PM OPERATION

Created: 7/8/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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MEMORANDUM FORi CHIEFROJECT

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4* fpQrt ia to to rooordoperation from

utaot to ita flniahj toactors adding to and detractor froa the success of the operation, and to Hot those errors mads, avoidable in rutuT6 operations*

aaa foUouod wm be informal and in chronological order

1. Staging and Pre-Operationhe Operation 3. Comments. gTAOIW AMD PRE-OFERAnOH ^Pftf^TTOff?I

The ftyfrrrmmrl of ths Situationr

*' ApproximatelyALLIGERIS personnel had received training In

Wcaragua,f these under the guidance of PI FALL. PIVALL graduated

ahotegehock troop leaders,taff personnal

pjMftPrpnf* 8 ofore prepared In thrso forma Forty-three tons uero waterproofed for burial. Fifteenpacked for drop. Thirty-ono tone were prepared for shock troopto the staging period the entire burial and shock troop equipmentmoved to *^

wsa reluctant to provide auiocrt for this

operation. The hooduran Government allowed ell staging to occur lneldeordera. The Wcaraguan Government permitted training and support ln tha form of air operations to occur within Its borders.

u. . ituationi Ue wore operating under the belieflfTalvador for uae aa shook troope and specioHsta, outeude of the tralnlne personnel that had been cant to Wearagua.

5. Plansi

plana were baaed on the belief and stronr proof that aof the people inside Guatemala were opposed toto fight against ConKunisU, and the belief that the CALLIGERIS orpanlaa-

LE*had strong organ! saUcna In each of the

S:rained

organiser to the point that each target area could be conquered by its ownwith the realisation that the amount of organisation within the army unit would be tbe key to the amount of bloodshed necessary.

addition, shock troops were prepared in tha following manneri

Puertomen under the loaderahlp ofto

move from MtcueUto to Tanedores to Kntre Rios, in order to seal oil toT Puerto Harrioa

5 alias west

of Hotapan through Asuncion Hita to ouuafwfand subsequently to tha capital oity.

Qd9rto rove from Plorldo to

Carta Blanca and be in position in Zacapa at tt-tour.

M- . - 6 men underwas to aove from Copan

M Chiqulmula. There were to

hold at Chiquimula until It could be aeon whether Zacapa or Jutlapa forces needed aid.

oroeon underwaa to move from fluevo Ocote-

peque to Esquipulas to ftiesaltepeque. They were to bold at Gjesaltepeque and if no aid was needed at Zacapa or Jutlapa, they were to move to San Luis Jilotepeque to Jalapa to Palencia to Guatemala City.

6 men waa to break away group and take

ifcralea ia order to back up the block of Puerto Barrio*.

B- StadDg Qhd Preparation for the

Just prioray the Communistsoncerted drive against of People, Including key leaders of the Army and civilians were jailed or otherwise incapacitated.

Based on the fact that we believed the Inner organisations wore much more extensive than the portion Jailed, we decided to launch the organiters and sabotage leaders to the undamaged portion of the Inner organization.

laot^e* leaders were launched byuly. It

tcarfthat reached their desSnaUonTbut

Sfbordlr?^ eU0V9arE8Intercepted at

Tvanty-twoay drops were attempted. Bo definite licht

1G0 men crossed into Honduras from Jutiane just

our Inner> agitate the rear of determine IX such agitation would ignite thet th. same time hoping that an

ay oould be launohed whan praoticabla.

FS

for0aa We useden

daSif ^our shock troops and

agitation desired to atir up

'Hicaraguans, Costa Ricana, Bondurans and any other interested parties that wanted to Join our ahock troopa ware rocrultS.

aaraB ^waa not as aucceaaful

waathe dcclaion to request permission toweighed and tho field daoialon

hlnewas tho beliefia based more on failures to act

t oafact^ condition

uas withheld with tha realisation that if the full situation were reoortBd

d92ayaU fOTdeteriorating

On tho evening ofh alltroops crossed the lino atas scheduled. Throughouth reporting was sketchy. On passed Toned ores.captured Camotanbort

fight wi in only one casualty. C oo* caqulpulaa with no fight. At this point ve picked up AGO recruits lor wee as reported at Carta Dlanca. ^departed group. Tbe Guaoao sabotage teas cut tha rail briago ootueen Zacapamto Barrios. Indications are that coamuuiloptions cuts Jutlapa to Guateaala City, San Joss to Guateaala City, Puerto Barrios to Guateaala City and Zacapa to Guatemala City ware successful at this tlae. rjl. oabed tanks at Sao Jos* and Retaluehue.

Ont C, -ae re supplied four alios out of Qua lan,he waa not wnere he was supposed to be. Ho waa re supplied duringhours. od his instructions were to break

away when Cuegaltepsque waa taken and go to Jutlapa.s moring captured Jocotannail fight with the local

garrison, aptured one half of Puerto Barrios and controlled the ocasaini-catiooa Iron tuorvo Barrios to Ouataaala City. aptured Morales, Bananera and Loa Ana tea. j- 3 boabed the tanks at Puerto Barrios,

d C- ent an advance partyGualan, which partywith tho opposition. Bo"took the remainder of his forces toengagement and after winning, he remained in Gualan. The same day theba boat, apparently off course, as thay were scheduled to land to anear Santo Toons, landed obove Puerto Barrios and immediatelyire fight. The exact efficiency of this group can only beby the fact that ovary Puerto Barrios military coonunique from thismentioned this group ofon and grossly *xagperatod their size. Thenan were captured on the night ofh.anc C oined

at Vedo Hondo. CALLIGERIS joined thea there, ana tne FCP moved to Managua. The fighter aircraft ran their first tactical mission, hitting the Guateaala City tank* on this date. C. " still containing the Puerto Barrio*ccupied Horaloo. Reports from TGU indicated Canaloo and Qiiesaltenango uprising* among the populace, and the two chiefs of the Chiquinula Garrison were captured by surprise at Vodo Hondo.

Onc"C uperior force at Gualan consisting ofof tho roiniorced Zacapa Command. His radio operator waathe radio destroyed, otroatingoint near La Onion. attacked biuquimula without air support. The, attack was

successful except for remnants of the garrison which held out at the Cuartel. Thirty-two menfficers were captured. The men reported that tbe Army did not desire to fight CALLIGERIS. One of the officers Joined our foroes. C led from Puerto Barrios under duress. C aB still holding Horalea on th* 2Jrd. The firhter support on that day hit the Zacapa Garrison, exploding an arnoo storage dump, andridge betwoen Chiquinula and Jutlapa.

et rv3at

-5-

Onh air aupport waa launched agalnat tha garrison that waa holding oat in tha Cuartel at Chiquimula and against artillery Installations within range of the town, an unsuccessful try was made toorganised at Jutlapa. p*aa run out into the nountelna near Moral aa

and the Puerto Barriosarge group toward the Zacapa

area, air aearcfa along tba Puerto Barrios-"Zacapa corridor vaaaily secondary ml salon for fighter aircraft from this point forward.

Onh the Zacapa Oarrlaonacked OMquimula. Thiawaa withstoodunior of floor, ' wn. C brought into tha fight as supportrtea aa baring left inof the 3 nemy dead, probably anC "3 placement and leadership von the day. eported moring from Ipala toward airopportune strike flights ware runontinuous basis from thiamall drop vaa maderoup at Jalapa. ImmedlatsJyrecipient* attacked the Jalapm Garriaon. The air hit fournforoementa,f than. Mataetoros waa hi t. KL Jlcarodestroyed and tba Zacapa to Chiquimula road vaa atrafad and bombed tofrom Zacapa. Two hundred fifty atomy troops ware reportedOnion. Recruit* continued to flock to the Liberation army. 0 at Chiquimula.

Onh the Zacapa Garrison again oounter-ettacked Chiquimula. On the same day our air support surprised them assembling at tha line of departara and they were easily routed. Tbe Jalape group una reauppliad and immediately the an amy command or reported that be waa under attack0 rebels. It Is believed that the appearance and equipping of this group caused the Immediate holding up of the Guardia da Honor an ita advance into our rear from Ipala to Ouesaltepeque and caused tbe enemy commander to delay throwing his reserves in at Zsoape-Chlquimula. Tha air hit the Zacapa marshal3ing yards, bitting one passenger train carrying troops, hit the Jutlapa bridge and strafed TGW. SOMOZl'e intelligence reports that TOW wont off the air at that Una andetalt*nango radio shifted frequency tofrequency, Onesaltenango radio ostensibly becoming TGW. OZA, TTH00RAS Puenteaen to croea against Jutlapa from Salvador. Ba vaa lined up with an air drop which vaa to occur on tba night ofh. Re was given operation money andto Salvador to make tha arrangements. (Eventually, when tha final Junta vaa formed, XTJIGORAS waa informed that ha waa not to cross tha border under any clroumstanoa.)

ill radios were ordered to concentrate on communications cute, aa evidence waa on hand to substantiate the fact thataa causing confusion, which was counter actable only by phone end telegraph. Proof that the teams must have acted on orders cosesuatemalan Amy emergency order the following day to protect tbe lines against the robela at all costs.

ALLIGKas *tUotarf Zaoepa and on receipt of enemy fireeir support due to weather fell back to Chlqulmula. aaslencd to hit the taoka at San Josehip of unknownby SOMOZA to be carrying eras to

Onan faint waa launched at Ipele. for the purposeand at total derknea. all forces were pulled down to thTroadfinal attack on Zacapa. The air that day hit the Zaoapave andump was hit. a.

bostbed again. TGW was strafed and bombed. The Jalap* group waaZacapa and3 wee reaupplled and instructed WZr. to Zacapa

Onh all ground forces and air support commenced the attack on

* officera ware oonfarrad

-Ithand arrangamenta for tha Zacapa truce were made by. The

final diapoaiUon of troopa0 CALLIGERIS maaacapa soldiers at Zacapa,0 men of tha ChMtemaJmnirmy beloT 3 Ubar*tioa Army abora and to th. left of^aaltepeque

nr. coMKS-'rrsi

M**ndparmamurr axUaa Ignored

for the sake of expediency, ahould be reoorded forCt: .tudy and preranUon or ineluaioa In future operation..

- or paramilitary operation, rBSOCCKSS

Bead^arters vas massive, while the iapWntlng staff vaa necessarily restricted

ak "P thing, to be dona than three

aen can put Into practice. Ihe end remit laecessary disaardintf of ideasaliant but imperfect imputation of the plan. Wed dovTto this case, beoanae of the loyalty and untiring devotion of aTJBOCa* Held poraonnel

^ UiUrPrcred true- In the erent the abore ll unavoidable ia the future, care ahould be taken to arrange the plannlng/iBPlemen-

proper procalonct Igain,

.inc. the IQUQCX. field personnel did dsvote iteelf to the job, tho defeot vaa not seriously detrimental but could have been one acre poaalblo asset to the opposition.

B. BgaflQUATters Direction '

n* xa7fl 10 of the operation vacillingness to delegaU command to the field at the cranial operational moaent. UKOLS direction vas ccopletely conatruoUre and avoided hand-tying, operation-crippling restrioUoas sometimes found in this type of project.

LIKCLH laid down tho rules of conduct of the operation before the operation, confining it. direction to those new situations vhlch developed an the operation progressed. This should serveodel for the future.

C.

unfortunately, throe incidents completely removed the element of

surprise.

1. The propaganda program, one of the most effective arms of the project's paramilitary machine, vas exposed prematurely la thispinion. The first leaflet drop caused the opposition to spring into action right at the moment when tho inner organisation vas necessarily the moatorganizing, equipping, recruiting, .to. TO quoteL In ayave much opposition, mostly underground. annot afford to continually oppress that opposition, but at the first sign that it Is ready to act,

lthhat your leaflet drop gave to

,uouid d0 exactly what hecapacitate tha entire organisation

If possible."

intlth*tloa, any criticism of thlill field personnel, including elated at tht first new. oftha sutcasaful

sttci^d* the serious consequences occurred thahhtact wat

B ^orod that the most effectiva leaflet drops during the operation vara thoseucceoaful paramilitary blow.

jj* Praaature paramilitary acUons ln connection with tha attempt el isaided the enmsy ln preparing counteractioTto rtu^tst * i accomplishing th. destructionU>practically negated proposed ^rsnd specialiats- movemanta due to occur within tha following three weeks.

m lk/rossinguneour wasthe opposiUon extra day. of

preparation after certain exposing preparatory moves had been made.

Tha "suit of the above errorsearth of coordination of underground support to the operation.

D- ysluo of TraJnJ.^B

u- - of shook troop movement and combat

w.i * okiraishea and in tho two

* that mo ^ocuvenaas was gained in poraiLilltary training received under PBPRIMS dlrocUon,

Q^ confidence of the troopa. nlt lwu,orfl was ^ovn whan the firstafl withstood solely becauseunior officer's wisecanandunder fire. Although vary aaldoa in the future will we be able to train hosts of troops wh^orking behind

ust^ Programs sfwe

1 8ubtmltfor. month'a leadership training.

seo OT^kt

K. Air Supoortf

o. ort Provided the clincher to the operation. Air was used'r the vacancy leftp^'ubs^uent

t as-tion. hisidgea were cut, reinforcements harrassed, reaupply by ehippW stopped

f-pDu^^'

Th. psychological effect of fighter elrwoe tremendous andto the ay th thatrmy was an organised, unbeatable force,

t "BJ cccflllodetrategical, *eoi-taotlca2 and supply

support. Close-air support vas not feasible for several reasons!

ao trained air-ground liaison teaa*.

Inefficient tactical cceaminlcatioas ays tea.

. 3* ur* fighting was such that unstable positions, undefinablo lines and the fast aircraft being used prevented orientation by the pilots.

It should be noted hero that the sole aloes sir support employed vassssua 1B0 and7 ciroling the combat area withagmenUtlon boabs and home-madeand scrap Iron bombs.

F, ^jrarcnlflatdona

We were not preparedactical ooaaunlcations net. Six tactical radios and the FCP radioull schedule for the base setup we employed. Teaa to FCP to teas coamanications at timesours because of staff traffic and blanks la comannications due to atmospheric conditions. It Uses, the round trip traffic was only two hours, but this vas not dependahl

Dse of code is impracticalactical net. due to Ua* time fayolved and also due to the garble factor. In this operation certain Immediate action

usages, FCP to Air Support, were garbled. The moat damaging ware those in

which an errorarble orsctirred in coordinate*. Ao Intelligent guaaaommo officer or an air operationss to what was meant does not suffice. Reaupply runs ware made under Just such circumstances when time did not permit cable clarification, in at least on* suoh instance,hat the teaa was on the ground and that the droplias north of the team area. Usually, garbles war* more preTal*nt whan the operator or commander were under fire.

having tho agent pads and Chief of Operations separated by radio from air supporterious error rectified early in th* operation, until rectified, air requests were sometimes received after th* ground action had occurred. Allowances had been made for this possibility be placing special air request pads in agent hands with th* base pad at air operations, but this left air operation* working in the dark as to the ground situation. Whan rectified, we aero able to support the operation more properly.

Before rectified, however, ve were forced to us* vole* codec C nases, stoar* oouid be cut from the time neoeeeery for an air request to be honored.

V. SPECIAL SOBJlffl.

afcroup cf persona who comprise th.hacontent to bury their completeof usefulness under the guise of lack of faith ln succeae.

Our organisation haa its .hare. Some have drifted froa project to project and fron division to division-confusing assumed VofassionallBa- withre el Wtother people'.

In aoat cases these people are only dead wood. Usually, their Boatto an operationonfusion of the Issuebort period. However, otthlaan point out four specific inatranoss in which support functions

m" ithlfl

The poaalbla effects of tolerating such persons in an operationalare too obvloua to list lBn

It is hoped that this situation can ba pointed out to KIBaRK heads aa an oxlatlng condition, true not only in this project but also ln others with which the writer has had experience.

VI. Raoccsw.nr1at.lona for all field paraonnal considered aa having performed In an efficient manner are being pre^ted In eeparate reporta. ish at this time, however, to place in the body of this report ay personal opinion that tho key man to tho success of this project Is Vincent C. PTVaLL.

PTVALL's firm sdhcronce to ordera enabled UKOLH to rely on the fact that plana were being carried out within the realm of poaeibillty and that of^utisapu toajtartaoa.pl.ii ware minimi,ad. Tba preservation of subam IntaresU uasolemn duty by PTVALL and It shoved up in the results of his work.

His profesalonal knowledge and direct mannor of dealing with the indleonous personnel gained him, and KUBARK, their respect and spirit of caoarade necessary to good guidance on operations ofe.

, and objecUvs thinking and reporting spotted

for LIHCQLH many defects In the old CALLIGERIS organiaation, uaeful in

It la recamended that his servlCQa would be valuableUHOOKwithin VIE if he ia to roaaln in WHO. If released from WHO, Vtthat KCHOOK staffa for training asain wtsaassignment afterTHOOI training course a

It woulderioufl KtJBiuUAUHOCft Iobb to lcso this can through disinterest on the part of KUB1RK or through allowing hla to become do-activated.

WILLIAM EOBERTSOS

CPM/raatJCCESS

WB/lfw

84

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