Created: 7/28/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



iwo initials

IHSTBUCTIONS: Officer designations should bo used in the "TO" column. Under eachine should be drawn acrosst'ff^WSK numbered io co-respond with the number in the "TO"h office- should initial (check mark insufficient)IihooldJm relu-ned to Regtttry.



Distribution: I

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structure in flux. Castillo Armas had enteredCity one day before our arrival; the Junta wasrocess ofirm and clear-cut policy as to how to deal with the Communist problem after the overthrow of the Arbenz regime did apparently not exist, except possibly to the extent that the Junta wanted to avoid the appearanceolice regime and wished to proceed "democratically."

Our primary objective was to assure the acquisition of documentary evidence which would expose the Communist conspiracy and its foreign tics in Guatemala. Pursuant to headquarters directives, received after our arrival at the station, we also were to make available documentary evidencetate Department team (Mssrs. Miron Burgin and Vasqucz) which had been dispatched without our knowledge and arrived simultaneously with us.

Upon arrival we ascertained that the overthrow of the Arbenz regime had been executed without any planning toward scientifically breaking the Communist Party; nor had any thought been given to the systematic arrest of Communist leaders. Automatic arrest lists were lacking. The Guardia Civil arrested aboutersons, but the bulk of the arrestees wore Indian peasants, jailed to prevent outbreaks. Some of the top Communist leadership had sought asylum in the (Mexican, Chilean. Salvadoran. Argentine) Embassies. It still is

our estimatereat number of the medium Party leadership arc tree. Our efforts to induce the Chief of the Guardia Civil to begin systematic arrests of significant Communists failed. (Appointment of new Chief was already under discussion and the man we saw became Governor'of Dept. of Guatemala. )


We also found confusion and lack of planning concerning the acquisition and control of the documentary Party materials. Immediately after the overthrow of the regime there appears to haveituation whereby any interested person could grab Communist documents and papers. The only act revealinglan seems to have been the locking up of CP and front organization premises. Nobody could tell us exactly how much and what was in these premises until weersonal inspection.

We discovered the following indications of the uncoordinated "grabbing" process:

a) The Chief of the Guardia Judicial had entered Party headquarters and obtained some documents for his private file,

b) The files of the SAMF. the CP controlled railroad workers union, had been shipped by the Army to the Guardia Civil.

The Chief of the Guardia Civil received two sacks full of propaganda materials, books and notesedium level Party functionary, and gave them to the Station.

The station obtained some documents from the private files of Arbenz, Alfonga Martinez and Capuano.

Accordingtation report, Castillo Armas' advisor,bought some of Cruz Wcr's papers from

a boy on the street.

f J The Junta itself took control of the documents in the

Palace. Col. Cruz Salazar showed us some of these on the occasion of our visit to the Palace, and handed us a


6. The chaotic condition in which we found the documentary materials during our inspection can best be gleaned from the pictures which were taken in order toense of reality. It is evident that anti-Communist elements had raided CP and front premises. The physical security of the premises was farcical in two instances.


Ee were shocked when wc discovered that no guard had been posted at Party headquarters, the obvious hub oi the conspiracy.

Upon our arrival on the scene, excited neighbors told us that they

had seen lights in Party headquarters at night, had seen the shadows of persons and heard voices. (We initiated the postingilitary Police guard at Party headquarters, but the damage may have been doneimilarly astonishing was our experience when we attempted to enter the premises of FUD, the Communist student organisation,

which also was unguarded. eighbor whose backyard was adjacent to the yard of FUD, kindly invited us to climb over his wall and

inspect the premises of FUD. These experiences illustrate the

inefficiency of the anti-Communist forces.

when we entered the premises of PGT, CGTG,other Communist organizations we were surprised by the mass

of documents which still had remained there, and we came to the conclusion that the Communists themselves must have been surprised by their defeat. Other evidence discovered later also indicated that Arbenz' resignation camehock to many of his followers and some Communist dominated organizations, and wc believe that the Communists themselves, in their optimism, are responsible for the fact that wc still were able to find what we consider the quantitatively greatest catch of documents ever left behindommunist Party and its auxiliaries.

Before weord about these documents, we wish to point out that the simple act of gaining access to them wasby the confusion existing in the government structure. It tookreat deal of running from Guardia Civil to General Staff and vice versa, until the military finally admitted (and possibly learned to its own surprise) that the Military Police was responsible for the physical guarding (such as it was) of the premises, giving us at last the necessary papers and an accompanying officer (Col. Soto) to make it possible for us to make the inspection. Wc mention this small fact only in order to illustrate the confusion prevailing in the days after Castillo Armas' return.

Concerning the documents themselves, wc wish to upgrade our previous (cabled) estimate ofapers which had been made prior to the inspection of the CNCG (Peasants' Union).

At present the estimate is closerieces oi scattered papers. Note also that no documents from the provinces have come in as yet.

was physically impossible to read and exploit all offound. Mras many documentsand earmarked tne most significant ones which wereheadquarters. eneral description ofinspected. The most significant documents were found

in Station files (especially, the Arbenz materials).

documents have, ofreat local onsiderable oortion of the CP complex can beand many individuals active in the Communistbc identified. The extent of government penetration can Connections with the Soviet-controlledand Communist organizations are also reflected. Indocuments couldomestic security service on itsproblem, of course, is toeliable domesticin Guatemala).

1Z. How much "national intelligence" of U. S. interest tlie re is in these documents, cannot be stated now. The State Department team believes (and we concur)ood study of the workings of the Communist complex can be made, provided an adequate field research team is assigned for an extended perioden foronths, according to our estimate). The photographs taken show that the papers will have to be organized before thev can be exploited. On the basis of the documents selected by Mr.f_ t can be stated that the most significant documents found so lar arc evidence to the depth of the Communist penetration of the National Palace and the general strength of the movement in the country, but not as yet lo the aspects that we are mosl interested in, namely the elements of Soviet support and control of Communism in Guatemala.

13. Such evidence will have to be dug out, laboriously and painfully, and may not be contained in the documents. Additional live sources (defectors, interrogations) will have to be developed for this purpose. At this moment there are no independent station

assets through which to develop them. However, we believe that recommendations made by us have served to Lay the groundwork for opening joint operations with special local authorities through which the intelligence and counteraction interests of ourand the U. S. Government can be achieved.

14. Before we go into the recommendations which weshould like to add that during theays of our visit welocal officials and, thanka to Mr.knowledge of

Spanish and professional attitude, enjoyed their cooperation for action support purposes. Our general conclusion was that at leaat on the working level thereincere desire to clean out the Communist mess. This desire, however, was not matched by efficiency-ind professional attitude. We feel that the biggest job this organization could do in Guatemala is to assist in the buildingrofessional security service and to enter into joint operations with the locals.

The officials whose cooperation we enjoyed are:

a) Colonel Ruben Gonzalez Sigui, former chief of the Cuartel General of the Army, and Chief of the Guardia Civil Among other services rendered, he had made up upon ourist of ther so arrestees which we transmitted to the Station.

h) Miguel Angel Mendizabal. Chief of the Guardia Judicial, who had beenears with the Second Sectionf the General Staff of the Army. Mendizabal stated he had received training from an FBI agent. Edwin Sweet, now believed to be in Mexico, while he, Mendisabal,oliceman with the Guardia Civil,ears ago, prior to his assignment with the Second Section. Mendizabal made available toeries of valuable CP documents which he had personally removed from Party headquarters, as well as an extensive alphabetical list of Party functionaries, foreign Communists, and Communist controlled premises.

We met Col, Victor Manuel Gordillo, who had been associated with the Second Sectionf the General Staff of the Army under the Arbenz regime. He made available toist of top Communist leaders including their biographies, as well as structural data on the CP. This work had been done secretly under the Arbenz regime, and indicatesad been aware of the Communist threat. Col. Gordillo also introduced usgent, tocky man ofho asserted that heember of PAR and in this capacity had the opportunity to observe Communist elements in the PAR. onsidered thisost valuable asset and offered us to assume control overighly unusual gesture which indicates the degreeesire to cooperate.

Col. Soto, of the Cuartel General, was our guide on our inspection trip, and identified the location of several Communists premises previously unknown to us. Col. Soto was recently transferred from his job in the Cuartel Generalost with the Chief of the General Staff of the Army.

The Chief of the Cuartel General was extremelywhen we advised him that no guard was posted at CP headquarters. He immediatelyetail of Military Police to accompany us, break into the premises, anduard there. This took place in the evening hours.

Col. Oscar Mendoza, former Military Attache in Cuba and newly appointed Chief of the General Staff of the Army,

cooperated in introducing us to officers oi the Second Section, and provided us with the documentation enabling us to inspect Communist premises.

15. ontains our recommendationulyo COS for the Ambassador. It is our understanding that the Ambassador passed the substance of these.recommendations to the Junta on

6 Based on lhe briefing received from COS upon arrivalndong discussion with ESSENCE on the morninge concluded that the Gardia Civil was not an effective security force, but felt on the other hand that there was considerable anti-Communist citizens' initiative in the country. Hence, we proposed the creation of an anti-subversive squad and the setting upigh-powered, Junta-controlled investigative group (somewhat on the orderRoyalo centralize all information, expose and liquidate Communism, and coordinate all necessary anti-CP operations (interrogations, arrests, defections, penetrations). Subsequently incipient action indicated that thehad been accepted. ol. Elfego Monzon indicated to us in the presence of COS that the Junta would create a< "Grupo A" (the investigative group) and "Groupo B" (the anti-subversive squad). he Chief of the Guardia Civil took us to the premises of the old Jefatura of the Armed Forces. Embassy building) which as he indicated, would be the working headquarters of the investigative group where documentation would be centralized uly, we were invited by the Chief of the Guardia Civil to his office where we met with Mario Sandoval and Domingo Goicolea, who were introduced as constituting the board of the investigative group, along with Juan Miron, who was not present. These representatives stated that they would also be responsible for the preparationhitcbook on Communism, and for the anti-Communist "education" of the peasants along Christian lines. At the meetinguly, the representatives of the group declared that they would obtain proper credentials from the President to ensure cooperation from every government agency. They were in full accord with the necessity for arrests of Communist leaders, defection operations and clean-up of Government agencies. They were fully cooperative, and we gained the strong impression that, once this group was activated and staffed out, this organization would be able to get to the core of the Communist conspiracy in Guatemala, and obtain the strategic information which may nol be included in the mountains of papers located so far. We also feel that the group was the instrumentality through which it could be possible not only to wipe out and expose Communism, but also to reinforce the sadly inadequate security forces of this country and so to strengthen the current government andommunist come-back.

At the meeting wc also advised that the group select at least one clerical supervisorlerks to process thewhich would be centralized in the old Jefatura. The two representatives agreed that they would not ship the records to the Jefatura until theytaff for processing^ (Unfortunately, through some undetermined foul-up. some of the records were actually shipped to the Jefatura and dumped thereost disorderly manner. J

Another meeting with the group was arranged for the. at the Jefatura. Embassy). This meeting did not materialise since Domingo Goicolea had to leave townpecial mission. Attempts were made toorning meeting for

ut no meeting materialized ash July was "Anti-Communist" day. Mr. Krieg of the Embassy's Political Sectionorning meeting with the group at the Jefatura for

This meeting did not materialize Only Mr. Bernabe Linares (former Police Chief under UBICO) was present, and advised that he, GOICOLEA and Armando Sandoval were now members of the group. Another morning meeting was arranged by Mr. Krieg for4 but only Linares was present, and no discussions

on the work plan could be held. At that time it was not evident what had caused the slowing up of the process of forming the group. It should be noted, however, that the government structure was still in fluxhe replacement of the Chief of the Guardia Civil took place on. and that government reorganization may have caused the delay.

the afternoon ofuly we visited the Jefaturaand other Communist records and documents hadrolling into the building). We met part of the group whotoeeting of the whole group on, totechnical advice on the function and organization of theMr. Burgin and Vasquez had. been already advisedEmbassy. We discovered later from Mr. Burgin thatby now Secretary to the President, had been at theto our arrival in the afternoon, and had demanded that thefunctioning. He also indicated that GOICOLLEA was tiedfamily matters, and that the group may have to proceed

19. ,uly, we attended the meeting at the Jefatura which was chaired by COS. Present were Armando Sandoval, Bernabe Linares, Col. Domingo Rosales, Raul Midcnce, and Juan Miron. It was apparent that the group (investigative committee) present was still an informal one. had no formal authorization from the Junta, and that the subversive squad waseality. ormer member of the group, one Calderon, had been removed because he believed he couldhitebook on Communismfour) days, certainly an underestimation of the problem.

We put before the group the question of authorization again, and the group agreed that it should beharter (constitution) by the Junta to empower it toationwide investigation and obtain the cooperation of government agencies, including Guardia Civil.

The group agreed that the Committee should consisthree man directorate, one of the members to be chairman, and that two alternates should be appointed.

The group agreedudge with nationwide authority should be attached to the Committee in order to issue warrants and subpoenas.

The group agreed that immediate instructions should go out to all departmental governors and heads of the departmental Guardia Civil in order to forward all pertinent files on pro-Arbenz parties to headquarters (Jefatura) for study.

The group agreed that special funds should be alotted to the committee. The group agreed toorkplaneeting onor our technical advice.

Mr. Linares pointed out that the primary function of the Committee should be the study of the documents in order tothe CP complex out of which further investigative leads would grow.

The investigation of government departments and the Foreign Ministry was also discussed, and included in the scope of the program. uggestion was made to "freeze" all records of government agencies. Another, to obtain the names of allemployees for checking.

Col. Domingo Resales was tentatively put in charge of physical security of the Jefatura and the documents.

The group felt in general that the project was an entirely novel one for Guatemala, and it was obvious that our advice would be accepted with gratitude.

20. After the meeting COS went to see Mario Sandoval and also planned to see Castillo Armas in order to ensure speedyof tlie group's recommendations.

2). Onuly we assembled in the Jefatura in the presence of liernabc Linares, Col. Domingo Rosales. Juan Miron and COS. COS advised that he had seen Castillo Armas the preceding evening andCommittee for the Defense of Democracy" would be created by presidential decree, with sufficient authority toation-wide investigation of Communism, The Committee would consist of Domingo Goicolearmando Sandoval and Juan Miron, and two alternates, Raul Midence. and one Lopez. COS stated that Bernabe Linares would be in charge of theand Col. Domingo Rosales in charge of security and Wc recommended to Juan Miron that the first step to be taken was toarroom on the CP and all auxiliaries; to put up on the walls the structure and personnel of the CP complex so that significant arrest and investigative action, based on facts, could be taken.

22. The net result of our trip can bc summarized as follows:

a) Wcirst-hand appraisal of the available documentation and the cooperativencss of local government personnel.


Recommendations4 to COS for Ambassador

anti-communist action is needed urgently and is

Party men continue to hold the governmentheld undernspectores del Trabajo and ofetc.

who took asylum in Embassies have leftand returned to active life in the city, somenames.

C. The frontiers are open and the escape of communists is not blocked.

responsible for the torture and murder ofArbenz have not been arrested even though theirknown. It ia reportedol. Prera of the Guardiathese arreats.

CGTG is still active. The closing of its central office isto curb the activities of its communist leaders andwho are accustomed to clandestine activity.

Junta should designate and fullyan with whom wein the elimination of communists from all positions of influencegovernment and society; in their arrest, detentionin the seizure and study of key documents in theand in the effective denial of the claim of communists toof asylum andndue to

3 There is urgent need for:

central repository oi information on the Communist Party,fronts and related groups.

apable, energetic, anti-subversivc squad in the

c. horough check of all:

Offices (headquarters) (national, regional, municipal,f the CP. the CGTG. the peasant federation, all communist fronts;

Government offices dominated or strongly influenced by communists;

The homes and offices of all leading CP members, and of all their relatives and friends where they may have cached documents ,

in order to be sure that the Junta has in its possession all important documents and records which will

IJ Clearly evidence the foreign direction of the communist movement;

2) Specifically identify not only all leading foreign and local

communists involved but all CP members and collaborators, so that they can be rendered ineffectual and can be prevented fromenewed bid for power.

Arbenz Ifctorial (obtained by Station from Arbenz1

A. Documents: Ccimunist books, magazines, newspapers, pamphlets;

Foreign Itinistry documents concerning the "Juneuestionnaires put to Arbenz by Army and press; an offer of sale of planes and anasenoarochure on Agrariantudy ofGuatemala Commerical Treaty docuocnts concerning the formation of civilian militias. (See brochure of documents prepared for Director's use bofore ISC).

8. perioral Character of the Documents

1. The above cited Concaunist hooka, etc.ubstantial Marxist-Leninist Library. Included are works of liarx, Lenin, Stalin, Uao Tse-Tung, Malenkov; copies of Cocinfora journal; Soviet and satellite magazines and books. (Photographs of this mterial were taken). Items of special interest:

copy of the Report of tho SecretaryCP Guatemala, Jose Ifenuel Fortuny, toCommittee of thatearing the handwritten inscription:

"To the young and exemplary President of Guatetoala, Jacabo Arbenz, vrith the deep affection of Ms friend

Jose ianvel Fortuny"

Two copies of Fortuny's Report on the Activities of the Central Coifmittec of CP Gvatcmala (II; one copy of the Statutes of CP Guatemalaist of books available at the local Communist bookstore, Librcria Future Also, two envelopes narked in pencil, "Forprobably Jose ^anuel Fortuny).

Three copies of the short biography of Stalin published in ibscou. Cneiandwritten dedication to Arbenz' wife:

"To iaria Cristina:

The lofty example of the great should inspire us with optimism.

totilde Elena Lopez4 - .

pecially-bound edition of two of Kao's theoretical works, "Onnd "Cn Contradiction." Name of "ARBE-IZ" is stomped in gold on cover. It boars ainscription:

"To Colonel Arbena, tho two basic contributions of Mao Tee Tung to universal ?'arxism,

Katilde Elena

It was also accompaniedalling card of Ifatilde Elona Lopezandwritten inscription:

"Colonel Arbenzi

I am placing in your hands the two basic contributions of lao-Tse-Tung-To Universal larxism, and other important rjatorlalsAgrarian Reform inant to talk to you to explain my plannograph on Agrarian Reforn in Guatemala which will gather together, in clear and sirple form, all that has beenn awaiting your invitation since you said soiio time back that 'we shouldisit' Your health! (illegible notation: nrobably lopez' initials).

The 'bther important materials concerning Agrarian Reform in China" to which lopez referred wereyped copy of the Spanish-language "The law on Agrarian Reform of the People's Republic of China" (Poking: Foreign Languages Publishing, whichin addition to saideport by Liu Chao-Chi on Problems of Agrarian Reform, and the Statutes of Organization of the Peasant Federation.

2. The questions put toy the Array General Staff concerning CoOTunist influence in the Government, and:

a typed list of answers to Amy questions.

four and one-fourth legal pages of advice on !tow to answer the questions. (Tne author is clearly

a CP membervery probably,nuel Fortuny).

3. rochure on Agrarian Refornecision and "related documents":

Report by Tsador Lubin, L'.S. representative before tho Economic and Social Council of the UN.

Statements by Secretary Acheson

Speeches by Hi Hard L. Thorp and Henry G. itennett

Resolution of the Economic and Social Council of the UTJ.

/>. The page bearing the Table of Contents is annotated:

"Publications of the Department of State of Washingnited States of America.

Translation by tlie Office of Foreign Information of the linistry of Foreign Relations of Guatemala."

A. discussion ofGuatemala Cotnereial Treaty Cites need for changes; possible. might take if treaty were denounced by Guatemala; and action that Guatemala could take to counteract the effects of. action.

A letter "to the Government of Guatemala, Guatemalarom "Industrial and Technical Advisoryenoa, Italy, datedeferring to "previousand offering for sale airplanes, submachine guns, and rifles. The planes were DC-6s, Consolidated Vultees, and DC-4s. The arms were frorn an Italian arms factory for which the writers were "sales delegates;"

the arms would be suppliedwedish port.

linistry Material

a) Documents: Cables (open and decoded) to and from Foreign Ministry, letters and namoranda of the Foreign Minister and Guatemalan Ambassadors; related materials.

Cfao-rtictor of tht* Ddc unguis:



and memoranda dated4 from Guatemalan Ambassadors in Central America concerning movements of elements of the Army of Liberation and attitudes of the various

A letter from the Konduran Foreignunedeclining to sign the additional friendship and non-aggression pact requested by Guatemala.

A copyetter4 from Foreign Minister Toriello to Minister of Government Augusto Charnaud and MacDonald, protesting against police outrages in Guatemalaroup of "honest andeople.

A copy of General Lazaro Cardenas' Expression of Support ofnd of Toriello'a Expression of.

Memorandum of the Guatemalan Ministry of Foreign Relations,laim9 against the Government of Guatemala, made by the. State Department in the name of the united Fruit Company. Rejection is based on the Agrarian Reform Law.

A Guatemalan Foreign Ministry memorandum, undated, (apparently from G. Toriello to President Osorio of El Salvador, sent by Toriollo via his friend Salvador an Ambassador to Guatemala, Col. Jose Alberto Punas) praising El Salvador's fine attitude toward Guatemala in its hour of need, and asking that El Salvador employ its good offices toimilar attitude on the part of Honduras; specifically, to put an end to the provocative acts of Guatemalan exiles which are being performed with tho knowledge and "patience" of Honduras.

A file of the Guatemalan Foreign Ministrya resume, for the President, of (open and decoded) cables sent by the Foreign Minister to the Guatemalan Ambassadors to El Sal Tador, Cuba, Washington, Costa Rica, Honduras, Panama, Ecuador, Colombia, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, snd Bolivia, alleging the falsity of tha. State Department declaration that tbe Guatemalan Government badhipment of arms from Poland* Messages also citsd U. S. efforts to call consultativeof American Statss to "intervene" in Guatemalan affairs, and urged Ambassadors to win support Guatemala.

A blind memorandum containing notes "For awith Willy Toriello" (GuiUemo Toriello, Guatemalan Foreign Minister}* Notea urge practical steps to strengthen Guatemala's position In world public opinion in the face. criticism. Tbe notes were clearly writtenarson with special knowledge of high-level Mexicanaffairs. Numerous steps are urged to win Mexican support of Guatemala. Tho notes reccsswnd activity on the part of Arevalo and others. Tbe al* Is to win the support of tha countries to which special emissariea areat least tothem somewhat."

8. CommuniontIons directed to President Arbenz

Docodod telegram from Arevalo in Santiago,ecounting pro-Guatemalan sentLacnt and Congressional action in Chile.

Telegramepartmental Governor,tating:

"Revolutionary. pro-Arboat) political parties need arms. Eneey troops advanced via Sbupe, Caparja, and Leia. Us await orders. Urgent.*

4 from Jaime Rosenberg,Judicial, advising the President of theand antl-Conmmlst activitieseputy forof Isabel.

Memorandum,rom Rogolio Cruz Wer, Chief, Guardia Civil, urging cancellation of the viaas of Guatemalan delegation to the anti-Coinaunict Congreaa held in Mexico during

A letter4 at the Hague by (quiteop Guatemalan diplomatic representative at Bern. It treats of the author's delay in obtaining data desired by the President; the printingage brief (subject matter notraise of Guatemala's firm stand at the Caracas Conference; and the author's desire to return home.

Lotter dated4 to President from Jaine Rosenberg, Chief of the Guardia Civil,opy of the statements given by captured crewof the ship,hich arrived at Puerto Barrios loaded with arms and military supplies. Also included is the statementuatemalan who was awaiting the shipment in Puerto Barrios and who signaled tho ship upon its arrival. emorandum note is attached to the top of the letter; the note points out tliat "all the persons mentioned in instant report were executed,'1 exceptew who were hospitalized with serious wounds.

(The foregoing does notollate, itemized list. The Arbenz documents are being photographed and the originals and one set of prints wijl be returned to the Station).

II. Communist Party, Guatemala City.

Old dirty one-story building with seven offices.

ifunerous papers scattered about on floor, on desks,

and protruding in disorder frondesk and cabinet drawers and shelves. Stacks of propaganda material.

Character of Documents:

Lists of CP departmental, section, and cell officials, organizational chart, membership books.

Cases of expel'ed (or disciplined) CP members.

3. Internal CP correspondence and Party-organ subscription liats.

L. Propaganda materialhandbills, newspapers, books.

picte: The foregoing cor.stif teaeneral appraisal, basedery brief survey. inute, lengthy Gxamina,tlon of the copious material, paper by paper, nay produce documentsigher order than those cited. Thia observation applies equally to other promisee and documents described herein.)

III. CCTGuatemala City.

Old, dirty, two-story building. Aboutooms

occupied by tho CGTG proper and affiliated trade union federations and unions.

Thousanda of papers scattered about in great

disorder, in addition to some CGTG correspondence notebooka atill bound in good order.

Character of Pqcimientat

CGTG corr es cord en co-note books, in good order, on relations with HFTU, CTAL and some affiliated trade vnions, especially peasant unions,

Thousands of scattered letters, handbills,outine trade union correspondence natvre.

CGTG propaganda material (and equipment)handbills, newspapers, booklets, pamphlets, uall-posters.

IV. iversitario Donocrntleo 'ieado carters, Avenida Simeon, Guatemala City.

A. Premises: Old, dirty, ono-atory bulldinr; withooms.

3. Documents: Hundreds of letters, handbills, pamphlets, etc.

scattered about on the floor of two rooms.

A pile of half-burned letters, etc. (as above)atio; fire anoarently put out by rain falling

into patio.

C. General Character of the Documents:

Circular letters from the WFDY.

Local letters re student-political affairs and personalities

Propaganda materialspublications of WFDY, local "youth'1 handbills, pamphlets, newspapers, booklets.

A small pile of miscellaneous, routine peasant-federation records (left-over from previous tenancy).

V. Files and Documents laintained in Room at Headquarters of the Guardia Civil, Guatemala City (Seized by the Guatemalan Array).

A. Documents I rawer file cabinets, soveral drawers (removed fromhree small cabinets containing addrcssograph plates, and small stacks of Conmninist propaganda material.

3. General Character of Documents:

six file cabinets contain correspondence and recordsworkers union affiliated with the CGTG)Sociedad do Seguro Social del GremioSGF).

Five of the cabinets are of little interest; theyfiles which deal with industrial accidents and insurance-policy dossiers.

One cabinet is of moderate interest; it contains folder on the SAKF's relations with the CGTG, CTAL, WFTU, and soiie unions in Mexico snd Contral America.

file and desk drawers contain miscei:aneous SAKFcorrespondence, stamps, and pamphlets.

Two small cabinets containing addrcssograph plates appeared to pertain to the SAMF or the SSSGF; other small boxes of addressograph plates belonged to the peasant confederation (CiCCG).

Cno box contained photograph of what appeared to be trade-union nestings, personalities, and Soviet-uor .or scenes (propaganda).

he Conmunist propaganda Tutorial consisted of Soviet and Gtiatenalan magazines, pamphlets, and 'iandbills.tack of copies of the lkscow riagazinc, "Unionore wrappers addre-ssede Librcria Futuro Jn gi ateoala City.)

iatorial lade Available to Station by Cel. Ruben Gonzalez Sigui, Director of Giardin Civil (Retained in Station).

Two sacks of books, magazines, pamphlets, and notes.

Character of Documents:

The material consists, in very great part, of routine Communist books, magazines, neuSDaoers, pamphlets, and handbills.

The most interesting and usoful material consistsing notebook sheets listing CP Guatemala (PGT) officials,figures, key addresses, trade union leaders, names of anti-Communists, Communists who have traveled to Soviet orbit and Red China, leaders cf other pro-Arbenz Parties. (Hote: This material nay be the notes of a

Mimeographed documents of the CP Guatemala relative to the statutes and program of the Party.

(Note: Col. Gonzalez Sigui also madeist of0 arrested CommunistsJ.

VTI. Additional Jaterial free Col. Ruben Gonzalez Sigui4 (Seized by Guatemalan Army).

Telegrams (and typed abstracts of telegrams) apparently from the files of Au^ustocDor.ald, Minister of Government.

Telegrams from peasant federationG) affiliates to CTCG headquarters. (Possibly passed on to -inister of GovernEont;.

Abstracts of telegrams sent from Departments (State, Provinces) to President and apparently nassed oninister of Government.

Copies of censored cables of Hew Yorkorrespondent (Kennedy).

Character of the Documents:

They reflect:

a) Expressions of support of the Arbenz regir.c, during the hectic, critical June days, on the part ofgovernors and peasantatcs of tho Ci:CG.

Statements by poasant unions (affiliatedCG) re readiness to defend the regime with arris against the "imperialist invaders".

Expressions of alana, confusion and disbeliefArbenz resignation.

The determination of censors to keep the outside world frou loiowing about the fears of the government and the populace.

Brief notices re planes sighted.

Accusations of disloyalty (to Arbenz) on the part of certain provincial officials.

of various peasant uprisings.

of support of the Arbenz regime on thethe PRG.

VIII. Material Located in Office of llguel Angel Mendizabal, Cliief of the Guardia Judicial and Retained in the Office of the Director of the Guardia Civil (as of.


A small cardboard box filled with CP Guateeala documents and membership books (obtained by Sfendisabal at CPin early.

A list of foreign "larxists" who havo been in Guatemala (with local addresses).

An alphabetical list of Guatemalan Communists) with "local addresses.

ote: Copies ofere obtained for Station files).

Character of the Documents:

2. The CP documents were mainly concerned -vrith the Qepartnent of Cvfltcmala: taey list dcoartmental officials; they are useful.

The membership books did not belong to prominent Communis ta but they are useful for indexing and possible operational use on short-term basis.

The lista of foreign "Marxists'1 and Guatemalan Communists are of use; the latter is of use as an arrest/aearch list.

IX. Documents pertaining to former Chief of Guardia Civil, Rogello CRUZ Wer (Obtained through Station channels).

A.. Documents: Four police-type reports to CRUZ, dated re "subversive" activities.

B. General Cliaracter of Documents;

report, datedites the activitiesemigres (along the Jtonduran border) whocontact in Guatemala with "Reactionaries." information indicated that Col. Carloswas among the emigres. Surveillance of therecommended.

report, datedited activitiesan Invasion of Guatemala backed by theCompany.

X. Documentsron the Palacio Kacional through Col. Jose Luis CRUZ Salasorember of the Junta).

A. Documents:

1. tudy dated inf the manner in which banana production and marketing could be handlod in the event the United Fruit Company should withdraw from Guatemala.

A liat of the personal expenditures of President Arbenz' wife, from February through.

Memoranda and correspondence directed to President Arbenz1 wife, as President of the Instituto deuarderias Infentilesoncerning trede union activities relative to same and concerning the withdrawal ofommunist woman from her post inrtincnt trade union. emorandum fron the Coaraunist woman to Jose I'anuel FCP-TUTY, Secretory General of tlie CP Guatemala, concerning the same svbjcct matter.

Documents rertaining to Alfonso Martinez (Chief of tho DA!', as of Arbenz fall). Obtained through Station sources.

A. Documentst Hscellaneous letters, rocelota, certificates, memoranda, etc.

3. Perioral Character of Documentsow Items of possible interest)

Martinez1 Army papers reflecting hit military training and activities.

Certification by Jose. Manuel Fortuny, as Secretary General of.hat Alfonso Isrtinez was

an active member of.

) that lartinoz wasonfidential mission abroad for theand instructing Guatemalan diplomaticto provide necessary facilities. Also,various names, for mpney received from Armymissions. (Of Interest in connectionof Alfonso Martinez' participation in the purchaso

otorious armsapersackground for "confidential niosiona" for the Government.

(Hotel As previously indicated, certain of the documents nontioned in the farogoine general notes, wore brought back for briefing purposes; they are being photographed and returned to the Station).

Original document.

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