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IKSUCCESS, Headquarters LINCOLN'
bUUJU.1 SPECIFIC Foreign Policy and Propaganda Problem, caused by final phase of PBSUCCESS
La Attached is an excellent paper by Elmer F. LUKETY on Foreign Policy and Propaganda Problems. It was writtenINCOLN staff paper but it bas so many usefula forwarding it.
2. LINCOLN strongly recosaends that theany of which have been cabled) be put into effect immediately in bo far aa possible.
William D. Playdon/ L 3
f D. PLAYDON
Foreign Policy and Propaganda Problems, caused by
final phase of PBSUCCESS
Tho following tentative notes on subject are submitted for your consideration and possible recommendations to HQ.
The actual invasion of Guatemala by tho CALLIGERIS forces has resulted in at loaat three, possible more, groups of pressing problems of foreign policy and propaganda. affecting third countries, neither Guatemala, nor the domestic policy or public opinion situation Inside, to wit:
Soviet action in tho Western Non-communist reaction abroad
believe that these problemsonsiderablethe foroign policy and external security of. Theyprovoked by CIA action and might havo to be solved again,in part, by further CIA action, and It appears to beduty totand on these problems. This dutymainly with HQ, not with the field:.fln.Mr.ipafca nnfl propfl.ce,,fnr mmhas illustrated in the cose of their failure to planpHaae^ol1.that any development, actually or potentiallyU.S. Government, directly or indirectly originating withlikely to bo blamed on LINCOLN, you might wish to presontand considerations concerning eubject to HQ, in order tothat tho responsible officers at LINCOLN were at leastof the dangers in tiie international field in connection- even though LINCOLN itself must not be expected toproblomn.
problems are likely to plague the U. S. Govornmentconsiderable time to come, regardless of whether PBSUCCESSor resultstalemate (the latter is difficult toshould not be discarded beforehand as atheoretical Ofuick victory by CALLIGERIS' forcesour situationut it would hardly disposeproblems under discussion. If such victory isatternext few days, these problems In turn may tangibly (or eveninfluence the outcomo of the paramilitary conflict asimpact. action, of foreign public opinion, of foreignupon. may sway public opinion in Ouatemala, morethe attitude of the army and of the government, all thethe longer the military decision remains in the balance.
main weaknessos. policy in all threeInbove aro
a. lack of aggressiveness and initiative by lack of advance planning and proper'coordination between overt and clandestine action
At this moment, so faran Judge from here* the advantages aro mostly on the enemy aido. He had enough information toour time table with precision, he took the initiative by bringing the caae beforeuch faster and more dramatically than our cautious maneuvering aimed at getting some limited OAS- and before the public opinion of the world, while we aro on the defensive along the entire line, barely able tolausib' denial and to expose the more barefaced lies in the enemyui unable (and apparently unprepared, too) to recapture the initiative which we had successfully seized when the ALFKEM appeared in Puerto Barrios but which we had lost gradually since.
drastic and effective action is taken atmay result in increased rather than reducedin the Western Hemisphere, even if CALLIGERIS forces In the lattor case, many Latin American countries may
be looking for an outsldo ally to protectgainst.nd the Soviet Union, by its arms shipment to Guatemal by ita impressive espousal of Guatemala's case beforeouncil andorld-wide campaign virtually unopposed. or other friendly overt media, as well as by its advancement in Asia, is certainly the logical power to which to turn. Needless to say that If the CALLIGERIS forces lose, the superior prestige of the Soviet Government and of the international communist movement as protector of small nations against "Yankee imperialism" will have bee' solidly established. In this event, we must expect an immediate land slide towards Communism throughout Latin America. In either case, the interrelationship between communist victory in Indochina andprogress In Latin America should be kept well in mind.
addition to Soviet-Communist aggressiveness andAmerican reactions, wo ought to note unfavorablein Europe and Asia as well. Radio press reviewsthe FBIS news ticker here indicate that many. or in any case staunchly anti-communist media,the British Labor Party, the Swedish Social DemocraticCairo, many others, condemn "invasion." Only notableGermany Chancellor Adenauer. The general tendency of allmedia is to underestimate the communist threat Incase of "Agrariannd to brand the "Invasion""relapse into Dollar diplomacy" or something similar, makingor unwittingly use of standard communist arguments,linking. State Department to the interests of the
8. Counter-action la most urgently, desperately noeded In. set-up because lt is there that fastest enemy action is taking place: moreovor,. moves aro virtually certain of world-wide publicity and can therefore do double duty to influence world public opinion, top. In order to resume the initiative, steps like the following would appear to be in order:
or possibly Nicaragua, ought to file aagainst Guatemala with the Security Council,uatemala,efendant as well;night be based on instances of Guatemalaaffairs of Honduras, Nicaragua; possibly thesealso declare to feel threatened by disproportionateto Guatemala;
might be accused of terroristicendangering the peaceful relations with othercountries; well-known cases of police torture,inhumane conditions etc. might be brought before.
attempt to divorce. case againstregime from the UFCO claim might be mode, forhaving. delegate in the Security Council askconsent to submit the UFCO claim to arbitrationWorld Court or some other suitable international forum,that said claim has nothing to douatemala.
the State Dept. does not want tohiteits own (as we previouslyt might.nd thus force distribution togovernmentsomprehensive indictment ofregime prepared by private sources. The"The Case ofritten by CALLIGERISSUMMIT, might conceivablyeady made answer to Of course, it would look better,orcould, on behalf of SUMMIT, submit said report togovernment and the latter would submit it to theCouncil: given the strained relations betweenthe Mexican government, this does not look likely -such way, omitting. Government action,found, if we look hard enough.
9. The over-all undesirable effects of PBSUCCESS upon noa-cotnmunlst governments and public opinion abroad, especially In Europe and in Asia, threaten to be far-reaching, long-lasting and quiteellplanned and effectively implemented campaign, combining overt and clandestine techniquesarge scale, seems therefore in order LINCOLN is not the right place to draw upomprehensive plan and the following suggestions are therefore made only as possible cor
tributiona towardslan (which HQ, in cooperation with the State Dept. and presumably under the authority of the National Security Council ought to work out).
. Government) Action: . oolicyas implemented inn. andaction of. Navy and other governmentbe explained to foreign governments and public opinionthrough
speech by the Preaident, reassuring both Latinthe neutral nations in Asia (as well as publicthat our "hard" stand in the case of Guatemala isfrom the "good neighboro "relapseo indication of any disregard of theeven the smallest nation, but an indispensable securityagainst Moscow's beachhead in America. This speech,must not be primarily defensive, but must also attackcommunist conspiracy, enumerating Moscow'sof sovereign little and larger nations the worldintelligence on tho Prague center of communistin Latin America, on Ouatemala CP leaders' travelsIron Curtain and other pertinent evidonce.
White Book by the Stateummarizing theagainst Guatemala and against Moscow's interference inHemisphere
strong USIA campaign along the same lines.
unofficial action. It Is undesirable, alsoof non-attrlbutability for PBSUCCESS, to have the burdensuggested world-wide campaign borne byvenould consider very strong and decisiveaction, as tentatively suggested above, absolutelythe testimony of. Government will not be genera:
accepted at face value: quite apart from general. trends, even pro-Western and. governments, groups and individuals ma-consider us toarty in the case and therefore prejudiced, to si the least. It is thereforo recommended to supplement official actio: as suggested in the preceding para, by other overt activities, such i
another overt activities by otherhite Book by Honduras,etc.
international protost campaign agalnat politicaltorture of prisoners and other symptoms of thestato in Guatemala (oven if that shouldatterpast by the time the action gets undero beby liberal and labor groups, the AF of L, ORlT, the Amerl
can Civil Libortiesnd sultablo national outlata in key countries the world over
c. Action by anti-Communist groups, possibly acampaign by the permanent SUMMIT organization, by the National Committee Freeatin America must notournd other suitable outlets.
Non-overt diplomatic action. APART from whateveraction may be already under way or contomplatod (a) tothe support of other countries for. stand inb) to prepare the oxpeoted meetingubmit thatnon-publicizod steps should be taken by. ambassadors in countries likely to be particularly affected by the undesirable impact ofor instance, India, Indonesia, Egypt,xplaining to the Foreign Ministers of those countries on abaels (even though not involving exposure of anyinformation, to be sure) the attitude ofn the case of Guatemala, reassuringlong tho linos of the President's speech, suggesteda)hat this does not imply any change in. basic respect for national sovereignties, etc. Such presentation may Include an implied warning that, ifcommunismermanent foothold in Latin America, thin increasos the trouble spots where World War III might brook out so that it Is in the interest of all poace-loving nations to let. preventevelopment.
Clandestine post-PBSUCCESS action. Some of the activities outlined in parabove are definitely CIA responsibilities. In addition, it would appear that CIA ought to work out its ownplans as part of the frame work of the over-all plan suggested in the present paper. Such operations might, for instance, include (this Is not to be construedinished draft plan, butew examples):
Intelligence concerning Guatemala andcommunist activities In the Western HemisphereUS government agencies and other overt outlets inthe overt action recommended above;
black material tending to Justifyafter tho fact;
c. ong-range program of penetrating theParties in Guatemala and other key WH countries, anticipe ing greatly increased Soviet-Conrnunist activities throughout Latin America in tho next few years, whother PBSUCCESS wins or loses;
d. Provocation operations, especially along anti-religious and anti-national lines;
o. Suggesting to international labor and liberal (inol. social democratic) circles, thoy might, instead of.ather take some positive action tocommunist designs on Latin America (Note: the virtually complete absence of anyabor or liberal movement in Guatemala was undoubtedly one of the most significantpermitting easy communist victory);
14. The above are juot some off-the-cuff suggestionscrashaused by having to look at tho flood of. reactions which the final phase of PBSUCCESS has provoked In the last few days and by Impatience with the apparent lack of diplomatic, political and psychological initiative equal, or better superior, to the remarkable performance of the Guatemalan communists under export Moscow advice and control. The present paper omits therefore any referenceecessary analysis of the outcome of PBSUCCESS,the outcome may be: such an analysis, especially in the political sociological, and psychological fields, but directed at our ownas well, ought to bo undertaken before furthor long-range WH plans are made. Certain. the relationship between agrarian reform and the effectiveness of communist propaganda, seem to be applicable not only throughout WH, but in Asia, Africa, certain Europeun countriesoo.
ELMER F. LUKETY