CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
ITICWBBIX XCTUSMPTB DI QPATBKALA
between than, in thisthen vlll be relatively little violence, tbe revolution will be over before there le tlsa for the United States to furnish any overt assistance, except perhaps through political acres. The aost Important eotloea tha United states should beto take would appear to be the
a. Just as soon ee it appears that the Arbens regime haa been overthrown
and is to be replacedew one, the Secretary of State will presumably wish to express his satisfaction at tba revolt against cceanmlsa and his readiness toew goverrissnt if lt gives evidence of being able to reetore order and toesponsible and democratic edmlnietratlon.
b. There vlll be do urgent need for military aid but tbe United States would presumably express its willingness to furnish such aaslstance if desired.
a. On the economic front, there is little that would need to bo done except toontinuation and perhaps an expansion of the technical assistance program and perhape to offer acme form of help if there has bees such destruction of property.
United states could
the new regis* and to attack the root esmaes of unrest in the area would be, in suitable manner, to begin to dissociate itself froa the sppesrancs of too close an alliance with the fruit company. This operation requires seme
urgont pluming preparation. irstla planning, tha egeaeiee coacnmrtd ahould concert thair view* aa to to* evolution In to* fruit company's position that would beet wmatlooal intereet. Preeumably, In so doing tbaylev the practices and positions of bobc of th* corporations that bar* bean notably successful In doing business In tatin America without oltber tba actuality or tha appearance of wholly foreign ownerahlp or of monopolistic control over tha economies of whole countries. The next step sight veilrlrate approach to the fruit company. hird night ba tha developmentublic poetare which tha government could uun without dleasterously and Improperly undermining tha position of the fruit company In northern Latin America wblla at the sen* time suggesting tha desirability of evolutionary changes in tba ceavany'e relationships with Latin American governments and peoples. Although what la here proposal ia La affect the developswstew policy for tbe long run, thaee steps acquire real urgency from the unrest evident throughout Central Amerioo and from the prospect of having toew regime toensible but Independent* and eolf-rcspootlng policy.
2. Koch the mere troublesome contingencies trie* out of tbe possibilityebellion will be attempted but will be only partly successful. The rebel* might after the first day or ee hold Ouateaala City and on* or two outlying garrisons but be maneced by pro-Arbeaa foreee sa strong aa or stronger than their own. Alternatively, they sighttrip or territory centeredope along the southeast border ef the country next to nonduxe* with perhaps an Isolated garrison In th* north. hird but least peeelble alternative they might hold Puerto Barrios sad most of the territory along tha railroad up to Zokopa about half way to tha oapltol. More Important than the territory they hadwould be tha relative strength and dependability of the opposing forces. Possible courses of action can be coneldered on tha assuaptloBsi
tat rabel forces ara plainly and greatly inferiom and
taey ara equal or aara atlight superioritya good ebanoe of winning the whole country given tlaa end support.
3. On Mneyllon a, the peeelmletlc assueptlcc, it would eeea toajor error for the United Statee to extend laawdlate poiitloai recognition and follow^ tale oat with large scale overt support. ourse of action would be recognised perfectly clearly by aost Latin Americans,orm of intervention. Ths example of the revolution of Panes* froa Columbia, always alleged to have been instigated by the United stateeeame of obtaining the Panama Canal Zone, la ell too familiar In Latin America. It would be reasoned tbat. If every (abortive coup can be used by the United Stateeaais for Intervention, then the doctrine of non-intervention la meaningless. Even if thle course of action were ruled out, howwrer, there ere oertaia, mainly covert, atepe which might be attempted.
long as lt seems desirable to attempt to prolong resistance,could be covertly supplied with funds and eqalpmant by air drops.
attempt might well be made to induce the rebels not to bold out
until they bad/suprassed in bitter fighting eat to hide their arms, prepare to go under ground end perhaps toew key communists leaders, but tosa ocofliete with the army.
rebel aircraft might be used to evacuate aost of theif the temporarily held territory were oontlgpus to Hondurasight1 be
lt might be feasible to evacuate eiaeahle rebel forces, perhaps In an attempt touatemalan lnvaeion of Honduras.
upon the outcome of b. end c, decisions could betodvisability of attempting covertly toeallymovement and to aoustaterarge scalefroa an external base.
if Uw eugtsttnbls outcome her*appear* to be Materialising lt will be of tbe utmost lmportano* for propaganda purposes to represent tbe whole episodeesperate, largely unplanned reactionrutal reign of terror inetitoted by Arsonstep in the conversioneaaunlet Infiltrated coalition gproiiawmt into en out-and-out coaaamiet dictatorship. If this effort le sufficiently euoceeefal, lt could pero the way for desired action at the OAS conference end could provide the basis for external sanctions aeainet Guatemala. (The chances of this degree of success ere not, however, considered great.)
a. Even under eaenaptloo b. above, the aost optcalstlc assumption, tbe advisability of recognition by tha United Stateevolutlxioary regime that had not ret established even reasonably effective control over the country would be questionable. Out on the political front there would be ample opportunity for acre infernal expressions. approval. Thesa should, however, be sufficiently tjemperate so as not to prejudice the rebels In the eye* of their countryaeo. If recognition were still withheld. military or economic assistance would elao be ruled out. umber of set iocs would, however, appear to be urgently celled for to maximise the chances of ultimate success
exeeeelve rigorous public support by the unitedbe actually damaging, strong private political aaeurancee couldmade to the leaders to stiffen their resolution.
wouldary great veins, hovever, under theassumed would be the prompt recognition of the rebel regime by theneighboring countries, snd perhaps, the extension to it by them ofof overt assistance. ove would not only help to bolster tbepev* the way for stones. recognition but sake it eaeier to providewith additional assistance. Quite possible, official. support would be requiredhy.-Soooea, Oelres, snd Csorlo -to
Induce thorn to support 4unconsolidated reglae.
la th* political field. It night nil b* desirable forpolitical figure among the rebels to nek* sons stateosnt aboutof hia country to the fruit company and the United Btatea which
would eetabllah the mcrewaurtruly indlgenoue one in the eye* of tbe (hattemalan eltisane.
ahould be wade clearly to step up tbe scale ofand nllltaxy assistance. Since the situation here sssuaed is onean airlift would be possible to eecurely heldhere shouldphysical barrier tolseabl* tonnage of militarythose could b* used. The nad night well arise, too, for the airliftgroup* of rebel* to the principal area of conflict. At this state,
the Question would arise acutely of the propriety of using rebel nllltary aircraft against ground foraes.
5. In connection with the three contingenole* discussed above, and with ethers aa well, the decision ahould be nad* as to thef any, which would Justify intervention in Quatemelas. arned forces. Presunably such Intervention for tha express purpose ofebellnat Arbenz and hia follower* would be unconceivable under any XB tbe eventuiok and successful coup it would be unnecessary. And if the outcomeevolt vere hanging in the balance, any direct military action by the united States in support of side would be regarded as the noet blatant sort of Intervention and could be expected to be coadeaed not only by every government In Latin America but by most non^cawsunistB in the rest of the world as well. Clearly, then euch military action could be Justified only far the pur-poe* of saving American lives and, perhape, American property, though the ease
fox too uso of troops to protect Aneriean property would be extremely week. Oo tale besle, the policy regarding armed Intervention night be eunmarlzed as follow
Intervention would be undertaken only if circumstancesbe said to exist which threaten the safety of Aneriean nationalsother foreign natlonale in Ouateaala and which would be undertakenthe eole purpose of protecting such individuals and evacuating then.
form, the intervention would consist of the landing by airwould aaountuch enlarged cabaeey guard, and perhaps the landinget other airfields. She adaaloa In each cue would be theAmericana and perhaps other foreign nationals, presumably to be followedwithdrawal of. forces tbeaeelves.
this adsslon ware undertaken under tha circuastances esaumed
inbove, tbe opportunity would certainly eclat for influencing the outcome of the Internal struggle. If the rebels had demonstrated sufficient strength ia their own right to put the outcome of the internal struggle at least in the balance, It would probably be desirable to exploit any opportunity to favor the rebels that would not Involve the visible overt employment. forces in military action on their behalf. The sorts of actions. forces that might be appropriate within thla limitation would bei The facilitating or denial of the use ef airports, sir lifts and other transportation; the furnishing or denial of supplies or of the services of utilities to particular installations orunite; the furnishing or denial of communications services, etc.
d. Zaituation. military forces would require skillful and euthoratative political guidance on the support. The Astbessodor would be quite capable of providing It. It might be well, therefore to conclude in advance exranganentswhereby he would have effective liaison with the military cceraanderOriginal document.