CIAJSTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM kleasias^itizedfiqm/o
RQM/OIS SUPPORT OF PBSUCCESS
mteiliger.ee support lor PBSUCCESS was provided beginning
in Guatemala with its ramified implications bearing on the totsl
economic and political situation of that country. Thisreparatory investigation laid on by WH Division without revelation to RQM/OIS of any detail of the contemplated operation. The underlying intent of the requirement was implicit, however, in certain terms of reference divulged with regard to the study, and this office consequentlyoluntary memorandum of "Special Considerations" which was classified Top Secret and given limited distribution. (Attachments)
The Chief and Deputy Chief of RQM/OIS were briefed on PBSUCCESS on3 by Hans Tofti. They were requested at that time to devote the facilities of this offiee to support of tbe project as indicated bynd Chicf/WH Division, giving highest priority to this requirement. The two members of the Research Panel specializing in WH affairs were
briefed that name day, and other components of RQM/OIS were instructed as necessary to cooperate in meeting special and high priority demands with reference to "the Central American area." From that day until the end of July.BSUCCESS requirementsarge part of the time
/.
SECRET
of the OIS Chief and his deputies and absorbed more% of the working time of the two Research Panel specialists, who had to put aside all of their other regular assignments in support of WH Division, add in addition worked moreours overtime on PBSUCCESS. Asemergencies continued to arise, almost all members of the OIS ttaff. including other geographic area specialists, were called on for special contributions.
The duties of RQM/OIS in support of PBSUCCESS embraced the following: 1. Coordination with OCI and Staff D
RQM/OIS briefed DAD/C1 onnd thereafter with his cooperation maintained continuing coordination of PBSUCCESS requirements with OCI and STD. This coordination and close cooperation continued for the duration of the operation and into its aftermath. In final stages, STD and OCI also gave direct support on request of DD/P. Certain technical services by STD also were suppliedIS specialists from time to time clearing with or assisting those of STD on background information.
2. Radio Broadcastoordination with ggfldx FBIS OIS ecember arranged with FBIS for installation of the "C" teletype line direct to LINCOLN and for special monitoring services,asic target list and briened tbe FBSS editorial stafi to the extent necessary for establishing firm support of the operation. Coordination with
FBIS continued throughout the duration of the operation. OIS obtained from
FBIS such support data and services as information on radio facilities and
reception in the area of concern, and in later stages of the project, special
monitoring of Radio Liberacion. FBIS notified OIS when unusual developments
were observed, such as temporary cessation of broadcasts, which information
was passed on by OIS to responsible officers of PBSUCCESS. Hard copies
of "C" line transmissions, not distributed otherwise within tbe Agency, were
picked up by this officeuilding and transmitted with other spc^cal
materials to PBSUCCESS staff in Barton Hall.
3. Coordination with Contact Division, Cartographic and Photo Interpretation Divialons and FDD
OISecember briefed Chief/OO, Chief /Cartographicd Chief/FDD, as necessary and arranged for priority support for
PBSUCCESS from the respectiveanoia: offices. Throughout the operation, very close liaison was maintained by OIS with these offices, especially the two first named, which were called upon continually up through the final days, for highly specialized contributions, usually under emergency pressure. RQM/OIS was the onVy channel of communication between staff members was deemed helpful. All PBSCUCESS requirement* laid on Contact Division,ide ranRc oficks and highly important tasks, passed through this channel.
Otm as also did allrequirements for special cartography.
including maps for night use printed on cloth with luminous ink. and all
requirements for photo interpretation for parachute drops.
All concerned conscientiously held to channels at all times ei and on
various occasions satisfaction was expressed by all concerned with the
time-saving and efficiency thereby attained. The only instances of confusion
occurred when persons newly assigned to PBSUCCESS went out of channels
through inexperience. Because the system existed, however, these cases
usually were clarified before duplication of effort resulted.
4. Press Clipping Service
Facilities and costs of press coverage were explored with CIA Library and Contact Division immediately on request, in early December. The UJC
CIA Library press clipping service was established byecember. For
security reasons, on instruction from PBSUCCESS staff, the clippings were
transmitted daily to BQM/OIS and were airmailed from this officeost
Office box designated by LINCOLN. LINCOLN under look" directly theof foreign press items desired. ater date, sJfcen npeed-up and increased scope of coverage were sought, arrangements were made by RQM/OIS
service. This provided daily coverage, airmailed directlyost Office Box designated by LINCOLN. Additional uax clippings from miscellaneous
sources also were forwarded to LINCOLN, it has been informally reported, from another office, presumably in WH Division.
Dissatisfaction arose on the receiving end which declared the press clipping service slow and inadequate. The confusion seemi lo have been partly due to the fact that the material came in to LINCOLN from several sources and notKingle channel where responsibility could be fixed and clarification of the problem obtained. Time was lost in overcoming the deficiency of tbe service while RQM/OIS awaited final instructions on which action could be taken to procure the commerical press clipping service. In the meanwhile an informal check on the flow of clippings provided by CIA Library and airmailed as received by OIS, allowing for the unavoidable lag due to the extra step of transit between the Library and this office, showed that the distinctively onesfcr marked envelopes used by OIS had been received regularly at the normal rate for ordinary^mail service. The timeliness of the OCD Library clipping service, of course, depended on the speed of delivery to the Library of the J5 newspapers covered, most of whlkh obviously originated outside of Washington. This service probably could have been developed more satisfactorily had OIS pressed for definition of the purposebax by the clippings In the operation.
5- Research Reports and Collection of Intelligence Data OIS procured or produced in support of PBSUCCESSpecial reports, analyses, and compilations of data, totallingages, (see attached list). Included were studies on the coffeeindustry in Guatemala, communism
in Guatemala. Guatemalan efforts to procure arms, and the Caribbean Legion;
a definition of the element* of psychological intelligence; data on railroads, electric power, petroleiC basic geography; climatic and meteorological
information; economic and financial information and analyses;
and notes; analyses of political situations and group attitudes and of factual
evidence bearing onspecific developments.
6. Psychological Program Support
SIS support of the psychological phase of the operation was impaired
by lack of definition as to the extent or limits of support necessary, lack of
a claar channel to the responsible head of the psychological operation, and confusion as to the policy and extent of direct procurement of materials by LINCOLN. The general requirement laid on with OIS was vague and extremely
booad in scope. Efforts to key in OIS support with the direct acquisition of materials at LINCOLN were unsuccessful. Because of time and emergency
pressures it never became possible for OIS to obtain clear knowledge of where other procurement began or ended on what aspects of the general program OIS should focus its effort so as to supplement and not duplicate other undertaking No clear channel uk or liaison could be established with the individual primarily responsible for overall planning and conduct of the psychological aspect of PBSUCCESS. This was the only case during the operation in which OIS was unable to carry out its standard practice of working out with the requester a
precise definition of needs, scope and limitation of requirements. While it was made evident that large-scale support along various lines would have been welcomed by PBSUCCESS for purposes of experimentation and improvisation other pressing demands made it out of the question for OlS to undertake the assignment without more precise specification. OIS support was finally limited to obtaining recordings for radio broadcasting purposes, selected experimentally as to type and quantity. LINCOLN'S requirement of recordings (without indication of quantity) of "typical Guatemalan marimba music" could not be supplied through normal commercial channels. OIS therefore ultimately arrangedleared agent in New York to hire professional musicians and have recordfling'maderofessional studio, OlSsupervising the selection of musical numbers recorded. Tbe cost of bbtaining these recordigs, which totallf three hours of playing time, waspart from the cost of liaison and supervision and time snd travel expenditures for our scacch for records from commercial sources.
The recordings were brought to headquarters immediately on completion and were reproduced on tapes by TSSrecaution against loss or damage snd for better technical results in radio broadcasting. TSSriority to this work and the recordset of tapes were turned over to the Barton Hall office to be sent by air freight to LINCOLN. Through misunderstanding
of shipping instructions or negligence in picking up the shipment at LINCOLN,
thereelay of at least two weeks in the receipt of this material by
persons cognizant of the requirement. OIS was informed in the course of
opeationibrary of recordings was being acquired directly at LINCOLN. The extent of duplication of effort or cost that may have occurred is unknown. After termination of the operation OIS was informed that typical regional
music had been picked uponduran night club and used for rebroadcasting. Wxabt Whether this rendered superfluous the special procurement of recordings
in New York is unknown.
Doubtless there was fault by omission on both sides in this case. The main deficiency, however, appears to have been rooted in lack of advance
planning oi the psychological program in sufficient detail of outline so that
support requirements could be described in concrete terms and quantities.
Coordination with Departments of State and Defense a. At the request of WH Division, OIS worked intensively on the preparation of support materialsfor the American Delegation at the Xth Inter-American
Conference,s the Conference became largely concerned with the question of communism in Guatemala, this task was
consideredhase of PBSUCCLSS support. OIS staff membessonsiderable volume of research and presentation, including text and charts, and carried out the coordination of State ARA and OIR contributions with
CIA production, as well as most of the editing, typing and all of the work of
reproduction and assembling of the main American documentary exhibit snd reference paper, under the title of "Communism in Guatemala" (ISOontributions to this study were obtained from CENTS (external researchj OCI, OHH, STaff C, and WH Division. OIS arranged for the meetings and conferences necesaary to organize and coordinate ths work and followed through on the details of fiaal (noeparodx reproduction as indicated
the remaining period of PBSUCCESS operations, OISliaison with State, -acin in OIR,*md ARA. as requested by WH Division
OU
andad represented the Agencyin meetings of the task force assembled by State Department to prepare the US position papers for the OAS meeting on the Guatemalan case,^scheduled for Montevideo ami subsequently cancelled.
request of DD/P, OIS prepared certain data and special reportsthe Assistant Sec. of State xrf for American Republic Affairs and
the Undersecretary of Defense. Normal liaison was maintained at all times with the Department of Defense. Special and crash requirements were fulfilled through this liaison on numerousooperated by forwarding for OCI and OIS advance copies of pertinent attache reports as received, as well as all data on the Guatemalan O. B.
8. Timely dissemination, of intelligence materials and reproduction aervice OIS gave priority treatment to dissemination of all incoming cables and despatches pertaining to the Central American area from December to lhe end of the operation and into its aftermath. The competent officers and analysts were alerted and promptly supplied with significant incoming materials.
After operational needs led to establishmentpecial staff at Barton Hall, apart from WH Division, OIS was called on to meet the problem of providing both the Barton Hall office and LINCOLN with copies of intelligence materials routinely disseminated to WH Division. For security reasons, it was decided not lo request additional copies of IAC materials, and arrangements were made with HI/Reproduction for daily priority service on items selected by OIS for Barton Hall and LINCOLN. This service ran to thousands of pages of verlfax reproduction. It proved exteemely helpful to the offices serviced and was continued to the end of the operation.
Conclusions and Lessons Learned
RQM/OISnique position in relation to PBSUCCESS While informed of the objectives and course of developments and while laboring under the time pressure and constant emergency demands which characterized the entire operationconcomitant developmentshe Guatemalan case in the OAS, RQM/OIS still wasirect participant and therefore was able to consider the factors in its purviewertain amount of objectivity. Periodic recapitulations of OIS commitments were made, support problems were reviewed and notes were kept for the possible benefit to future operations which might follow from lessons learned.
1. lear, precise definition of the problem, the long range and the immediate objectives, is fundamental for purposes of planning, providing support and carryingroad operation. Such definition should take into consideration the desirable effects the operation is intended to produce and the problems it is likely to create. No opening for doubt or misconception should be allowed in the choice of reference terms; if both psychological and paramilitary action is contemplated, the fact should be plainly stated and the preponderance or precedence of one over the other, the hmits imposed or possible extent of the action anticipated, should be contained in clear language in the plan. OIS expressed some of its conclusions on (ha* subject^
memorandum, "Comment on Guatemala Country5copy attachedj.
a.
Z. In such an undertaking as PBSUCCESS, "post-operationl'country'plan
should be prepared concurrently with the country plan and should be developed and defined with the same care, skill and background knowledge applied to devising the operational plan. Major disruptions in the entire nation of
Guatemala were implicit in the plan of PBSUCCESS^isruplion of government
organization^basiche army, political parties, labor organizations,
v^,
and the economic life of the country^ Tbe problems of the transitional.
have beenide-over opeaation
and replacement
personnel prepared to carry it out in case of exposures in connection with the
I
basic operation. For example, PBSUCCESS was focused on elimination of Communist influence in Guatemala. The means of^post-opcrational control
a>
and disposition of high communist leaders, therefre/ should have been
A /
problem forency responsibility could nol abruptly
considered almost as an integral part of the operational plan, certainlyost-operational pi
be resigned. It appears, however, that alplking-waa^ttozat in preparation for
thisckUjii-prwr.tses volctcTSy the opiratdrfi of Ranilotoll them will- Kflj* card file or checklist of the principal communists in Guatemala of concern to PBSUCCESS was pwtporgd-uatii.
7
hen RQM/OIS was requested to procureist'clock the following day. This was after President Arbenz had resigned, and the list was needed to prevent flight of Communists across the several Guatemalan frontiers (with Mexico, British Honduras, Honduras and
-tttjEK (from such sources an were available at the late hour ol thetop-gap listing was completed to meet the deadline. evision was issued one week later with the cooperation of WH Division and State BI after/requestimilar crash basis.
ilarallorli factual data on geographic and climatic conditions; economic, political,
military, and social conditlonsjVimportant historical considerations, and the
3. rerequisite for any operation of the scope of PBSUCCESS shouldountry study, or series of studies, prepared well in advance of operational activities. Such studies^wsn^^ring together for ready referencejrpertlnent^
characteristic attitudes of groups and influential leaders^ These studies would be additional or supplementary to standard NIS production in that they would be geared topecific operation in the depth necessary.
J
Such studies would (a)seful guide for systematic, and "post-operat(hid' planning, (b) indicate aa at an early stage the gaps in information which could be filled through field collection or other means, (c) protect the security of the operation, and (d) reduce the need for emergency and crash studies.
4. The demands on personnel for high pressure and overtime work, while universally met with cheerfulness and even with zest, raised the cost of PBSUCCESS and led to serious security risks. This could have been to a
considerable extent avoided, had support requirements been analyzed and
spelled out in advance.
More orderly and effective support, with less Strain and security risk, could have been arranged by OIS, even as late as December,horough study of foreseeable needs had bean made, an inventory of assets in the Division and at LINCOLN had been drawnifnininn al Ike chain
opewt wa-had- beenIbl e. OIS
n
made several efforts at the time to fill the gaps in knowledge of inch 'f- shrina.
but could not complete them, despite the willingness of WH Division to cooperate in every way, because of the haste with which the operation moved from the planning into the action phase and because of the fact that operations began at LINCOLN before an adequate complementary office was established at headquarters.
5. It was demonstrated in the PBSUCCESS experience that use ofhannel to obtain support materials from sources outside the Clandestine Services area protects security regarding operationalhinwreeweta/ advance collection of support materials
tv
can be accomplishedery extensive scale without jeopardizing operational
ontrary to impressions which prevailed in some quarters early
in prepaaations forii^Jioj*attempt*
cover preliminary Investigations {such as study of the Guatemalan coffee industry) by giving them excessively high prlority^tep Biuret classification, tends to stimulMe more speculation thanormal approach as forxha any of the scores of other study requests routinely received in the various offices concerned with research in GlA-Aftfa-and-Statc:
y 6. triking aspect of RQM/OIS aspxek experience in supporting PBSUCCESS was gradual discovery that the operation as laid on was disapproved by many uzx^ssek analysts and desk officers in CIA and Department of State. Those who held this opinion generally believed in the over-all. elimination of Communist influence in Guatemala, but were convinced that the method chosen to accomplish the objective would at best return only partial and short-term advantages in exchange for grave long-term risks. They believed that this operation would fall ah considerably short of the result desired, would produce new problems, would lead to widespread conviction that US direct intervention was responsible for any adverse developments, and In the long run have repercussions Injurious to US prestige and policy objectives throughout the rest of the Western Remap here. The analysts and officers who expressed these reservations, to the knowledge of RQM/OIS, chose one of two courses for their own action: where under obligation to work actively in support of the operation they stated their reservations and then consciously strove to do everything in txwarx their capacity to promote
SPECIAL STUDIES AND REPORTS PREPARED OR OBTAINED BY rqm/ois TOR PBSUCCESS
STUDIES Date
53
4
A
(A) 4
THE COFFEE IKDUS7RT IK GUATEMALA
COMMUNISM IN GUATEMALA
GUATEMALAN PROCUREMENT CF ARKS FROM THE SOVIET ORBIT
CHECKLIST OF GUATEMALAN COMMUNISTS REVISED CHECKLISTS OP GUATEMALAN
OQMUBia
No* of
3
2
Prepared by RQM/OIS
StateQK/O: RQM/OIS*^
RQM/OIS
RQM/OIS, WHtate BI
REPORTS a) 3
3
3
53
3
3
73
83
3
3
3
3
4
4
24
Guatemalan Lavs Governing
Exploitation
"Black Bug" In Coffee Shipments Guatemalan Araod Forcea
Estimate of Current Economicn Guatemala
Data on Import of Coffee Bags
Iowa State College Facilities In Guatemala
n
Salvadoran Requests for
Railroads and Electric
Installations In Guatemala Data on Puerto Arenas
Caribbean
Essential Elements of
Intelligence (Definition)
Outstanding Claims Against Guatemalan Land Expropriations
Caribbean
Materials for PsychologicalEstimate of Radio andIn Guatemala.
Current Labor Situation in
Geography of Guatemala
Caribbean Legion-Lcperco
RQM/OIS
OCI
RQM/OIS
" (oral report)
CCI
RQM/OIS (Voluntary
(Voluntary ORROIS
matter only, no transmittal memos or charts.
i
o
4
4
74
4
4
4
14
94
94
4
4
4
U4
4
4
4
14
In
Attempts of the Guatemalano Obtain Arms
Analysis of Evidence In Assault onomoza
Diaz Itinerary
Soviet Bloc Importers of Guatemalan Coffee
Analysis of Sidney Gruson
Petroleum Situation in
Effect on Guatemalan Economy of
Application of Economic Sanctions
International Financial Positionuatemala
Financial Sanctions Against Guatemala 1
Guatemalan Newsprint Conauttption and Sources
Soviet Aid to Spanish Republics,and
erman Shipping Firm
Unfavorable Devslopmento of
Deterioration in Guatemalan Financial and Fiscal Situation
Guatemalan Cloaked Financial Transactions
Guatemalan Financial Transactions Relative to Arms Purchnaea
Subsidiary Financial Data on
malna Arms Deal
RQM/OIS
QM/OIS RQM/OIS
(oral report)
STATEMENTS
84
4
4
Draft Editorial on Non-Aggression Pacts
Draft Policy Statement on ALfhan Anas Shipment
Communist Press Reaction to Honduran Strikes
3
4
4
1 June 54
pecial Considerations Regarding the Coffee Industry in Guatemala
Comment on Guatemala Country Plan
Bow to subvert the Guatemalan Amry Attltvttudee of Guatemalan Arsy
Fortuny/Alvarado Monzon
RQM/OIS (volt&ary)
QM/OIS
RQM
BIOGRAPHIC REPEKTS (Additional Biographic Reports Incorporated In Special Studies Hated above)
4 Jorge and GulUerno RQM/OIS
4 Minor KETLHAUER and
4 Maria VILANOVA da
24 Elf ego
24 Jose Luis CRUZ State BI
Mauricio "
Original document.
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