Created: 9/1/1954

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible



ANNEX ASECURITY, by PBSUCCESS Security Officer, Mr.^ ,


Part One yPM Officer, Mr. *C-

Part Two y Aasiatant PM Officer.

Party Asst. PM Officersar.c"

Part Four y Aaat. PM Officer, Vincent C. PXvALL


Part One y PBSUCCESSOeemttlftfui Officer.

Part Two y AMDy-^


y AMD Asst. Ait- Four IR STATISTICS*


Part One y Chief Co



annex j






- CLANDESTINE RADIO, by Mr. David FdlLLIPS. Part One istory of the Operation

Part Two nalysis of the Operation









Tha Project was corpartnentallied ss much as possible for reasons of security andvery effort was made to keep all key personnel adequately inferred of what they needed to know in order to properly fulfill their aealgned duties.

Int Is believed that the syeten employed proved essential and valuable. However, upon the do-brlefing of Project personnel, after completion of tha mission, it becase apparent thatesult of their respeotive cooper tinentaliiation from the overall operations, they frequently expressed views and opinions which were not particularly accurate. These de-brief logs, however, are considered valuable as they reflect conditions In the field during operations and the comments of Individuals concerned for future consideration.



PBSUCCESS Security Officer, Mr.


nrltgr Officer assigned to the Project wasPoopedby the Chief, Special Security Division,


Security Office, at which tine the basic elements of the Onn an interview with

aaic concepts were set forth and agreed upon. It la believed that these two concepts were the keynote to the subsequent developments of the Project with regard to the security and

clal Security Division and ths Security Office. These two major concepts were:


"Z'l ? Tsufficient

"safe house- tad other tterile faciUtles la the same area, but in such

r?JeCt Mald ba completed and yetplausible denial" of. Government interest in tl* overthrew of the pro-Coramunist regime of Colonel Jacobo ARBENZ Guzman of Ouatemala.

he utilisation of the security representativetaffquired during the day-to-day devolcp-rants of the operational aspects of the project. This would require the

etelled andknowledge of all

X?8?haoperating methods of the PP, PM, FI and administrative staffs.


ootllne of the cover story had been furnished to the Security Officer prior to his departure fron Washington on


B0dJfled to certain respects and embellished in others and put Into writing in the fernegulation which was required reading for all persons assigned to LINCOLN. opy of this cover storV is attached aso this report. It is believed SJt Si. cotZ story served its purpose adequately in view of the fact thatwaT

5 coinProrei" of project, in spite of the feet, that theersonnel were working and living, in close proximity tcC.

J whoonnal curlousity with regard to theplace within the LIMCOUJ

wn heldvarious members of the project in order to assist them in implementing the cover story. It is to be noted that anong new enployeos of the Agency, it is somewhat difficult to convince theaover story will be accepted as true by friends and

roridinf; they take sufficient time le learn the coverare cble to repeat it with some degree of proficiency and in ananner. Mo difficulty along this line was experienced withpersonnel who had previous experience with the Agency. From ait is highly undesirable to assignroject of thisG2nialvh0 haye xperience in theit is even more undesirable when such personneluuxx. Although this situation dlT

existinor degree with regard to Dan of the employees assigned no aajcr security corpromise was encountered. However, of such personnel created adainiatrativ. problems whichto some degree with the efficiency of the staff. Therefore, itprojects only sxperienced clerical per-

sormel bo assigned who have sons knowledge of covert operations.


1?ITaf!Tnts* t0 DroTlde LINCDM Personnel withtn rtlm tM, *ntrv and departure from the basfist of LIKCOU pereonnel. AUware briefed with regard to regulationsilitary base and s, the eeerscrtScoRp:air.ts were received fromreeard to thVpftn-

duct cf LINCOLN personnel while on the

It is the recommendation of the Security Officer thatletter ofbe forwarded to the Comanding Officer of thcC

froa thocooperation received

lumxfl j

. loeto were placed on the only entrance to the LINCOLNiasuadj*PT.onnel. wo-way mirror was installedprecaution. The Chief of Supportuty

1stls! Pre!!nc2Uff BeBlbarhe officesL-hour


was2!its inception


sterile vehicles for their transportation...

iu oD^aineaental basis Thrp*

of these vehicles were assigned to the safe house installations and tvT

Ca" f these ve^ieswere obtainedirSS consultant and insurance in the amounts of

insurs adequate protection in the

event of accident. All personnel utilizing the ears were briefed on theey were to take in the event of an accident.

roaccidents involving these vehicle, during the course of

WlnVOlTOd *which was procured

wtomobile during theU. The agent

lcared consultant of the S basis. Three


assigned to stand by with this'olio* inslructiona and at tha tlsa of tho accident it was deterrilnodd been drinkins and was not on duty. Reccncendations have bean mco by (Cm Security Officer in regard to thia individual case. However, tharoo=urit7 cer.proirviseesult of this accident.

The only other accidentehiclo lffrtcimj to ono of the aafe houeeo, and th? Linages ware, nlncrura. Io security co^roaiae resulted frcn this accident.


e houses waro procured by the Safe House Procurerantthe essMtsnce of the Special Securityn, prior to thaof teseadquarters. ouses wore obtained inaYamtT and all of these houaas were located

Site a

as originally contemplated that ons of the safe houses would be utilised to boato the principal indigenous agantIKCOLH ataff Berber who acted aa Special Coordinate- between theus agent and the Chief of Project. The Special Coordinator used an alias and waseprotentative of "Tho Tho Qroup wasroup of American businessman who were willing to finrnco tie indigenoue agent and his organltation in their efforts to overthrow tha Corcnunitt reglne in Guateaola. The safe house used for th? above poroose wat referred to as Site A.

Site p

Uflthsr of tha aafe houses, Siteaa orlcinslly intanded aafor cerUin indigenoua perscnnol who had been ore tightUnited States to assist the PP strff in carina progeriatapes for ultlmte use on the cland:=tinatation in Dua to doveloprranto over whinhad no control,tha partibs tarn Healwhore) Division agent,

eceasary to revira procedureslleoa

a corXerenee site whereasic diecuasioea waro hold betweenGroin" and the two sanior reproec-tativee of tha IMiraioua forcee know aa nThe Junta."

roved very satisfactory for this purpose and it was at thia aitoirn and else- working relationship n>nd agreed upon bet:rr?on The Group and The Junta.


It ia believedt thia point to rent!on tha incidenttha aesiennant of Maurice H.offiOo staT? agont. to Sitoarrival inOUTOL did not follow lutrnotlon tart used

obtainiiig tnT keys to the site. also oaplo/ed a

it later developed, obviously furnished this dcrostic with

too wch information. OUTOL renamed ateriod of onlyays, but during this timo tM made many cOKplaint3 and by her ettltudireat deal of aoiiiamrative difficulty. asablo or unwilling to work under the direction of thepecial CcoreVnator end con-plained that there vera too cany reeponaibilities bains plrced on herutonobile waa obtained for her personal use end sha stated that the oould not driveehicle. Arranganantn wt>ro then natfa to procure her

ehicle, which did not appear to aatirfy her either. The situation finally became untenable and it was necessary to suggest to her that she return to Washington. She became emotional end inferred that she would have to contact her friends in the National Security Council who, according to her atatenent, had requested her services. With the consent of the Chief of Project, necessary arrangements wero made to have the Chief, WH, recall GUYQL to Washington. It was apparent that GVYOL was neither profeesionally nor emotionally qualified to handle an assignment of thia nature.

FBI Report on Site B

During the pariod of tho conferences, between The Group andtherereat deal of traffic 'going and coring atU, LINCOLN received information to tha effectFBI hadeport to the affect that the nalghbore were,of tha activities at Site B. It la significant, however,that the information furnlahed by the neighbors and of the FBI" was almoatetailed statement ofstory and in no way compromised the project. Although itbean reaolved by LINCOLN, It la the opinion of thsthat tha FBI's confidential informant In this inatane* wasof ths housekeeper hired by GUTCL. His name was

Investigator for the State's Attorney's Office inC 3

At the time Sit* *> oroeored, it waa not realised thatproximitywould create aorlous difficulties with

regard to transcribing radio broadcasts. Ons of ths rooms of this aafs house was soundproofed but even this action did not auffioiently improve tho situation* esult of tha report from tha FBI and ths undeairability of the locationechnical point of view, It was decidei to dispense with this site.

Site C

l.i. ji "i

This site was obtained for the purposs of using It aa apersonnel who would be brought to tha country for thefin tha preparation of written propaganda for the PPto various delays experienced by the project, It was finallydiepenae with this alts.aan several oocssions forand mads an excellentGuatemalan personnel

siaignad to the PP program.

nd E

In, it was decided to require other safe siteswith those which had bean originally obtained, Thiamade for both security and technical reaaens. Slteandall located in residential neighborhoods within closethe neighbors. None of the houses was large enouirh tojiandlePP staff and housekeeping personnel. interdrawingt was decided to obtain two largeto the north

Siteargs houss with apacious groundsetached two-apartment dwelling, waa obtained in March. One of the apartments was ueedecording studio and there wore adequate facilities for all personnel assigned to this particular endeavor.

In April, .ljft.aa obtainedand was

uaed asesidence for sale personnel. This site was also intended for ths uae of the Principal Junta agent.

Bothroved to be eminently suited for the. purposes of thia project. Son* problems arose with regard to the housin- of the Junta personnel in view of the fact that there were both mele sad female members to be housed. To insure proper decorum, arrangements were nade to house the male personnel atnd the female members at Site D.

Bothere acquired using cleared cut-outs mi all necoeeary security precautlona were taken too:roror.^e.


ateretcrytt*lraddUlon- coverfor th. various

aliasraTOllln8 Africafrom each trips they wereh rr-ard

to the latest details on iamdgratlon procedures in the various countries.

PAT Pilots

A cover story waa developed to be used by the CAT pilots Ybioh!yincluding capture by Ouatcrcalsn authoritiea This cover story explained the presence of the oilota in central America and also provided themlaueible reason for flying aircraft in the Nicaragua-Honduras area.


of April it became apparent that crawei contacta of the Security Officer,

appropriate alias. Details vera

OntraCtVrllt9nto to have the willing prospects

2 !yJHthat fighter aircraft woulder pilote were cad*

senf "Pi?Md^rlcan fighter pilot*being


^vieion provided qualified security events to FJh'SuT vi.8hipPfldouarteri to

of tMa 53 ^

. ico seems particularly noteworthy in view of theb^0na "riously HI and, due to thia lUness, he


wiL Ir^nHnN nSl; resanceing agent travelling with our principal agent appears in this instance to haveery for-tunate precaution.

Dv.-ing the course of the project, nine Latin Americans, sow of when Guatemalans, were brought into the United States via Miami. Upon each arrival careful check was made to determine whether or not the persons arriving wore under surveillance.

rbl?utheenaitiV9 entry and departure which was handled by UNCOLN wascase of Colonel Carlos CASTILLO Armas, who was brought into

rf,aalias onU. Onanuary ttoTTAT in Ouatemala, which pspericture of ST? ,3 eproduction of his falsified documentation which he

?nt" th* SiUd SUUs- Fortunately, no questions were

and Naturalisation Service authorities. In order

III* he Security Officer obUlned forfalse documentation aa an American citisen and obtainedhim back to Honduras via the Panama Canal

Dreca^[on8hMBhftiTGbajjl* ^dled,every

precaution had been exercisod to Insure the complete aeniMfiv nfparticularly during hie discussions

and certain staff members of LINOOLN who were known only by aliases.


roblems facing LINCOLN and was coneistingly an irritating detail thatreat dial of devious maneuvering to accomplish.

tha documentation of an agent le


S-to cbUin an American passporttS*ncy- ontacts of the Security minorspassports in true names were obtained withinX$ ?Calt hBd0 tJw oont"ct in the Passport S'SiSJ; Kington. It was leaned that thisreferable Method

J"aport ln true naMthrough tho channels established by the Agency, which resultedelay of two or three weeks

Sld had to ceher or not the rules and StowS adh,red to and the administrativeM Parity. A. one of theof this report it i. strongly suggested that the whole question

l0WSiting procedures

it^ ?VbUiBlngPCrts in alias. The faculties * r0CM8inS Action within Headquarters are totally iHiBfi1roject of any urgency whatsoever. THth ro^tTproJect PBSUCCESS, two or three wekks were impossible delays and

crucial toT* S',tanc"throc houraconsidered and- Jt is the considered opinion of the Security

result of six months experience on project PBSUCCESS, thatfunction, handled by Headquarters are simply not^




The Security Office assisted the Administrative Support Sectionan unofficial scurler system between LINCOLN and operations This proved toather difficult problem in view ofthat the President of Nicaragua had cancelled all peraits forhis country. It was necessary to have certain highly classifiedrecording tapes carriedourier who couldontact atin Nicaragua during the brief stop on.tha flight between theand were made to obtainfour of these couriers who

made an average of three or four trips each week to and from Nicaragua. had to be arranged to insure that the couriers did not gotarget country. With the assistance of the Air Operations Officer,later assigned to thespeolal peraits to enter that

country were obtainedumber ol persons under both true name and alias,


eight post office boxes were obtained and serviced daily

3 cover mall purposes during the course of theof these facilities were changed during the course of the projectreasons, but there apparently was no security compromise inof the mall. One box was obtained for the receipt of personalcertain of the project personnel. Anothers obtained for theof registered mail from Headquarters. One post office box wasa two-way facilitv the rer*ipt and forwarding of mail to therecruitedost offico box was obtained for the

receipt of mail forwarded froa New fork and addressed bo one of the female indigenous personnel residing at one of the safe houses. One post office facility was establishedackstop for the receipt of newspapersfrom Central America and another box was obtained under the alias of one of the staff personnel assignedafe house. In addition, one box was obtained for receipt of personal mall forwarded from New Yorkfor two of the indigenous male agents residing at the safe house and one box was obtained in the true nametaff agent assigned to the projectemporary basis and whose cover story was such that he could use his true naze.

Also, letter drops were established and serviced by the Special Security Division in New fork and.

One live mall facility was establishedthe CS

officer of tha project whose assignment required his operating underthe target country. This address was usedackstop for anymay have been initiated to determina the accuracy of histemporary residence

tEVs?APSRS(Acquisition of Central American Papers)

Toeasonably current and accurate PP program, lt was necessary that newspapers from Central America be obtained in the most expeditious manner possible. Accordingly, inquiries were made on the best asthod ofthese newspapers and it was determined that the use of the air waybill system would be the most practicable solution. In order to have some back-stopping to this procedure andlausible reason for ordering theseost office box was obtained in the name of the International Survey Associates. This fictitious concern was ostensibly conducting



DT^Sr'fS?both tho

pro-Cor^.tin the countria. oomerned, n,olltwenty-four hour, of

ourrent and accurate information on which to hate their production. 3EOJRITT PERSO.VHSL


for PBSUCCESS ond waa authorltad to uae hla wfeTl'-a

Office tfor about 1

"'iawl toa Sscurity Officer by the

rron tne Agency to accept employment Inuaineaa.


Mf*nineBeSpecial Security


aAwiougn it la estimated that more than fourteen different.l.

in the many supply flights from Headquarter.OLTOHAPH SUPPORT


During the course of the Project, actuallyanuaryoh, LINCOLN requested and roceivcdi

rovisional Operational Clearancesperational Clearancosrovisional Covert Sacurity Clearancea Jjl Covert Security Clearancea

learance actions.

Tha majority of these clearances irare issued daring the first-three months of tha Project. In addition,pecial Inquiry and Information Inquiry type of cases wore initiated bynd completed by Headquarters. There vers only IU eases in which derogatory Information required the cancellation of

the clearance request.


It waa the desire of the Chinf of the Project to have the Security OffioercEition toirect channel of communication with the Security Office in Ksadauartors on mattora partrinlng to clearances and other security Batters- For roasone which were never made quite clear, this direct channel was nevor achieved. It would eppsar, from the LINCOLN Security Officer's point cf view, that information copies of roc-coats for clearanoss were fur-niohed to the Security Office. However, Security could take no direot actionn the Security Officer caalgned to. In other words, ths LINCOLN Socurity Officer wouldequest to Headquartsrsiovert Security Clearance on an individual and "slug" ths cable for the attention of the security office. For the first two and one-half months of the Projeot, security did not even receive copies of these requests. It Is not known who Instructed ths cablo secretariat not to furnish securityopyable which waa slugged for their'information. Although it was never explained to the Security Officer -why this- condition should prevail, this type of procedure caused additional work which was totally unnecessary. learance request want to the Western Hemisphere Division where they, In turn, would writeequest to either, the Security Offloe or to


In .iany instances, tho Securityc LUiCOLN wouldpecific type of clearance and in aboutays another type of clearance would bo issued. umber of occasions. Covert Security Clearancos were requested for Alter leans who were going to be used in Latin America and for certain Latins who would be used in the United States. In view of the fact that the request had to go to Western Hemisphere Division, for reasons never clear, they would ocision as to what type of clearance should be issued, ii other words, peron or persons unknown in WHDivlsion wouldecision on the type of clearance needed contrary to tha request made by the LEiCOLN Security Officer.

During tho latter part of tho Project, Sacurity did. racsivecopies of cables sluggest The Security Off leer'was assigned to tho Project for tho purpose of handling, saoasj other things, theof appropriate clearances on indigenous and American personnel. To handicap the Security Officer by rot allowinghannel of communication with hie officeadquarters does not appecr to make good senss. All

the Project or the Bbouty Chief of the Project. Under this procedure there could be no unilateral communication between the LINCOLN Security.Offleer and.the Headquarters office that could have bean considered as- "uncontrolled traffic.;' It would eppear to have been much more practical to allow the Security Officar of the Project to havo forwarded through the Chief of Project action copiee of requests to Ma offica in Headquarters witho ths Projectteff in Headquarters. In this manner, persons not familiar with clearances and the tsrtainology used in security work would not become involved unnecessarily in these mattora. In essence, there were parsons in Headquarters handling clearance requeats whose existence was not Justified. If tho request could have gone directly to the office which took action and an information copy furnished to ths Project supporting staff, it would hava expedited the clearance action andreat deal of misunderstanding. Misunderstandings -id develop in view of the factva persons hrridling security matters in Western Hemisphere Division "ho ware not them?3Ives qualified in the security field. it is rccommendod that consideration bs Given io the future for the Security Officer assignedroject tohannel of coioinicatlon to the Sscurity Office in Headquarters to expedite and coordinate clearancend ether mattersurity.

Unless the Secavitytrff memberroject and is awareetailed operationsay-to-day basis, he cannot furnish proper support and guidance. totcMnt, it is believed that Project PSSUCCSSS is ample evidence and sufficientatecurity representativetaff memberound method of ope ratir. 3-



"Official CoverINCOLN Station Personnel"

The following coyer"tfc.e usedshouldcover story carefully and, if additional clarification orof the cover story is needed, you will contact the Securityadvice and guidance.

You are anThis unit was established under J, which ia anAgency within the Department of Defense. The unit to which you are assigned isield "task" force sent out to make thexploratory survey toadministrative office/ -In other words, your unit was sent to C J7etield office to handle the administration and-papa* wovL necessary for aipportlng the technicians, engineers,chemists, biologists and geologists who willrrivingater date if the budget is approved. At thisnlysufficient funds have been advanced for the unit to sot up an adrdnlstra- -tlve office and make necessary arrangements to establish contaot and channels of communications with various unir^rsities, manofaeturisg research laboratories, and various industrial and chemical concerns.

Your specific duties are the same as in any government Job. If you'lsrical employee, youypist, secretary, administrative aesietant, etc. If youtaff employee, you are an "Administrative"FinanceReseardhUgiBtibsd Supporttc. itle in the government usually doesn'tndicate the actual dutieserson, or (b) make sense '" to other government employees or persons outside the government.

Ii. How did this take place and Just what is this unit all about? The Department of Defense is the largest department in the govern rent and hes under its jurisdiction the Army,ir Force, Marinesumber of agencies. Officials high in the Department of Defense rscognirsd the need for an organization to do certain research and survoy work that was of interest not only to the Army, Navy and Air Force, but also of interest to other government agencies within the deferre establishment. Host cf this research is in the field of technical subjects relating to such things as mineral deposits and the testing of these deposits for possible use in industry or as possible sources of energy. Marine deposits(sand, coral,ound in tropical and semi-tropical climates are also being collected and analyzed for various reasons. Various types of plant life and marine life will also be collected for study and one result of this research could help in the military survival tests. For example, great progress has been nade in the fiold of military survival research by determining that many types of shell life and tropical plants are edible and can sustain the life of-soldiers or sailors who are stranded in these places or cut off from normal food supplies.

$r. Ofreat deal of this research in the fislda of biology, geology and chemistry is naturally cla selfled. This is not at all unusual. The fact that such research would develop information which we would not wish the rest of the world to know is accepted by all persons,

You must remember that you are not one of the technical.people nor are you an expert in any of these fields. -You doeneral knowledge of the pun? ose of the unit and generally know of soms'of the items of interest to the technical people, but most of it is" "Greek" to you. If youtaff Member, your job is to assist ths technical people in getting their reports on paper and properly distributed as vail as aiding them inlow of technical reports, editing, and the vast amount of paper work necessary forenture. The clerical personnel assist in typing these reports, making copies, duplicating material for distribution,

In the simplest of terms, you are workingefepae Department Unit to which'has been assigned members ofrthe Army, HaWii MrMarines, and.other Agenclea, in order tourvey-basic Information and samples to be used for reoearch"work/.in the fields of geology, chemistry, biology, and other technical fields yaaging fron geomagnetism to the energy radiation of various rare elerasritoy vlt would be well for you to remember the terms used' fiT^hls Regulation and if you are not sure of your cover story>vyoa willTcpntact th'J Security Officer ond ha will assist you in putting the story 'into language beat suited to your individual case. The field-ia^rtachr4eal one.and.yott are not supposed to have any technical knowledge, and as'ii rule people that you meet will not be particularly Interested once they learn of tho technical nature of tha work.



as Security Officer at FJHOPEFUL fromU to

7, during which time the following security natters were handled.

Upon arrival, be was advised by the Acting Chief of Station,the Military Police guard at. Mmawta was to be withdrawn. cooperation of the Chiefarrangements were made

whereby the tour of duty of this guard force was extonded for an indefinite period.

At the time he arrived at FJHOPEFUL, packaging of categoriesnd ii materials was in progress. This packaging was supervisedecurity standpoint, and security advice was rendered from time to time. It is noted that packaging which was to have left Washington sterile was not always so. Arrangements were set up for the destruction of excess wrappings andby burning or, in the case of certain items, by jettison. As storage and working areas were vacated, they were sterilized prior to being abandoned.

Sterilized airplanes were inspected by the Security Officer and theOfficer both internally and externally prior to anyto insure maximum sterilization. The security officer maintained asecurity check as each plane was inspectedecurityprior to each flight. The security offioer was present duringand at each takeoff and landing. Upon completion of the airpha**previously cleared air force personnel Jwere brought to the operational sitethey painted appropriate identification markings on the planes totheir return to the United States.

A recreation program waa set upnd Deflect personnel were provided with outside recreation inanner so as not to jeopardise oocurity of the project. The security officer accompanied these groups whenever they left the base In order that he might handle and backstop any problems which might arise.

All personnel who were used by PBSUCCESS vere security briefed uponand departure and personal baggage of personnel moving black was sterilized. Tha Security Officer checked Deflect personnel pricr to each flight to insure sterilization and their cover story was gone overfor review and adjustment.

Utilizing facilities of the Chief ofarrangements were

aet up whereby passports and tourist cards which bad been permitted tocould be validated atime as personnel wore ready Tor return to the Chi ted States.

action was initiated to secure appropriate security

clearances for individuals who, due to their position, night poaeibly have gleaned Jcnowledge of some phase of the project.

Throughout the tine he was at FJHOPEFUL, efforts were cade to keep -hlngseed-to-know basis and to keep "conversationocial level. It is his feeling that security at FJHOPEFUL was, through the fineof all concerned, maintainedigh level.

k constant night patrol was maintained on the base and, while possible,our security coverage was maintained in the working area.

Since security and morale are closely allied, it is his opinion Personal mail should be given high

P-TOPEFUL it was found that some personnel were.





report is to serve three purposesi To record the operationoutset to its finish; to MaeMllM the factors adding to andthe success of the operation; and to list those errors made,future operations,

outline to be followed will be informal and inas follows:

Staging and Pre-Operation Preparations.

The Operation.



A. The Background of the Situation Prior to tha Staging

1, Approximatelyf CASTILLO Armas' personnel had received trainii in Micaragua,f these under the guidance of PIVALL. PIVALL graduatedabotagehock troop leaders.taff personnel and JJ Exactlyadio operatore graduated under the guidance

2. Eighty-nine tona of equipment were pr epared in three forma at FJHOPEFUL. Forty-three tons were waterproofed for burial. Fifteen tons were packed for drop. Thirty-one tona were prepared for ahock troop use. Prior to the staging period the entire burial and ahock troop equipment had

The personnel situation: We were operating under the belief that ween in Honduras and Salvador for use as shook troops and specialists, outside of the training personnel that had been sent to


5. Plans:

a* Our plana were based on the belief and strong proofarge percentage of the people Inside Ouatenala were opposed to Communism and were willing to fight against Communists, and the belief that the CASTILLO nrmas organisationood one and that CASTILLO Armas had strongin each ofarget areas. Each of theae target areas was to be organizedrained orgaMaex to the point that each target area could be

conquered by its own inner'organisation, with tha realisation that the amount of organisation within the Army unit would be the key to the amount ofnecessary.

b. In addition, shock troops were prepared in the

en under the leadership of Colonel TORRES, to noire from Kacuellao to Tenedores to Entre Rios, in order to seal off the Puerto Barrios area.

Jutiapa6 men under FERNANDEZ to moveoint

iles west of Ketepan through Asuncion Hita

Jutiapa and subsequently to the capital city.

A force ofen under Colonel CHAJON was to move from

Plorido to Carta Blanca and be in position in Zacapa,

A force ofen under NEIDERHEITHAHK was to moveRuinas to Caaotan to Jocotan to Vado HondoChiquimula. They were to held atit could be seen whether Zacapa or

forces needed aid.

A forceen under Colonel HENDQZA wae to move from Nuevo Ocotepeque to Esqulpulaa to 5ueaaltepeque. They were to hold at Quazaltepeque and if no aid wae needed t Zacapa or Jutiapa, they were to move to San Luis " ilotepeque to Jalapa to Palonoia to Guatemala City. J

PEREZ withen was to break away froa TORRES* groupMorales in order to back up the block of

Staging and Preparation for the Operation

Just prioray tha Communistsoncerted drive against our inner organisation. Thousands of people, including key leaders of the Army and civilians were jailed or otherwise incapacitated*

Based on tho fact that we believed the inner organizations were much more extensive than ths portion jailed, we decided to launoh the organisers and sabotage leaders to the undamaged portion of the inner organization.

All organisers and sabotage leaders were launched byuly, It is not known the percentage of these men that reached their destination, but there are many reasons to believearge percentage wereat the border.

u. Twenty-twoay drops were attempted. No definite light patterns were received on these drops. Portions of the arms were used later at Canales, Palencia and Quezaltenango.

5. Resident radio operators were launched, and later contact was made with Zacapa, Puerto Barrios, Guatemala City and Quezaltenango. One Wuezaltenango radio operator and one Ouatemala City radio operator did not come up.adio operator formerly scheduled for Jutiapa was oonvertedactical radio operator.


en crossed into Honduras from Jutiapa just prioray. In light of the recent roll-up of our inner organization, it was decided to use these men as harassment teams to agitate the rear of the enemy in order" to determine if such agitation would ignite the innerto the pointay, at the same time hoping that anay could bo launched when practicable.

On assembling the shock troops, however, it was found that the total of CASTILLO Annas'n was. We

useden scheduled for harassment teams in order to fill out our shock troops and depended onay air drops to provide the agitation desired to stir up the'inner forces. In addition, Nlcaraguans, Costa Hioans, Hondurans and any other interested parties that wanted to join our shock troops were recruited.

ay movement of arms into Guatemala was not aedesired due to the Alfhem alert, delay in movement to Honduras andtoo numerous to mention.

Two daysay, the decision to request permission to go was made. The facts bearing on the case were weighed and the field decision to request permission to go ahead was made in spite of the fact that in many cases we could not follow the original plan. One of the most weighing factors was the belief that the history of failing organizations is based more on failures to act than on failures fromeport on the factual condition of the situation was withheld with the realization that if the full situation were reported, pressure from above LINCOLN might haveelay in operations, irm belief was shared by all that further delay would only calleteriorating situation.


On the evening ofh all shock troops crossed .the line at fir at darkness as scheduled. Throughouth reporting was sketchy. Onh TORRES passed Tenedores. aptured Camotanhort fight with only one casualty. HEHDOZA took Esqulpulas with no fight. At thia point we picked up LOO recruits for the MEriDOZA group, CHAJON was reported at Carta Blanca. PEREZ departed the FERNANDEZ group. The Gualan sabotage team cut the rail bridge between Zacapa and Puerto Barrios, Indications are that communications cuts from Jutiapa to Guatemala City, San Jose to Guatemala City, Puerto Barrios toCity and Zacapa to Guatemala City were successful at this bombed tanks at San Jose and Retaluehue.

Ont CHAJON was reeupplied four miles out of Gualan, indicating that ho was not where he was supposed to be. He was resupplied during the daylight hours, FERNANDEZ joined MEtfDOZA and bis instructions were to break away .when Quesaltepeque was taken and go to Jutiapa. 1SHJD0ZA was moving toward Vado Hondo. NELDERHEITHANH captured Jocotanmall fight with the local garrison. TORRES captured one half of Puerto Barrios and controlled the communications from Puerto BarriosGuatemala City, PEREZ captured Morales, Bananera and Los Amates.C "Jbonbed the tanks at Puerto

Ond CHAJOtf sent an advance party into Gualan, which party became engaged with the opposition. He took the remainder of his forces to support the engagement and after winning, he remained in Gualan. The sane day the La Ceibe boat, apparently off course, as they were scheduled to landeception party near Santo Tones, landed above Puerto Barrios and immediately


involvedire fight. The exact efficiency of this group can only be determined by the fact that every Puerto Barrios military communique from this day on mentioned this group ofen and grossly exaggerated their size. The last nine men were captured on the night ofh. iiEIDERHEITl^Wiv and MEWDOZA joined at Vado Hondo. CASTILLO Armas joined them there, and the FCP moved to Managua. The fighter aircraft ran their first tactical mission, hitting the Guatemala City tanks on this date. TORRES was fltlU containing ths Puerto Barrios group. PEREZ occupied Morales. Reports from TGW indicatsd Canalea and Qussaltsnango uprisings among the populaoo, and the two chiefs of tho Chiquimula Garrison were captured by eurpriss at Vado Hondo*

Ond CHAJOKuperior force at Gualan consisting of the majority of the reinforced Zacapa Command. His radio operator wasand ths radio destroyed, CHAJOtI retreatingoint near-La Onion. KEHDOZA and NEIDERHEITKAHH attacked Chiquimula without air support. Ths attack waa successful except for remnants of the garrison whioh held out at the Guartel. Thirty-two men and two officers were captured. The men reported that the Army did not desire to fight CASTILLO Armas. One of the officers joined our forces, TORRES fled fron Puerto Barrios under duress, PEREZ was still holding Morales ond. Ths fighter support on that day hit the Zacapa Garrison, exploding ah ammo atorage dump, andridge between Chiquimula and Jutiapa.

On the 2Uth air support was launched against the garrison that was holding out in the Cuartel at Chiquimula and against artillery installations within range of the town. An unsuccessful try was made toen organized at Jutlapa, PEREZ was forced to retreat Into the mountains near Morales and the Puerto Barrios commanderarge group toward the Zacapa area. Air search along the Puerto Barrios-Zacapa corridor wasaily secondary mission for fighter aircraft from thia point forward.

Onh the Zacapa Garrison counter-attacked Chiquimula, Thiawas withstoodunior officer, Antonio BETETA,en. HENDOZA was brought Into the fight as support and was reported as having left in the face of the enemy. BETETAnemy dead, probably an exaggerated report, BETETA's weapons placement end leadership won the day. The Guardia de Honor was reported moving from Ipala toward Quezaltepeque. Air searchpportune strike flights were run on a. continuous basis from this pointmell drop was maderoup at Jalapa. Immediately thereafter the recipients attacked the Jalapa Garrison, The air section hit four trains full of re-enforcements, destroying three of them. Matamoros was hit. El Jicero bridge was destroyed and the Zacapa to Chiquimula road was strafed and bombed to prevent re-enforcement fron Zacapa. Two hundred fifty enemy troops were reported at La Union. Recruits continued to flock to the Liberation Army. The reported strength0 at Chiquimula,

Onh the Zacapa Garrison again counter-attacked Chiquimula. same day our air support surprised them assembling at the line ofthey were easily routed. The Jalapa group was rosupplied andenemy commander reported that he was under attack0 rebels. Itthat the appearance and equipping of this group caused theup of the Guardia de Honor in its advance into our rear from Ipalaand caused the enemy commander to delay throwing his reservesZacapa-Chiquimula. The air section hit the Zacapa marshalling yards,naaaenger train carrying troops, hit the Jutlapa bridge and strafedreports that TOW went off the air at that time and that

infjened that he wa:

Quezaitenango radio shifted frequency toJtOW frequency, Quezaltenango radio ostensibly becoming TGW. ThroughC DIGORAS Fuantesen to cross against Jutlapa from Salvador. He was lined up with an air drop which was to occur on the night ofh* He waa given operation money and dispatched to Salvador to make the arrangements. (Eventually, when the final Junta was formed, TDIGORAS was infjrjied that he was not to cross the border under any circumstances.)


All radios wars ordered to concentrate on communicationsvidence waa on hand to substantiate the fact thatas causing confusion, which was conteractable only by phone and telegraph. Proof that the teams must have acted on orders comesuatenalan Army emergency order the following day to protect the lines against the rebels at all costs.

Onh CASTILLO Armas attacked Zacapa and on receipt of enemy fire and without air support due to weather fell back to Chiquimula, The fighter support assipnM to hit the tanks at San Josehip of unknown origin reported Jto be carrying arras to Guatemala.

Onian feint was launched at Ipala for the purpose of deception, and at total darkness all forces were pulled down to the road for tho final attack on Zacapa. The air section that day hit the Zacapa fort, getting secondary explosions, making us believe an ammo dump was hit. Hataraoros was bombed again. TOW was strafed and bombed. The Jalapa group was launched toward Zacapa and CHACON was resupplied and instructed to move to Zacapa the following morning.

Onh all ground forces and air support commencod the attack on Zacapa. The advance party entered Zacapa, Zacapa officoro wore conferred with and arrangements for the Zacapa truce were made by Majorho liGKZOii agreement was completed, and our forces were ordered to hold up. The final disposition of troops0 of CASTILLO Armas1 menacapa soldiers at Zacapa,0 men of the Ouatemalan Army below Quezaltepeque0 Liberation Army above and to the left of Quezal-topeque at Jalapa.


Certain lessons, some newly learned and some paraciliUry axioms Ignored for the sake of expediency, should be recorded for KUEAHK/KTIHOOK study and prevention or inclusion in future operations,

A. Planning

As can happen in any military or paramilitary operation, PBSUCCESS heacquarters was massive, while the ir=lenenting staff was necessarily restrictedery few. Twenty men can easily think up more things to be done than three men can put into praotice. The end result iaecessary discarding of ideasaliant but imperfect implementation of the plans

thl5Decausa of thtt aoycklty and untiring devotion of XUKXK field personnel to the project at hand, the latter case proved true* In the event the above is unavoidable in the,future, care should be taken" to arrange the planning/iJBplamentation time ratio giving the implementation phase its proper precedence. Again, since the KUHCOK field personnel did devote itself to the job, the defect was not seriously detrimental but could havo been one more possiblo asset to the opposition.

B. Headquarters Direction

tt onVf keys to the success of the operation

UNCOUfis willingness to delegate command to the field at the crucial operational moment, LINCOLN direction was completely constructive and avoided' 0Perotlon-criPPlinfi restrictions sometimes found in this type of

LINCOLN Uid down the rules of conduct of the operation beforeconfining its direction to those new situations whichthe operation progressed. -

should serveodel for the future.

C. Timing Errors

Unfortunately, three incidents completely removed the element

propaganda program, one of the most effective arms ofs paramilitary machine, was exposed praaafca-ely In this The first leaflet drop caused the opposition to springright at the momont whan the inner organization wasrganizing, equipping, recruiting, etc. To quote SOMOZAi

in ny country j. have much opposition, mostly underground. annot afford to continually oppress that opposition, but at the first sign that

actiof forewarning that your

leaflet drop gave toould do exactly what hencapacitate the entire organisation if possible."

In fairness to the P? Section, any criticism of this leaflet drop is "Monday Morning Quarterbacking." All field personnel, including the principal agent and his staff, were elated at the first news of the successful drop, and it waa only when the serious consequences occurred that the act was criticized.

s believed that the moat effective leaflet drops during the operation were thoseuccessful peranUiUry blow.

premature paramilitary actions in connection withto atop the AIfhen arms movement aided the enemy into the movement. By not accomplishing the destructionanasand yet exposing routes of ingress and launching points,negated proposed araa and specialiata' movements duewithin the following threo weeka,

equeatuneuneour waa -elayed on Juneunerossing, again giving the opposition extra days of preparation after certain exposing preparatory moves had been

The result of the above errorsearth of coordination of underground support to the operation,

D. Value of Training

the success of shock troop movement end

combat was tha calibre of unit and sub-unit leaders. Our

WM ofin th. ground and in the two major battles engaged in. It la believed

S^fSrsSSoT W" 6flin0d

theonfidence of the troops,

the "ilitary efficiency of the unit leaders waa shown when the first

inbt 0uf forcM va9solelyunior officer's wise weapons placement and command presence under fire.

Seldoa ln be able to train holuthir^ them, it shouldrerequisite of our KUHOOK programs that we withdraw unit and sub-unit


lost through lack of capabali^ to organixe in the opan.

E. Air Support

Air support provided the clincher to the operation. Air wae used strategically to substitute for the vaoancy left by the roll-up and subsequent disorganization of the majority of the inner organization. By this method, bridges were cut, reinforcements harassed, resupply by shipping stopped, troop movements interrupted, gasbline supply virtually destroyed, and arms and ammo supplies destroyed.

The psychological effect of fighter air support wasand added to the myth thatrmas' Army was an organized, unbeatable force.

Air support was confined to strategical, semi-tactical and supply support. Close-air support was not feasible for several reasonst

No trained air-ground liaison teams,

Inefficient tactical communications system.

The nature of the fighting was such that unstable positions, undeflnable linos and the fast aircraft being used prevented orientation by the pilots.

It should be noted here that the sole close air support employed wasessna iBO.andi7 circling the combat areapound fragmentation bombs and home-made THT-nail and scrap iron bombs.



We were not preparedactical communications net. Six tactical radios and the FCP radioull schedule for the base setup we employed* Team to FCP to teamat times took twenty-four hours because of staff traffic and blanks in communications dueoospheric conditions. At times, the round trip traffic was only two hours, but this . as not dependable.

Use of code Is impracticalactical net, due to the time involved and also due to the garble factor. In this operation certain immediate action messages, FCP to Air Support, were garbled. The most damaging were those in which an errorarble occurred in coordinates. An intelligent guessorano officer or an air operations officer's surmise as to what wae meant does not suffice. Resupply runs were made under just such circumstances when time did not permit cable In at least ono such instance, lt is known that the


team the ground and that the drop occurred nineof the team area. Usually, garbloe were more prevalent the operator or commander was under

Having the agent pada and Chief of Iterations separated by radio from air supporterious error rectified early in tho operation. Until rectified, air requests were sometimes eoeived after the ground action had occurred. Allowances had been made for this possibility by placing special air request padB in agent hands with the base pad at air operationa, but thia left air operations working in the dark as to the ground situation. When rectified, we were able to support the operation more properly.

Before fled, however, we wereo use voice code uaine& Jpersonal corenunications to tC In thoee cases, at tines, six to eight hours could be out from the time necessary for an air requeat to be honored.


In every business therepecial group of personathe "scoffers,1' the "disbelievera"en contentt.hoir uumpleto lack of uaefulneaa under the guise ofraith in

Our organization has its share. Some have drifted from project to project and from division to diviaionconfueing assumed "professionalism" with plain lack of energy or ability to do core than point out weaknessea in other people's thinking.

In most cases these people are only dead wood. Usually, their most damage to an operation is oonfuaion of the issuehort period. However, on thiaan point out four specific instances in which support functions were warned by such characters not to offer requested aupport as "this project is doomed to failure.11

The possible effects of tolerating such persons in an operational organization are too obvioue to list here.

It is hoped that this situation can be pointed out to KUBARK heads a3 an existing condition, true not only In this project but also in others with which the writer has had experience.

VI. Recommendations for all field personnel considered asin an efficient manner are being presented inish at this tine, however, to place in thethis report ny peraonal opinion that the key man *oof this project ie Vincent C.

PIVALL'a firm adherence to orders enabled LIWCOLH to rely on the fact that plans were being carried out within the realm of possibility and that Principal Agent attempts to alter those plans were minimized. The preservation of KUBARK interests was

olemn duty by PIVALL and it showed up in the results of his work.

His professional knowledge and direct manner of dealing with the Indigenous personnel gained bin, and KCBARK, their respect and spirit of camaraderie necessary to good guidance on operations of this type.

In addition, PIVALL's analytical and objective thinking and reporting spotted for LINCOLN many defects in the old CASTILLO Armas organization, useful in planning the operation. .

It is recommended that his services would be valuable instaff position within WHD if he is to remain in WHO. .from WHD, it is recommended that KUHOOK stafffor training assignmentsield nro-inet assignmenta KUHOOK training course.

It woulderious KUBARK/KUHCOK loss to lose this man through disinterest on the part of KUBARK or through allowing him to become de-motivated. .




PART JW) by Assistant PM Officer.

Departure free LINCOLNae* with severalmind to be accomplished uponViral

rir3r2op? to aPrtparedness which would permit tie initiation of the campaign at an early date and at tha same tino would permit supportremitore uprising which might be cause- by any oneenber of actions within the target country.

five-man "hornet" teams for the harassment ofin localities far removed from the obvious area of activity.

the remaining resident radio operators to theirpoints*

all shock troop equipment to selected staging areas near

the border.

ei Movo by all possible methods, land, sea and air, arms to the inner organisations.

U Bring sabotage plana to theges. he sab leaders

for launching tc their area?.

-to his targetsi

the final military plana and modify them to Suitanalysis of the situation.

Upon arrival, and after meeting with Mr,PIVALL

th fittdar9h*rra- organisation, ltthat nuch of the above wculd bo very difficult to accomplishshort Un which remained. It was apparent that CASTILLO Armas hadknowledge of thestrength of his owr At times he claimed to havet

was on the b: is of ihese figures that the decision to form toewas madi. During the attests to form these groups CASTILLOnumber of excuses as to why this could not be dona. It wasthat heriMhave the men that he claimed toa list of aU menwas demanded by. name. He submitted

a list of men far below the numbor that we had hoped was p'reseat. The listames. This not only did not permit the formation of tha five-manut it also did not furnish the required numbers for the shock troop organization. This information cameeek before theoy.

Upon tho receipt of this information, ray first inclination was to relay the shocking facts to LINCOLN with an urgent plea to postpone the initiation of the campaign. After such careful consideration, however, it was my decision that due to tho possibility of gathering considerable


sympathizers along the way, we ccild launch thelanned. elt that any relaying of such Information would hive tha effect of detracting from and darkening the enthuaiesr: of the CASTILLO Armas organisation aa well as having tha effect of possiblyaapaisn which might bog down hopelessly if not permitted to becin on rchedule.

Jfech of the preparation for the campaign waa made very difficultturn of events within the target country. The crack-down afterleaflet drop made arms ingress almost impossible. Most ofbroke down completely and we had to roly on auch methods as

and his plane delivering arms to his personal finca. We ware able to send individuala across the line with area in auitcaaea and ba-> It is not known at thia time how auch of that was effective. e tried every method Imaginable and we arc confident that acme of them worked. Even the launching of the radio operators was extremely difficult and hazardous for them. We are sureumber of them were picked up and of those who did got to their respective erecs,ew came on ths air.

PIVALL hadine job of preparing the aabotage leaders andeager to get in and begin their work. There remained theyr equipment in for them to work with. Seme wasas taken in by? While mentioning PIVALL,

it might be added that ha had done wonders in organizing CASTILLO Armas' staff into tho proper sections. All hands had the utmost respect for PIVALL and his command preconcoell aa hie language qualifications made him invaluable.

In looklre over the final military plansj it struck re that theof ocrfj jtrecps by way of Gualan wold not only give tho enemy adequate warningba movement but the concentration of Coaaeunlat Die> aonnel at Oualan would hinder our advance toegree that the C nemy forceauccessful counter-attack. It appearedincers movementJ would bo rore likely to succeed. lan was worked out to bring an additional forco from Copan Ruinas down through Camotan and Jocotan for an attack upon Chiquimula and thenee toC heof this force was l) to aid In the capture ofCn the event that thaf Jteam experienced difficulty, and 2) Jfell to us early, to-cove ^antdly through the Jclapa tree to the capital. In the latter case,forees would protect the rear of this colusn. CASTILLO Areas' staff took to this plan with alacritylt was de-.ided that the CP would be with this group,

Much of Bay time was taken up with interviews of perscnnel nawly


arrived from Guatemala, both military and civilian. Upon the arrivaland,an inLervirf with Mm. Ihe be commandfc Jforce, ror.^acinc

I felt that asC Jhad been In command of ehe garrison efC t cne tine, along with his higher rank rndperlance, hi should beof this very Important foree.

Another crrlval waswas very nuch impressed

with his foroo and bearing and recommended hii for 3one ocaaud. In this case it was command of the force which was to cross from Knars. Ocotepeque.

In the absence of theteeas foras decided fe to utilise the talents of Jin this line. Ha had bsen meet anxious to do sosavHrlng other than deliver arms to hii finca and claimed to be able o perform bombing missions with his Cessna lEO. as frankly skeptical

about the accuracy of such bombing, but he convinced me that it wasconstructed bombs of THT blocks surroundingso that they would detonateoff on his

initial flight of this type, headedhad with him two

men, fore flew in almost on the ground towardtanks at San Jose. As he approached the tanks, he pulled intoand the bombardier threw the bomb. His first attempt washit and the tank burst into flame. He then flew to Hetaluehuethe same thin?ho SHELL and ESSO tanks there. He ran' out of"strafed" theC Jltanks> and then set afire with grenades.another of

these missions tfrC is audacity was.illustrated by his callingtower at C aying that he was. an air force plane wishing totower gave roper instructions and he came in to hison the C Jtank. Ke received muchre as he triedon the runway of the field. In eluding the fire he dived intoof.trees andranch of one 'of in his" controlhad to land at the first availableto remove it.

Jwaa very anxious to perform very hazardous missions at all tinea and was invaluable to our efforts.

Our Bafe house facilities in C- ouss whereof CASTILLO Armas could functionnit. There wo hadconference rooms and briefing rooms. PIVALLat thereearly in the morning and worked there all day with tha staff. in another safe house, too, which servedtorehouse for He worked with his sabotage leaders there. Thelocated high on the mountainside outside of the city. Upon thethe FCP radio r* wnwT o*'veted- another safe house aboutThis house was ideal for the

radio station as it was well into the suburbs and comings and goings were not noticed. After this house was opened, we spent much of our time there.

Upon the arrival oithe final touches were put

on tho plans and very shortly after his arrival the campaign wasshould be noted here th?*entire organization of CASTILLOcompleted confidencein his leadership. So far as I

could tell, none of his decisions were ever questlonned and forneither were any ofa ho came. CASTILLO Armas madeplea for strong air attacksthat he had made previously

to na. He was not given any assurance whatsoever that air support wouldother than for air deliveiy of supplies, which we feltaof the personnel who came out of the country to us

Jwere of the firm opinion that, should powerful air blowson the city In the early phases, the campaign would not be a Ths concensus of opinion was that if several bombs wore droppedthe Guardia de Honor, on La Aurora Air Field, on the Base Militarone other on* on a_ the Oovernment would Colonel nsisted

that the Government almost foil with the first leaflet drop.

.Timt. ho Core the arrival oi Jorganizer returned to

had been captured by several soldiers who recognized him

ormer association in the army. He was tortured but escaped to return with valuable information. People wore coming and goinr along theat this time without interference, particularly Inand C jlareas.

- It -


Cite, our big problems Mas the men and supplieaWe had cooperation with thoin

ructuoad ofnto

the - ;this did not work out. We

did send ooverol xoads of arma in specially constructed private automobiles with false compartments. We had no cooperation from the President there.

Movement of shock troops to the staging areas began in small numbers. Receiving parties were sent ahead and when we received word that the areas were ready, movement was initiated. Movement was very slow and In vory small numbers. Finally, when time became shortay approached, more speed was necessary and troops were moved in larger and leas cland'""Te ovementlood of newspapermen to descend^

J laking operations all tbe more difficult. Final movement of the shock troops brought the operation fully into the open aa it became necessary to move the troops by commercial,chartered airplanes. This was necessary in order to aasemble the troops at the staging areas at the proper time for the attack.

Difficulty was encountered in the plans for the seaborneBOKO for which we hadoat at La Ceiba on the northHonduras. The boat was loaded with flnuinrnont which was deliveredCeiba through the cooperationwho, incidentally,

was ofhelp in manytransported equipment

In his C- ^planes for us to many points and into fields which were not well-suited to his planes. roup was dispatched to La Ceiba to man the boat but discovered it to be missing. Presumably the boat hadun to the islands for cover purposes. Finally the team caught up with the boat and boarded it for the operation. It Is not entirely clear at this date what developed from this operation. It la known that the boat was picked up, but mora than that is not known.

* with the exception that at night allwas lost betweenC Jind SHERWOOD, thereby causing aof messages in the morningonsequent bogging down of There was considerable between the sending ofthe fieldlr*tC or this reason, itto mowbackordsr to give more

adequate service to the field. With respect to answering some messages which cams in from the field, it was frequently impossible to gain contact with the field stations for some hours. More urgent messages would follow and some of the original messages went unanswered.

With regard to security, it ia obvious that many of theTsasuraa which would normally be employedrulywere disregarded in this instance. In order to accomplishmuch ofhad to be abandoned. We had toin thexj and from aafe housea, thereby un-

doubtedly identifying ourselves with the organization of CASTILLO Armas. It can be said, though, that this movement was kept to an absolute minimum and that a? no of it was absolutely necessary to accomplish ths task. The safe house where the FCP was located waa by far the best and kep tbe most clandestine.

After the movement to C he FCP functioned much more efficiently and was able to offer the desirea support to the field. The fact that the KUHOOK staff worked right with the Air Opa facilitated thia support, in addition to keeping everyone informed as the the fieldhich situation had not existed prior to thia time.

Cthor than the numerous snail lessons learned during the campaign, there are, in my opinion, two main lessone to be learned from the ore rail situation* First, at the very outset of the planning for an operation of thisecision should be made as to the importance of its success. Upon reaching this decision, the amount of rower to be utilised and the method of employment of thia power ahould also bo decided. This power (and in this caae lt was air bombardment) ahould not bo withheld. It should be utilised at the very beginning of the operation. It is ny considered opinion that if the air power which waa used in the final phases of the operation had been used on the first day in the same manner, the campaign would not have lasted U8 hours, ew lives would have been loat in the bombing, but many more lives could have been saved by shortening the campaign. This opinion ia basod upon both the reports of persons who cane from Guatemala and my previous knowledge of the Latin people.

elieve that the KUGOWN program could have beenwith the KUHOOK program. Byefer to the The reaction to theae dropa was terrific. Tha results,definitely detrimentthe KUHOOK effort, and the reaction ofof CASTILLO Armasone of dejection. It was the

opinion of all of us, including C ^that it would have been wollfield had been conaultad before the decision to make tha drop had The leaflet dropsrackdown within Guatemala whichcome eventually when the roveasnt of oar troops to tho borderbut it cameime when we were still able to make deliveryradio operatora and sabotago personnel into the it was virtually impossible to accoaplish

pleaded with us to permit no more leaflet drops as evory ono reduced the effectiveness of his air operationa. The overall effect of auch KUOOWH activity cannot be underestimated, but lt la recommended that in the future they be coordinated with the KUHOOK activity so that they can be mutually supporting.

With regard to eomunications, as in operations inave been Involved in the military service, much of the planning is based upon split seoond contact between unite and command by radio. ave never seen this contact work out completely as planned, even with highly trained operators. In this case, with indigenous operators and difficult conditions, while the results were amaaing, they did not work out as planned. Only in the final phases did the radio commo begin to work properly.

Finally, while an operation of this type is most difficult to keep clandestine, it would have been much more easily accomplished if the enemy had not beon fully alerted some weeksay, ot martial law boon proclaimed and the curfews, police patrols,ot been in effect, our movement and sabotage plans would have been much more likely to succeed. It Is not known at this time how much of our sabotage was completed, but so far not auch of it has been reported.

2 J


PART. by Assistant PM. by Assistant PM Officer,

A. LINCOLNh fAr FJHOffiFUL, arriving

therehief of

Station. Then inspected

materials on hand and set up the original packaging station.

Materials on hand at FJHOPEFUL consisted ofncluding rifles, ammunition,mistols,mand grenadesew miscellaneous items. These materials were sterilized, cleaned and placed in fireable order before packaging for caching, or advance shipment to the front. Personnel arrived the latter part of February to assist in packaging preparation of these materials..

During this periodbs. of equipment was received, including mortars, li7 mm andm2ifles, sub-machine guns, LMO, hand grenades, fragmentation and concussion, TNT, demolition charges(shaped). Also included in the equipment received wereedical supplies, equipment, parachutes and other miscellaneous items which were to be included In the kits, as prescribed by LINCOLN. All these materials were opened, inspected and sterilized(if needed) for further shipment or.packaging. Packaging of these items were for caching which consisted of cleaning and oiling all fireable weapons, wrapping in cloth, sewing in burlap sad dipping in tar, the tar acting as the preservative for burial purposes. Atof the operation thereeople, includingC Jinspecting, packaging and wrapping the above-mentioned materials and loading aircraft leavingUL for Honduras.

Other work included the supervision of tying down these loads as well as the distribution of materials to each area. During this time we were steadily receiving more supplies and equipment for SHERWOOD which was also dispatched to their-respective destinations. Also, at this time6s were unloaded which brought thebs. of equipment into FJHOPEFUL. This entailed workingeek, for the full crew of men there.

The packaging of material was completed around the first ofwhich time the first three men of the packaging crew were releassdto the United States and the last three men hich date they left FJHOPEFUL. During this

acted as Chief Assistant in supervising and packaging, loading andand tying down of aircraft loads. During the stay at FJHOPEFULbs. of materials were shipped to Honduras and other destinations. 0 lbs. of communications gear was shipped to SHERTCOD for setting up their station.

une orders came through to move to Somerset, the advancethe purpose of dispatching bundles and supplies to the troops cf new drop bundles to meet requirements from

andoceeded to Somerset, arH^wthe niphtune, atthey remainedaysthe local air

ooperation was received fron the indigenous personnel of Sonersot in loading and unloading aircraft there.

Cooperation and support of all branches of PBSUCCESS personnelwas exceptionally

The pilots and crevs of the aircraft seemed toense of security as to discussion of flights, placed they had been, also the work thatere doing, ^veral tires it was necessary in public eating places to call their attention to the fact that they were not to talk of their activitiea In which they wore engaged. This was notioeable most especially from tho crews as there waa rrcre contact with them than with the pilots.

P-!i7 pilots were not familiar withircraft, this being eepecially true otC

3 These two men hadit of trouble with bombs that did . not explcde. It is believed that they were droppw ith the chemical release and not arming them. Jerry(not C aa very aggressive in his actions and runs, very truthful in target hits and missed and probablyatter record of thia operation on hits and damage done than the other two.

C-U? pilots were much interested in the monetaryfrom their flights and drops as were their kickers.

four indigenous kickers and one ground crew nan weregood in their work. There were very few complaintsmen, they worked hard and did the very best Job that theydo considering that thereanguage barrierand the crew.


arrive3 June on the last planeload

of bundles an*ery small buildingAva<inhlfl in which to store bundles. The building was connected to thcC-

building. It wasndy> bunaies, uOW each,undles# each,oxes ofarachute*ts. Working area ua* fA*>iv

When we arrived, thereotalundles in the building. In the next few days -rare equipment arrived to be packed. ickers, Ii Americanndigenous, arrived. In theaysore bundles were packed and stored outside under canvas. ickers were then trainedew practice drops were made at the end of the air strip, after dark. After the training was completed,ay flights were started. No drops were madeay and then were madeimes dally. Aftereek of operations they were running out of bundles. ew more supplies were then received which were packed intoundles. Besides all these bundles,drums of gasoline, boxesm2 ammo and food were being dropped.

When we were not busy packing and loading the, we were helping loadith ammo and bombs. No one kew much about thisnew even Tb ss than anyone but shortly everyone was sort of an expert onomb and working0 cal. gun.

Thereouse in towntayed when the opportunity presented itself. There was no troubleood place to eat and we ate good Anerican-style food.

All in all, security was good with the exceptionew times when non-Agency personnel had to be told to keep silent.

orked with did an excellent jobnjoyed working with thera. Everyone leaving this operetion should nowack-of-all-trades. The experience received will be very useful in the future. hink the operation was very successful and well worth all the time end effort put into. it. eel that everyone who worked on this operation should be very proud that he was asked to help do this big job.




PARTy PM Operations Officer, Vincent C. PIVALL

The followingumnarvcourse of events froa the tine PIVALL was dispatched1U, to the ond of activities against Guatemala.

The synopsis will attempt to shed light on all phases, thatorganization, security, operational matters and thethe overall training had on the final phase and success of This report is divided into three phases: departure to the White Paper; rainingSettina ud of the para-military organization of CASTILLO2re considered the most important

as far as KUHOCK activities are concerned. They deal mostly with training and organizational setup,


Upon PIVALL's arrival inC emi-organization foractivitiea had been set up. otal of fifteen men were on hand as the advanced training elements The equipment had not arrived and selection of tho training site had not been settled*

Originally, training was to begin by Ik January but up to that date no facilities had been made available*

After considerable negotiations withQ ^authorizationeiven to commence movement of personnel and equipment to C

First difficulties encountered were rovcmor.ts of equipment and personnel while taking into consideration the most strict security measures* After an unsuccessful attempt to oat for transfer and movement, negotiations witlTa private concern were made touitable launch. Cover story wasrew of engineors were to work on private experiments his story was maintained throughout entire pre'ect,

Cn taking overtflo only facilities made available

arn and an inadequate water well, omplete training site had to be constructed. Two living quarters, mess hall, sanitary units and showers were built along with development of suitable areas for training activitiea. During this period evaluations, observations, complete interviews and background studies were rade of the trainees. Food and building materials were shippedaily basis and continued until approximatelyanuary*

On or aboutanuary food shipments wereunknown to PIVALL at that tine) rO.thoughtating all was fine and that an attemptbeing made tooat to enable the

project to discontinue use of the rented launch. Ko attempts were

made to pick up our distress messages telling that absolutely no food was" available and that serious conditions existed on the islandre-arranged method for pick-ups of messages had boon made. ig had been constructed solely for this purpose.)

During this critical period SARANAC had one seriousar. appendicitisernia patient and two YD cases. items had been included in the entire shipment ofeffort was made to Justify the conditions to thewas certainly one of tha darkost periods as far as theconcerned and it is mentioned here only because PIVALLallowed to forget it by the trainees who had experienceda week of suchmall boat arrived with dstuffs and building materials, PIVALLC. to inquire about the disorganized logistics.

On arrival at(T ]Jall newspapers were carrying the accounts that CHACO DE1XIAD0 had passed on to the Guatemalan government.

As Jwaa in the United States, PIVALL immediately began liaison with U ew location. Arrangements were rade and all equipment and personnel were evacuated that same night without incident or problems.

Again, the new location was without adequate facilities and work was begun immediately to construct suitable billets, trainine sites, etc.

During the brief staytraining had beg-on,

primarily tomall cadre for future use as instructors.

A half-day training and work schedule had to be implemented. Labor units worked in the mornings and group instruction took place during the afternoons. Individual instructions were held after supper.

During this early training period only one major problem was on hand, ad been reported that the advance clement would be comprised of CASTILIO Armas1 top leaders who were to be semi-trained or experienced, and to bear in mind that they were to be the revolt's organizers. This was truly an underestimate. In fact, of the first twenty-seven trainees arriving at SARASAC, only four had theor were considered capable, of becoming organisers or leaders. This later slowed down norral training operations because separate groups had to be maintained.

Schedules were revised and instructions changed to meet the requirements for the conditions originally set up. Three groups were established which consisted of officers, sab trainees and troops. Three complete running schedules, independent of each other, ware drawn up. During the second phase of the training, sab trainees and trcops were irade interchangeable.


1. Security prior to the "White Paoer" had been extremely lax on the part of the personnel working in C J This waa primarily because no control was maintained over the personnel* No serious precautions or attempts at compartmentation had been undertaken."


Camper tnentation vas unheard of among the principal factions and contacts^ in nost cases were made overtly, utout ayaten was never employed.

adequate facilities were aalntained forregarding incoming or outgoing ooirespondance. not nade available and file folders wore available for

lnspec-ion by anyone. Allere made

changeable vxng the principals j, DELOADO ancTherinciple was never rracticed. All conversations, even those rogarding the highest operational natters, were discussed "openly" with absolutely no regard

is felt that because of the above lax securityable to secure andarge rarier of documents.


On receiving word to reactivate training at SARAHAC, all efforts were then concentrated on the training program.

he early part ofotal ofrainees were at

The following schedule was adopted ond carried out with full force:

for officers were held0 toand00 noura.

for Sab personnel were identical;

for the troops were the same except forXP duties'.

During the first three weeks, theory and blackboard problems and instructions were in order. Classes organized for officers concentrated primarily on the following courses:



and staff problems.

reading and terrain evaluation.

infantry tactica.

of troops in guerrilla warfare.


use of fire power.

problems and aerial resupply.


on, and control of, citlea.



r t


k. Security

1. Nomenclature, care and cleaning of all weapons, m. Tredecraft problema.

... laced were: Deployment of troopa.

ap reading, troop

leadership and guerrilla tactics. Security was stressed in trade-craft instruction. Also included were lectures on cutout systems, contacts, surveillance, CE, CI, etc. After the theory andinstruction, live problems were conducted.

Officers were then assigned definite jobs and placed as group

leaders. ontinual rotation to various duties was mandatory for

each officer to familiarise him with other duties in addition to his

HSeS^SJi SfSanitation, Mess, Adjutant, First Aid

Liaison>ontrol,ave eachealth of experience.

criodlso conducted in full lores. Selected Sab trainees totaledith an

he baator operaUoV..; The f: During the course

in fC!!Wd Chatf the trainees were calculationsimplification method had to be employed. Stress was on photograph targete, rather than nathanatlealu-ation. Included during this period were simulated charge

lantUinS of charges and detonators, electric wiring, demonstratlona of electric and non-electric caps, time calculations and improvised charges.

CtUaiin sab problemsby the trainees, permitting the student to attainconfidence in handling

ontinual nightmare for the trainees, strut problems were conducted mostly at night. Stress was on tercet approach and coordinated attacks. odel village was

SonSd8tJungle ^Proximately six kilometers froo SAHAhAC. It consisted of several small houses, rail track sections, small generators, automotive parts and gas and oil drums,

SABUa^ chansad Atbaction being conducted while trainees were at work. Observers were always

on the spot for chocking of sab personnel or teams.

Bn, *he third element, the foot soldiers, were instructed mftrta* techniques, patrol 'and recon pro-

cedures, methods to overcome terrain difficulties,survival, first aid, map study,

Mar2 and early April the three groups werein an effort to establish coordinated attacks.

^efny occasions SCRANTOH student tactical radio operators were utilised in training, sab and field problems.

necessity for developing "organisers" and in some respects viewedskepticism for the following

caliber of personnel sent to SARAKAC wasit was expected to be.

therainees, only about ten were

of the "hood" type and could

only be utilized in regular troop units, guerrilla or sao teams.

oe Purchased inC J, Personnel had to be detached withloss of valuable *

^^oh Security: Overall excellent. Guards were posted on a

phasP that PIVALL requested the

wbecause of their laxness in security,

S- liaison: Liaison was maintainedmaintained during that

fi* lawll,ed rathar th*n

b' illingtldUre theof training

onfi;ant operation made it extremely easy to handle and instruct the men.


took advantage and exploited the atin trait, at overy opportunity.

were made to feel "highly superior" inthe opposition troops,by constantlyin the fact that they would be bettersuperior weapons and fire power, and wore ledefficient

during the period of training was alwayseffort to attain the best recreationalmade. Disagreements among the men were referredand were always settled by boxing matches.

SARANAC slogan was "We were born to die for Qod This was the premise by which the menlived and trained and which was kepttheir minds day and night.*


i^erPIVALL returned to LINCOLN fortion. before departing toAoTlLLO Armas organization in Tegucigalpa*"

vrnirvS* deoarted with instructions to act as the

aS8iSt CASTILL0 Araas *possible wayfnnd assisting wherever possible. Tomazement; no semi-military organ^ ization had been established.equest to correct thislituaUo^ was forwarded to CASTILLO Armas and he was asked to assign one o?

iSniiZir VSrfff* Co}onea*-- 4was assigned and made Chief of Staff at PIVALL's request. efinite military organization was

> ins^f

inhssignments, etc.

erG then 6ivenaJ1ii

Utuse in the best ^terest of Up to this time no such organization had existedassurances by CASTILLO

lTHere:hK center forsection, and CI and CE

ab and lnStrUCt0r

by LINCOLN were studied and necessary

SSSoTS SSSSiSrapld and con8tant chanfies^

aJal_feParate1 operations were estabUshed which later had

ohf 8UCCeS8

* Ocotepeque, Morales and "Ucomments on results see Attachment

icult toomplete and full report of the successes and defeats of allell

2 Attachments



3 andtroop*.



and related, but nofSSi tni--*

casualties to Uio enemr forces C . considerable danaje and Los Tarros,"U*

ware tjtah the primary object of retakineC ?Sm k rouP

^e, and coding movement^d^fcapturingtne objective of attacking

r unimswas on the outskirts of

nd ready to attack when word was sent of the peace negotiations, and to renain in position until further notice.

m. C- roup

This group totaleden who sailed from

TOTas Knlchelowouth-ost oft 3Their primary mission was to harass C 3 Thia

action was planned and coordinated so that they

According to monitored radio reports the eroun mada

trifarou?^fjsij- dieted that

clule tlae enemy forces, h en!^'r -JComander, Colonel Bolanos, was consistently

einforc^"ts fron Guatemala CUy to cop^th IV. C S

i ^jts^iSs- mb



. sked if any blunders were committed that

St iSrt hl^Sf^ ^cumstancee might have been different. He further stated that the trek across

?Jd,the co?tlnualoy ihe commander to* They were cOm-

cortLiir?^Hithe and thethem haVirig fche benefit of

The later successes ofbow,

tremendous losses sustained byand the last ditch stand ofor


orces can be included in the same movement,their jumpoff points were distinctly apart. Both forcedQuezaltepeque for the eventual attack of

heof Chiquimula can be attributed to manywithew mentionedsicua-

thMe forPes' the fact that thet L ere theof the high level staff werothe successful aerial support and th- -hikingM* plncer movement by enemy forces wming frcnC jSlhiSttaaSuU llf a

troonf UCCe33th8 part ofonstant enemy OB situations fromtM. area to

ThaC Jm^^eot never developed because of the intervention by theforces were merged with the Nueva Ocotepeque



pointsthB "tion, Sab activity was in action at tha following

a. Rail and communications between Entre Rlos and Tenedores.

b" naU.*Td COW]uni<:ations between Tenedores andbetween La Libertad and

and coramunicatlona KG of Gualan and HW of Gualan.

and communicationsof*C Jand NW orC

San Francisco Bridge, located below Tenedores.

The above sab activity was coordinated to assist all troopa. Other Sab operations were as follows:

ported that destruction of the oil atorageKhifh w" tothe signal to begin activities, did minutes before the extS

TCW* Jt was never reported whether an attempt or actualoccurred against TOW. Although the station continued to broad-

that TCRotnerad been grouped to traSstitters! Sizing the QuezaC-aSgo

threein or around the capital by

d. Rails and communications leading to El Salvador.

"tivlty successes have been the most difficult to .Jhether attempts or actual action was accomplished on selected -argeta is problematical because of the inaccuratTreporta, ttotSt

annex c


PBSUCCESS Air Operations Officer Lt.

The following report is aubmitted for two purposes. To rscord thesummarizing all factors adding to or detracting fron theths operation, and to list shortcomings to be useduide in *


1. Planning

original plan for providing air operational support forbroken down into three categories, phase one, the initial stockpilingphase two, tha delivering of equipment to advance base.C

^mti phase three, the aerial resupply of troops in the field.

D minus thirty days it was decided that tacticalof the ground forces might be required. Genera Cabell concurredconcept ofighter aircraft support unit in being in thewas required. At this time the fourth phase, fighter support,

orinus thirty the concept of utilizing tactioalground units was approved. At this time every effort was mads toclandestine methods, the necessary aircraft and equipment requiredthis support.


A. Phase one and two were conducted In accordance with tha overallplan and were completed within the allowable timeAdequate planning was provided and phases one and two werewith no major difficulties,

3. Aerial(Phsse Shree)

difficulties were experienced by the air operationscomplying with request to provide aerial resupplies. The mainwere the provisions of sterile air crews ^auirsd to fly ihe original plan envisaged; utUizedr. Tjair crewsoverflights. inus thirty Headquarters reversedand would notcrews to be used. Airimmediatelyivilian recruiting program through cutoutssterile air crews. The recruitment of these air crews was1 June.

sterile air crews under, the direction of Bob Stewart C out from Miamiune by devious routes. All air crews wereat SOMERSETune, .On or aboutune' air operations at SOMERSET

wore established and ia readiness for phase three operations. The air crews wereery brief course in dropping technique^ and each, erevlwber was provided the opportunity of naking at least twTpractice drops.

MB.selected were highly Qualified civilian pUota with

and an average of

pilots wire considered all-weather pilots.

: Jh0hrco air resupply was flown without one najor difficulty insofar as pertained to the aircraft and crews. The major difficulty encountered was the lack of reception committees at the designated drop acnes. Approximatelyverflights were made without onceeception committee at the DZ. horough debriefing of the air crews invested that each crew had definitely located and pinpointed the DZ and the reception teams were definitely not there;

entered in the area of operations somewhated the operation. This was notajor problem for the

xSELt IZIT afgetlosed! ft.

Tactical Fjchter Aircraft Ground Sunporfr

0Uallfledpilots was one of tha major

io^iSi iJ apabilities. Cue to

<Wficult to contact civilianpilotsfi^^fjSP.Uot9wa3 necessary to qua ighter pilots and could be used for planned operations. ^departure only two fighter pilots were interviewed and hired!

I'^aircraft available for the start of air tactical

*> . ere delivered to SO.YSRSET by the C

J ircraft arrived in combat ready cendition ana the

"ort^SL'Sr'd-ircraffusedlorrk enablings to run daylight air resupply drops.

to flv'soSlaid on airover Guatemala City with fighter aircraft.

SrUr City. Machine guns were^ired ?St2^'maround of Guatemala. The aUS-StT" f th. city. Enemy * capons fire was encountered during these IcV level

mSSSfifihter aircraft "celvod severalMts on each mission

j?" bove diversionary tactical flights vers stopped by urgent

A?tE?SI gr0Und forcM i" tha ChiquiJula-ZacaJa area,

n t0 0ne tactiCftl fifhUr, Ou? second fighteJ hid been damaged andrash landing at SOMERSET andnter was

effort was made tonlrd

efused to allow us to use his aircraft, fenuft

INCOLN Headquarters for additwljghter aircraft. ew days later onerrived at SCKERsS. Ju.t

prior to arrival of this aircraft ourlewail wheel tire ao we were still down to one aircraft available per flight. Again urgent

f'. J* rasadditionalat

f ?atccuid notelivered at SOKES*-

?!in* rrived from FJHOPSFUX and an extra

thf ed and this aircraft was available and combatuatemala City (the dive bombingirect hit through the left wing, rupturing the gas tank andhree-inch hole in the main spar.Thisaircraft S'tff8 andS SauSlfor

CJiUpp!rt^ as flown itiredt hit in the tail assembly requiriiw^eolaceffenT

fajor problem for fighter aircraft. W0 radio faculties were available for homing. Every mission departing SOMERSET

TfrJ8k* At thiS tiaehe yearweatheris verTbad fiLf"dttoe could wa forecastours later. onLftRT^ftrated exceptional bravery in conducting tactical operations under these adverse conditions. >lany tactical support missions were conducted where the pilots made intrument flights to theand instrument flights back to SOMERSET. With exceptional flyingots of luck, no aircraft were lostesult of the weathir. It is

ithfF* this nature, provisions be made for having electronic homers installed in the fighter aircraft.

5. Difficulties Encountered

rT^f rial

/JJ ^ortaBe of Qualified armament andf qualll'led mechanics to maintain theq!Jalifiedto offset combat fatigue."

IJ S ready fighter aircraft. W Lack of all-weather electronics equipment in the aircraft.

l) ISorttSfiSercund)


CC8S8 ir operations seotion at SOMERSET is credited to the

dthis proje^Uday period of operations every man, other than the air crews, was

^lUKn t0 Wfkhours Perday. During the rcmaonan^

they were not authorised to leave the area, (In fact all

2caTC thesleep) ersonal

followed orders and instructions to the letter. There wafnot cneTinoiSrt

Si facWen- hs experience of thfnstration of loyalty and sincere will to win been so clearly demonstrated.


AMD Assistant Air Operations Officer Lt, Col, ^

The air operations personnel for phase four PBSUCCESSfield were locatedeast end of theand consisted

of ono building approximately UOeet. We vera authorised the use of approximately one forth of the building for storagemall area for office sp*-- Tee building and aircraft ptfrhiig area,

Thisaxi and parking problem for our aircraft. Thia was solved by clearing an additional taxi way crossing around the fox holes and machine gun positions from our area direct to the runway. Our area

hen Ke had fchehe fighters, the Cessna and8 all on the ground at the same time.

f the equipment and supplies that were to be used in the airdrops to our forces were in place in the storage building upon our arrival at SOMERSET. However, approximatelyundles still had to be packed from the equipment brought to SOMERSET from Honduras.

At the beginning of the operation we had two air operationspackers and loaders, one mechanic "no we had considerable help from

at SOMERSET. Our staff later beefed up with two one armament specialist and an sdditlonal air operations officer.

Arrangements had to be made for quarters, messing and transportation for all personnel including air crews. The air crews beganune. At first we tried to keep the crews together at safe houses, but due to inadequate water facilities, no cooking facilities, poor sanitary wyeUeieMavetf^cXeA-aJfomi in the various


An escape and evasion plan waa worked out for the air crews with the native kickers instructed to lead air crews into Honduras in the event that an aircraft was forced down.

Arrangements were madeontrol'towsr operator on duty at all times when our aircraft were operating. ystem of code names was used with the control tower operator and the aircraft, so that anyone

monitoringnot identify the air traffic with our

location. beacon was kept

when our airorart were out on missions.

jsupplied weather Information forour operations, ode system, using the lights on the aircraft, was used by the pilots upon their returnission at night to identify themselvesriendly

aircraft to the tower operator. The tower operator would then turn-on the runway lights aa soon as the aircraft was identified as friendly.

effort was nade to get8 In commission. C

ot flown the plane for acne time and had aa*connectedgee tanks. Without the use of theae gaa tanks tha aircrafthave sufficient range to get to the target and return to SOMERSET.and the fuel tanka removed and cleaned; The

reat deal of trouble' getting

axrcrait into ccnraission. Finally it was ready for test flightbefore take off the electrical system caught fire delaying the useaircraft for several more days, "he aircraft was put Intoand several flightsj however, itattle danage'insection on the flight to San Jcae. enMrtn Mft fcnvba on the aircraft and although thexd

a terrific job of getting this aircraft into oemission, all fighter action caasad the next day.B waa not used again In the operation although it diduccasaful test flight after the new tail section had been installed. Arrangements were also completed to transfer thand Cessna IhO to Honduras.

The packers were busy night and day preparing thend ammobeen returned from Honduras for air

Arrangements wore made

SOMERSET, for meala when personnel did not'have time to go V

which was quite often. The sanitary conditions were so poor tonour personnel became sick at the boginninfand we had

to have canned food flown up fron FJHOPEFUL.Hd every-

thing that he could to improve the sanitary conditions, he did go out buy special food such as eggs and gave the crews breakfast at3ought apecial food to prepare lunchea for the flight creves

With the personnel scattered in various hotels and often flying on staggered schedules and with commo facilities approximatelyilea fron the air base, transportation wasroblem. This was aolved by renting automobiles and getting local driver's licenses for the operators,

an office and briefing-and-debrlefing room were aet up ii C

3eld quarters. One of the first projects was to spray silver paint ontffl. Although their Force insignia had been removed and the metal polished, the paint waa appliedrecautionary measure

The air crew started arrivingune. The first mission after our arrivaleaflet missionune. The crews were briefed aa to th* cover story and the local situation. The pilote were checked out In the aircraft and organised into crews with their kickers. Plaid Command Post supplied two Guatemalan kickers for each crew. They were used to move the bundles from the cabin of the aircraft to tha two kickers in the door. The two in the door discharged the cargo when the green light was given by the


Pilots were given Instructions in ths tactios of clandestine over-flights. Arrangements were completed to make practice drops on the end of the airfield to train the crews and also test the bundles prior to dropping them In The drops were made juat after dark so that the parachutes would not be observed. The high sxperlenoe level of the pilotsig asset In that

thoy caught on to the techniquaa of dropseception tear, with very little difficulty and they were quite accurate. The pilots were alao given the opportunity toew practice instrument letdowns at SOMERSET.

Several attempts were made to workystem to drop leaflets from the fighter aircraft since Headquarters disapproved the use of the leaflet bomb and time did not permit the local manufactureeaflet dropping device. Attempts were made to drop leaflets from the cockpit of the' Fighters. As you can imagine this proved verycoverage at best. The leaflet bombs would break before the pilots could get them out of the cockpit and the leaflets would all fly back into the cockpit. Also, the aircraft had to be slowed topb before they could open the cockpitand if you will recall from the reports, tho anti-aircraft fire was pretty accurate around Ouatenala City.

Theay cargo over-flights were routed in fron variousthat the opposing forces could not determine the location of ourT-hle arrived in combat ready condition. These aircraft werefrom tho air mission toi*1

turn, bought two of the aircraft and tried, on several occasions, tothird fighter frcmL Jbut were unsuccessful until the^iast fewthe fighting in getting the third fighterto

keep this thirdin combat-reaay condition to defend

SOMERSET air field andC- Jin case of an attack. During theof the operationere alao used to naks firing passescities to let the people know that CALLIOERIS had air powerhis forces. The spare parts forrrivedtair mission personnel handled the unloading and the turning- *art* *eat SOMERSET. The

ZX, in turn, made theae spare parts available to ua for use in our operation, however, the one thing that we needed most for thethe tail wheel tires, were not sent down along with the rest of the spare parts for. hortage of tail wheal tires forade it so thatighter would land we would immediately have to take the tail wheel off that fighter and put tt onto the next fighter ao that it could get offission. This was solved, however, by the arrival of several tail wheels and tires from FJHOPEFUL.

The armorer who was recruited in Miami arrived in SOMERSET andwith the general setup of the operation and with thesoon became apparent he would be acreiability than anIt was decided to return him to the United States. During thawe were trying to get8 into commission and trying toporta for7 the air mission neraonnel were veryus. They even discouraged the

freius. The air mission personnel were disappointedwere selling us8 and the air mission personnel

hac putood bit of time tryingt back intodid not feel that lt was right to sell the

ouple of Americans who were down in Nicaragua for mercenary reasons. However, this was all smoothed over

. fx clf fwlp

koep the operation wellhink it was on two occasions thatto borrow bombs fror.fl.but this.was caused by our trying tonore on hand at SOMERSET than was absolutely necessary and becausean inspection team to arrive most any day, We tried to flyfrom FJHOPEFUL just before they were needed or at least keep apile at SOMERSET, As the operation grew, we had to arranse formore space in ths one available building ao the

Xi Mrtalmy haveig help. The

the identityo hide

personnel were doubled up again. These people certainly gave us as fine as support as we can expect to get in any operation that is undertaken in any other countrv.


The fighter pilots were checked out and briefed into theommon radio frequency was installed in the fighter and cargo planes so that thoy would have inter-plane communications. Code words were used to keep the trafficinimum. We were unfortunate in having one of our fighters crash at SOMERSET during landing upon the returnmission. The aircraft skidded off the right side of the runway and was apparently damaged very little, jgave an order that this aircraft had bo be removed frora tha runway area"prior to daylight C-

jTheretorm and driving rain inwhile they were trying to set the fighter upon its wheels and timeshort,towed the fighter off which resulted

in severe damage to the left wing of the aircraft. This aircraft wasspare parts durine the remainder of the operation. . Airwho in turn trained and assisted our

personnel in loading and arming bombs and loading and adjusting the maehine guns in the fighters. An armor specialist waa rushed from the States, but he arrivedew days before the operation ended. The mountainous terrain, poor weather conditions, lackadio-honing device in thethe relatively long flight to and from the target area with no alternate airfield if SOMERSET closed down with weather, made the fighterittle difficult. It caused the fighter pilots who were not familiar with tho area to be apprehensive about the missions. as the pilots became familiar with the area they became more agressive about going on missions even when the weather was doubtful, which was cuite often.

could see our

fighters taxiing out for take off and, of course, the fighters hadswinging from the bomb shackle* To rensdy the chance of tharecognized, we painted tha bombs silver in hopes that the peoplewould think that the bombs were actually gas tanks

or" an Integral part of tho aircraft.

kthe cai6o

the ground commander at Chiquinula callad for air strikes so

The request came in from the field few gasoline and foodP^ed on the looal market and Aof

or -ntinual landing

t to Chiquimula

pUoturt although tha aircraft

5 sSHiaSs.waa- ss> ins



Sor^no serious Problems in the air borne coanrunications after the VHF crystals vrere received.

?^UnlC2tifw KithoBraand Post: Before the Field

reeZ? ITSV t0Ot UnuSual toTw ours aftep the time tbe support was ttoTCP moS^was helped considerably^ ThL'S^In ? ir operations at


craft should be in place before operations start.

of-Bundles to be Air Propped!

The average bundle to be air dropped was entirely too heavy. undle weighed over UOO pounds limitingaximum of three the number which could be stacked in the door and dropped in one passover thedrop zono. Then the aircraft had to cirole until the other bundles could be moved to the door and bo discharged. This proved to be very time consuming in ths drop zone area and wasask for thehandle JjOO# bundlesoving aircraft. Also, these bundles must have been some problem to the personnel on the ground in that they had to move them from the drop zone. ecommend that ths bundles not weigh over SCO* in future operations unless itesupply drop such as was taking place at Chiquimula where our forces had trucks on the

drop zone. E, General r

The Field Commander and Air Operations Officer worked in close harmony throughout the entire operationersonally feel that they bothuperior job andreat deal of credit for what they accomplished. eel very proud to have

^work^or0 had **


AHD Assistant Air Operations Officer Captain


It must be clearly understood that the remarks which follow are intendedritique and analfcls and are not to be in any way construed as criticism, PBSUCCESS is now complete and its accompliahraentsatter of record; however, in addition to fulfilling the goala originallyelieve much value can be gained from PBSUCCESS by an objective critique and analysis of all aspects of the operation. The main body of this report will consist of comments on various categories among which will be included ny own duties and responsibilities aa Assistant Air Operations Officer.


A. Communications:

In an operation of this sort communications are liaturrclly onekey items. Fronave seen the Office of Cceasuni cat ions hassupported this project and given it superior support from an equipment stand point and from the stand point of the competency of the communicationa personnel Involved. The somewhat serious deficiencies which did arise appear to have been due to last minute or uncoordinated changes in operational plans which precluded proper communieationa planning Items which caused trouble, such as shortagea of coda clerks and operators at key points and delays in getting messages from the commo centers to tha recipients, are certainly itetoa which chould have been avoided if the requirements had bean known in time and properly allowed fcr. roject of thia type it ia often essential that the senderessage know when and if the message was received by the. the way LINCOLN was aet up all concerned ahould have known thatatter of minutesessage was decoded it would be in the handsesponsible staff officer and consideration being given as to action required. This was not the case with the field or with Headquartersj consequently,hich was guiding the operation, frequently did not know if itseen received and were being considered for action. Thia was particularly crucial as LINCOLN was in the middle, between the field and Headquarters, with messages constantly coming in from one or the other requiring knowledge of what both were doing. The same thing appears to have been true as regards connunications between the Field Command Post and SOMERSET in that requests for support from FCP were received at SOMERSET after the time specified In the requeat for the support to take place. Conversely, FCP would request support and not know untilime later whether the support had been forthcoming. The tine lags in all communication nets should be subject to determination and known to all concerned. The heavy reliance upon cable trafficroject of this type makes it imperative that all personnel involved be thoroughly versed in the use of Cablese to reduce coroo load and also in the techniques of cable clarity. Regardless of the lengthessage or the time of transmission it is utterly useless if its Bjeaning la not clear or if its meaning ia subject to Interpretation. The handling

of cable traffic at LINCOLN appeared eapecially effective aad the method used to file cables for reference vas very good. The amount of incoming and outgoing cable traffic waa tremendous and it isurvey of this traffic to establish guidance for future operations would be of great value. It is assumed that the Office of Communications willetailed analysis and report on the communications aspects of PBSUCCESS.


The recruitment of air crews proved toery special problem in view of the time factors involved and also due to tho problems inherent in tha nature of air operations. Last minute restrictions on the use of

J crows and the approval for tactical air support made recruitment of airatter of utmost urgency and in the tine allowed the necessary contacts could not be properly established. This time faotor plus the security factor madeifficult task to recruit air crew members. esult we ended up trying to recruit pilots and mechanics who could leave immediately, if not sooner,omewhat shady sounding proposition to an areanown shooting war was going on. Naturally, in view of ths time element, we were notosition toroup of prospective recruits and pick out the best and concentrate on thea. We were almost forced to take anything that came along whichar froa idealing at it in this manner, first impressions weigh very heavily and the person doing the recruiting mustompetent air man familiar with tha requirements of the work and capable of judging the qualifications of the recruits. The story used in recruiting the unwitting air crew members waa that the person doing the recruitingepresentative of the exile Guatemalan government which was attempting to regain power in Guatemala. The anti-Commie aspect of the employment waa stressed along with the monetary benefits which, in my opinion, were quite substanial, but proper. Pilots wereonth with the minimum guarantee of two months which gave them0 per successful mission bonus. Kechanias werealaryer month with the minimum of two months work and no bonus. AH personnel involved were givenpenss money to go toManagua and were authoriseday per diem. The recruits were told that the contracts would have to be signed in Managua which madeittle harder to sell because they were more or lessoke and were being told to take tbe expense money and if they didn't like it when they got there, they could return to Miami, but due to the time element they would have to sever whatover ties thay had here quickly andhance on some unknown situation. They were also told that half of their money would be given thea in advance and the balance placed in the bank in escrow in Nicaragua. This was not particularly appealing in that they wduld never know if they were going to get the money out and back to their families. If contracts could have been signed here, half the money given to them here, and the remaining money placed in escrow in the Unitedelieve it would havo been much easier to get personnel. The usual approach was to get the namerospective pilot or mechanic or Wniwror uncleared contact, as the case may be, such asC

Jin Fort Lauderdale who would give names of people "ho he leu were qualified and who night be available. The person doing tho recruiting would then contact the individual using an alias and give the aforementioned story. Previous contacts and meetings had taken place in motels or roomsmall hotel and it was recommended to me that thisontinued. After several dealings of thisound myselfwith it and in the future wouldifferent procedure as follows: As one of the main things which seems to be needed is to lendura of respectability to the employment and to putood front, it culd sees to me much more advisable tooom in one of tha largest -otels in Miami or even out on Miami Beach. This not only lends some

individual will swing the deal in mostPOLICY OuTDAKCE

substance to the person doing the recruiting, but also appears betterecurity viewpointotel of that type you are more easily lost in the shuffle and lt does not look strange tojrber of people coning up and asking for you and then- going up to your room. Long distance calls, roon service, and things of that nature stand outnail place making it seem more adviaable to do itig -time basisarge establishment. The cloak-and-dagger, furtive type of dealing must be eliminated as much as possible as it only stands out in the mind of the prospective recruit and makes him much harder to deal with. Most of ths recruits with the proper experience ore at least in their thirties andonsequence have families, obligations and even though the money is attractive and the cause seemsittle something extra is needed to push them over and lt is believedeal show of confidence and frankness will do much to overcome any qualmsecruit may have. One thing whichittle difficult was establishing the initial contact with the prospective recruits. The recruiter would call and the recruit would not be hone so they would ask where they couldessage. Unless the nan doing theing ia established full timeotel, some kind of cut-out ia neceasary. The use of actual home phoneeal or assumed name seemed inadvisable. One gimmick triedhone-answering service, the number of which was left at the recruit's home and where he could call andessage. Again it left an aura of shadinessknew Just where youcan't be located, I'll call you, don't call me" type ofshould be avoided if possible. Also the factor of the times when tho recruits are available to be interviewed, the standing-by for phone calls, the need to sec them off if they do accept the contract, all make it necessary that the person doing the recruiting do lt almostull-tine basis if there ia any urgency, orart-time basis if done far enough ahead of time so that it can be stretched out and not interfere with normal duties. The existing, situation where it was tried to sandwich recruiting in with thehour day achedule made it almost impossible to conduct it properlyreat many messages were missed and people not contacted due to the unavailability of the person doing the recruiting. ideeel it should be added that taking prospective recruits and their families to dinner and entertainingittle proved very valuable in that the wife was able to hear herself that the pitch waa and to make her decision which in all cases heavily influenced the decision of the husband-recruit. Asking married recruits to meet you at some small motel in the wea hours of the night is not very conducive to getting the right kind of people of getting their families to accept their employment. Along these same lines, the objections of the wife were the main thing that killed off many good prospecta. Again it is feltarge, classy hotelood dinnerrank discussion of all elements involvedersonable

individualI auino

roject of thia type it is most important that all possible policy be firmly established andethod Is available to all concerned to obtain policy clarification or additional guidance. Soon after the operation began,une, it became evident that operational control of all field elements would have to be given to the Field Commander who would then operate under existing policy and bogi^en all possible policy guidance. One of the complications was that when additional policy guidance was requested by the Field rosanndar it was at times difficult for LltCOLH and, most assuredly it was even more difficult for Headquarters, to properly furnish such policy guidance in viewof the fact that detailed, intimate knowledge of the situation in the Field was not present. 'Along these same lines many policy

problems could have beer, anticipated end worked out ahead of tine if .HMCOLH and headquarters hadittle nore fully what the plans of the Field Commander were* It-must be made, clear at this point that this was no fault of the Field Commander's in that his situation was somewhat the same and be waa not too sure Just what the status of his forces and their requirements wore. There appears to haveeeling at many levels that when things looked bad it would be better not to sayalong the lines "there Is no use of upsetting all thoseeel that this resulted in many casesin LUCOU* and Headquarters making policy decisions or attempting to foresee policy complicationsrue knowledge of the situation, this attitude of withholding bad news nay have been fully Juatifled, but In any event lt is regrettable. In order to make proper operational decisions and certainly in order to write policy as detailed and asioture of the operational aituation as can be had lt moat necessary. It is realized that thia is atomplicated and most difficult problem which certainly makes it all the noreetailed analysiserious attempt at improving things of thia nature. Many things such as the procurement and stock-piling of bombs and ammo andlstandby status pointed up the need for foreseeing, various policy modifications and changes which, if accepted, would require much time and difficult coordination to implement. Therefore, all posaible and practicable atepa ahould be taken to get everything all lined up In the event that the policy decision la made along the lines which are being prepared for. This at timea becomes most expensive and may result in what appears toaste of effort, but when time is of the essence as in programs of this type, especially after things really start rolling, there is no alternative except to prepare for all contingencies and have as much aa possibletandby basis.

Cos of.the worst things which can happen is policy vacillation. Due to the tire elements involved and the complex structure with possibly two or three countries involved and several individuals in each, policy must be as clear as possible and changes made carefully and with due consideration to all their effects. Vacillating or indecisive policy guidance not onlyiaruptive effect on the morale of all concerned, particularly under operational atress, but lt also seriously hinders operations by bringing about undesirable situations which themselves engender tho need for more policy guidance, which in turn accentuatea the diaruptive effect of policy vacillation. ide issue of thia point is the rather evident need for an operation of this type to be runeam work basia. In order for this to be done all concerned must participate in policy matters aa much aa poaaible In line with their responsibilities and capabilities. The proa and cons of policy must be open to question and the reasona for the policy should be known as much as possible by those who hsve tohen if there is disagreement or lack of comprehension of the policy lt must still be adhered to in spirit and in letter.


roject of this type and particularly at LINCOLN the staff officers played an important role in providing assistance to.those In charge of the project. The time element involved in tbe operation and the trenendoua flow of traffic made it imperative that staff officers be available at all -tinea to handle matters in their field of responsibility. It goes without saying that the staff offloera should havo as detailed an understanding of all elements of the project as ia poaaibleincere desire to accomplish tbe Job. Professional competency la, ofasic prerequisite, but even more important is the exercise of initiative and the ability to present

ore's ovn views..and to listen to those of others. The staff officer must be constantly on the alert for anything which will in any manner effect his responsibilitiesI or even an Administrative or financial matter could in many ways effect Air Operations) and conse- -fluently all traffic must be reviewed and analyzed to determine its effect on the sphere of responsibility of the staff officeronversely, the effect upon other operations or.spheres of responsibility of an indi- -victual staff officer's actions should be pointed out to the staff officer concerned so that he can analyze tha effect on his responsibilities and take the necessary action or work up compromisell aspects of the program are naturally Intricately woven together and must be treated as such. Consequently, the staff officer mustnowledge of all aspects of the programympathy for the problems of others. All actions taken must be for the good of the projecthole and not aimed only at one particular aspect with no thought given to the over all effect. This again beccnes the responsibility of the staff officer to insure that this holds true and to bring to the attention of those in charge of the projeot any matters which he feels will not maximize the chances of the project to be successful. The only justification for the existencetaff officer is to guide, advise and support others* E. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT AND FINANCE

The administrative and financial support on PBSUCCESS was outstanding and the main reason for this was that it was operated trulyupport element. All too often in governmental activities the administrative and financial support loses sight of the fact that lt isupport element and attempts toontrol element. An important part of the work of administrative and financial support is to see that thegets its gonoy's worth, but this ia not the primary reason for administrative and financial support sections. Basic justification for for thia type of support is exactlygive all requiredand financial support toward the success of the project. This may sound very elemental, but it is so often overlooked with consequential, detrimental effect that it should be stressed and full advantage should be taken of every opportunity to encourage tbe proper type of supportSimple administrative and financial rules and regulations are certainly necessary and the need for compliance with them seems obvious. In the case of PBSUCCESS it is felt that the administrative and finance regulations wore very effective and were adhered toost satisfactory manner. The importance of the multitude of details which were accomplished ranging from the provision of office supplies to furnishingillion dollars in advances shouldnot be underestimated. Aside from the actual contribution of such details to tbe successful complstion of the project, the value of permitting staff personnel to concentrate on operational matters while feeling certain that no serious lapse will occur in the administrative and financial matters, is incalculable and must be given full weight. To sub this subject up it should be emphasized that in order for any project to succeed the support approach must be "how will we do it" not "why we can't d> It". The entire approach of PBSUCCESS support waa aimed at getting the job done, and it got done.


As'was proper most of the intelligence work was done long before my arrival at LINCOLN;m not familiar with how much waa actually available and howmuch could or should have been available. an certainly say this much, that allver needed was available. In fact, it was not not only available to me but anyequested


hC BXSCt nannerI.desired. One thingat" 6it could toe


The cover story and physical security measures' at LIHCOLH appeared very effective. The concept of having tho Security Officer as an integral part of the staff seemed particularly valuable in that security problems vero anticipated and/or handled as they arose during tho day by day development of the program.


The logistic support of PBSUCCESS was particularly successful andof what can be done when all tha personnel involvod aroanxious to get the job done. Much of the logisticsrgent priority basis and was done by airlift. Tneto Panama of large quantities of support Items such asand various types of armament was handled at Headquartersnoat expeditious manner and clearly reflected the professionalspirit ofof all concerned. Further movement ofaccomplishedelative few number of people

and toward the end oruy one aircraft and one crew were available for this support. Again the relatively late introduction of tactical air introduced serious problems which were overcome by the combined efforts of allober view of how thin our personnel and assets were stretched clearly shows the amazing Job done by our people in the field, but at the same timeit frightening inelative minor breakdown would have caused serious complications. Again, the need for professional people whose only desire ia to get the Job done and who can anticipate requirements and cope quickly with difficult problems is clearly indicated, ethod forneeded supplies and transporting them rapidlylniwnm of red tape and adminiatrativa delays is absolutely essentialroject of this type. It is foolish to state that all requirements should bo planned and properly processed when the operational situation is such that the thing has to be played by ear* One thing that must be remembered is that while getting too many supplies may be wasteful, not getting enough may be catastrophic*



lh Jun

iles weet of DZ. Hade drop

on lights, (Drop later reported con-proniaed.)

8 Zl So roceptlon. Returned with cargo.

IS Jun

2 eturned with cargo.

i Z2 reception. Returned with cargo.


3 No reception. Returned with cargo.


lio reception. Returnod with u reception. Returned with cargo,

9 , No reception. Returned with cargo,


-OOfcO Rc- No reception. Returned with cargo,


3-A No roccption. Returned with cargo.

9 _FQ

OO5 weather in area too low. Z9 cargo*

6 Z9 Dropped to light pattern.

Dropped to blinking light and pat-


i5 2 , No reception teaai Nine bundlea inun-

dlea NE ofd:,.

C-10 un>

C-19 un.



91 un


E, 2A

5 CF92U3 Prim E,ec $k

No reception team at. "T" Panel and reception team otundle. No reception at Jutiapa. E, and 6A;

Reception team at0 waving white cloth. Delivered cargo. One "A" chute stoamerod.

Reception team located and cargo dropped to approximatelyen at DZ.


IB, No signals at1 but team present.

IF Dropped cargo. No signal or team at

Returned with bundle.


bs food

reception. Returned with cargo.

une Not


Dropped on oir fiold. Team spread xhite drums gas sheet. Truck waiting. Dropped alln Ii




C-27 CS Jul








2 ga3 drim

Not DZ. Dropped on2 ant} crowd seen gathering bundles. tates his Intel net picked up msg that Ouat troops had re-captured Rios prior our drop and we supplied enemy troops.

a, 2F

No reception team atropped to DZ narhed with white Thirty-=anparty waiting.

Dropped to two DZ's in main body. Observed our troops loading cargo 'into truck.

No signals or panel3 found. Cargo returned.

8 drums gas,6bx Cargo dolivored toaoo andE of Chiquimula.

Both DZ's marked with panels.

x Dropped two bundles to tenlbx 9mm near DZ waving towels.nd ammo.















Bi 9

Bead Northb frogs Frog bombs dropped from No O lb frags ulawla along road aod rr to la cape.

Minimumooplu on DZ waving to fc/C. Cargo delive red.

Clouds obscured primary DZ. Dropped cargo on throe* at Chiquimula.

8 drums raa- Esquipulas strip deserted,0 Landed at Chiquimula and uo-pd. frag bombs loaded cargo.

d frags Dropped frags on hill atlong rr station and do bridge at

Dropped cargo to reception team at Chiquimula air strip.

acapa arearums. Zacapa area 0 bundles

Dropped cargo to reception at Chiquimula air strip.

Two bundles to four menX at hoe dies totemite flags at

ds food

Weather poor, circled one hourbefore getting Intodropped

Weather poor. Dropped cargo in five passes all on DZ.



c. 1










ds ammo, CADICK returned SOMERSET. mortars, rough and will be used onlyrequirements.

Cargo do live red after1 hourin. Medical kits,

first aidsuao to

CMquianila ifles

Cargo dropped airfield. ldgs with largo red crosses in Zacapa.

rog .TO lbs.rogds.

No reception teamropped frag bombs on Zacapa; dive bombed truck -hit. Bundle dropped advance forces Chlqul-aula.

Return CALU- CALLIOERIS returned SOhERSfcT.OMERSET Stated pilot ok that crash

landed Chiquimula. Aircraft

complete loss.

Searched area one hourin. No reception located. Returned with cargo.













uat City


WiS Armed recon 0 lb. Chlqu Inula


O7OO-IO3O Anted recon d. Chiquimula and Gualan


Ftr.hen leaflets over Ouat City. Flrod MO in air.

Engine trouble

oles,ossill take two

Attempted knock out bridge near Zacapa.ombs duds.

Hit Zacapa Fortit HU section. Bothn RR Station was dud.

Weather poor, got lost. Dropped bombon hill SW LI Jicaro.










6 Jun.

F-20 ui-

Rk Bridgoe

So and No of Chiquimula


Chiquimula Chiquimula

b. Hit rr bridge south Chiquimula. omb hit north end . Damaged beyond use. omb completely destroyed rr Station at Gualan.

1 -on Gualan Station and tracks.

1 -bomb odgw on RR south town.

0 lb Bombed reported auto weapons in graveyard.

Train -Chiquimula

Cargo piano reported burning at graveyard, airport and oil tanks.

1rain weat of El Jicaro.

duds. Train strafed.

Finlab El Jicaro tratn.



Diveboabed Matamoroa. Three bombsin center.

tanks, Ouat City.

i0 Sano6rag Bombed rr bridge atEl-excellent result*. Jettisoned 2

cf II *

1llee eaat of Ouat City.

-boobs placed adjacent outside train of

rogs five trains In marshalling yards, Zacapa,


niln knocked out.

bs Bombs jottlaonud In eeo at

1 -passenger train pulling Into

rogs Zacapa Station. ombsR station and train.









gas tanks, Ouot City


Bridge at6

Zaoapa area


Zacapo Area

0 lbrags


FuelSan Jose Ccaaao, Ouat



Air otrlkeoe

rag Zacapo nroa clusters

jettisoned atifl'N,

let boob Bussed. 2nd bit base, an king big crack In concrete structure.

bombed aad strafed artillery spotted on hill at Clobbered Military jeep on road to Guat hade bomb run an AA Battery Ouat City,.


Dropped on hill at3 and near bridge


Mission aborted. Bombs jettisoned sea. Ko location given.

1st pass on tanks, bomb roleaae didn't work. 2ndear miss.

Bad weather, bombe Jettisoned in ocean. Ho location given.

Bombedarge gray bldg. ammo dump. Big secondary explosion. ropped on reported gun positions5 and

Blasted small trestle on apurline itaoapa and mg positions on hill.



5 une











Zacapa area, Pto Barrios



5 Zacapa

Zacapa Patrol

Bad weather, coiling too low. Bombsin ocoon off Somornet.

Weather low. Radio towers in bottom over-coot. Bombs landedds from bldg. Strafed gasone exploded.

Direct hit tfetamoros. Secondary explosion. Pilot observed big fire in fort.

Bombedrag cluster enemy troops at woodsI1. n center Zacapa airport to knock out field pieces. ombs dropped east Zacapa bridge on small ridge.

Unable get in due to weather.

Croanlanded noor Calligoris Hqs. Pilot sent Octepoque, Honduras. Pilot all right. complete loss. '

b Awiisien was roachsd tolackstation This particular phase of PBSUCCESS


Mr. C Jdsparted LDfCOUf v< Karen for FJHDPSFUL andthere onarchloaded with equipaent, for

SOMEP-iST. No ccniplicationa were encountered upon arrival. Heavier pieces of gear were stowed at SOMERSET end the remainder of the equipment was moved to SARANAC.

Onarch PIVALL Jarraicedeeting withC owever, was not availableeeting was held Therein besan,the long and frustrating negotiations for

r-ot reject tho principal request but had many

direct and unonsweraoie questions pertaininR to the functionsU0CFSS complex. Actually, f Jhad little authoritydid create the lmpressionfrhd this was at the firstho could do ncihing^for us .without consulting/" heterminatedan answer to our request within


Tour days passed and no answer. Qreries to meet againa reply us re matpical "nanana" or "women tito*conversationsheld on several occasions. Moat

ofconversations wereiead*.ng and explanatory nature concerning tha security of the broadcast operation. Bold and actually forceful assurcnessroadcast of this nature could not be definitely located broucht a'jont another promiseite would be provided.

SARAKAC was offoredite. This wss not acceptable primarily because of training activities which were nbt compatible with black broadcasting,

was offered. Now,

this cite was actually ideal both from the standpoint of security and appliedillty to other phases of commo operation. There was one,remendous ono, disadvantage to thisogistical. As"it turned out thore were noorcit capable of moving the necessary squlpnect to ths island.

In the meantime, two additional personnel

arrived. We were now ready to effect installation and go into irEsdiate operation, if andite was located.

Our effort seemed to boc dew ar* ascut,antase vzaWithin

twoshort curt talksand

^ J, SHERWOOD was given the grern light and numerous sites wore offered.


Of three sites reconnoitered, one locatedselected. This particular site was onarm and

was well hidden-from the0 yards. Physically, the building was in deplorable condition yet it would provide the necee-oary shelter for our equipment. Surrounding terrain was-ideal for erectionairly well disguised antenna which would give our broadcast signal an excellent chance of penetrating the targot area.

With the usual delays caused byw-moving Latin customs we were not able to move our equipment into the building untilpril. Five days later all equipment was installed and ready to goow-power level. At that time we were awaiting the arrivalower generator which would enable us to go on high power. ay we were ready. Tapes arrived during the afternoon and SHERWOOD was on the sirCmomentarily). Almost every piece of equipment failed during the course of the first day's broadcasting. We did manage, however, to complete three complete two-hour inauguration programs.

From the opening day until the final broadcast0ingle program failed to be transmitted on schedule. This successful operation must be at least partially attributable to "Lady Luck."

Another commo phase of this operation dealt with radio circuits which wereoutine nature and were employedhannel for handling necessary staff communications.

A still further function of SHERWOOD was that of base station forgent radio circuits in the target area. Of thegents mounted, the base station came into contact Because/the specific area in which wo were operating, there were nany periods of poor communication encountered. On the whole, service to the agent operators could besuccessful and more than satisfactory.

Other duties in the field included necessary liaison to establish the initial steps in setting up the SOMERSET operation.




Onh, the Central Intelligence Agency dispatched me to Guatemala,as to operate aa an undercover agent, posingealthy American tourist and operating independently of the permanent CIA inatallation in that country. The background of my assignment was as follows:

By and large, executive power in Guatemala is centered in Guatemala City, the country's capital. Thus succeas or failure of the operation in the last analysis hinged upon our ability to wrest control of the city from the ARB2NZ Oovernment. Conversely, as long aa the ARBENZ regime could exercise sway over the city, local successes in the provinces would not necessarily have assured us victory.

ARBENZ and his advisers also recognised this strategic premise and were laying their plans accordingly. With the threat of angrowing daily, eapeclally since the arrival of the arras shipment in Puerto Barrioa, unprecedented measures were taken to ready the armed forces concentrated in Ouatenala City and the law enforcement agencies for the anticipated showdown. Repressive measures were stepped up and during the week beginningay, tho Guatemalan police struck ablow against the underground organisation of CASTILLO Armas. ariety of reasons we had not been able to stave off this event, whose success was mainly attributable to the insecure and thoroughlypractices in whioh the Guatemalan underground excelled.

'Jhile our undertaking was still in the planning phase, we had viewed this very developmentikely contingency. Ve had been reckoning with the possibilitytalemate at some stages of the revolt, irrespective of Insurgent successes in the provinces andof the scope of the Internal resistance whichnight be able to muster and actualise. Once that stalemate had been reached,

we knew that the factor of Guatemala Cityocal point of governmental strength would loom large. Something had to be done about this.

U. Tie knew that Guatemala City was the Achilles heel of our We had been unsuccessful in making serious inroads into the monolithic structure of government control over the armed forcesthere. The civilian roeistance organisation in Guatemala City was deplorably weak and exposed to the unceasing vigilance of the Government, the mounting fury of police terror, and communist depredations. There existed, bo the best of our knowledge, no serious fissures in the Array High Command's loyalty to President ARBENZ personally, although it ia only fair to say that the officers1 corps in its overwhelming majority had all along been strongly anti-Communist. The police, we found, was to all Intents and purposes Communist controlled.

5, In the light of such unfavorable auspicespeedyof the center of governmental atrength and in realisation of the

ovarriding Importance of the time element in all thia, we determined that an attempt would have to be made toesistance cell within the structure of the ARBENZ regime.

Ae an optimum we would have liked to obtain concrete assurance of major defections among tha troop units garrisoned in Guatemala City, once the internal uprising in the provinces hit its stride and military units in the provincial garrisons defied government control.

inimum, we were anxious toransfer of power from ARBSHZ to elements sympathetic to our cause, aheadilitary showdowneouldrolonged and bloody affair and which might well have resultedovernment victory.

The thesis was generally acceptedalace revolution "old style" would militate against the effectivenesshorough purge of all Communists and fellow travelling elements In Ouatenala. Although weopular uprisingast scale as aforhorough house-cleaning, we were naturally prepared toalace coup in preference to failure and defeat, provided we could be satisfied that the transfer of power thus engineered was notommunist ruse designed to mask the preservation ofinfluence and powerovernmental front. As subsequent developments proved,odge was In fact attempted and had it not been for the vigilance of our representatives in Guatemala City, might have succeeded.

The linchpin of President ARBENZ' control waa the Army High Command. As long as its fealty to tha President remained unimpaired, the chancesuccessful overthrow of his regime were scant.

Even peripheral defections in the provincial garrison towns could not make up for the continued allegiance of elite troops concentrated in the capital, and their defection could not be hoped for unleas andignificant element of the Army High Command decided to abandon the sinking ship.

To hasten this development by eatablishing lodgements ofwithin the Army High Command of Ouateraala was the specialon which my Agency ordered me to proceed to Guatemala.

It stands to reason that the tasksave beencould not in propriety be discharged byC ^personnel assigned to our ir.bassy whoss compromise would have disclosed beyond peradvonture that the conspiracy enjoyed official American backing. Por that very reason, it was clearly understood by all concerned, including ourthate apprehended in the performance of my mission, the bnlted States would merely accord me the customary protection to which all citisens abroad are entitled, but would disavow all knowledge of my mission.

The only facilities toid have access, were the C- Jnow* throughould ewrainicate

wivh the regional headquarterrC nd with the Director in Washington.

11 Onntroduced myself to Colonel of an organisation composed of


Guatemalan exilesew prominent and independently wealthy United States citizens dedicated to the cause of overthrowing theegime.

Hi. xplained tohat the Americans participating in tola endeavor-were not in any manner answerable to the United States government. eft no doubt In his mind that we were acting within the framework of United States foreign policy which had resolved tnat Communist ascendancy in Guatemalairect and major threat to the security of the United States in the Veotern Hemisphere and which for that reason was looking with favor upon any attemptby patriotic Guatemalan elements to break the Comunist

15. It should be notedactignificance transcending this particular operation that Colonel X,eriod of considerable doubt, decided to cooperate with us mainly on the strength of histhat this undertaking was backed by the United States, He may or may not have swallowed my story that the United States Government was not involved. He may have believed my protestations that this wasuatemalan undertaking. Thia matter was never raised between us again.

Psrsistent demands for tangible manifestationsd.?Jt!tesculminating in an almost vehement insistence that military objectives in the capital of his own country be subjected to air bORbardment suggested to my mind that he viewed this whole affair in the context of the worldwide struggle between the United States and Soviet imperialism. His decision to atake his life and career on what ne must have realized waa an exceedingly hazardous venture stemmedfrom his conviction that in so doing he was aligning himself with the United States.

eri0ci of almost two months.urnished high-level intelligence,ave beenontributed to the suocess of the operation. It should be stressed that lie did soime when our fortunes uere at their lowest ebb and that his trust in our good -aith and in our professional competence was never seriously shaken -not even when tne whole structure of the internal resistance organization caveo m.

I cannot help but feel thatust have known that he was working for the US intelligence service. However, it should be stressed that at no tine while this operation lasted was he provided with conclusive evidenceirect involvement of the United States Government and the prime requirement of non-attrlbutabUity remained inviolate all through this operation.

Hy attempts to recruit members of the Army High Command,the llinlster of Defense, Colonel SANCHEZ, and his chief assist-

SUff of tlle Guate"ttlan Army, Colonel PAMHSUO, met

watn vfte difficulties of unexpected severity and finally had to be abandoned so as not to jeopardize the security of Colonel X.

prioray Ionethrough the

invited SANCHEZ andLO to neat withh At that stage it was my intention to serve thorniat ultimatum ravher than wasting on them any further missionary efforts.

21. ound myself hamstrung, however,stipu-


lationas not to engage in any recruitment attempts under the

protection of hisestriction obviously imposed at the insistence

22. ae furthermore laboring under the handicap of not being able to deal with the aforementioned officersosition of strength. Rather than courting rebuff and possible compromise of Colonel X, Ithe engagement, being certain that the impact of governmentwould eventually convince then that they were backing the wrong horse. As it turned out, neitherivotal role in the regime's final undoing, and both, in the reflection of their enforced exile, are likoly to rue the day when they chose to ignore ray overtures.

likerresidentntil the moment of hie enforced abdication, remained in effective control of the governmental apparatus and any premature sally might have met with swift retribution. My instructions toad been all along to tread warily and not to stake tho few important assets which we had been able to develop,recipitate move.

25. The internalad promisedever materialized. Furthermore, the manifestations of United States backing to which all along he had pointed as an indispensable prerequisite for the successalace coup supported by the Army High Command, were somewhat slow in coming. In the end, all came out well.



Tba undersigned joined PBSUCCESS in3UFIRE offioer, Tter reading over tbe files availnble at Headquarters at that tine and having been briefed on the present status of the operation, the writer was assigned the specific task of proceeding to Honduras in order to study at first hand and report on those assets, particularly KUFIRE, which were reported to be controlled by the CALLIQERIS organization. During this ireliBlnary two-week assessment, the writer net CALLIGERIS and several of Ms senior staff members, host of the time was spent debriefing CALLIOEP.rS on the extent of his KUFIRE assets both within the target country and within those peripheral countries which had access to the target. Almost immediately two facts became obvious, and both were reported upon the writer's return to headquarters. Namely, that CALLIGERIS himself had very little speoific information regarding tbe names, identities, locations and little access to information of any of the members of his intelligence nets, particularly those within the target country. Secondly, lt appeared that althoughwas being produced by nets within the target country, until that time most of this information had not in fact come from well-placed or specifically trained intelligence agents buteries of informants or friends of CALLIGERIS or CALLIQERXS's staff who upon occasions reported bits of information and incidental intelligence which they felt would bo of value to him. With the exception of what later became theSIESKER net there was very little indication that CALLIGEaiS had anything whichlearly defined intelligence reporting structure*

It became the writer's job then to endeavor to establish within ths CALLIGERIS organization, using those assets which ware alrealy available anderies of intelligence nets in the target country, as wellE structure which would serve not only to police :the CALLIQERIS organization but also to establish effective penetrations in the enemy services both within the target country and her neighbors. In,view of pausity of information available outside tho target country concerning those assets which CALLIGERIS claimed to control inside, it was necessary torip into the target country in order to identify those assets and endeavor to establish the net structures discussed above*

According to information which had been supplied by CALLIQERIS, ths entire intelligence organization within the target area was being run by SEQUIN, with the aid of SEMANTIC andloser study of the situationicture that was somewhat different,. SSQUIH's poelton it that time could be better defined as that of an administrative coordinator, not entiroly responsible for intelligence, but also responsible for coor-ilnating efforts along the PP and PM lines in ths target area. SEQUIH's nain contribution in the intelligence field was his handling of SLEEKER through SETTLER. The SLEEKER/SETTLER complex had been producing fairly ell at thatut it was felt that muoh of their productionvo been obtained through overthe writer then met with SETTLERrder to debrief him thoroughly on the SLEEKER operation and instruct Tin on methods that were designed to make the best possible UBe of what

appeared to be an extremely useful Communist Party penetration* ifficulty which arose In this situation and which is in sent respects characteristic if all of the intellegence operations handled by the CALLIGERIS organisation ;ras that SETTLER hinaelf had very little information concerning SLEEKER'a identity, background, method of operation, motivation or reliability* The attitude adopted by SETTLER when Queried for more specific detailsSLEEKER and his operations was that there was really very little necessity ?or going deoper into the SLEEKER operation lined the fact that he wasinformation of considerable value to .us was sufficisnt proof of his bona fides* As maudlin as that concept may seem to anyoneeasonable degree of sophistication in Intelligence, it is Important to bear in mind that throughout the entire project that point of view was espoused time and time again by CALLIOERIS and several of his senior officers. Although CALLIOERIS was nore than willing to pay lip service to "getting to the bottom ofe never to the writer's knowledge took any positive action in this regard. The Inportance of thia concept should not besince lt is believed that in many ways it aervee to explain why much later In the project many of the intimate details promised by CALLIOERIS were never made available to KUBARX peraonnel.

Another problem which arose at the time of the writer's first tripatemala and which became Increasingly more serious as the projeot moved on was the lack of any functional division of responsibility throughout the CALLIOERIS organization. The three key CALLIGERIS men in the target, SEMANTIC, SECANT end SSQOIU. allultiplicity of functions. This not only had an adverse effect on security as far aa conpartmentatlon was concerned, but also created serious problems during ths last few months of ths operations, when the size and diversity of the jobs to be performed madeumanly impossible task for these threeand finally only SEMANTIC andbe responsible for accomplishing ths major part of the task which lay ahead. This againeflection of theOERIS method" which Involved the use of one or two trusted and covafeie foilovers to handle all of hlaworkiven area. Although It was originally contemplated that SEMANTIC was to be the Principal Agent for political and economic intelligence within tho target and that SECANT waa to be tho Principal Agent for the military intelligence, in the final analysis these intelligence functions accounted formall part of the work that they were to do* It Is indeed unfortunate that SEMKNTIC had ao little time to devote to intelligence, heistinct aptitude for this work and it Is believed that he could have accomplished condierably more than he did had his efforts not been constantly distracted by the myriad of other requirements placed upon him by CALLIOERIS.

After the existing nets and agents within the target country were identified and brought under some degree of control, SEMANTIC assumed the functionsoordinator of Intelligence and rapcrta officer for all the reports cooing out of the target. Re understood the baalc requirementsood Intelligence report and after several months was abte to turn out good political intelligence, properly scurced and with atreliminary evaluation on his part. In the field of military intelligence SEC/AT through Ms contacts in each of the military garrisons and his contacts with the officers on active duty within the military in Ouatenala City was able to turn out the first coherent order-of-battle report that had been received by us since the inception of the projeot. To the best of the writer's knowledge this report served as the basis for future order of battle planning. The greatest single failing of the military Intelligencewas its inability to produce specific answers to tha EEIs forwarded to the field by LINCOLN. AH of theae EEIs vere distributed to .SEMANTIC


ZCAI" and to SEMANTIC within the target with specific instructions that they carried the highest priority for Intelligence gathering. Inapite of the constant insistence on the part of the case officer both to CALLIERIS and to SECANT on the inportance of obtaining the specific information requested in the SEIs, it became obvious that CALLIQERIS felt that tho degree of detail which we were seeking was far more than that which he required touccessful military campaign. This opinion was voiced by CALLIGERIS to the writer onand it is believed that this accounts in part for his failure to produce through his nets tho Information which we required. It is worth while to note .here that although CALLIQERIS recognised the need for accurate and up-to-date intelligence, he consistently felt that our criteria and methods were far too advanced considering the capabilities and degree of sophistication on the enemy which we were confronting. This was truoarge degree in the military Intelligence reporting, but became much more apparent when our insistence for details delved into natters pertaining to counter-intelligence and security.

it is recognized that the Intelligence production of the CALLIGERIS assetsXCESS was extremely small and scanty when taxing into consideration the magnitude of the task which was set out to beaccomplished. Although some of the factors bearing on' this are being brought out in this report, it might be helpful to point out what tbe writer believes are the two most important contributing factors. First of all, CALLIGERIS never did recognize the need for efficient and Independent intelligence structure within his organisation. Ho effort had apparently been made to change CALLIGERIS'a viewpoint prior to the writer's arrival and many hours were thus necessarily spent tediously pointing out and explaining to CALLIGERIS the reasons whichuch tighter security and intelligence structure. It wae not until the White Paper incident in lateU that CALLIGERIS finally began toittle and recognized ths need for tightening up within his own organization and expanding his CE functions. Even after the Delgado Affair, CALLIGERIS's personal viewpoint did not change appreciably. Although he recognized in part the seriousness of the affair, when an effort was made to delve deeper into it, he brushed the matter off stating that he had already conducted his own investigation and was satisfied that he nowkknew the facts surrounding the Delgado case. (It is interesting to note here that several months after the Delgado afffairoutine meeting between the writer and CALLIQERIS, the latteroint of mentioning that we, "thehad actually failed in our responsibilities andonderful opportunity when we did not investigate fully the circumstances surrounding tha entire Delgado affair). Since all of the writer's dealings with the CALLIGERISwere done through CALLIQERIS, the letter's personal opinionsignificant effect on the actions taken by CALLIOERIS'son any given problem. This, of course. Is true of any organisation of the type with which we are dealing, but it seemed partlculary true in this oase since CALLIGERIS delegated practically no authority and thus would follow through On suggestions only whan he personallly felt that they were worth while.

The second factor which is believed to be responsible for the scant intelligence production within the CALLIOEHIS group is the fact that almost without exception all of those people charged with specific Intel* ligence functions, from principal agents down to informants, were all assigned, or were actually participating in, at least one or two other functions either within the PP or PM field,th the sole exception of sleeker and one or two other low-level informants, all of the personnel

within the intelligence structure were performing covert or semi-overt anti-Communist functions within the target. Their intelligenceamountedide line, and as pointed out above', most of their reporting consisted of items which came to their attention and which were forwarded to CALLIQERIS through either SECAOT or SEMANTIC for hie use. Ir.spite of all the writer's efforts to convince CALLIGERIS that an Intelligence structure should be entirely Independent of the military or PP aspects of the project, CALLIQERIS himself, as well ss others on his staff, always seemed to feel that in the final analysis intelligence was subordinate to military planning; Consequently, many well placed persons, who had they remained inconspicuous and covert would have boon able to produce considerable reliable Intelligence, found themselves blew, or forced into exile due to their semi-overt activitiesield other than intelligence. This practice was in effect long before the advent of PBSUCCESS and turned out to be almost impossible to change


One problem which the writer believes should beatter of record in the eventituation such as that whloh we have.recently experienced in PBSUCCESS ever develops again is. that of the qualifications of the XUBARK personnel sent to the field to make contact with' senior officials of foreign governments. Since an operation of this type by its nature precludes the use of official government channels for its communications and dealings with foreign officials; it is extremely important that the KUBARK personnel assigned the task of making overt representation to foreign governments, as spokesmenleaving it tacitly understood although not confirmed, that this "group" in fact is the United Statesave the stature, maturity and age qualifications as well as the professional ability required to perform their Job', Since the opinions formed by foreign government officials of the United States Oovernment and of KUBARK are based largely on impressions that they receive from thosewith whom they come in contact, it becomes extremely important to our efforts to maintain prestige abroad, for us to laave with theseeeling of high regard for our porfessional competence and seriousness of purpose.


The variety of problems encountered in endeavoring to maintain security and adequate cover for the personnel associated with this project has been covered elsewhere in this report, but certain specific comments as regards security and cover in the field will be touched on briefly with ths thought that they might provide some useful suggestions for future operations.

Probably the greatest single lesson In cover to be garnered from PBSUCCESS field operations is the pressing need for more extensive commercial cover facilities particulary in the area covered by thia operation* Short range ccmercial cover can be provided fairly easily through the use of legitimate or notional concerns who would have reason to send representativesiven countryhort period of time on legitimate business. This system worked well in PBSUCCESS forwho were required to make one or possibly two snort tripsiven country and who were not to remain for periods in excess of one or possibly two weeks. Short range cover was also provided through the use of tourist cover, but the shortcomings of this can easily be seen in that this type of cover usually precludes returning

ountryecond trip and in many areas of South and Central America would nol pemit the traveler to remain in an area for noreew days.

In some of the larger capitals in Southlimsy commercial cover is sometimes all that is needed to cover tho cursoryerson night receiveotel, bar, plane,ut in most of the ensiler capitals end cities throughout Central America, the provincialism and busy-body attitude of most of the resident American populationthe useuch firmer and better back-stopped cover. ense the degree of depth and plausibility of cover requirediven individual bears an inverse relationship to ths site of the city that he is about to visit. The development of an extensive resident contract agent program, even though no immediate use is seen for these agonts, is something that the writer feels would yield substantial dividends were we ever called upon to mount,hort period of time, another operation callingroup of Americans to establisheal-permanent residence.

Field Oserntiujta

The details on the HI, PI and PP aspects of the operation have been covered in separate reports, therfore, this villhort constructive critlcisa and consents on the coordination of the three fields of operation*

The problem of selection of competent, trained indigenous personnel to fulfill certain specific Jobs waa great, and to keep the selected personneliven Job was still more difficult. At first it was difficult to get Colonel Castillo to delegate authority to his staff. He wouldew competent men, aome of whoa bad been given PI or PP jobs, toultitude of miscellaneous taaks, therefore, never leaving them enough time to do the job they were responsible for. Thia situation never completely cleared up, especially in PI since the man responsible for Intelligence was also the nan with all the contacts in Hondusas and tha Colonel's right-hand man.

Since ths whole project was geared toM operation and there didhortage of personnel, all effort waa made to give PMriority. These included preparing, briefing and dispatching, organisers, sab leaders and the infiltration of anas. In the middle cf this was the docking of theat Puerto Barrios with arms which

meant the preparation and dlepatch of special eab teams.

These special operations compromised many of the routes across the frontier and the action alerted the enemy to set up patrols along the border. One other operation that hampered the infiltration of personnel and juat about stopped the infiltration of arms was the first propaganda leaflet drop over Guatemala City. This dropremendously good PP effect, but the Liming of it was prematurewith the state of the PM operations. The field knew nothing about the drop until after lt was made. The field would have probably conoured with the drop since it was only afterwards that the effects on the PM operations were really felt. Shortly after the drop the ARBENZ Government cancelled all civil liberties and constitutional rights, grounded all private planes, started an active border patrol and started rounding up and torturing all anti-Cotnaunlsts, This crackdown rolledarge portion of the leaders in the'ma* internal- TM two top internal leaders,C.

J Ihad to exile themaelvea in the

Ecuardoran and Selvadoran Embassies respectively. Many of the other top echelon also went agile-htn^m. y uio ,left-

3 but even these two people haa to leave Guatemala uity and move to the Ganales area.

During this period radio operators were being infiltrated,andsftltrated, arm*flown intoC.

north of San Jose, bjthe tvro Cessna ISO's.

Each plane would carry0 pounds of gear.

Alao through this same route, radio operators, sab menInfiltrated. In Kondi'rna movedfield by trucksto

the forward staging areas. This large movement of arms within Honduras was delayed until the last possible day because of the alert it would cause in that country and becauss of the strike situation on the North Coast of Honduras. The strike hurt curof movement tremendously since the Hondunen army and police wore all alerted to watch for arms being sent from Guatemala to ths strikers. This caused many of our people to be picked up andwe wore able to get them relosed, caused much delay.

Because tine was In favor of the ARBENZ Government, lt was necessary to move fast for an earliestay. The Internal organization was being closer controlled, the leaders had been exiled or eliminated, the Eonduran Government was under great preasure to expell Castillo Armas and his Guatemalan exiles, the OAS and UN were preparing inspection teens and bless the newspapermen who did their fair ahare in publicizing the affair.

Byune preparations were not ideal, but the aras andwere at the border and ready to move. The weather wasmovement scroaa the border onune was slow since noand all novensnt had to be over mountain andune Colonel Miguel Mendoza had captured EsquipulasErnesto Heiderheitmann had taken Casotan. These twolaunched from Kusva Ccotepeque and Cop an Ruinas. Colonelout of Florida onh and ont was on theOualan. Major Torrea and Peres moved out of Macuellzo on theTorres reached Entre Rios byt and Perez had

Ond Colonel Chajon retreated fron Quian threatened bysuperior force reinforced fron Zacapa. Major Torres retreated free the Puerto Barrios area and Perez was forceduatenalan Air Forcettack to abandon Morales. Perezundred men back to the Honduran border and returned to Tegucigalpa for new instructions, money for food and nore equipment. Major Torres was isolated between tha Montague and the Honduran border to the north. Perez was given food and arms and Instructed to move back into Morales. Major Torres and his men were pulled out of their position and given instructions to follow Perescrales,since this was the only place the hentagua could be crossed, andto Puerto Barrios. Since communications wore bad with this group it was not until the 3rd of Julyessage was received from this group over Tropical Radio that they were in control of Puerto Barrios and to send them shoes and food.

In the South Colonel Kendoza and Colonel Heiderheitmannat Vado Hondo. Colonel Castillo Joined them there. days of the fight were during the Chiquimula campaign2ltthh of June. Chajon was routed in Qui an,from Morales and Major Torres retreated from Entreweather grounded air support on the eve of the attackanddeserted that nighthad been defeated.extraordinary air to ground

support inollow-up as scon as the weather clearedood attack byJa was what tipped the balance.

iji completeew government,

whichbeen working on In Tegucigalpa, was


Preparations began immediately for the attack on Zacapa. The attack started onune, the sameease fire was rsriissted. The night ofune Colonel Castillo and Major Oliva met with the Zacapa Garrison commander and arranged tha surrender terms, ssages were received from Coban and Jutiapa that those two garrisonsalso ready to join Castillo Armas.

Onune Castillo Armas flew to San Salvador for thswith Colonel Elfego Monzon. On the somelew from Managua to Tegucigalpa, picked up Ambassador Ruben itelhao and Carlos Salazar, present Ouatemalan Foreign Minister, and took them to San Salvador where they wore to make final arrangements for the arrival of Colonel Castillo and the meeting. Fron San Salvador we picked up the? pilot at Hueva Qcotepeque, flew to Chiquimula and Esquipulas to make sure Colonel Castillo had departed, from there flew to Managua and delivered the pilot. The morningeparted Managua for Tegucigalpa. Upon reaching Tegucigalpa, Ambassador Villauer gave ne instructions to depart Immediately for San Salvador informing me that the meeting was not going well and that Castillo Armas was getting ready to depart for Chiquimula.

AmbassadorPeurifoy arrived in San Salvador from Ouatemalamorning ce afternoon andCastillo ArmasNo agreement had

been reached an**on the verge of breakingArmas,their whole group were very unhappy

with the terms and were ready to return to Chiquimula.



i mi Ambassador Peuiifoy the nightuly* im and pointed out the discontent in the The Ambassador informed me that he had Just receivedcall from the Secretary of State and had receivedto press for an agreement Immediately.. Be also pointedthe Junta would consist of five men with Colonel MonzonPresident for fifteen days at which time awould be elected. as not satisfied with themy latest instructions had been to helpossibly could and not allow the meetings too the Presidential Palace and contacted CastilloAmbassador Peurifoy had already informed then

the "Group" was cancelling their support, including air, ifnot agree to the above terms. irst talked to Castilloo'clock in the morning of the second. He was unhappy withbut willing to acceptIf that was the desire ofhen talkedwas much more

difficult to convince. He claimed he woula have no part inof such an agreement. We finally got around thishaving only the twom the agreement and nottwo legal advisors did the rest of

Castillo's group, felt they had won the battle and lostonvinced more by fatigue thanCarlos Salazar agreed to rewrite the terms

since they had been very poorjy written by Horizon's lawyers. At U'-h5 am tho agreement was signed. 'clock the same morning Castillo left for Chiquimula to check his command post and explain the terns of the agreeera nt to his field commanders, including Major Ollva who had returned to Chiquimula the day before just in case Castillo would not be allowed to leave Salvador. Ollva had instructions to continue the marchuly.

Castillo returned to San Salvadoruly after spending the nightuly in Tegucigalpa, From San Salvador Castillo flew to Guatemala City with Colonel Mortzon and Ambassador Purifoy.

i flew to Guatemala Cityuly after gathering the gearshop in Tegucigalpa. The situation in Guatemala Cityand the feeling of unrest nan high. Nothing had beencontrolling the Communists; Communist homes had not beenthe organization of the new government waseeting with Castillo Armas, Major Ollva and

early in theuly. Castillo claimed he had no controlarmy in Guatemala City and, therefore, could take no strongremovingof the Junta and getting control

of thead already discussed the

situation in detail. Thatold Castillo he had untiluly, to take over Presidency of the Junta and cut the Junta down to three men, himself as President, Major Olive and Colonelointed out this had to be done by this date to relieve the unrest and to cut the Junta down to working size so they could start taking the necessary action agains*bji tttjhad te be talwn. C



The unrest was somewhat relieveduly whan Castillo took over the Presidency of tbe Junta. Valenzuela in Honduras was ouch happier and President Scraoza wea tickled pink.

The appointment of tha Ministers was completed during the weekend and the following important appointments took place: Lt. Colonel Oscar ffendoza, Aray Chief of Staff; Colonel Fito Mendoaa, Chief of the Air Force; Colonel Emeato Keiderheitnann, Chief of the Base Milltar; Jose B. Linares, Chief of the Ouardla Judicial, and Colonel Kigual Mendosa had been offered the post as Chief of the Guardia Civil. The Governors in the Provinces were being changed as well as the Chiefs of tha Military Qarrisons.

My last meeting with Castillo Armas took pieceuly. He informed me he felt much nore secure aboutwould atart to take theaction. Isanea little

better, but still felt we could not loae control of Castillo. Until Castillo cleaned up the situation he did not feel the United States should recognize the new government or give them aid or the aircraft.

I turned over the contacts tcand visited

AmbassadorPeurifoy that afternoon before departing. Peurifoydisturbed that no concrete action had been taken againatI briefed him had taken place duringmeetings and howfelt about the situation.

He told ma that tbe United States was getting ready to reoognizo the new government and he did not believe he could stop it at that time. xplained to him that Castillo Armas was probably the best man we had at tha time, especially because of thswe had given him, but that he waatrong man and needed plenty of good, strong direction. Every effort waa made to give therue picture of the Existing situation.




PARTof the Operation

he Operation

ANNEXProgram .



this report the name SHERWOOD will denote th^feblandestine radio operation which was parteneral project designed to "remove the Comyunist government of Guatemala and replace it with one friendly to the United States, without bloodshed if

Mr. David PHILLIPS was named as Case Officer for the implementation and operation ofHILLIPS arrived at the baseithin the continental limits of the United States,, mi began preparations for the daily clandestine broadcasts which commenced1k and continuedi> when an armistice was signed and there no longer existed the need for "clandestine" operation..

SHERWOOD plans also called for an Orson Welles type "panicto coincideour.- Due to the impossibilityaour, this project was suspended. Therogram, however,is so greatiscussion of itsincluded in this report of Special Annex

The report is divided into two parts.- escribes the actual nistory of the operation, without comment. Part II is an analysis of the operationtudy of its achievements andith ano assisting future clandestine radio movements, especially in theHemis sro.



Tha Initial step for the Case Officeretailed study of the physical and psychological terrain of tha target country. Physically, tha target consisted of (l) the capital cityhe provinces of Guatemala. Psychologically, the target waa the combined population formed by tho inhabitants of the capital and the^rovinces. This group might have been broken down, roughly, in the following percentages.

Hard core of Communist

Public officials and Communist ayra-

pathiaors(aome motivated aa rriohof the United States aa

group of uninformed, apathetio,

"neutral"ort of


U. Urge group of moderately informed

listeners who deplored Communist -

influence but had beerfable to ooj^fi-n

heahlng about iyf,

5, Small band of militant anti-Communiata,

actively engaged in .

egime (seme in

The purpose of the clandestine broadcasts, of course, was to intimidate member* ofnd awing member* ofnto the ranks of group u, and in aoms caaes, group 5.

The second preparatory step for the Case Officerhorough, general study of the targetistory, legend, social structure, religion, and personal characteristic?.

The third move taken by the Case Officeretailed study of the operational plena and alms of other phases of the project in order to

PlaaS and" (OoaVAl* as possible with KUHOOK, KUOCWN operations.

The fourth step was the personal obeervatlon of the target country and its Inhabitants by0 Officer. To this end PHILLIPSour of Guatemala. areful investigation was made of the capital city and its surrounding towns. Street names, tranaportatlon systems, public utility lcyouta, military positions, legislativetc were observed. Oeneral terrain was covered during several days by foot,and small plane. In the limited time permitted, the provincea and pro vine Ul way of life were also studied.

Personal conversations wore undertaken with an authentic cross-section or tne population. Opinions ranging from strict Communist-line to bitter anti-Conmunist thinking were found. Tho people talked freely and without suspicion and the germane parts of their conversationa formed the basis on which all psychological efforts on the following broadcasts were based.

to neighboring countries irere made to evaluate general area reeling. ong conference with Colonel Ccrlos CASTILLO Armas and meters of bis command was an Invaluable baromstar for Judging program content.

walthe case officer

waa able to audition and recruit members of the SHERWXJDprbductlon team.

Tho Team

The final team selected for SHERWOOD wast

nrofessional radio annooivpt- And producer

w hV? tat0 eXil6- Mnof

byanU-CoBmotst gmatpn 0dlt*i


GROUP'S representatives in San *

t;tor thctLw?rk'ixed payment of

d childreS lived in SaT

during the period he worked on thee wasir because of hie accent, but he contributeda scri^wSiar?

workeTin the United



Tha production work waa dlrecUd tnr PHILLIPS. Physicalunder the responsibility of Kisswho expertly managed

the two aafe houses needed for living and workingas assigned by Cosmo.

The work of the above was carried oat in direct liaison withoffice of the project PHILLIPS worked under the direction ofKUGOWNclosely with ths finance

and security officers, and the technician with tho senior connunlcations officer.

The Physical Layout

The indigenous beam and its supervisors lived together in two safe houses, one in and anothernail city close to the central offica of the project.

Final sites were safe housesand UE". The studio and thsof the female contingent were in houseand the workingliving quarters of the males were in house In botholoaned and prepared meals under the supervision a'

House "pB was in the country, isolated, surroundedarge lam and fairly closeublic park. The main house contained three It was in this houseost of the activity was carried on.mall annex to the main house was ths studio. Here was installed the equipaent needod-for the recording of the programs.

earby city, isolated from neighbors by an axpansive yard.

of the SHERWOOD programs PHILLIPS, C

ft the United States and proceeded to an improvised

studiohort distance from the SHERWOOD tranamitters, locatedtablearm neor the capital nhlio sympathetic

"aSsolated home in theliving condiUons were of theo water, no furnitureproximity to the broadcasting studios cade it invaluable. Except UP"and nj9hed to the hfoadcasting trans-

The broadcasting transmitterowerful short wave unit which easily reached its audience within Ouatemala, as well as neighboraBgT republics. (And could be picked bp in the United States.) Thisomaunications center for field activities of the project.


n 1 h' ortunate date ss, after an official transmission of tho Labor Day festivities in the capital ell

BUii0n! Wat 0ffthe cuntry wanting

toadio broadcast was, of necessity, forced to turn to their short wave band. Thus, the chances of listeners occidontly stumbling across our programs was greatly increased. Moreover, this chance was heightened by the simple expedient of placing ads in the local papers.


'o"*Program representatives In Mexico City -ere toelegram to all newspaper editors in Guatemala City. The telegram askedalf-pate advertl..msnt be placed in the paper '

Utlonbegin operaUon the next daypecial program featuring,CANTINFTAS.

U0ntilaRram, signed

ictitious nameictitious firm titlelT

Tinstructed editors that they ahould collect from the representative orihe company who would be arriving the next day. would

ho.would talk to thea about future

advertisements. elegraphic room reservation was made for the notional representative, so that editors who checked would find that he was scheduled to visit the city. The telegrams arrived too late to catch ths evening papers, but two out of three of the morning papers carried the

,Xtthat ith no other program, to hear,tuned in or. the frecuencla. mentioned in large lettera in the ad to hear CWfTTNTUS . Payment for the two ads waa later sent to tt. appropriate editors through the mail.

-JJ!iflmto the aeriaa, plu.

a special program which purported to" describe the Key Day piJ-ade tisina


that intelligent llatenera would not be inaulted, but also styledt of the lea. ob.arving listener. TheMttnUS, Communist leader, was imitatedpeech, andof tha true government broadcaat revealed thatwaa reasonable,and

ay the programs entered theay" phase. Thia wasof the uphill campaign to create distrust in toeto inspire confidence in the phlegmatic anti-Commnist-programa Airing this period

Curpana HadialB(Our Radio Campaign). Explanation of thereaaoju^hind.our clandestine, SdSy w, iSreln^h. tir.

-Sangre da Martirea"(Blood ofull radio theatre'slthmusic, etc. whichJ5fBJ|Jathe torture and imprisonment if tnii^mMat'

tk.Soraoe" -and -DondeW. are. Whore Weton Movement'- what we inTended to','

vtdM wTriaSningT^^frT^ ^

U) "Rompiando Ua Cadenaa"CBreaking the Chains). An

ltimately breeze Rel oke. Individual and group instruction.. Beginning with passive re.iatance this program slowly built SutSc.ment.H-Jaf This waa t> program ?hat sparked ramous 32 campaign, gave individuals tool, with which to fight.

(5) "Pagando Centron(Bull'. Eye). Short spot program, andins witheffects, which apotlighted individual Cc^su ana^ -crime.. As often as possible, based on actual intelligence.


and Co-ntry). oman'sand writtenoman, giving females their angle In thehow they could

"Hiecellanea Musical delisc Jockey type of comedy shew. Quia programs, Jokes, poems,llharp needle of satire and ridicule against Red leaders and sympathisers.

"Alma Chapina." ationalistic program, featuring Indigenous marimba music, poem recitals, recounting of history and legend.

"Las No tic las atras Radio Librae ion." News summaries and reports that-press-censored Guatemalans might not otherwise know, with comments showing tho way the international press was thinking, and how the country

of its Rod affiliation* he of the worldesult

The regularly scheduled programs changed completely on tho advent of the move of the skeleton crew to the field and tha occurenceay.

The KUGCWN type of programing gavo way to an almost KUHOOK typo, reporting on battle action, defection, army losses, etc. Radio Llberacion also served as an information source for the world's newpaper and radio reporters and United Nations bodies. (See Part II fornd results of tho new type programming during tho action period.)


Members of the radio team were brought Into this country on round-trip plane tickets. They knew only that they were working for "Thehey were unaware of the physical location of the transmitter whichtho tapes which they preparedfexcept for the skeleton crew which later moved to the site.)

Owners of the two houses used wero told that radio programs were being prepared for the Latin commercial market, mostly translations of. shows. Employees who were near operations were also given thia cover story, which was never questioned.

Kail for tbe team was censored by supervising officers. All nail was dispatched and received at safe boxes in Mew Toric and Xaxioo.

Kerrbere of tbe team were never allowed to leave safe housescompany of one of the supervisory group. Trips to restaurants and rsre strictly limited and each team member was veil briefedcover story in the event he or she was questioned . Ro membersteam vers allowed to leave the United States unescorted untilwas

iolfa'snd equipment used in the safeterile manner. All documents were sterilisedat safe houses, Ambers of the crew werePHILLIPS,^ nd other supsivLorsY



The Case Officer's personal knowledge of the target country andts blunts wasajor consideration in the final, effectiveness of the SHSBHOOD clandestine programs. The

SSirfw! fde" general Prodectthe

ase Officer waseciding factor in the fluid coordination

called for in such an operation. That the Case Officer must be fluent in

selfievidMtwhatever country is the target ofroject is /

.v. *7 tne0fflcer through Ouatemala shortly before the first broadcasts was certainly tho most valuable preparatory step taken. It was felt that even the most obscure errors in program content might damage the plausibility of the themelandestine station operating in some secret location in the Republic.1' inor error asire hydrant red when, in reality, they were green would have lessened the impact of the broadcasts. (The trip revealed,that there are no fire hydrants at all in Guatemala.) Exeat knowledge of prominent landmarks, highways, public buildings, military installations,ital factor inay broadcasts and attorap-ing to aid military movements made in great haste. It was interesting to note that the indigenous team, presuming the acceptance of the listening audience, seldom made an effort, without prompting, to insert deceptive details into the scripts in order to establish and maintain the myth of being within the target country.

e broadcast during the periods in which the largest listening audience was presumed to be at homo. Individual programs in the broadcast schedule were presented In the order which seemed moat logioal according to the social habits of theomen's programs well before or after meal times, for instance.

A thorough knowledge of Ouatem-la'a radio stations and newspapers

Saving np0rtant Part overall

A final and extremely pertinent factor in the Casearation isdeep personal knovjledso of the political Opinions of each member of hio team, xf an announcer disagree with the ideas expressedarticular speech, hia very lack of enthusiasm or shaded infk. ction of words cmh^5ycholocical goal desired. This can sometime^ be overcome by atf explication^ the individual team member of the--

During the SHERWOOD broadcasts one announcer was very unhappy at. the thougnt ofquibrack at the^United Fruit Co. He had worked for the Company and considered it fair andnly When convinced that the disassociation of "Radio Llberacion" with the Company would aid the cause did he tear into Mr. GUKP with gusto.

The Teen

was fortunate ineam of The three key members were

hard workers, quick-witted, iand absolutely ^Hfnated to the task of

oneland'U rofessional radio man, and it is. to be hoped that any.operation similar to SHERWOOD can count on at least one. professional of his calibre to spark the other members of the team. Oddly enough, the major failing of the team was the lackense of the dramatic,ase Officer should constantly be on his toes to give the suggestions which make clandestine broadcasts more tnrilling than every day commercial broadcasts.

stood radio man end" a ilitant anti-Communist, towever, the political fanatic will provide better work in the end. The combination ia the acme.

A woman's program and women's voices are an important component f any sustained broadcast movement. SHERWOOD was fortunate that no

SS^tTSJaf.0Be durin8 the few months that women lived and worked inhouse. Nevertheless, the obvious delicate

WOUldf women Advisable in any operation that might run more than three or four months. Pre-cat spot announce-rents on records or tapes made and later inserted in programs would solve this problem easily.

on SHERWOOD the Case Officerthat future operations avoid recruiting any indigenousthe age This suggestion applies evento agents withand ability. lounger people take suggestions rapidlydebate. Older members of the team are wont to destroy awith obtuse investigation of motive and final result, andeasily take up the naan little tasks which must be accomplishedto meet rigid broadcasting ..

The supervision team should be carefully chosen. nowledge of the language spoken by the indigenous teen is helpful. But the primarybove ability ands tho possession

^ ' nd worklfle ndigenous team onL-hour basis can become an irritating chore, and the output'of depends directly on the manner in which they areSpeclficalJy.Ia Latin team is quick to spot the feeling on theupervlsorthat'heresent only because it is his job. Pessimism'on- the part ofrapidly inculcates pessimism into the teamV'Optimism keeps than happy and proud ;of their work.C^VCfficer will find it difficult to praise the team overmuch if their work has been good and his criticism should be confined to suggestions, it-mights be doneiVthe next' Jime."

. The Case Officer should be the*only*officerxcept for very unusual/

ia aidesscod example"e eKld

The Physical Layout

Tha working and living quarterseam such aa is necessarily alloyed for the production of .clandestine radio, broadcasts need not be luxurious. They should be comfortable, functional and isolated; The equipment should be the finesi obtainable and. in perfect condition.

afe housesn and "C" had been vacated when the SHERWOOD Case Officer arrived at the site oflthough they had been selected for other reasons than broadcast preparation, it had been hopedhey would serve for studios and .living quarters as well. They turned oat- to be inadequate.One was tod. hear an airfisldj evenefforts failed to obviate,the .constant roar of aircraft engines. Another house wasense residentialurious neighbors were chased frequently from the beck door...

The following characteristics are desirableafe house for this type of operation*

1. Largo enough that people can get out from under each other from time to tine.

2." Spread out enough that soma members of ths team car, ilaep while others are working.

3#" Isolated enough that neighbros do not drop in toup of sugar.

Ui ndispensable.

5." arge enough lawn that beam members, who can not be cunaing to the race track, can indulge in some sort of spent,

most desirable feature by far is aAfghanistan.

The equipment reedod in order to make tapes is listed belowi

1; Double Mangacorder recording machine. 2; Mixer Control box.

Ul One portable recording machine. 5; Oood receiver with adequate antennae. One disc recording machine.

desk mikoa and ona standing mike.(bi-directional),

Two tum-tables(three-speed).

collection of sound effects records,

of general music records, with speolal emphasis onand music native to target country. (Do not makeof not purchasing American records. Any broadcastIron Contain which did not'contain American songbe

General office suppliesi typewriters, standard elsei. only heavy

bond paper(thin paper rattles in the mike).

dictionarissine volumevolumes of legend, history and poetry of target country^.



Tb* Programs ;

SHZRVtOD-vas an extremely interesting clandeatlne operation because It was' possible to Judge its'effectiveness, soon' attar1the firat transodaalbn. At that time the preas of Guatemala Has still comparatively free of csneor-shlp and published Items revealed, or at-least influencedreat extent, publichere was nohe kind that broadcasting 'to an Iron Curtain void invokes. It vas possible to put the flamajito**an< . RBENZ hot-foot and watch him jump) toumor and watch It grow, ometimes into actuality; to cry havoc and sometimes sea ithe true estimate of the SHERWOOD operation cannot be known at thisev/daya. after the end.of the conflict. a1atlmate would require aminiature GALLUP poll, with especial care'taken-to'qiieftion'at length the'*'oppositionRBENZ, FCRTUNI, TCRIELLO, et(aland find out'how much they Buffered from the barbs received daily on the' programs.i

But it'i Is obvious that SHEHTOOD was an asset to tha Overallbegank, Guatemala was an almost Comintit officials were firmly and smugly settled Into be permanent positions. Anti-Communist elements werea large degree and anti-Communist sympathisers did not see even a chance of succsaaful revolt agalnat tha powers that guidedof the

One month later,une, newspapers carried banner headlines over their editorials. "Terror In theOnreat In Ournd "Where Are We Heading?"

The psychological planning of tha broadoaata and otheraimedteady increase in tempo until that point wasths point waa reached too soon. Government cfficlala worethat they took extremely cruel repressive measures against Many were forced to take exile and flee the country. rings were destroyed. Thus,ay the hoped-for masstlie people did not ocour. It hardly could, as most of the leadersImprisoned and the maea of antl-Communiata had been intimidated*point of fear for their lives and3 ftn*.

This point of strategy will have to be oloared up byutountry scheduled for abrupt revolt cannot be too agitated, perhaps the frenzied state of affairs made the final showdown even more inevitable. Certainly the arrival of the arms ehlp ALFHEM was a It took the place of several weeks of argument on Srf&RWOOD' transmissions and clearly defined tha tasieibad recelvjRP arrui from Russia, thus Guatemala and Russia were playing fbotalaV Prom that point there waa no question of the nature of the target, only the quaatlon of how soon and in what manner it would be destroyed,

SHERWOOD had several primary objectiveai'

Xa To offer hope and oonfidence to ainVl-ComraunlstV

intimidate Communist'

u. To deceive) To entertain; t<


6. KCEOCS aupport; and ?. To provide vorld-wlde information.


1. To offer .hope and confidence? Ahtiitfomraunlst eleme'nts Inhad sponsored a- futilei abortive revoltswisvperiod of yaars0 They had fizzled so, dismally that.morale, of the population had fallen Dangerously, Even militant snti-Cbmmuhists saw Utile hope of effective action.- Exiled anti-Communist leaders were divided, the once active groups within the country wsro losing their sip. snd-hard-hitting Soviet-stc-ao government propaganda had ceraonted .theimpression that the

Red leaders were firmlyentrenched.


SHERWOOD ifl very existencetrong oounter-punohi Here.wasconcrete; Hareaily recounting of the injustices ofherooiceainst, authority sndto stop it.


Although.SHBJHOOD- destroyed as muoh as possible, it attempted tosuggestion of creation at the sane tiae. Every tinsthatondition must go, it tried to effor athat wao fair .and just. is radio announcerhealso lndlcaleof^ifl'jdys of

livingesooratlo government. Individuals -oiudehis, workers, farmers,ere told of the particular benefits that they would

oncer the regime that would .replace Communism;

^ 3HSRVAXOthat victory over Communism was

J. ' eoraln8' atter of hours; Even the words of the song composed by the SHERWOOD team and adoptedatUo tune contained the words -Have hope, boys, the day ihm soon

2. To Intimidate; The broadcasts of SHERWOOD containedloaders and groups shake in their boots! of high Treason"ighly dramatic feature which singledprominent Red and roasted Mmlow fire. His history,his suspicious habits and his motives were treated atan effort was made to refrain.froa the "we will string youof threat, it was made obvious thatin for an unhapp^new items; based on athred of truth, revealed thelife the Red wasleader left tS Oountry

toonvention we pointed out that he waa really meetlnc Soviet officers for military talksj if TCRIEXIOgressioVlUt to


_ Obviously the most effective efforts were the ones basedists of names of officials who had receivedloans, known Communists, and authorities who were build ina; upin foreign banks,up

tJHH^Y'0f the earns type, announced the names of Communists who had arms stored in their houses. It was quite gratifying

IV! ne individual targstT had been visited by the military police and rudely relievedellar-lu* of machine-gunsc

8hanged, considerably to the "you will have the bloody of the nation on your hands" attack;

and Ifwas fuming to know who was piloting the leaflet-dropping -planes, we congratulated the Chief of hla Air Force for.not giving away

d^ect3 The defo-tion pitches of SHERWOOD broadcastsnot only to the military, but to the mombsrs of tha policeand even "neutraLsP, ell1 of whom wereto the winning

*Th?itary defection program beganubtle way- recounting the feats of heroic Soviet pilots who had found fame and forWby comingerfldually t0 ^ ay effort when Colonel Hadojfogave his former Air Force buddies detailed instructions and soldiers and officers of the army were asked to make the switch In groups.

ofwere- toeaMdown by fearrrert.ln8trUCtedanti^ominists

Broadcasts were coordinated with leaflet drops during the final days of action in the Zacapa area. The leaflets were prepared by tha SHERWOOD team and dropped on troops without communication with the capital, who wore ignorant of the rapidly changing situation.

Primarily, from beginning to end, the idea was that everyone would have toecision sooner or later. The Liberation Forces were going to win, so why choose the losing side?

Evidence indicates that the defection program was especially effective with pilots. At one atage in the final daya it was necessary for SHERVXD touick step back with all except pilots lfho couldlane Withmy redoes were going across the border and ourhad to tell them to stay at home"


SHERWCCT) From the first day of broadcasting the claim was incessantly reiterated that the station was within Guatemala. It was the Big Lie Technicians cannot explain why the ARBBH2 government never found the

Laafdat, never knew. In tha

last days, TGv, made shrill accusations against Honduras. Ths only logical reasoning is that the Guatemalan technicians just never thought of the

m^oses.bsin8 otron5 * troA.&SL

The failure of the government to locate SHERWOOD, and theepeated newspaper stories that it had been destroyed, helped create the .final impression that it in the country. Perhaps really inteUigent listeners felt that it waa not, but the rase of uninformed peopleo have accepted our claims. LIFE mogasinc, in the issueeek after the armistice spoke of the broadcasts -from the jungle."

a* the newspaper clippings Inaster Copy only)

show the contusion that resulted from the broadcasts. Several times it

h!Government said it would

find us within three days and that there were, in reality, two stations.

onduras. Lights were turned out throughout ?he Republic to find the location. The Military Attache ofsy in Guatemala City was approachedovernmant official who wanted instructions on operating aircraft homing equipment in order to search us

8CCUfied AHBBIZ of operating the 'station from toe National Palace as an excuse to curb civil liberties.


This confusion was ably abettad by agents within the country who spread rumors, made false denunciations to the government, and wrote letters to the^newspapers sayin3 that they had seen suspicious movements of men and machinery.

. At onearmers walked through the San Marcos mountains to locate the station.

S^ar SHSSrjOD program endedramatic ZtH' The whining of bulletsoman's scream preceded the sudden^^Programa carefully rehearsed destruction. The next

*announced in banner headlines that amODD had been destroyed. It was great fun reappearing on the air after this edition hit the streets.

Ption effects were based on reality. When TOW announcedommunist demonstration had been cancelled because of rain, our "rain" sound-effect recordteady background to our nextram. ay the Case Officer debriefed pilots who had flown overvy*clluasfnOC8nt reMrks on the next Program indicated rain, sunshine

* Just been brought by messenger"5 f Aseertations of strength and state-

r Uberation officers "who Justouncil in this building must have startled the true Liberation officers in the field.

Programs' CASTILL0 AraaBstudded into the

. orurorsstatements ware made about tha possible


andH-Hourrogram several hours long

nfron the Supreme Chief of theoosdoasts changed considerablyams gave way to nU3ic wased with marches, and,trong" pitchfor^my

a+articipated and cooperated directly with PM operations.

W8t J0r 0fficer ^tookor. specific

"port. An example, however! was ?he

r mto do something about the rapid movement of govern-

ha Capitalcit7 of ZacaP*- firmodiately advised that all movement in mechanized vehicles^ prohibited andall such vehicles would bs considered military objectives; an inhabitantHflhe

ley shouXd leave at once> taking belongings^Jth them, but only by foot or with animal drawn carts; thatlSl people leaving

' B'' oecau" Governmentiian%hadthose routeshe only two

iUS M the already fluttered ones to Zacapa);lhatdrivers should travel at the slowest possible speeds bEuaitto

road-ralnea (non-existont) were Intended only to destroy vehtclos, not take Innocent liveB; that our sabotage toans ahould have care when utilising vehicles stolen fron tha Government because (it was explained in obvious code-sentences) nxny of them had been booby-trappedj and that everyone friendly to the CASTILLO Armas cause should sabotage highways and brldgea.

SKZRWXD also created heroes, skirmiahes, mass defections, and in the final days it activated, armed, and put in motion two great columns of Liberation forces which were scheduled to arrive at the capitalew hours." The latter deception took place on the Sunday morning before the Sunday night resignation of President Jacobo ARBENZ.

Col. Rudolfo lO-rtOZA, "Chief of the Liberation Airefused to appearnterview, fearing reprisal. Afterottle of acotch and an adroitly hidden tape-recorder microphone,igorous statement asking defection of Guatemalan pilots went on the air without his knowledge. Such drastic action was necessary after the first few days of battle proved that ground forcea wore not numerous and that an 'air force hero" waa needed to justify the Liberation Air Force's frequent sorties.

It was SKERWOD which Xajjt.dojjnjthj terras which could bring peace. Among the terms were tha ousting of communists and the formation of ajunto to replace ARBENZ. The firat junto headed by Col. DIAZARB3IZ and outlawed Communism.

It was at this point that SBBUXB played what was probably ita moat important role in the conflict. The Government had ostensibly removed everything that CASTILLO Armas was fighting for, putting the Liberation Array In an extremely delicate position. ontrolled media like radio waa capable of instantly refusing to recognise DIAZ and promising that toe fight would continue, even Increase in fury, until he was removed aa well.

The final SHERVOOD program was carefully planned and painstakingly rehearsed. After appropriate dramatic programmingpeech by CASTILLO Armas, the announcer promised that theransmitter would now be hidden awayecret place. There it wouldymbol of tne forces union were ready to go into action whenever freedom was in peril.

ie Information; Very little "combat" news filtered from the 2g*he outsido world. esult phony government propagandawere the only news releases passing through the etrict censorshipand Sovernraent reports of fictitious bombing and strafing of civilians were hitting toe headlines of tho world. The Guatemalanbefore.tream of Ilea with impunity.

SJEXTJOD at this perioderies of programs aimed at foreign correspondents and newsman in the capitals of neighboring countries. Radio ava-ions la several countries picked up theae programs and rebroadcast them, long and abort wave, to the entire world.

nited Press dispatchHEW.COD report as coming from an "authoritative source," From that point, we had it made.


mm. tf

initial stages of PBSUCCESSpecial "Oraon 'of panic program had been acbeduled to coincideay.project waa abandoned when it became obviousour wouldprecisely determined until the last minute, and when theS? necessary aabotage and

is made here.

p."fitt countfld oa" he possibilltiee ofrogram, especially for future actions, are ao greathort note

uatenala it haa for many years been tha custom for all radio eta-ionslong and short waveto tune in to the frequency of TOW. the government station,eek toovernment sponsored program known aa the "National Hour." This situation, duplicatedin most -atin republics, was to have been taken advantage of by an interruption which would spur the country into violent motion. SHZTTOD hadpecial program, imitating announcers and performera of the "National Hour." It was too much to hope that tovernment officials and members of toe Armed Porces could long be fooled by auch an intrusion. ltored interruption was to have been interruptedan announcer claiming to be speaxing for tha government would breethleasly explain that although tho rebels had succeededew moments in taking over the network, everything was now under control. The program would have continued in this

lroving chaos among Red leaders andof the

eaote contro1running fromL V roRram on every single

radio in the country, long and short wave. Orson Walls had Charlie


potential ofituatlon ia obvious.

of ARBENZ and TORIELLO speeches,

aWn* transcendentalents favoring the CASTILLO Armas forces.

J?8stalls of such an undertaking at first glance

aX,Ilty KtiM TOUldbene agent would cut the remote control line,n aeent

SHERlCOD'a own tranaraltters to ursurp the TOW frequency.

The panic and consternation causedimple SHERWOOD intrusioney daysay provesrue deceptive panic program, taking over the frequency of TOW, would have been of tremendous impact. It ia strongly advised that the possibility ofrogram be considered in any future projects along the general line of PBSUCCESS.




asic Mia Bloc and


vT.- -- -Personnel






I* Synopsis

SCRANTON was the official cryptonyn used to designate the indigenous agent radio operator training programfDCCESS.otal ofO's,esidents (RRO)acticalnd one cryptographer were trained and graduated from training sites in HicerKgoa archU. f these were launched from Honduras against ths targetune, the remaining operator being sent to SAHARA for use in sub-project Present records indicate thatf theO's came up on the air, although onlyostly TRO!a, managed to remain active throughout the entire period. Ofne Was interned by Salvadorost their equipment through enemy action. Thoanaged to rejoin friendlyeing back on the air, and the third about to be relauched when the Project terminated. Incomplete records indicate the RO'sinimum ofessages fromo the field.

II. Bfisic Mission and Requirements

original basic SCRANTON mission is detailed in SCRANTON In brief it consisted in producingotalgents, includingndRO's. These were to beto the tactics and strategy of unconventional warfare againstOuatemalan targets. In general, the RRO's were to be in contactforces" at each target, while the TRO's were to accompanydirected against each target. Both RRO's and TRO's wereetween their respective forces and their supremeoriginally were to live "black" and furnish commo upay atthey were to ge off the air and remain silent until I>toeans of reconstltution of inner forces andthe event of failure. The TRO's were to be ready to follow theinto guerrilla type warfare if need be. With the controls thusthe supreme commander would possess highly flexible assetscontingencies.

original basic requirements ofRO'a andRO'sRO's when it became evident that CALLIQERIS,indigenous agent, was unable to furnish trainee candidatestime desired. The new requirements were obtained by eliminationconsidered to be of lesser Importance. Fulfillment of theseis discussed in Section IV of thia report.

the new basic RO requirements, newthe form oflaterryptographers were added in an effortthe flexibility of the training program by relieving laattrainees of the necessity of learning crypto work and thusperiod of training necessary. However, CALLIQERIS proved to beunsuccessful in obtaining crypto candidates andryptograduated as such. '

in. Sites

original training site

motelygC iiloraeters Vest of the Hicaraguan capital, wasJacob front in .Tannery. Gear waaNicaragua on lu January,ctivated by

Andrew F, MBBTOH (ps) and John F. MKDLECOTT (ps)n the next day,anuary, before any trainees hadsite was blown when the Ouatemalan government published aninter alia, the names, location and purpose of thissit* was deactivated the same day and the non-sensitive gear ending policy decision by Headquarters, On 2indications by f" ew site would bethe storm blew ever, Merton was ordered to return toKlddlscott was to sit tight and reactivate when able, Areport on the above ovents in iwwAjrfnad in the SCRANTONII file. Aerial photos oftaken by Jacob R.

SeekTord are included in the sane file,

entative site was selected

approximatelyC2 Kilometers Northwest (best recollection)

i, This site"Mooted by fj las not secure enough. are available

nf tim. if*ftCe*ie** teided

toite located

abouuC^aVae-xbere Northeast of the Nicaraguan capital,ile from the Saranac training camp. Ho facilities were available and it was necessary to construct living and training quarters in the open Jungle, the first week in March. Trainees began arriving aboutebruary and were used in camp construction. Traineea were strictly ocmpartmented from the Saranac camp. Actual training beganarch and continued at this site untilpril, at which time activities were transferred to the Saranac site. ethat living conditions wero of the crudest at C.

were road communications. Phctofl are contained inileart I.

pril, Saranac (PK) training activities

closedhe Saranac quarters in the hacienda

ranch of Training continued at this site

until SCRANTOH closedune. Fairlyor table facilitiesaatrine, and two cookseased thealthough the road communications system was stillthe advent of the real rainy season in early June,C

Jwas practically cut off from civilisation and it waain two instances to use horses for transportation. Asof the road conditions, one more site change wasa point aboutm from Managua, but because of the lack ofover thohe orooosed site, it was decided tostores to tideuntil the end of the training

period. Photos of theare Included in the SCRANTON

Fileart I. omparison of the scale of living related to civilized standards may be comprehended when it is recorded that rats often ran over the sleeping bodies of the trainees and instructors andoot boa constrictor was kept by one trainee in the attic of the main buildingounter measure. However, other thanmalaria attacks, the health of the trainees was consistently good.


Indigenous Personnel

Training Program

ay was limited only bv

uction and agent ^ruction*


riles, ^uo the agent section was written up in the Spanish

md lcs4onscontained in Ietterlrf

Instructions, SCRANTON Pile SCP/L.

Procurement end Training

1. otal ofrainees (See SCR/li fUes) waref bytherriving

S anolhw nd 6We,

abUiSv ncluding security, illiteracy, in-ick of tS/ XCOpt Ssnerator cranknd lack of time. One nan was graduatedrypto clerk only.

eturn to LINCOLN was haddlecott's inabiinf to

Spanish. Tha basic levels of the trainees varied fron intelligent to slow. Ai^could read and write the Spanish language and most displayed commendable perseverance. artial confirmation of the need6 weeks training period is seen in the fact that the tyros, whoeeks of training and were the last to graduate, were considered to be barely adequate communicators.

U, Training aids included blackboard lectures, code training tables, recorded tapes, field trips, training lectures fron Director of Training, and, most important, an aotual training circuit set up between SCRANTON and SHERWOOD. The latter circuit proved invaluable since it provided actual cossnunicatlon conditionsistance of about liO kilometers. Because of the necessity for cenpartnentation, it was necessary to let the trainees believe that the base station was in Honduras. It is safe to say that the training circuit was the single most Important factor in producingCRANTON graduates, and for this reason it is. desirable to point out the contribution made by the SHERWOOD operators who maintained the base end of theeek.

Factors affecting the morale of the trainees were, on the positive side, the professional ability and competence of the Office of Communications instructors, thsir wiilingnesa-to undergo the same hardships as the trainees, their ability to apeRic Spanish, the obvious backing given by C. Jnd SKIX>!ER,ites andhe messages fron UJMJUBBB. the presence of end occasional use of firearms, and tho graduation ceremony itself, the coremonlal openingottle of champagne and toasting the departing graduates. On the negative side were ths presence of agitation, the dislike of mercenaries, the enforced isolation, the lack of women, and hard liquor, and the lack of communication with home. That morale was very high is probably boat demonstrated in the field performance of the operators where it will be recalled thatut ofperators launched were eventually heard fron.

Graduation of operators was not announced until immediately before their'departure. Minimum tine was given for packing, saying farewells, show down inspections,o as to accustom the Individual to frequent changes and uncertainties. It also precluded most of ths last minute message-bearing to friends so contra productive of security. champagnereferred to before added the proper note of solemnity to the occasion.


These wero prepared by SHERWOOD, In generalelection ofide frequencies.-Jperformed the necessary photographic work. Assignments may be found In the SCRANTON file SCR/U,onsolidated list in SCR/U. Due to the relatively poor quality of the graduates, much of the actual operation took place on the guard channels, since the risk cf losing the poorer operatorsa frequency change was too great.

Briefing (ONTRICH)

The briefing of the radio operators took place in Tegucigalpa. Each operatorjage^briefed separately and checked out.


on has equipment before being dispatched. Each operator waaopportunityke several radio contacts with the baseThe operators were briefed thoroughly onsecurity and "black" existence within Guatemala. wore introduced to their guidee,ompleteand emergency infiltration plan was worked out. Afamiliar with the routes and area of operation wasfor each radio operator who waa not familiar with thewhere ho was to operate. Host of the operators ver*fron Honduras and El Salvador, one flew In with.

Innd was dropped offiles from Quesaltenango. In addition to their radio equipment each operator was provided withistol,sdicsl kit and emergenoy rations. There were no casualltiss among the radio operators,

E. Launohint;

TheO's were launched as follows by



(Equipment ahot up Inejoined and awaitingShock une


(Unable to get to Frank) interned by Salvador; releasedtroops; converted to THO with DannyJuno




CP) une


(Arrived Bond, equipment captured) rejoined atJuno

To Performance

Following incomplete figures will indicate general performance)!

6 mags from;ogs to.

7 aaga fron (last oneags to.

2 msgs from;sgS to.

3 msgs fronjsgs to.

agsags to.

sgs from (laat oneags to.* msgs from|nogs to.o show.

eard once onune. Ko oootaot.

1 mags fron; ti2 msga

sg from.

sgsega to.

essages were handlod fron ths fieldo the field*

Indigenous personnel at SCRANTON other than the trainee!



V. Security

..Pbys*cal 5ecurity was maintained by physical ccoDartrien-

oeing ion*. Physical isolation was the secret of the ccmpartaentation/

raduate trainees but oneC

Jthe remark being made that this sroup was

T*ooJlatewas treated as suspect, both on

bUn ^rtftpertinentinformation Sd


case of OASOLINA was'rererreo to inbove. In^ ?talMd0alue toraSof aSh!USLb5 uteffort.

f an

haveUpriie^tBl^0 ^

ecurity hazard waa


1 rcraenber alial!c Jw2 returned to Honduras and no damage resulted.

ecurity hazard was the emergency and reporting of the toSdent

fty John S. Shopstone (ps) indicate that no security hazard rolultS.

to Salamander. He was presumably drunk and listed AIJOL.

tha staffr ae Ueht touristAumber employee cover given to tte r^ ^tructors apparently served the purpose. Major use of the cover was for overt commercial travel beta FJHOPEFUL and LINCOLN.


ove sent in-Alicaragua vaa facilitated by special trawleaued by Salamander. The only time these failed to serve the purpose was during: the assassination attempt againstTat which tire all movement was restricted. The isolation of the SCRANTON sites served to ease the strain on oover. Dotails of individual cover ore on file in Security and Corno.

J. orton recalls he was told by oneCommo staffonce asked "who is PIVALL".

It is believedbe the


VI. Staff Personnel

A. Staff instructors included John F. Middlecott, John S. Shepstone, and Adnrew F. Kerton. The bulk of the Instruction waa carried by the former two and too much credit cannot be given them. Middlecott spoke no Spanish although training was not delayed on this account. Shepstone's Spanish waa more than adequate for the job, while Merton's Spanish may be classified as adequate. was experienced to getting Shepstone into Nicaragua, which may have contributed to overall problems in meeting deadlines.

a. Merton and Middlecott activated the firat. Following the expose of this

site, Merton returned to LINCOLN slnoe his service in Guatemala would have exposed United States Interests should he have been blown. Middlecott carried on with the aid of Vincentpanish speaking Saranac instructor, and began trainingarch. Shepstone arrivedpril to share the instruction load. Middlecott was recalled to LINCOLN overay forandbrlofing. After Middlecott's return to SCRANTON, he was stricken by appendicitis onay and, following aoperation, remained thereafter at SHEK.'COD where he assisted the training net to SCRANTON. It should be remarked that Middle-cott's service following his operation wasolunteerribute to his professionalism. He was unab le to aerve further at SCRANTON since road communications wore too rough for hie safe convalescence. Followingay, Shepstone was aided by Merton who returned from LINCOLN to SCRANTON for tho abort time remaining. Shop,"tone departed for Headquartersune, leaving Kerton to flnisn training alone and to cloae SCRANTONune.

C. Other staff personnel, not assigned to SCRANTON but who worked closely therewith, were Vincent Pivail, and SHERWOOD personnel, particularly DUNNAVANTho was top corno man in the area and who was responsible for preparation of signal plans and equipment. It is regrettable that time and space does not permit adequate description and recognition of the part played by each of these.

VII. Gear


pending upoxos at the most* att equipment waa

inf.JFliiperating houra appeared to be in the earlyto cone up more at Early morning hours were also used,extensively.

Vin. Estimated Costs

of 0bt',infid ^cm commo, otal

etc subsistence,this sum, approximately

eVenM foUowineGuatemalan White Paper

omplete report has been submitted to Finance within SCRANTON Filewith a

IX. Conclusions

withonclusion3forth In statementexplanation where

procure,aent Problems should be resolved at the lzt.l< moment, once the relative role of agent radio

Of training beginning with raw recruits who are In theearch Experienced

. ,Squally importantbove Is the placingrain, tog/operational case officer in direct contact with the^principaT^

irif^SJ^ithl8Tat Joast0 fficer in contact with In

ofrlooaed Sh problems on so many different levels, he could not possibly give proper

. 0 be conatrued only as praiso forador the conditions . Hoover, records Indicate that as early^wltJl CALLI<*RIS "as requested and

' It is regretted

as easing the logistical

B noted that the TRO's, scholasticallytunwdulk of the traffic. This

nnfiJ ^e Ulinsness of the operator tob* extrapolation,

Jutionthe Prob^ of getting resident^ the ^ents subjective senst

through the use of technical devices


echnical conclusion, which perhaps dees not belong In this report, is that plans should not includeropaganda broadcast and an agent base station together. The mutual interference of the functions contributed to theencountered in PBSUCCESS.

0. Due to the problems caused by slow procurement andgent training was minimized, an undesirable circumstance which may have contributed to the RRO'a difficulties once launched. Thorough training in living "black"roll up" or tactical situation would have been especially desirable in the case of Project PBSUCCESS.

the SCRANTON training program as itCESS program, was the necessity of the cooperationpeople asT" t 3eems, however, that many problemsbeen simplified tf the SCRANTCN program at least hadin an isolated location inemark that mayapplicable to Saranac and other activities. The travel andproblems would have been simplified, aa wouldand liaison with.


While briefing Included instructions for RRO'o to lie lowaynder the demands of the tactical situation as it developed, RRO's were In practice utilised tore or less as tactical operators.



, Tha primary objective waa to provideurrent and continuing TZ ha operational, geographic, economic, political,

J arMS offor use

of KUHOOK and KUOCWN planning officere of the project. econdarywas to obtain for operational use, publications, saps,charta, and other support materials as required.


hVctlv*tion of LINCOLN,odioum ofon ths target country hod been assembled. There was no Intelligence reports, researchiOMi Photographs, and maps had beenhrough collection * was established at SSoLN.

S^ISmS fUedcerreiponding to

2 SlfS Pfilet were set up on the

of Sulky studies, bound


eferenced to the appropriate

nro1 'available at the outset of the

gffita&TM arsg wrLT^tei bTs^ are.

nSclStilntr8 "e^Sers^

EI requesU were voluminous questionnaires in Englishprepared and sent to LUOTON for field use of CALLIGeJbne*ta


fSS^frf: Conseq^ntly, they were not answered promptly or in Suf-

Lttafrf-.nh1group ofEEI* producid

fcetter^results since the questionnaires were more brief, specific ail in

per8onno1 flt theC- ^md OUAT stations also delayed equo3ta" to ^dividual from LINCOLN was assigned to^he OUAT stationonth to collect ESI and photograph potential tatget.

fa.a3te1 between Ifl Februaryay. are to RQM/OB for terrain studies from aerlel photographs fornnang,


ere- to RQH/OIS for terrain studies and aerial photographs of potential drop zones for supply of field teams; ere toand CALLS nets for Order of Battle data on military garrisons; ere to KUFIRE and CALLIOERIS for details of airfield facilities; ere to the OUAT station for blueprints, photographs, and details of strategic installations for sabotage planning; ere to RQK/OIS for KUOOWN support materials.)


Two aerial photographic interpreters were made available atto prepare terrain studies and ovorlays from aerial photographs made by ODUNIT during World War II, These studies were forwarded promptly. They were sterilized for field use. This was the only available terrain information for air operations and proved of considerable value during the final stages of the project.

A large collection of still photographs supplied by RQH/OIS provided the location of oil storage facilities and strategic installations which became bombing targets.

The clipping service contributed useful leads for KUGOUN officers: however it could have boon more effective if the clippings had beoninstead of approximately two weeks old.

Part of the collection of records used by KUOOWN radio activities was supplied by RQK/OIS. (FXI: RQK/OIS collectiono ne -seemed unnecessarily sluggish in the beginning, but about the first of Nay, they jarred loose and submitted some worthwhile background Most of the information they supplied was atear or two old,ound it hard to understand why this information couldn't have boon made available to us in December instead of Kay.)

U. Personneli

The lacking essential was experienced personnel. It was not until Aprilull time staff was assigned to this section. This staffecretaries had to be trained on the job. Maintenance of the files and preparation of EDI requests had been done in connection with other Jobs. KUHOOK requirements had outdistanced its operational research facilities. esult, full time of the staff was spent in the final stages of the project in supplying KUHOOK and Air Operations requests for target data, assembling OB info, and in preparation of situation reports,


By kr.Senior Staff Officer, PBSUCCESS


SAJARAUPT-J? "as an operational task conceived in principle inby the Chief of Project for the purpose of harassing andthe communications system of the Guatemalan Government in tho hopeconfusion, delay and general breakdown of the government

Initial studies were assigned to KUCLUB inU, but nothing concrete was developed. eeting at LINCOLN on, interested Sf^nT atafLfelt that Uttlebe done in the few days retaSStfltr17; one asset believed of value was the information assembled

ZtlJ^? or aeveral months at the Anorican

Embassy in Managua, recording messages from Guatemalan military radio circuiS.

resu^fin theaken'A. pecial group agreed to lend every possible assistance.

enior LINCOLN Staff Officer, was assigned as

Hasdtive to accomplish, and was

not handicapped by restrictive or limitedinstructions,

vi"idio transmitting and receiving gear wasbe preparedSOMERSET.

pecial group atwereto prepare tape recordings of the general'characteristicsOuatenalan military radio transmitters and to make availablefrequencies currently utilized.

Guatemalan radio operator, reportedly familiar with Ouat miUtary

transmitter and to

provide background knowledge and radio lingo sufficient to'perform intrusion" work. Unfortunately, the man assigned proved to. adio mlUtary experience, and no knowledge ofquipment. For incompetence and for security reasons he was removed from the site before the critical period.


thonl^H^ ?Bk,in/Jf-? CP^eeded to Headquarters. needed to install power and operate

receiversadio transmitter were crat">JT Tns Cfttft

Officer then proceeded to Managua, arriving C y

under the alias of Clifford J ^

A suitable location for SAHARA waa found in tbe garage anduarters of a* vmocowptwtn pvopprfv

^ -1 tive that SAHARA

SRERrJM for security reasone. Therefore, the-selection ofquipment, and the actual operation

os SAHARA were accomplished without the assiatance of SHEffiTJOD, The sito selected proved to be exceptionally well suited to this operation because JJV everal thousand feet ebove thehichopvinbra conditions for transmitting and receiving radio messages.

The selection of this siteortunate ore ir)atw respects Because waa locates

possible toguarding the'site at all times^toion or curiosity. Further, the proximity toprovided excellent opportunity for frequent

contact. The privacy of the grounds permitted the

erection ofpecially cut antenna not visible to the public. Also, the site provided excellent opportunity for bringing various groups of people ithout Pledge of other groups already located at the aite. This wasv lmcortant because of the fact that it was neces-

ff^5P alsossy employee

to work at the aite on certain occasions.


A. IntelllRence Activity

SAHARA was originally conceivedarassment to the Guatemalan Army. In order to harass, it was. first necessary to listen to Guat circuits. The clear traffic passing over these circuits was so startling both in amount and in Importance of information that what began exclusivelyarassment program expanded overnight toa -arge-scale interception program of Guatemalan intelligence.

werepolice various frequencies inntercept these enemy messages, which were distributed locally and then transmitted to Headquarters.

This intelligence was utilized for operational purposes: o friendly groups near>alan ie an example.clandestine radio script received most of its ring of

ualfrom SAHARA

B. Harasament

Harassment activities consisted of disrupting receipt of coded messages at Guat commo headquarters by taking on additional code groups whenever the legitimate operator paused, thereby'creating confusion and delay up to one-half hour until the circuitWs able

reestablish identification signs, or until the frequency

As SAHARA harassment activities became effective, the Guatemalan

fcrcBd t0 utillse commercial channels of communication, and SAilaRn was .hen aole to arrange for and effect interception Vf

3 "SU'0 Procured important antel-IIfence by the utilisation^ of voice scramblers belonging to frier, or

By harassing the Guatemalan ceaaBunications circulte duringritical operational day a, sahara was able to cause delay and confusion and even forced tha enemy to utilise unaccuatomed frequencies and cades, thus further slowing dean their communicatione system.

C. Intrusion

Becauae, the enemy was surprised and completely unprepared to cope with intrusion, SAHARA was able to accept and receive military operational nossages under, the tuise of addressee when the addressee did notEven when the addreasee did reply, SAHARA also replied and thus confusod both sender and addressee. The enemy communications facilities acceptedURA intrusion messages with no apparent recognition of invalidity.

Whenever climatic conditions permitted and Guatemalan circuits were heavily loaded, SAHARA intruded with repeated CQs and requests for repeated code groups and entire messages. The best efforts of this natureie-up of Guat commo facilitiesritical period

for *ne-paragraph


ffVTtt*ck on communications systemimportant part in causing the ARBENZ government to fall. Theof sahara produced the

with^rulntyf ^ Udlr*ot rU1Ui7

eddiatrUStRbTO' 8biU*

acconPli8hed createdthat the entire uuat comno system waa Interspersed with "Rebel" operators.

nformation intercepted was givena.ER-^OD clandeetine radio before it was delivered through


Since all sahara activitiea are well-documented inofintercepted, it would be extremely valuable to haveto determine the relative value of each type of harassmentand their effect on the ln

couragament ofn this activity were ofm he Case Officer that henceforth

?SaS ejects




Jchief, Support


The administrative support of LINCOLN was putenior staff levelvery outset of toe Project by the Chief of Project when by hisforeeaw the need to have the Chief of Supportommand level withsection Chiefs. This one action enabled the Chief of Supportcurrent with all the requirements of toe project as it progressed. it possible for him to anticipate in many instances the requirementsoperating officers, thereby eliminating needless delays and timeor

Por purposes of discussion, administrative support can be broken down into the following general categories:

Budget and Fiscal

Logistical Supply


(pouch andLocation and liaison.

eMraltsit intermixes with Security, "Commo" (radio and cable traffic) and operations.

m this report to cover all the situations met

and dealt with on this project. The purpose is instead toummary of toe problems encountered and the solutions found to bs most satisfactory, ine routine operations of administrative support are presumed to be well known and have no placepecial report on PBSUCCESS.


Budget and Fiscal (s) Foreign Currency Procurement

One of the first requirements was to secure sufficient foreign currency to minimize the use. currency in the target area and to prevent an influxubstantial amount of. currency which might arouse undue suspicion. interest In the area.

Early in3 the Comptroller was requested to takeaction to secure approximately C Indigenous

currencies. The Finance Division attempted to locate such monies, but wa unsuccessful as only insignificant amounts, If any, were available onopen market. It was determined that any effort to create activity wouldbowrdoue and would yield only nominal amounts. Although at

JJ, Finance Division, to initlat*

were madeFinance Diviaion. tourchaslni

program through tha foreign offices of

no appreciable quantity could be obtainedecure manner.

Thia necessitated the use. dollars throughout the entire project. Due to the fact that throughout the target area dollars are readily accepted and are froely passed, no serious difficulty wasexcept in Ouateaala proper where tha pay of indigonous agents was rendered more difficult than it would have been otherwise.

It will be readily recognised, however, that in any area in which dollars do not normally circulate, or are not roadilyack of adequate indigenous currency could present serious problems.

(b) Operating Budgeti

Initially it was planned to operate the projectaskseparate stages, as th* nroWt. nrogreesed. This envisaged anestimated budgetwhich would include all thetaaks plus headquarters overhead support.

LIKCOLH, during the first three stages prepared monthlybudgets, by task, baaed upon anticipated expenditures. this proved impracticable as the responsible operating officers were unable to anticipate with any degree of accuracy their requirements in advance. In addition, to bo of value the information would have to be accurate and complete. With the limited number of personnelwith finance training, it was not poaaible to keep such detailed records. erefore, upon the completion of etsgehis system waa abandoned. Funds were then provided directly to the responsible officer,on the approval of the Chief of Project, as the course of events

During the first threetation Reserve was established to provide each station with an emergency fund. This provided LINCOLN and the field with sufficient funds to meet emergencies as they arose, iherefore, upon abandonment of the Task System of budgeting, the Station Reserve was constantly replenished aa the operational needs dictated. Thiaimpler and more expeditious method, although from an accountingooser method.

The cooperation received from headquarters left nothing to be desired. Every effort was made in each instant by all concerned to provide all funds requested within the required time limit. There was no incident or time when the project was delayed or hampered in any way by lack of funds. In one or two Instances when it appeared that sufficient funds wore not available in the field, subsequentdisclosed that either the individual did not know whom to ask for tola or had not accurately determined his requirements in advance.

Monthly Sunr-ary Accounting:

In order to keep PBSUCCESS field accountability in one central record, lt nea decided that the area command stations,in their relation to LINCOLN, from an accounting standpoint, would be treated asreportingtation. This meant that all funds sent to the Stations would be picked up on LINCOLN'a books as an advanceOLeT


two finance officers. In addition to the Chief of Supoort It. root question as to whether or not it would beTbe^er Vbai


upply andaah baalii fwm

commercial houses in the LINCOLN

Excellent rapporttabl^hed in the beginning and maintained tc the ond of thTproject.


llgenco'w^nphases of intol-

of teohT Althoughima, through the end

Duotheoffice'OB an individual basis.

this did not present any major

fcSSSx^X' ateblishment of the "Who's Who" file under the Chief/FI did ouch to offset the lackentra file.


uPUc*tionheadquarters' records. onstantly coming and going, required constant attention.

COMMUNICATIONS (Pouch and Couriurl

at thay Mmontact point located oat Omco> there turned over to the

f0Wlar'n fcUrnthe Sate Department courier any incoming pouches from the stations to LINCOLN.

nd frC" beadqusrtera -ere dispatched via were establishedfiX?

! one outgoint

tSfa of Stage

HERMMD with broadcast tapes, it was

s^lnlfS P * courier fleryice' lLi oLT^/lf0UPemployees DTROBALO. stage rive, a- which time they went onaily schedule.

ouches were processed bv LINCOLN during its

_FIELD LOCATION AND LINCOLN had been determined, it was nec*ss*-v


restricted to the Chief of Project and tha Chief of


Support, excepting for Security natters which were handled by the Chief of Security and Air Support requirements which were handled by the Chief of Air Support.

(c) To maintain the field locationroper manner the Chief of Support acted in the capacity of an Adjutanteadquarters Commandant. It waa necessary toet of basic regulations for the induct and guidance of personnel; arrange for billeting ofcure mnnlies and equipment locally by purchase or requisition

J provide office space as required, etc. No major difficulties were encountered in any of the above,


Budget and Fiscali

It is recommended that:

to the establishment of another such project, abe made well in advance of the requirement date to determine ifcurrency is available and in what quantity. Also whetherthe lack of it willaterial affect on the project,

etailed operating budget is to beualified bookkeeper be made available to keep such records and the operating officers be thoroughly indoctrinated in the necessity of maintaining their requirements within budgetary classifications.

Serious consideration be given to whether or not the additionalUatifi" th* naintfiE8nC9ingle accountability at field

Logistical Supply

Although the lackogistlca trained officer on the Chief of Support's staff was not critical, it la believed his staff and the projecthole would have been strengthened if one had been


It is recommended that:

person be assignedield project of this type whoexperienced and thoroughly familiar with Agency procedures.time andas lost through "on tha Job tresting.1*

personnel going to the field be indoctrinated inasTP,nd their functions. also be required to learn standard trade terminology.

Communicatlons (Pouch and Courier)

It is recommended that:

In the earliest planning stages, the pouch and courier network be organized, detailed and confirmed with all other interested govern -ment agencies. It was notedubstantial time lag existed between


tha tip*equirement was laid on by Headquarters with the State Department and the date the State Department actually implemented tha requirement*

Field Location and Liaison:

extremely good working relations between C -Indwould indicate that the methods used to select andStation were satisfactory. The principal reason forrelationship is believed to be that all officialthe host organization were limitedew responsibleconflicting requirements, unnecessary demands, orwere avoided.

is, therefore, recommended that in similarthe future, liasion with other cooperating govern-aentew responsible individuals through whom allrequests are channelled.

Original document.

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