and berween many republics
Economic condiuons deteriorate dramarically. barter main form of economic intciaciun: famine widespread
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Key Judgments
Implications of Alternative Soviet Futures
The USSR is in the midstevolution that probably will sweep thc Communist Party from power and reshape the country within thc five-year time frame of this Estimate. The outcome of this revolution will be affectedumber of factors, including thc following:
A sharply declining economy and standard of living that will get worse for the next few years no matter what economic program is adopted.
The difficulties inarket reform program anditikely popular backlash.
Continued devolution of power to republic and local governments at the expense of the central government.
The rising claim of nationalism on defining the state and legitimizing its policies.
The increasing importance of popular cxpecutions and aspirations, and ihe government's abilities to meet them,ide range of issues-including living standards and personal freedom.
No one can know what the duration or thc ultimate outcome of the rcvolunonociety where repression andcontrol have been thc rule, and the culture has been resistant to change, but where recently, democratic aspirations appear to have become widespread.
Of the many conceivable outcomes, we believe four scenarios span the ranBc ofontinuation of lhe currcnl "chronic crisis" with no politicalelatively peaceful "system change"maller, more pluralistic and voluntary union in which the central government relinquishes substantialhaotic and violent "fragmentation" of the country resulting in many new states with widely varying political and economic systems;regression" through renewed repression into an auihontarian state runombination of hardliners in the military, security services, and Communist Party (see1
approach taken by thewe tgdescribeiheseoutcomes
Commumtysumatc is .mendedvciy simim to ihc four used in
bepeculate, and
than in previous esnnutes on poliiicalDeepening Crisis in ihe USSR: Pros-
opments in the USSR. We focus on afor ,he Sex, Year, ,hey are meant to
of possible outcomes and iheir"ideal cases" in order to make the dis-
for bod. the USSR and the Wesi.between ihem clear. The realily is
than on current developments.e much more complicated
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This Estimate's focus is on the content and implications rather than on the relative probabilities of such scenarios. The USSR could pass through any or all of ihese scenarios during tbe next five yean. Nevertheless, we believe that, on tbe basis of current trends and our assessment of tbe criticalthe Weak prospects for thccountry is much more likely to besystem change" or "fragmentation" scenario five years from now than to remain where it is today in "chronicn our view, an attempt to impose, the hardline regime of the "regression" scenario becomes more likely as the country verges on "system change" orut, of thc four scenarios, this is the least likely toasting outcome. In any event, wc believe that the USSR in its present form will not exist five years from now.
There will be profound effects on the geopolitical balance io Eurasia whatever the outcome. "Systemhe most favorable scenario for the USSR and thc West, would leave the USSR somewhat smaller than it is today anduclear superpower, but this Slavic-Central Asian slate would haveolitical and economic system much more conducive to close ties to tbc West. Even so, the difliculiies associated withransformation over the longer term may be toourden for the government and population to bear.
The geopolitical shift would be most drasticfragmentation" scenario, where the country broke aparthaotic fashion. Some formussian or Russian-dominated state would eventually emerge out of the chaos, butood many years it wouldar less influential actor on the world scene than today's Sovicl Union, and it would be bordered by many new countries of varying stability and military strength.
Thc ability of Western governments to influence the course of events inside the USSR is likely to grow in thc "chronic crisis'"system change-scenarios and in the aftermathfragmentation" scenario:
- The country's crumbling economy will increase thc likelihood that any government, except one led by hardliners, will turn to the West for aid and accept some degree of economic and political rand it tonality in return. The need for such aid would give most national and republic leaders an incentive to avoid repressive measures.
Even though the upper limits of what thc West might realistically offer would fall far short of the country's total capital needs, such aid could play an important role in moving thc country toward "systemhat is, the transitionarket economyore pluralistic political system.
Western assistance could play an important role in the newlyBaltic republics, simply because of their much smaller size. On the other hand, local and regional instabilities in thc Transcaucasus and Central Asia arc likely to limit Western inclination to provide assistance to these republics.
With the exception of the "system change" scenario, the West would face major obstacles in actually exerting influence.chronic crisis" scenario, which the USSR is in today, aid for political and economic reform would be hard to channel inlo projects that would benefit long-term growth and could get caughttruggle for power between the center and the republics. In this, and particularly in the "fragmentation" scenario, the gathering political and economic disarray would make it more difficult to determine whom to aid, how to get it to them, and how to follow up to ensure the aid had its intended eflect.
The aftereffects of increased instability or repression would also pose challenges to thc West:
- The East Europeans, the Turks, and the Nordic countries would turn to the United States and other major Western powers for assisunce in coping with refugees, instability on their borders,ilitary-led government in Moscow.
fragmentation" scenario, various factions or republics could gain access to and control of nuclear weapons and threaten to use them aeainst internal rivals or other countries. Allhough any Westernwould dependumber of variables, timely Western offers of assistance in securing and/or disposing of such weapons could have pivotal effect.
Seizure of control by hardlinersregression" scenario would lead to an increase in East-Westreatly diminished interest in arms control and olher negotiations,lowing in ihc reduction in the capabilities of thc Soviet military.
Violence at home could spread to the Soviet iroops that are due to remain in Germany until thc end
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Contents
Key
Chronic
Implications for ihc
Implicaliona for the
3
System Change _
Implications for ihe USSR
6
Implications foMhe West
7
Regression
7
Implications for the USSR
Implications for the West
8
Fragmentation
10
Implications for the USSR
Implications fprjhe West
Score!
Discussion
Crisis
This scenarioontinuation of the current crisis with neither tut entire collapse of the system nor substantial progress toward resolution of (lie country's problems. Gorbachev might manage to hang on to powereakened central government because neither the left nor the right would have enough strength lo oust him. but. even if he left thc scene, neither side would gain the upper hand The country* goes from one system-threatening crisis to another Despite the turmoil, much backtricking. and political stalemate at the top. thc trend is toward morefor the republicsarket-based economy butottom-up and relatively chaotic way. The command economy verges on breakdown butmanages to limp along.
Implications for Ihe USSR
The current situation in the USSR is best described by this scenario. Thisighly unstable scenario. Allhough there would be some continued movementluralisticoluntaiy union,arket economy, governmental aulhorily would weaken, and Ihc potential for major popularwoulds unlikely this scenario could prevail for the five yean of thb Estimate.ransition to one of thc other three scenarios of "systemrs likely earlier rather ihan later in this period.
If Gorbachev remained in office, he would become less and less powerful. Neither thc left nor the right would prevail, but both would remain strong enough toerious threat to Gorbachev and to each other. Tbe potential for large-scale intervention into politics by the security services and lhe military would coniinue to hang over (he country. Although less likely, this scenario could still exist if Gorbachev is removed constitutionally, decides on his own to step down, oratural dentil. Whoever is in charge, lhe central government would continue to losealthough without Gorbachev this would occur more quickly
Indicators of "Chromic Crisis"
Economy continues to deteriorate,and economy does not collapse.
eco-
Center/republics discussions onstabilization/reform plan drag out without resolution (or they agree and the plan fails center pursues ineffective ad hocepublics try to Implement individual; nomlcprograms.
Central government remains viable but power steadily erodes.
Center/republics unable to resolve keyconcerning powers of nalional and
Political polarization grows, but neither right nor left are strong enough to become dominant.
continues but at relatively low levels; periodic Incidents of regional repressionV i.
Mtlllary and security services act morebut shrinkoup.
The republics wouldood deal of thethe center lost but still would not be able to govern effectively. None would be fully independent, butBaltic states, Georgia, Armenia, andremain tethered to (be union only by the continued presence of Sovicl troops and the vestiges of Ihe central command economy. Russia would naiii grcaier conirol over its own affairs
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increased influence with other republics, but ii would not yci be strong enough to transform thc center to iu liking or assume all of tbe central government's former authority within the RSFSR. Yd'tstn's strength in Russia and lhe USSR would grow,east initially, but hc would be hamstrung by the center's continuing ability io limit the RSFSR's economic sovereignly, by infighting within his own camp (abeiied by tbend by demands of non-Russians in the republic for greater autonomy or independence.
With no resolution of the center-republic reUtionship. there would be no hope of stabilizing or reversing the economic slide. GNP would drop dramatically, and the country would face worsening shortages ofmaterials, consumer goods, and food. Inflation and unemployment would skyrocket; strikes would proliferate. Significant human suffering wouldin some areas. Foreign credits would dry up as the couniry failed io meet debt service payments; Western companies- -scared off by lhe growingand economictake their business elsewhere Ncverihcless. the economy would avoid collapseajor expansion of independent arrangements and barter deals that republics,and individuals made with each other.
The economic disarray and growing republicwould accelerate the trend toward reducedcapabilities. Thc military leadership would Iry to ensure that lhc drop in allocations to the miliiary was not diamatic. but the trend would slill be decidedly downward because lhc military economy would not be insulated from thc accelerating decline. The republics' quest for greater autonomy or independence would exacerbate ihe Soviet armed forces' manpower and morale problems. Modernization of Moscow'sforces would continue within the limitsTART treaty, bui even these forces wouldbe affected by (he economy's dismal
Implications for the West
In this scenario, the ability to conduct foreign policy by whoever leads tbe central Soviet governmcni would be conslraincd by Ihc lurmoil al home. Western governments would find Gorbachevuccessor not
only preoccupied by tbc domestic crisis but also less and less able to ensure that lhe USSR is capable of fulfilling thc foreign ccrnmiiments il makes.any Soviet regime in ihis scenario probably would still seek accommodationange ofissues and almost certainly would want to avoid confrontation. The Soviets would be likely to continue:
lhe growing economic and politicalwith the United Stairs. Western Europe, and,esser extent, Japan.
Negotiaiing ongoing and new arms control agreements.
Coopcraling inew European security order.
military and economic commitmenu. while expanding cooperation with tbe Uniied Slates, in the Third World.
Whatever the Soviet Government's intentions, the economy's rapidly decreasing ability toassive military, lhe likely increased involvement of the Soviet army in quelling domestic unreal, and the general lack of cohesion within lhe country would seriously limit the USSR's capability to threaten its neighbors or thc West. The Soviet Union would almost certainly complete its withdrawal of forces from Eastern Europe, possibly more quickly than scheduled. The leadership would have every incentive to adhere Io the terms of lhc CFE and START ireaties and probably would seek further armsto lighten the military burden on thc economy.
In this scenario, Soviet as well as republic interest in Western economic involvement would conlinuc to expand rapidly. The deteriorating economy would ensure that the central government would continue to seek accessestern economic institutions and be on the Wens doorstep for loans, credits, and general economic assistance, although il would not be able to repay such assistance!
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Special requests for consultation j, technicalemergency aid. and trade from republic and local governments are likely to increase. Without political resolution of tbe conflict over who owns resources and controls foreign trade, both USand private business relations with thc USSR and its republics will be complicated and harder toove direct Western contacts with thedisapproved of by Moscow would be perceived
as interference and could result in attempts by the central government to block Western assistance lo republics and localities.
System Change
This scenario assumes that the existing politicalis replaced with relatively little violence. This occurs with the old regime's dissolutionesult of republic or popularin Czechoslovakia inthrough agreement between thc center and the republics. In eitheroose federation or confederation of tbe Slavic and Central Asianemerges, and independence is granted to those republics seeking it. The political and economicthat emerge in the core Slavic-Central Asian state aad the independent states vary widely.
Implications for the USSR
The level of instability in this scenario would depend on lhc manner in which the system was changed. If it collapsed due lo internal pressure, thc instability initially would be greater: new governing mechanisms would have to be created in thc midst of revolution, and many elements of the olddcfcai-ed- -would remain capable and desirous ofthe transitionewoluntary sharing of power by the center would be more stable, although, even in this variant, tbe new systems thai emerged from what was the USSR would encounter problems much more serious than those now being experienced by posl-Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
The newly transformed core state that emerges in ihis scenario would reflect thc political and economic trends in Russia and.esser extern, in thc Ukraine. As such,iu Slavicwould have, ai leastuch more pluralistic poliiical and economic system than ever before. It wouldopularly elected parliamentarywith numerous political parties. While lhc role of lhc state would remain large, iu authority would depend much more than heretofore on popularThe government's respect for human rights
,_H!
Figure 3
c '
sun io resemble thai of Western governments The Central Asian regions, on ihe other hand, would remain basically authoritarian and have poor human rights records.
Ihc republics would have substantial autonomy, wiih the center playing iheeven here notin foreign, defense, fiscal/moneiary. and commumcatiora/iransportaiion policies. The presidency of tbe new union would have less scope andess powerful office thin it is today. There wouldtrong pusharket economy, although <hc central and republic governments would continue
toarge portion of major industry, and reforms would be implemented unevenly in lhe republics. Progress would be much more gradual and the social pain much greater than has been lhe case in Poland.
Russia's influence in the new union couldource of tension. Iu leadership, most likely under Yeltsin, would have played the leading role inthe new system giving greater power to thc
Indicators af "System Change"
Cenler/republics sign and beginHon of union treaty and new constitutionevolving significant power to republics.. assume and poliiical lives;
m
rnatively; dJ'J&jfi_
Large-scale publicabor unrest, and -republic pressure came Ihe central govern- 'i
meni lo collapse.
Reformers/republics give up hope of reaching negotiated settlement with the center and conclude bilateral and multilateralreserving most powers to themselves and defining areas of the center's limited authority.
individual republics. Yet Russia would be an even more powerful primus inier pares than it is today because ofrestige and because of the resources it would control. Its growing sense of national identity and thc possible emergenceRussia first" altitude could also undermine tbe new union Ukrainian nationalism could also lead this republic to go iu own way with similar effect.
A Slavic-Central Asian state would have most of the miliiary potential thai the USSR bas today, although it probably would choose to field smaller and more Slavic armed forces. It would continue touclearh ccr.vn-.'icrtei would be much reduced and their posture largely defensive. The market reforms thattate would undertake, however, would over time (but not in lhe five-year lime frame of this Estimate) giveore reliable economic base for developing military technologies and modernizing the military, should its leadership and people decide onourse,
BEST
The biggest problem for the six republics thai would form independent states would be economic because of Ihcir meager industrial and resource bases and their small populations. Most would move quickly toward market economies, but how well theirfunctioned would also depend heavily on tbe degree to which tbey cooperated with theAsian state, each other, and their olher neighbors. The Baltic states would be parliamentarylbc other threewhile democraticend more toward authoritarian states.
Thc internal growing pains that tbe Slavic-Central Asian state and the others experience wouldrelations among them. Demarcating tbe new borders alone would be enough lo generate tensions The most seriouswould entail some violence -would most likely be between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and between the new union, on the one hand, and Georgia and Moldova, on tbc other.
Such problems among and inside thc new regimes that emerged in "system change" could over thc longer run become serious enough to causeegime io fail. Reestablishment of tbe old Commur.isi order would not occur, but the miliury and security services might be able to resume control (as in ihc "regression" scenario) or chaos and wide-scale violence could ensue (as in the "fragmentation"
scenario) duehe failure of political and economic
reform.
Implications for tbe Weal
Despite thccs such tensions among ihe former components of thc USSR' would create for the West, this would be far and away the most favorable outcome for Weslern countries. The Slavic-Central Asian core state would be smaller, less militarily powerful, much more pluralistic, and almost certainly more desirous of dose relations with the West than was lbc USSR. Especially in tbe period following iu creation, it would seek extensive Weslern involvemeni in developing its poliiical and. particularly, economic
5
player on lhe world scene. Il would seek admission to European economic and security structures, posing dilemmas for Western governments. East Kuropean stales already seek membership in these institntions, and some would worry that the new Soviet Union's acceptance into these clubs would dilute the meaning-fulness of their membership. On the other hand. East European fearsesurgent, militaristic USSR or of massive instability there would be substantialryincenario.
The Slavic-Central Asian core state probably wouldajor expansion of arms control agreemenis with the West. It would have an economic inierest in cutting its military,thc United Stalesital source ofwould seek significant reductions in strategic arms. This state would not forgo nuclear weapons, since ihey would continue to be important to its security and superpower stilus, but it probably would be willing to make reciprocal, and perhaps even radical, cuts in numbers of weapons.
The Allies probably would see less justification for maintaining NATOS troop presence on the Continent if ihe Soviet Union disintegraied asin thb scenario. Tbc Europeans would almosi certainly invite the new states to join CSCE. The Allies, however, would resbt any efforts by these new slates to join NATO-
structures. This probably would give ihe West unprec-edenicd opportunities to shape developcneftl of the new stale, but it would also bring with it requests for far more substantial economic aid ihan Western countries would be wilting to provide. The Wc.il would face very hard choices in apportioning limitedassiitar.ee among thc Slavic-Central Asian state, the other newly independent states, and thc democracies of Eastern Europe.
The Slavic-Central Asian state, while heavily focused during the time frame of this Estimate onew system ai home, would still be an importani
Regression
This scenario assumes traditionalist forces seizein order to break the back of the democratic reform movement and halt thc republics* move toward sovereignty and independence. Allhough Gorbachev could leadove,ore likely he would be compelled lo go along or be forced from office. Thc securily services and ibe miliiary. who spearhead this course, use forcearge scale to reassert central conirol. Widespread arrests of leading opponents, including Yel'tsin, occur. The new leaders attempt to
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centralized control over the economy.this averts collapse of thc command economy for awhile, it does little to hall the economy'ssharp decline.
Implication* for the USSR
This scenario woulderies of harsh measures that succeed ineasure of central control. The use of force could produce political "stability"ew years, given the organizational weakness of the democratic forces and the lack of unity among the republics bent on secession. This course might also appealignificant portion of tlte Slavic-Central Aiian publics tired of political debate and seeking political order and economic stability. Such popular support would prove short-lived,if thc new government failed to deliver.renewed political opposition and civil disorder would probably develop.
The new leaders would find it difficult to gain popular legitimacy for their rule. The draconian sicp of reintroducing thc command-administrative economic system, largely discarded under Gorbachev, would not be able to rebuild thc center-republic economic tics disrupted by thc independence movement. As workers saw their economic status continuing to deteriorate, they would become less reluctant to engage in passive and active resistance to the center's power.
Thc new government would also lack an ideological basis to justify its actions, since Marxism-Leninism has been totally discredited, along with theParty. An appeal to Russian nationalism by the conservative leadership would becould take thc formationaltep would further antagonize the restive republics. Il could provide tbe basis for anregime in Russia, however, thaiRussia first" policy at the expense of lhe rest of thc union.
The biggest problem for the leadership would be maintaining unionwidc control. The use of force to hold ihe union together would almost certainly lead to open em] conflict within several republics,those having their own paramilitary forces, such as Georgia and Armenia. Controlling such unrest
Indicators af "Regression"
Gorbachev, or successors, use whatever force necessary to maintain the union;
Traditionalists gain dominance, begin setting political and economic agenda.
Regime censors media, suppresses Individual freedoms; harasses/arrests Opposition groups.
Regime reasserts central control over the economy.
would severely tax security and miliiary forces;conflict would threaten the internal cohesion and discipline of the troops, particularly if they had lo be used against Slavic groups.
This scenario could unravel quickly if thc center were unable to quash the democratic resistance, if YeTlstn or another popular leader were able to escape the center's dragnet and rally popular resistance, or if the military proved unreliable. Even so. reform andleaders might not survivehort-lived repression,olitical vacuum at the center and in many republics. Such widespread unrest would also exacerbate the ethnic, political, and generational splits within thc armed forces and security services.
If repression failed, the result probably would be anarchyhaotic disintegration of the union, thai is, ihc "fragmentation" scenario. In that event, most republics would break away from the center This breakup of tbe union would most likely be accompanied by civil wars.
Implication* for Ihc Wesl
This scenario, while less volatile thanould creaic conditions least responsive to Western influence. The immediate outcome wouldore combaiivF poslure toward the West, which the new leadership would sec as opposed to its seizure of power and us harsh internal measures. Westernwouldhunker down" ailitudc among ihc
Jsimilar to the Brezhnev era. even though itlace gieater priority on heavy and defense industry It would assert its rightsilitary power, but its mam focus would be on the USSR's internal
il' ragmentarion
leadership, further straining relations. The regime's probable political, economic, and military policies would generate renewed concern in the West over thc USSR's intentions and would frighten the Soviet Union's neighbors, particularly in Eastern Europe.egime, however, probably would seek to avoid confrontation with thc West because of the fragility of the situation within lhc USSR.
Thc hardline leadership would place arms control negotiations on tbe back burner, and its willingness to adherexisting arms controlbe increasingly doubtful astensions with tbc West rose. There probably wouldreatly reduced willingness to cooperate with the West in reducing regional tensions, although for economic reasons the new leadership would beto be drawn into foreign adventures.the regime would lake an aggressive approach to arms sales to thc Thiid World, complicating Western efforts at promoiing regional security.
egime wouldore assertive attitude toward ihe countries of Eastern Europe and might threaten to hold up any remaining troop withdrawals unless Germany and Poland acceded to Sovietand economic demands. Given iu weakened condition and preoccupation with maintainingconlrol,raditionalist regime would almost certainly remove these forces in the end rather than precipitate an Easi-West crisis.
Although more confrontational, lhc regime would be unable, due to ihe changed social environment and the weakened economy, to conduct an arms buildup
JThis scenario assumes there is no effective central (government. Power resides in the republics and, in some cases, even in localities. Republics, along with many of the ethnically based regions, secede en masse from tbe union. Ethnic and social tensions explode in many areas; tbc security services and military are unable to maintain order. The result is widespread anarchy and local civil wars made worse by the proliferation of paramilitary forces and thc defection of uniu from the military. Attempts to establish lies among republics prove difficult due to differences in political and economic agendas and the ineffective conlrol of most governments. Many regional and local governments quickly rise and fall. The collapse of the national command economy and iu supportingleads to local systems of exchange, largely based on barter.
Implications for tbc USSR This scenano not only would spell the end of thc USSRnitary state, it would also make it unlikely ihat the union could reconstitute itselfederation, oronfederation, during lhc time frame of this Estimate. Thc country's fragmentationumber of individual political uniu, many ovcrily or poienlially hostile toward one another, would increase ihe likelihood of prolonged civil wars, which would further sap thc strength of already besieged local economies. The economic chaos would lead to severe food shortages or even famine in parts of ihe country
Thc power vacuum in Moscow wouldilitary seizure of poweruccession of coups, as senior military commanders tried to hold
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Figure 4
Russian Soviet federative Socialist Republic (ft S. f. s. ft)
The Fragmentation of Ihe Soviet Unionultitude of States
the rapidly collapsing union. Even ifin thc miliiary and security services were inclined to intervene in an effort to rescue thc union, they would not be able io ensure the loyalty of many of the individual units. Widespread defections and mutinies would make large-scale use of force to stabilize ihe situation impossible. There wouldery real danger that military and security force units would defecthe leadership of thceady pool of men and arms with which to
prosecute conflict against other republics orelements within thc republics. Some of these forces could alsohreat to the leadership of the now independent republics.
"Fragmentation" is not likely to last indefinitely. As with "systemhere would be no possibility of pulling the old system back together again, but new
MSTCEFT
Indicator*Fragmentation"
iW$&
- Cooperation between center and mostlies ceases; republics ignore center's diree- lives. Including taws on military conscription.
Central and republic governments" Ingly unable to conlrol violent protests overj* deteriorating economic and poliiicalions; but opposition unable to unite,ote actions.
Ke>2$
Interrepublic ties dwindle sharply; republicsake political, economic, and territorial demands on one another.
- . !' ommand economy collapses: attempts by republics ond localities to establisheconomic systems fall; economic condl-lions deteriorate sharply.
Military discipline beginsnravel.
Ethnic and labor disturbances spread rapidly.
a! forging cooperation among some of the peoples of the former Soviet Union would be made. Russia would be thc key. The establishment of strong and effective leadership in thc Russian Republic could stabilize the political and economic situationelatively short period (perhaps several years)on the policies, it adopted and its abilities to establish economic tics to other republicsevelopment would also depend on the Russian leadership's ability to exercise control over its own disaffected ethnic groups, as well as its ability to gain command of what remains of the armed forces. An economically and politically viable Russia wouldtrong iafluer.ee on neighboring peoples still wrestling with the effects of lhc collapse of the USSR.
Implications for the West
This scenario is potentially the most dangerous for Ihe Wcsi because of lhc chaos and unpredictability of events. Although thc USSR would disappearohesive military power, thc prospects of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction falling into thebands of some republics, mutinous troops, or radical groups wouldew set of risks. There wouldeightened risk of threatened or accidental use of such weaponsmuch less likely, ot-isidc -thc Soviet Union There would alsoreater chance for nuclear materials and expertise finding theirto foreign states seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
civil conflict or war within and between republics would alio pose major dingers for the West. Oonflici wilhin thc formct territory of the USSR would have the potential for spilling across borders, particularly in central and southern Europe and Southwest Asia. Western countries would have to weigh the merits of recognizing new governments in breakaway republics or in Russia itself. One orof the contending factions would be likely to appeal to the West for economic and miliury assistance, if not outright security guarantees.
Beyond the dangers posed to tbe West by thestrife would be ihe very real challenge of dealing with tbe extreme ecooomic hardship, includinglikely to affect thc bulk of tbe former USSR. Massive infusions of assistance and capital would almost certainly be required to alleviate suffering, but thc lackentral government, or perhaps even republic governments, capable of directing the inflow of economicwell as ongoingundermine thc effectiveness of any effort. The West would also be confronted with the problem of massive numbers of refugees fleeing the disorder, which could
destabilize countries bordering tbe USSR. Despite these problems, Western assistance probably would be critical to the ability of Ihe various republics and regions to move beyond the difficulties associated with this scenario to more stable political andsystems.
This scenario would also make any coherent Soviet foreign policy extremely unlikely. There would be no central authority in Moscow to conclude arms control negotiations, implement accords already reached, or to ensure the completion of troop withdrawals from Central Europe. Moreover,itnation of anarchy and civil wan in the USSR. Soviet forces remaining in the region would notilitary threat but would present serious problems for their hosts ihould they refuse repatriation; widespread disorder among these troops would be likely.
I 1
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