CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS 3
Id1 tha first of many meetings vaa held betwoenand officers ofdiscuss Guatemala.
cover, the full anpport of their organization
for intelligence, and later, financial, assistance. Incareful survey of anti-Coatsunlet Ooatenalan revolutionary leadere,decided that RUFUS was tba only one with sufficientaad ability^ to organize anduccessfulmilitary plan of action was prepared by RUFUS with the assistancea staff agentplan vaa reviewed,
improved upon and finally approved byretired, of the
Marine Corpa, who was called Inpecial consultant by the Director. Acccmpanylng tbe planist of requirements ln arme and omit Ions, which was estimated aa sufficient at tnat tlaa, baaedhe known capabilities of the regular Guatemalan Army and the expected defection of on*-third of its forces, to bringuccessful conclusion the projected movement. ay waa5rms
procured, and arrangements set up for their shipment ln earlya base lntbat country.
Coinciding vlth this vera numerous iv aetlTltlee Inside Guatemala.
All want vailshipment sssjBBBSk bad actually Left warehouse en
route to Bev Orleans. Tba Dspartaont of State refused an export license and a
a meeting attended by tbe Under Secretary of State, his Deputy, tha
Assistant Secretary for latin America/ end representatives of this Agency,
refusal of permit vas sustainedirective given that ve were not
to spark any revolutionary movement. Ia spite of lack of export peradt,
the sMpment left Rev Orleans but vaa diverted froa
to our ownwhere lt is still in storage.
This ledomplete revision of plane by tbe KUKUS group. The
iiillu.il id anti-Ccasamiat civilian elements inside Guatemala, whoto move, proved well enough disciplined to obey KOTOS'to disclose their hand until the proper signal vas given. were made with the assistance o'and one of ita
higfa lerel consultants, formerand currently
to enlist the support
principally of tbe Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Honduras andalao took place with Panama, El Salvador, Cuba andcommitment was actually made by Trujillo to deliver anof arms, by. this time required to eeafssTt the increasedthe Guatemalan Army. ^Perez Jlmmnes of Venezuelareditwith his Ambassador In Waahington for theplanes.continued to finance, up0
per week, tbe forces assembled by RUFUS In Honduras and Nicaragua, and to support soae of bis key people inside Gmteraala. Action was scheduled for Easter Week. At the last minute, without explanation, Trujillo
reneged and another unconnected group led by Carlos Simmonsrevolt at Salama whloh led to disaster for thoee involved and toofCordoba Cerna.
Although Cerna had nothing to do with the abortive revolt, because of his outspoken attacks on the Arbenz Governinsnt, his-emamassk prestige^ and
popularity among the people, and probably scene knowledge of hia efforts to organize eati-Communist cells, ho vaa arrested, tortured for eighteen days, and finally poshed acroaa the frontier Into Honduras. Prior to the Ealaaa incident there vaa continual agitation and several large demonstratIons by antl-Goaaunlat group*eriod of months. In Ouatemala City, since Salaam and tha exile of Cerna, there have been no public demonstrations by antl-Coavmmlsts, and there is aa apparent apathy
and fear vhlch lt must be assumed has weakened0 five-man cells
reported bj Jto have been nr-gn^i anAnf tmmtmWtM
gnera-tu fight. Any successful action must be preceded, therefore
byore favorable climate inside Ouateaala. Una, the KOTOS planear ago would bave little or no chance of success if launched immediately. It is hollered tbat there are sufficient favorable factors If all assets aad capabilities are utilized, touilding up' chance* of success to 8Cfl. At this tlaa it is not possible toategorical statement, and lt Is recommended tbat tbe trigger only be pulled if and when this prerequisiteee been achieved. Our preliminary estimate of the tlaa required is four to six months.Original document.