Created: 6/27/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

The following are some randan thoughtsave had during the day about the situation of our team.

first received sono very troublesome news from Jaketho inspection tean but on talking to Frank Wiener over thefound that it probably will not hit Nicaragua before July 7. In the

working up eone thoughts on how it night be delayed

and Headquarters ie doing the sane. In order to play safe we should probably

figure that it might arrive at Managua on tho morning ofiving us

8 full days after today.

we have to aove aircraft out of Managua it is my viewwill no longer be able practically to supply Calligeria forces andcannot give any fighter support unless we can obtain an operational

air field within Guateaala, This conclusion as to fighters ia obvious. As to eupplytf could not fly from Robaloupply point and back without refueling. Evenontrolled air strip this would bo of no value without substantial fueling facilitiesj? requires0 lbs of fuel which, plus containers, would mean that its total load would bo fuel for the return trip. Even the availabilityu would not correct this problem since it, too, would require refueling toound trip.

3. In view of the above it is essential that either the conflict bo terminated prior tor an internal position be secured with air


fieldupply capability. Puerto Barrios seems to be the Only solution.

It. In order to take Puerto Barrios men must be shifted from tho Zacapa area to Puerto Barrios. n now of the opinion that probably the only way theee men can get there Is either on foot or perhapsinor extent (though even this is doubtful) on the railroad. The reasono not include an airborne capacity ia that two of the three available. Eequipulaa and Chiquimula would seen to be clearly unusable for loaded takeoffshile the. Zacapa, may or may not permit such takeoffs. On the other hand Zacapa say be usable and there ie an additional possibilitytrip in Zacapa reported to have boon started Sherwood should be asked to check with Hendoaa and anyone olac In tho know regarding tbe Zacapa facilities. Under any circuastancea the greatest ntBjber of ecobat equipment and aen with whichi7 can take off Conceivably taking overloading risks, anoen might be addedunless the takeoff facilities are extremelyould think that at bestould be tho maximum.

Assuming thehat Zacapa has no adequate air facilities, tho only way of reaching Puerto Barrios with additional nen will be overlandould supposeays minimum between the date of departure and the time of combat.

Assuming usable air facilities at Zacapa, some sort of air lift plan Blight be worked out.

Under anyould suggest that we encourage Headquarters to go ahead with the arrangements on the boat (ref.)

obtaining it if possible on tbe scheme stated in paragraphf tbe reference. ould suppose that the main advantage of Ibe boat would be to lend perhaps some support for an attack on Puerto Barrios but more particularly to provide supplies for the Calligeris units and air force on the as emotion that Puerto Barrios ia taken. Actually it is my offhand opinion that tbeould probably lie off ehore until itignal eitheran aircraft or from shore that all in clear and it can land. This say be tooiew since with airhip with proper weapons mightaluable offensive weapon in support of the attack on the city. Ituppose, be fairly vulnerable as it approached shore but with its own fire power and supporting air craft, this might not be too serious while once in cloeo, It could provide eood firo covermail select nuaber of assault troope. ake no position on this except to say that obviously this latter possibility is preferable thoughit Involved tooisk with respect to the losehip, the more conservative approach might have to be chosen.

6. Under any clreumstances It is my view that our major effort at least forndune (assuming that it is necessary for both days) should be to support to the limit tbe fight at Zacapa, Chiquimula and Ipala in theof seriously harming the enemy effort plus .consolidating the Calligeris position inities and hopefullyonnection with friendly forces in Jalapa. In my opinion this resultossibility since as of the morning ofune, we should have additional aircraft ready for operationalrfe which were grounded for lack of tall wheel tires.

ould also recommend bombing at leastCity target and preferably two. Since the inspection teaabe in Guatemala City onune it would seem that these mayonly two days available for bombing the city forhile. the serious question of whethor or not the Casa PreaidoncialIncludedarget in this period. ava not yet made up mywhether we should request it but at then rathorput it up to headquarters.

that by the night ofune the cities abovefirmlyecision would have to be made whether or not to try

to proceed toward Ouatemala City to hold and send some of the available forces to try to tako Puerto Barrios or to try to proceed in both directions. This decision will depend upon the facts at the time, the dranagc done by the enemy, the condition of our forces, the availability of usable airports at Zacapa and other facts. It should be noted that as of Junee may have available for operational use additional pilots and aircraft. If so this added air support might justify an allout drive for Guatemala City.

additional air power just mentioned wouldactor

if tbe Zacapa-Chiqulmula-Ipala area was not firmly taken by the night ofune and our forces not defeated or disorganized.

under any clrcinntancee we should startfor some practical plan of action against luerto Barrios

on the assumption that circumstances will force us to try and capture it.


Immediately preparation of plan for capture of

of action for next few days or until completed dueor defeat an all out effort with full air supportChiqulnula and Ipala.

One or two bomb attacks during the next two days against Guatemala City targets perhaps Caaa Prosidencial being one.

Original document.

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