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SPECIAL
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE NIE
BLOC REACTION TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION TO RESTRICT BLOC REPRESENTATION IN THE US
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY DISSEMINATION NOTICE
his estimate was disseminated by the Central Intelligence Agency. This copy is (or the information and use of the recipient indicated on the front cover and ofunder his jurisdictioneed to know basis. Additional essential dissemination may be authorized by the following officials within their respective departments:
Assistant to the Secretary for Intelligence, for the Department
Chief of, for the Department of the Army
of Naval Intelligence, for the Department of the Navy
of Intelligence, USAP, for the Department of the Air Force
Director for Intelligence, Joint Stall, for the Joint Staff
of Intelligence, AEC, for the Atomic Energy Commission
to the Director, FBI, for the Federal Bureau of Investigation
Director for Collection and Dissemination, CIA, for any otheror Agency
be retained, or destroyed by burning In accordancem in il to the Central Intelligence Agency bywith the Office ol CoUecTTon 4uidDtesemination, CIA.
hen an estimate IsanT^tofioverseas recipients may retain iteriod not In excess of one year. At the end oftilTypvsekii^he estimate should either be destroyed, returned to the forwarding agency, ori"lTIInof the forwarding agency to retain it in accordance with
WARN INcontains Inforniatlon affecting the NaUonaT^eteasf of the United States within the mearSC,nd" mission or revelation of which In any to an una other lzed person Is prohibited by law.
Julyk
advised that we did Dot believe it necessary toummary memorandum on the attached Estimatenasmuch ao The Secretary and/or tinder Secretary would be briefed In connection with NSC consideration of thegreed and will not send this Estimate "forward" except as part of documentation being prepared for the NSC briefing.
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SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION TO RESTRICT BLOC REPRESENTATION IN THE US
THE PROBLEM
To estimate: (a) the likeUhootl of Soviet Bloc retaliation in response to US(as assumed below) on Soviet Bloc collection of unclassified materials of strategic intelligence value by Soviet Bloc representatives in the United States; (b) the probable character of such retaliatory measures; and (c) the effect of suchon the US foreign intelligence effort
ASSUMPTIONS
US imposes restrictions on Soviet Bloc representatives in the US designed to prevent them from acquiring "publicly available unclassifieduch as aerial maps, aerial photographs and mosaics,maps, geodetic maps, city plans, publications on government ortechnical researchwhich normally may beenly in the US by purchase or request. These restrictions would not apply to newspapers, periodicals, books, technical journals, general purpose maps, and other published materials normally available commercially.
These restrictions would be of the same general character as those presentlyby the Soviet Government and would include, but would not necessarily be limited to, the following:
a. Notification of Soviet Blocofficial, and other personnel,Soviet Bloc representatives inorganizations and quasl-ofll-ciai agencies, that they were prohibited from acquiring by any means, including photographing or sketching, Information concerning military objects, institutions, technology and armaments, seaports, large hydroelectric installations, railroad junctions, tunnels, and bridges,establishments, scientific research institutions, laboratories, electric power stations, radio, telephone and telegraph stations, and all unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragraph 1.
o. Notification of all Soviet Blocin the US that these missions and any offices thereof must be plainlyto indicate their official status.
advice to Soviet Blocthat any of theirfailed to reveal their affiliationswith US citizens orwill henceforth behave violated the accepted normsconduct.
to Soviet Blocof travel restrictions thatreciprocal with those appliedrepresentatives in the USSR orSatellites.
of an education andprogram to insure refusals byengaged in manufacturing or re-
search for the military agencies and tho Atomic Energy Commission as well as by private US distributors and salespeople to supply unclassified materials of the kind listed above, paragrapho Soviet Bloc representatives,
ctivationrogram forof publication of scientific, technical, industrial, and economic information
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prejudicial to the defense interests of the US, and for control of export of thematerials of the kind listed above, paragrapho Soviet Bloc
g. Notification of Soviet Bloc missions that all of their representatives must applyentral government office for unclassified government documents.
THE ESTIMATE
SOVIET BIOC REACTION TO THE ASSUMED RESTRICTIONS
Soviet leaders would probably conclude tliat thp assumed I'S restrictions would not be effective ln reducing the collection ofmaterial of priority interest,they would make the effort moreand costly. Soviet leaders wouldcalculate Initially and may eventually determine that these restrictions could be largely circumvented by the use ul localand sympathizers, agents, third parties, third countries, and the domestic and international malls. Thus the Soviet reaction would probably be based only in small port on tlie calculated and actual effect of the assumed US restrictions on Its Intelligencein the US.
The Soviet Bloc reaction would depend in far greater measure upon tho Kremlin'sof the propaganda and politicalof such action as it might lake. Whatever course of action the Kremlin adopted with respect to retaliation. Soviet Bloc propaganda would almost certainly portray the U8 action as deliberately andprovocative and discriminatory against the Soviet Bloc. (This would be possible, since the assumed restrict Vina are selective and aimed at the Soviet Bloc only, differing in this respect from the Soviet restrictions, which at least in form apply to representatives of all states with diplomatic missions in Moscow, although in practice the restrictions are not as strictly applied to the Soviet Satellites as they are tu representatives of WesternThe Soviet leaders might believeefusal of the Soviet Bloc to be provoked into retaliation could be represented as aor Soviet self-confidence and maturity that could be contrasted in propagandaaricature of the US violating accepted norms of diplomatic conductesult of unreasonable fears and uncertainty. On the other hand, Soviet leaders might calculateoviet Bloc retaliation to the US action could be presentedustifiable reaction to US discrimination, and that failure tomight be interpretedign of weakness.
he Soviet Bloc reaction would probably also depend upon the manner In which the assumed restrictions arelanket application of all the restrictions, withofficial notice and publicity, would probably cause the Kremlin to take counter-measures. On the other hand, if restrictions were applied progressively, appeured to be directed equally and reciprocally to allmissions, and attended by carefullyreleases of information, the Kremlin might not apply retaliatory countermeasures. Moreover, ln some cases, such as travel,could be implementedefusal to grant privileges to Soviel Blocthat are not accorded to ourrather than by the application of formal publishedrogressiveof restrictions would also permit anof Soviet reactions as the restrictions are applied.
n balance, we believe Soviet leaders would conclude tbat:
curtailment of the presentSoviet Bloc representatives, withoutwould result in some practicalto the Soviet Bloc and thesome loss of political prestige.
curtailments of privilegessides would at. every step be moreto the US intelligenceeffort than to the Soviet Bloc effort,US is much more dependent uponof the present level of privilegescollection than is tlie Soviet Bloc.
would be generally to thethe Soviet Bloc, therefore, to retaliatethe restrictions on USin the Soviet Bloc.
We therefore believe that, if all thementioned in the assumptions wereen bloc, the Soviet Bloc would respond by retaliatory countermeasures. However, if the restrictions were applied carefully and progressively, such action might minimize the Soviet retaliatory countermeasures.
PROBABLE SOVIET BLOC REACTION TO LESS COMPREHENSIVE US RESTRICTIVE MEASURES
ome of the assumed US restrictions would be more objectionable Lo the Soviet Bloc than others. Measures such as those assumed inndwhich directly restrict the freedom ol Soviet Bloc representatives would be the most objectionable ln Soviet eyes and the most likely to provoke retaliatory action.
n the other hand, measures of anor procedural nature, definingcompatible with the status of official foreign representatives, such as those assumed in 2b. andor measures designed to restrict Information at its source, such as those assumed in 2e., would probably not be considered objectionable by the Soviet Bloc. Such measures if applied singly, or apart from the assumed programhole, wouldnot provoke Soviet retaliation.
RETALIATORY MEASURES THE SOVIET BLOC MIGHT ADOPT
the assumed US restrictionsin the main, exceed those currentlyby the Bloc, Soviet Blocnot be strictly reciprocal.would probably be adapted onof the additional difficulties theythe US. If any retaliatoryadopted they would probably includesurveillance and increasedof US personnel rather thancomparable to those imposed bv
retaliatory measures mostbe adopted include the following:
limitation of the movementsrepresentatives either by direct travelor by the imposition of greaterhindrances lo travel.
strict enforcement ofregulations governing the conductpersonnel in the Soviet Bloc,more stringent enforcement ofon photography.
restrictions on theof US representatives ln Moscow,on US efforts to obtain
harassment of diplomaticdesigned to hamper theirincluding provocation intendedgrounds for expulsion.
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Original document.
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