CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM' RELEASEAS SANITIZED
DISPATCH HO.
pta Air Rnjch
(Specify Air or' Soa Pouch)
OOO
4
CESS Headquarters FROM LINCOLN
Guatemala
rogram
Plantewspaper Story on High Command Rift
attached draftewspaper story is designed to widen thewithin the Army High Ceasand, building up SANCHEZ at tho expense ofrival and enemy Colonel DIAZ. It furthermore is meant to serve as
L
conveying toessage which is self-explanatory. In line with jideaa on the subject, we propose to go along with hisANCHEZ may be controllable once it has been brought home to him that ARBENZ* cause is lost. In fact, lt may be possible to develop throughontrol relationship over important elements of the top echelon of the Aray who are believed to be hostile toward CALUGERLS, but who can be expected to do SANCHEZ1 bidding. Certain prerequisites will have to be fulfilled before SANCHEZ will see the light. This aspect has been fully covered in recent l eports.
ve request that the attached story, in substance, be planted withwhose coverage of the latin American scene commandsto guarantee that its contents will become known to tho personsit is actually addressed.. At random, we should like to suggest, the newspapers
Tile last two, Maxican newspapern* a
Washington correspondent namedo Is widely read ia Central America. According to RQLEKDER, he could be provailod upon to print the story as given
,to him.
C*D. PLAYDcfe
WDP/GLP/eaf4
Attachmentashington
- Guatemala
- LINCOLN
Addendum to
Slnoe signing the foregoing, the following thoughts have occurred
to rao.
A* ould suggest any such help as yon can get from the acting Chief and Deputy Chief of KUBARK staff as well as the press group working with that staff. As you may know, they have developed pretty extensive connections with the press in this country and can also make use of .the facilities of John BEGG'a offico in USIA. It would not hart to mention BEGO specifically to then.
attached proposed news articleeaty one andweery useful effect if published. push for the earliest possible publication and, ifLINCOLN know by cable where, when and how published. Wepick it up for further distribution through such media
P.
do everything possible to have it used in itssince it was prepared carefully for certain plannedcould easily be lost if changed by someone not fullythe background.
WDP/gfb
U
Although it would bo difficult toorecast of eventstartlingall of foreboding and foar hangs over this country and invests the higher reaches of the Government. For the first tine Bince President Arbenz took office, the Guatemalan Amy mph Command seeas to becre active Interest in developments liable to affect Guatemala's millnd international posture; refusing to accept the Government's optimistic estimates of tho situation at face value, it tries, with all the customary precautions enforced by the vigilancebiquitous and ruthlesspolice system, to elicit authoritative American views on tbe nature and extant of remedial action considered indispensable in order to break the conrnunlst stranglehold on Guatemala,
lour correspondent has learned from usually well-informed sources that Army officers about whose abiding loyalty to President Arbenz there can be,ao doubt, are profoundly, shockad at roallsLog the full extant to which the Arbenz regime has alienated Guatemala's closest and moat powerful friend, the United States of America. They conclude that the United States is firmly resolved to protect ber national security by meeting head-on the communist challenge presented by Arbeni and his regime, even if this shouldemporary shelving of good neighbor policy. An added abode has been provided by the conspicuous failure of the Guatemalan Government's transparent efforts toreathing spell by lulling her neighbors and the United Statesalse sense of complacenoyT*
It can be statedact that tbe Army High Command, casting about for an expedient to stave off national disaster, has found theescape batchalace coup temporarily blocked. President Arbens' choice as
Guatemala's next President is the Chief of the Armed Forces, Colonel Diaz. He is generally considered an obedient tool of the Communist Party of Guatemala. Hot only would he be clearly unacceptable to Guatemalans neighbors and to the Dhited States,wordsanking Guatemalan field commander and close personal friend of Presidentchoice would by the majority of the Guatemalan officers* corps be considered "an affront to the national dignity of
Another aspirant for the Presidency, who no longer enjoys President
Arbenz1 backing, is the Minister of National Defense, Colonel Sanchez. lie is
not prc-co.-xai.Uji st andtrong following among some of the best elements
of Guatemala's officers' corps. Thus far he has failed to provide the kind of
forceful and constructive leadership which, by virtue of his personal and professional prestige, he could be expected to exercise. like many of his fellow officers he Is waiting for tangible demonstrations of the effective strength of tbe Guatemalan opposition and for more conclusive indications of united States backing. He and other officers of his ilk fail to understand that time is of tho essence, if an attempt Is to be made to resolve Guatemala's communist problemanner leaving the integrity of the Armed Forces
Original document.
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