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DIRECTOR LINCOLN
CO/P
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POf^ll 7
TO:
RE: T PBSUCCESS
Y_ nTRRln
CITE: SLINC
WAS PREDICATED CN OUR DESIRE TO BE ABLE TO PROP^LT DlRTCT FIELD OPERATIONS ON TIMELY BASIS WITHOUT NECESSITY REVIEWING EVERY VARIATION WITH HQS WHICH OCCURS WHEN PIECEMEAL AUTHORITY EXISTS* PERHAPS IN EFFORT TO. -CONSCIENTIOUSLY ABiDER LIMITEO AUTHORITY WE HAVE'LOST WHAT MAY PROVE TC BERS EACH TIME NEW CIRCUMSTANCES DEVELOPED*
UPON EXAMINATION fOUF CONCEPT OF AIR POWER WE FI NOBASIC DIFFEFEHCE INOR OBJECTIVE ONLY PERHAPS TERMINOLOGY WHICH IS NOT ESSENTIAL WHEN FOR-.GOING FACTORS ARE IN AGnf.EVENT- for EXAMPLE WE 3A>TRICTLY MILITARY TYPE SlTUATlOK HAS MATERIALZED". -JEANIN3. HAVING TRIEO ANO FAILED THROUGH PfSCHOLOOlCAL AMD POLlTlCA. MEANS WE ARE NOW CONFRONTED b' Th MILITARYNEREINMUST ATTEMPT C" ARM* THROUGH FORCE JS IE FEtT OUT Ml APABILITY MUST ,
IT IS FORftOOOl OPY Of IMS MLSofcGc
UN
5) PAGE 2
BE EMPLOYED TO MAXIMUM. AS LAST RESORT.
WE ENJOIN YOU TO RECONSIDER POTENTIAL EFFECTIVENESS OF THREEANNED BY BATTLE PROVEN ODYOKE PILOTS. ON PRO-RARA BASIS, NUMBER Or ENEMY TROOPS TO NUMBER, COMPARED TO OTHER MILITARY ENGAGEVENTS KE BELIEVE, RATIOO TWO THOUSAND GROUND TAOOPS IS VERY FAVORABLE. FURTHERMORE IT IS INCONCEIVABLE ENTIRE ARMY WOULD REQUIRE SUBMISSION BEFORE LARGE SCALE DEFECTIONS OCCURRED,,
U. USING DEFECTION OF ARMY AS OUR AGREED OBJECTIVE THEN IT FOLLOWS THAT ALL EFFORT MUST BE OEVOTED TO THIS PURPOSE ALONE WHICH FALLS INTO CATEGORIES OF STRATEGIC ANO TACTICAL OPERATIONS.
STRATEGIC: TARGETS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE SERIOUS DISLOCATIONS TONENEMY ANO ALTHOUGH NOT IMMEDIATELY EFFECTIVE WOULD SOON IMPAIR HIS COMBAT CAPABILITY,. FUEL STORAGE ANO AMMO DUMPS, INTERDICTION ETC
TACTICAL: CONCENTRATION OF AIRPOWER ON ENEMY'S MAIN POINTS OF RESISTANCE PECIFIC ENGAGEMENT SUCH AS HANK.
UN 5U
LINC) PAGE 5
POLITICAL OR PYSCMOLOGICAL TARGETS SUCH AS NATIONAL PALACEp ARBENZ'S HOME, RACETRACKS, ETC ARE NOT CONSIDERED WORTHWHILE NOR AS PRODUCTIVE AS COMPARED TO FIRST WINNING THE BATTLE OF ANO ESTABLISHING DECISIVE MILITARY POSTURE. PRESENT THOUGHT IS THAT ADAM TARGETSULD BE-COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE THUS NOT CONTEMPLATED IN PRESENT PLANNING.
BEFORE ATTEMPTING FORWARD OROJECTION OF OUR CONCEPT WC MUST STATE THAT PRESENT ENGAGEMENT AT HANK IS SERIOUSLY REGARDED AS PLACE OF DECISION. SUCCESS WOULO MOST CERTAINLY SHAKE ARBENZONFIDENCE IN HIS ARMY AND ALTER ENTIRE SITUATION JUST AS FAILURE AND SUBSEQUENT ROUTING OF FRIENDLY FORCES WOULD REQUIRE COMPLETELY NEW EXAMINATION OF SITUATION ATMS,.
VIEW ABOVE, WE WOULD PREFER AT THIS MOMENT TO CONCENTRATE ON TO-UORROW'S BATTLE AND AOVISE YOU SOONEST OF ANY ADDITIONAL AUTHORfTY WHICH MAY BE REQUIRED DEPENDING UPON DEVELOPMENTS- MEANWHILE WE WILL PROCEEO WITH OUR PLANNING
AND SF.LECTION OF OTHER TARGETS SHOULD SITUATION REQUIRE THEM*
END OF MESSAGE
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Original document.
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