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Pollowingporlod of build-up and preparation which lastedumber ofnail forco consisting of Guatemalan political refugees under the leadership of Castillo Armas, entered Guatemala on or about Juneu. Tbe strength of this group of fugitives fron the Ccoeuinist-deminated regime of Guatemala has been variously estimated as consisting ofea. It is roll ably reported that Castillo Armas sod bis follower* made their wore cn thethat one or both of the following two developments would occur if "touched off" by his re-entry into Guatemala, cewpledalleneral uprising against the regime, vi^.i
wouldarge popular rallying tond/or
officer corps of tho Snstemalan Aray wouldthe reglswj
and that either for both) of these developments would produce sufficient force to ttpeet the regis*. It la believed that Areas was in teach with considerable numbers of militant snti-Comwunlets on the Inside of Guatemala who led hia to believe that the bulk of popular sentiment vaa aati-Cowrunist and that the tlste waa ripe for his novel and that, Boreover, the officer corps of theAray still held the balance of power and could without assietsnee bringhange of Government if they could be Induced to asks the move which they had long been eonslderlnc and discussing. The full detail* of the events which led up to the Juneove on the part of Arose, and of ths events which took place dur'cgay period of hostilities, are not yet known. certain facts have become quite clear. Including the following!
a. The successful penetration daring the early days of Juds by the police and other sgsnts of the regime, had resulted in far-reacting exposures of snti-CcaBnaiiBts who were committed to militant resistance against the Arbens regime. This penetration and exposure resultedonsiderable Increase in police arrests, tortures and killings of aatl-CoaBtunlsts gene -ally. ('t has beenestimated that well over $CO antl-Comtanlsts were tortured sad killed In various parts of the country.
although tha figures are not yet known beceuae ao aueh of thia was accomplished secretly and at remotehese developwante are known to have censed the greatest concern to Armas, who estimated that if he did not make
his more soon the main elements of potential resistance within the country would be crushed. It is further known that within the first two or three days after the entry into Guatemala of Annas' men tlie numbers of people Joining his forces were small (due in part to remoteness of areaa into which he esse snd also the fear of reprisal on the part of the CoeBsnnlets who had pot out threats, followed by orders calling for the immediate execution of anyone assisting Areas). Thereafter tbereapid accretion of strength to Armas' email foroea, which in eludeddefectlecs from the garrieona at Chiquisula and Zacapa.
the Armas forces had progressedZacapa and before there was time or opportunityuprisings to occur, tbe officer corps madeof tentative moves against the Comstunists, withhad increasingly surrounded himself and by whoapermitted himself to be led.
is farther reliably reported that Armasuse of two or three aircraft, althoughfrom the bombing of cities or other There was much contemporary confuaion ofas to the exact date when tbe first bomb was dropped
In the vicinity of Guatemala City, but it is now wellthat this did not take place prior touneomb was dropped on the Mataaoroe Fortreee on tbe outskirts of Ouatenala City.
2. During the period of hostilities as well as for the weeks which iiamediately precededhere hadery noticeable rise of popular antipathy toward the Arbemi regime end particularly the Communist leaders and the police, led by the ruthleea Cms War and his Depoty, Jaime Rosenberg. Reference ban already been made to tbe suspicion and fear of theong the top military officera. The arrival of the ALFHEMery substantial shipment of arras (valued at between five and ten million dollars) served to increase this concern
on the part of tbe Military. Vherees certain officers were at first happy that the eras had been received, they bocane alarmed upon discovering the faetttmrt they had been procured clandestinely from beblsd tbe Iron Certain and they vera even more alarmed when thay learned of CWercwcnt plans to Increase the alia of tbe police and to arm cadres of CoBsmnlst peasants. Moreover, other elemeote of the population took actions indicating Mounting opposition to tbe Arbens regime. The strong denunciation of Ccscaunlsm by the Catholic Archbishop of Guatemalarofound effect. Also anti-regime and anti-Communist sentiments all found expression in pamphlets, posters, newspapersidespread canpalgn of writing the" on walla and doors throughout tbe country. The significance of this symbol wee understood by all torotest against theof Article JS of the Guatemalan Constitution, which epacifically prohibited political parties of foreign origin and connection. These sentiments appear to have been played on and developed by the useertain amount of clandestine radio on the part of Anas and hla people. The Government made an all-out effort tc locate and destroy the secret transmitters and on one or two occaslo:ia announced their eacoeaa. The Government also declared that the hostile radio waa variously loeated in different parte of Guatemala, in Mexico, and subsequently in Honduras. In evaluating the pressures wbieh, in cortbinatica, resulted in the roaignat^T- of Arbens, it seems clear that he wea troubled about the activity of thia radio whlehto ask sharp and revealing questlens concern"np the nature aad extent of Communist Infltret-o- and control of hla Government.
3. In any event, Arbens resigned during the night of Junend waa permitted by bis successor. Colonel Diss, toong snd violent radio broadcast. Dies, who wsa long rel-ardmd as the most devoted aod loyal supporter of Arbens and the officer who get on beat with the Communists, followed Arbens on the airroadcast of his own extolling Arbens and the virtues of Ma regime, andlaing to carry on with theovernmental program. During the brief tenure of the Junta led by Colonel diac, most of the Communist leaders aa well aa Arbens, the two Torielloe and many others, made good thair escape Into the protection of political asylum granted by other latin American embassies. The embassies granting aaylum to the largest number of tho Cosaunlate awl other fugitives were, and reoain today, the embassies of rierleo, Chile and Argentinaalthough considerable noabera fotind their way into the enbasaiea of other nations adhering to the special Latin American practice of affording political asylum.
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