ESTIMATE3 GRAIN PRODUCTION IN THE SOVIET BLOC
TmS-Kaa&tel^lUMllS ItCPORMATION AKtECiaJS-TTE"
NATIONALTHE MEANTW} OP THESC,il IffiVEtRKOltOF WiaCHni^AnTMAfJfffiR TO AN UNAUTHORIZED
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Office of Research and Reporls
A study of grain acreage, yields, and production is most essential to an appraisal of thc Soviet Bloc's capability to support itsunder conditions of peace or war. Although shifts ln thc grain production pattern within the Bloc froc year to year are not of themselves valid positive indicators of intentions, it is possible that the Bloc countries would notajor military campaignrotracted drought or with an empty granary.
Thla memorandum deals with thc production of Brain in the Soviet Blochole and ln each of its major componentsthe USSR, the European Satellites, and Communist China. It primarily highlights the current situation regarding acreage, yields, and production of bread grains (wheat andoarse grains (barley, oats, andice, and several minor grains3 and gives comparisons with pre-World War IT and recent postwar yuurs. This memorandum doca not analyze the relation of grain production to the economy of each country concerned, but attention ls drawn to certain of theseparticularly population numbers, in their broadest sense. An analysis of thc utilization of the production of each grain (seed, feed, industrial use, human consumption, trade, reserves, ands being modeeparate report on the food balance of each Bloc country.
Although thc emphasis of this ra-moraodura ls on productionooe consideration haa been given to long-teft trends and the plans of the Bloc countries to increase grain production. Crop production plans for Communist China are vague and do not ocem to have the same degree of importance asave ln the USSR and the European Therefore, insteadection on "Plane" for China, there isection on "Problems of Supply and Distribution."
The numerical data contained ln this memorandum do not represent measured or weighed quantitiesthey are at best estimates and sometimes approximations. The estimated range of error in most cesesercent.
I. The Soviet
3- Rice and Other
III. The European
, A. 3 Grain
A- 3 Grain
of Supply and
Bloc: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
of Grain, Prewar
Bloc: Per Capita Production of Grain,
Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production of Groin,
U. USSR: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production of Grain,
t Selected Prewar Periods
5- USSR: Per Capita Production of Grain, Prewar
Satellites: Estimated Acreage, Yield,
and Production of
Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
ulgaria: Estimated Acreaeo, Yield,9
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9- Czechoslovakia: Eatlnated Acreage, Yield, aadof3 gfi
Germany: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Pro-
duction of5 29
Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Production
Satlmated Acreage, Yield, and Production
lU. European Satellite*: Per Capita Production of Grain,
China: Estimated Acreage, Yield, and Pro-
duction of Grain, Prevar 3I4
China: Per Capita Production of Grain,
Western USSR: Spring Wheat Acreage
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Qp lgj3_OttAIK .PRODtCTIOH Ui THE SOVIET BLOC*
Considering the Soviet Blochole,3 total grainestimatedillion metricasillion tons below production2 andillion tons, nearlyercent, less than the production Immediately before World War II. The decline in production is more serious than the absolute figures indicate, when they are considered in relation to the over-all increases in population that have taken place. The European Satellites, considerednit area, had the. largest decline in absolute tonnage (more thanillionnd production per capita fellilograms, orercent. Per capita production in theercent and in Communistercent. For the Blochole, bread grain production wasercent below prewar production, but coarse grain production wasercent lower than prewar production. Per capita production of all grain fellilograms2 andilograms
The USSR and Communist China have established high goals for grain production in their respective long-range economic plans, but little has been accomplished in actually attaining them. Grain production goals in Eastern Europe have been at about prewar levels and have generally not been achieved.
The USSR, after admitting failure to achieve its agricultural goals, hasrogram to extend grain production to new lands, to idle land in presently cultivated areas, and to lands
The estimates and conclusions contained tn this intelligence memorandum represent the besl judgment of the responsible analyst as
** The grain crops considered in this memorandum arc wheat, rye, oats, barley, com, rice, and the miscellaneous minor grainsmillet kaoliang, buckwheat, spelt, and (in thc USSR) Throughout this memorandum tonnages are given in metric tons.
that have not proved to be veil adapted to the production of perennial grasses. Judging from past experience in extending grain production into submarginal areas, the Soviet program of seeding grain crops on virgin lands holds little promise of increasingbyillion toillion tons as planned. An appraisal of all factors, including climate, which is of paramount importance, indicates that Increase in production is more likely to be within the orderillion tons,ossibility ofillion tons If climatic conditions arc unusually favorable. Some success can be expected from the much more limited program tothe production of grain on idle land and land formerly usedonsiderable extent for grass crops, but this program will have little effect on the total grain production situation in the USSR.
The USSR appears to be in serious difficulty with respect to the production of grainnot only for food, but also for nonfood use. Thc new programesperate move which may, with favorable weather, stave off the time when the country will no longer be self sufficient in grain production. Unfavorable weather may cause crop production to fall short of the country's requirements in the near future. In that event, importslargely from Bloc countrieswill be nccessari to maintain the present levels of consumption.
The situation in thc European Satellites is also serious. climatic conditions haveajor factor in restricting production during the past few years. Lower production has also resulted from such other conditions as peasant resistance tocompulsory delivery of products to the State, the low prices paid for those products, and high taxesall of which have reduced individual incentives. With normal weather conditions and the successful prosecutionrogram of real incentives to peasants, the Satellite area not only could become self-sufficient in grain but also could regain its statue as an area of surplus production.
Thc per capita grain production in China is clouded by the great variation in population estimates. Because of lack of betterChina's population count is presently being held static. As far as production is concerned, there appears to have been less change in Chinaecrease of about 'i percent) between the late thirties3 than in the other countries of the Bloc. On the basistatic population, per capita production of grain3 wasilogramsar lower than in other Bloc countries. Moreover,
population may be greater than that being currently estimated, which would make the grain situation even less favorable than it appears. In spite of internal exhortation designed to increase grainin Coanunist China, it is improbable that in the long run any significant increase in per capita production can be attained.
The long-term- view of the grain situation in tbe USSR ie not optimistic. The European Satellites probably can improve their situation somewhat, but at best tbe quantity of their surpluses cannot be expected to equal those enjoyed before the war. The Chinese situation-is more or less static with the possibility of becoming worse. Therefore, except in years of unusually favorable climatic conditions, the Soviet Blochole may be expected to be not more than self sustaining.
I. The Soviet Bloc.
Grain is the most important class of food and feed products in the Soviet Bloc. As food, grain contributes, on the average, more than half the caloric value to the average diet in the European Satellites, about two-thirds in thc USSR, and up to nearly three-fourths in Communist China. Tbe importance of grain as feedreatest in the European Satellites andbecause of humanfor grain as foodf least importance in China.
Although all of thc countries in the Soviet Bloc are allied politically, each has its own economic aspirations, goals, and problems. Inclusion in the Bloc has not resulted in free exchange of goods among the countries, nor has it resulted in "Bloc unity" in economic policy and planning. The production and utilization of agricultural products is not planned for the Blochole, ana there is enough "rigidity" in each country's agricultuial cconofny toleveling" of per capita production snd utilization.
It must be recognized, however, that Ir. time of emergency the centralized political and military power of the USSR will attempt
U IfeSOurceB of al1 Bloc countries-* capabilities andfac^^Tfil nT" desired between
A- 3 Grain Production.**
nr^ the Soviet Blocstimated
ercent below the production of*ceatprevar annual nr^ctJ eductSon occurred In the USSR, wbcreaT^Jl ^about tb* same as ProductionK^rn^urope was, however, higher lhann unfavorable
f,^h^ grain acreage3 of^
aboveadverse weather in most regionsless favorable growing conditions for
crops3 than Yieldshich averagedall grains, were low in cccparlsS! vith
wiSJvei? ners per heotare 2 andreuar
opulation, estimatedillion peopleU million greater than2 andillion greater than prewar population for the same area. Because of thc Screase iT^tion and the decrease in grain production, the supply of grain foTfood3 vas not so favorable as It wasnd much less ravoruble than in prewar years. For example, the gross grainpers estimated at
Alb"U' ^ria,Germany, Hungary, Rumania, and
klnBdeductionsactual food supplies, itactor that is useful for makin* eompmr sons of different years. Itevicenfamiliar production measure of million metric tons to kUograms
comparedilograms2n prewar years,
II. The USSR.
A. 3 Grain Production.
The rainfall pattern in the USSR3 was generallyfor crop production. Drought conditions prevailed in the southernost important winter-wheat region. The drought coupledontinuation of the general shift in acreage from coarse grains to wheat, resultedecrease in total production. Productionstimated atillion tons, waselow thc production ofillion tons estimatedercent below the production ofillion tons in prewar years If the total grain production3 isto the total USSR population, thn resulting factor, gross production per capita, ds considerably below similar factors2 und the average for the late prewar period. )
3 production of bread grains was estimatedillion tons compared withillion tonsow yields were the chief cause of the difference in productionthe acreage seeded to these crops3 was onlyess than Yields3 were about one centner per hectare, orercent, lower than Both the acreage und production ol bread grains were still below thecreage, the acreagerillion hectares and production by about fl million tons.
Coarse grain production3 in estimated at aboutillion tons compared with aboutillion tons produced in
maller measure that is far easier to visualize and
OO'; that makes allowance for changes in population.
> foi y; .
3ollow on pp.espectively
5 follows on
oats, und corn.
lthough the acreage seeded remained the sumc. Prewar acreage and production wereillion hectaresillion metric tons larger, respectively, than those estimated
Although the acreage and production of all grains have been below late prewar averages, the emphasis placed on theof wheat in the postwar period by the USSR hasajor cause of the decrease in the acreage utilized for coarse grain Unfavorable weather3ajor cause of the decrease in yields; it is estimated that yields averagedentners per hectare compared with an average yieldentners per hectare
3. Rice and Other Grains.
Prom an acreage ofectares, rice production is estimated to have been0 tonsbout the same as the acreage and production2 and of late prewar years. Yieldsstimated atentners per hectare, also remained about the same. In comparison with bread and coarse grains, rice production in the USSR is insignificant.
The production of "other" grains*3 is estimated atillion tons. This is about the same production that was estimatedut it isillion tons below prewar levels. owever,iUion more hectares were sown to these grains than Compared to theillion hectares sown during the late prewar years,3 acreageecreaseillion hectares.
The Fifth Five Yearalled for an increase of UO toercent in grain production During theears of the plan, annual production has not increased siffiificantly, In fact, production3 wasillion tons,ercent, below productionhe base year, despite the fact thath million more hectares were seeded3 than
Recent decrees which are intended to increase grain production were announced after3 harvest, when production fell to the
* Buckwheat, millet, legumes, and vetch. When reporting grainthe USSR includes legumes and vetch.
lovest levels'9- The most important decision on thcor grain production Issued recently vas when tbe plan to reclaim idle land and extend the production of grain in nev areas was The plan provides for an expansion of the graini million hectaresnd7 million hectaresringing the total expansionectares. Envisaged in this acreage expansionroduction increase of nearlyillion tons.
The following discussion indicates that although the acreao-goal may be reached, only exceptionally favorable climatic conditions could result in an increase ln production ofillion tons. If normal conditions prevail, however, production can be anticipated to Increase by less than half this amount. In addition, some '* million hectares more are expected to be seeded to coarse grains and other crops on land that has recently been used for low-yielding perennial grasses. 2/ Thisess ambitious project than the plan to expand need lags on virgin land-and is more likely to succeed.
C Si gniflcance.
The USSR depends greatly upon agriculture for food, feed, and fiber: about half of its population depend directly uponfor their living. The failure to increase or even maintain production presents an alarming picture to Soviet loaders. Soviet grain production, in particular, has failed to return to prewar The significance of stagnation in grain production becomes most apparent when lt is contrasted with total population vhlch has been increasing by about three and one-haIf million each year.
3 population of 2lU million, the quantity of grain produced ln the USSR3ross per capita productionilograms for the consumption3 through. The gross per capita production3 iaercent less than5 kilograms indicated2 and almostercent below thekilograms produced per capita ln the late prewar
** Chiefly wheat and millet, foriS eStlMated2illion
Although not ko dramatic as are comjxirisons of grain toii imi lar comparisons of coarse grains to livestock numbers would indicate an even leas favorable ratio of feed per animal, whichactor tending to reduce productivity significantly. Except for hogs, livestock numbers will not be affected aa directly by grain shortages as will animal weights and thc production of dairy products. Horses, cattle, and sheepthe roughage consumerscan subsist with little or no grain if coarse feed supplies are available. decreases in grain production, whether greatest in bread or coarse grains, impinge upon the food supplyread grain directly and coarse grain indirectly as it reduces animal productivity.
The program to expand wheat production into the lower Volga (Economic Region VI) and Horth Kazakh SSR (Economic Region Xft) indicates that the USSR Is putting greatest emphasis upon bread grain production.n Interlinear reading of recent Soviet decrees, hovever, indicates that some balance between bread and coarse grains will be maintained by reducing the seeding of bread grains in their traditional areas of production as expansion takes place in tbe nev marginal areas. Part of the land formerly used for wheat in European USSR may be used for conroo grains. hift otrongly in favor of bread grain production would be counter to the alms of the Soviet consumer goods program, which is aimed at improving the level of living by providing higher quality foods. It Is axiomatic that more mouths can be Ted with the grain produced from an acre of land than with the products from animals fed the same amount of grain, but the latter provide on theore palatable, and possibly healthful,alance between these tvo extremes appears to be the course the USSR is taking.
If, however, expansion of the grain acreages into marginal areas fails, as It ia apt to do unless extremely favorable climatic conditions prevail, and population continues to Increase as it moot likely will for some time lo come, the consumer goods program will be hampered. esult the Soviet planners my be forcedosition of having to produce for survival. This eventuality vlll demand great Increases ln the directly consumed crops, chief of vhlch are bread grains, at the expense of indirectly consumed crops, such as coarse grains and other feed crops. Possibly the only alternative under these conditions would be for the USSR to become an Importer of staple foodstuffs. As an importer, the USSR would be vulnerable to economic sanctions imposed by thc food exporting nations.
The lower Volga and North Kazakh SSR regions, where most of the expansion Is to take place, areelt where the soil is poor and rainfall uncertain." The program, however, entails theof manpower, including managers and specialists already employed on productive collective farms. Some machinery beingTl-located to the new areas could be used effectively in the old areas of production. The new area Is supposed tonorsepower units). This comparesimilar general purposep units) which were the total deliveries to all of agriculture/
The USSR appears, therefore, to bereat risk with its nanpower and capital. Rainfall in the new area ranges betweenndnches per year. Experience has shown that two complete crop failures usually occur inear period In these regions of Russia receiving an annual precipitation ofonches.n the past, extensions to acreage customarily seeded to spring wheat in Asiatic USSR have proceeded slowly because of low yields and frequent crop failures. Yields have beenentners per hectare in the years when thc crop could be harvested. 6/
Increased production from this extension of acreage5 probably will be no moreillionillion tons, into theillion toillion tons calculated by the Soviet government on inflated and unrealistic yield estimates. Consequently, the cost of this production will be inordinately high. The more modest program to restore grain crops to idle land and land that has recently been used for perennial grass crops in the betterareas of European Russia should be relatively more The scale of this program, however, is too limited to bringignificant increase ln total grain production.
Ill- The European Satellites.**
of In sown the
Excessive precipitation in the European Satellites in the2 delayed fall plowing and seeding, which resultedecrease Rown area. Inry and cold spring3 reduced yield of grain below earlier expectations. 7/ In East Germany,
* See the map. Western USSR: Spring Wheat Acreage, following* Include Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Rumania.
Czechoslovakia, und Poland, root crops are harvested at approximately the same time that fall" plowing and sowing occurs. This high seasonal workload combinededuction in farm labor that has taken place in recent years has resultederious drop in winter wheat and rye acreage.
Because of the favorable sowing conditions existing during March and April, early estimates indicated that the loss of acreage devoted to winter grains would be made up with spring grains. The shortage of farm labor and machinery, unpopular collectivization programs, and peasant resistance, however, resulted in disorganization in carrying out spring sowing plane. Government announcements of plan fulfillment and its criticism pertaining to support of the -View course" indicated that the planned acreage goal for bread grains was not fulfilled.2 planned acreage of bread grain was also underfulfilled.
A- 3 Grain Production.
Grain* production in the European Satellites3 has been estimated to8 million tonsercent of the poor crop
0nlyercent of Prewar. 3 grain acreage
illion hectares was lessercent larger2 andercent below tho prewar average5 million hectares. Acreage of bread grains was2esult of adverse sowing conditions in the fall2 and lack of seed in the spring Coarse grain acreage increasedercent2esult of increased plantings of oats and corn.
Yields of bread grain3 averaged approximately the same as In the northernjwing conditions were not as satisfactory for grains as These conditions resulted in yields of wheat and rye remaining at or slightly2 levels while coarse grain yields were unchanged. In the southernields of all grains were higher than in the poor crop yearhc most significant increases2 uere in the yields of corn'
* ,SeeP.elow, for acreage, yield, and production by country.
** Eastern Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania.
The gross per capita production* of grains estimated at Wi kilograms3 islight increase over2 level of
averafie Per caPita Production of grain
*7T ompared23 this decline readily indicates the failure of the Communist governments to in-
1- Bread Grains.**
The bread grain acreagestimated at lU.9hectares,ectaresercent less than the acreage utilized for bread2 and Ih percent less than
reductloQ in3 acreage occurred in Bast6 percent decrease as compared
The average yield of bread grains3 wasper hectare as. compared92 andn Rye yields in Poland and East Germany showed theWheat yieldfi rem3ined approximately the same as
7 eVhaatn the other European Satellites
showed increasesut they still remained below their
,CrtB"ad.graln Productionstimated atillion
tons,onsercent less 3uction wasillion tons orercent below the prewar
ton* Produced in the average prewar year
The gross per capita production of bread grain1 estimatedilograms, isercent of the gross per capiS production2 andercent of average prewar years. was experienced by some Satellite governmentsn adequately supplying their people with bread. With adecrease inapita productions indicated above, it appears probable that the situation will show no improvement unless Seat and rye are imported in sizeable quantities. Poland and Hungary, normally net grain exporters, have been negotiating for significant imports of grain, including breuu grain.
Seeelow. wheat and Seeelow.
2. Coarse Grains.*
3 production of coarse grains, in contrast with bread grain, is estimated to have been largerut is still1 and prevar levels. Production is estimated to have been approximatelyillion tons orercentut it is stillercent belov prewar averages. Thc production of both oats and barley show increasesut the roost significantis that of com, which increased by approximatelyercent2esult or increased acreage and yield.
The total acreage of coarse grains2 ls estimated9 million hectares compared5 million2 andillion in prewar years. The increase3 acreage2 cameesultavorable spring for sowing and lessoss in the corn acreage due to summer drought than occurred
The average yield of coarse grains3 is estimated6 centners per hectareercent2 andercent of prewar yields. Yields of oats and barley3 werethc sameut the corn yield increasedercentesult of more favorable growing and harvesting conditions
Grain production In the Satellites has not been meeting planned goals for thcears. The Five and Six Year Plans forannounced by the various governments, called for grainto reach and in some areas to exceed prewar levels by the end of the plan.** The increased production of grain vas to be'by holding the grain acreage generally belov prewar levels and increasing the yields significantly. The plan goals, however, have not been realized to date. The announcement of the "new course" in agriculture by the various governments Is taken to mean anof previous failures.
The "new course" in agriculture for Eastern Europe places great emphasis upon the necessity for increasing livestock numbers
* Barley, oats, und corn.
a^J? ^ the feed supply, in which grainignificant role
t 8lifiht inCre9Be instlTof?he' bread grains, the Increased production of both bread and coarse
frU^8 c8Ult^"easing yields per hectare. It is planned that the increased yields will result from increasing the incentives to the peasants, increasing the use of chemical
,ore cautious collectivize, tion program during the next two years.
uropean Satellites,esultelow-average grain
harvest for the second year In succession, now find themselvefifthe
andbe net importers of
grain, if they hope to fulfill recent promises to the population ofstandard of living. Bread grain productionnwas With an increased
population this situation necessitated increasing Imports of bread grains for East Germany and Czechoslovakia,esumption of im-
x^jd levels of bread consumption.
Coarse grain production, although more favorable2 because of the increase In corn production in the Balkans, still was below government expectations. Hungary and Poland have negotiatedfor imports of feed grains from Western countries. Normally these two countries are exporters of feed grains.
i effects of low grain production3 are estimated
to be: n ^crease of grain imports by Eastern Europe overyears;ecreased ability of some Satellites to implement fully their consumer goods programsesult of having tolmport grains;nability of most Satellites to replenish stateof grain from which withdrawals were made last year without endangering food and fodder supplies.
* Hungary plans to increase the area .own to bread grains by 5 Plan! t0 CXpandhectares. The Minister of Agriculture, Jan Dab-Kocial, in3 that "in order to secure the food supplyhe countrf o import some grain. 9/
IV. Communist China.
A. 3 Grain Production.
Estimates of grain production for Communist China include the following: rice, wheat, kaoliang, corn, millet, barley, andAll of these grains excepting kaoliang and millet are shown separately for consolidation into Soviet Bloc totals. (See} Kaoliang, the millets,iscellaneous grain class are included under the general classification of "other grains." The area covered by the estimates of grain production exclude the autonomous regions of Tibet and Inner Mongolia, the province of Sikang and, except as noted,
Adverse weather3 resulted in less favorable growing conditions for crops than During the growing season,was irregular and apparently below normal in much of the rice growing area. In May and June, for example, drought delayed rice transplanting in no fewer than six provincee. This subnormalarea extendedough semicircle from Yunnan in theto Kiangsu on the east coast. In much of the winter wheat area,
a generally adverse winter was followedate and severe frost that lowered yields in some of tbe important wheat producing provinces.
An expansion in the acreage of both rice and wheat, however, served
to compensate for adverse growing conditions.
The tentative estimate3 grain production in Communist Chinaons. This is lessercent decrease fromons estimated2 butercent below the prewar average0 tons. The rice acreage expandedercentnd the wheat acreage increased byercent. The combined production of these grainspercent of all grain production.
* The Chinese Communistsrain production tonnage that includes thc grains as given here, plus peas, pulses, soybeans, and potatoes. It is not known if the potatoes are included in this aggregation on an absolute orrain equivalent basis. many intelligence publications use the same or similar tonnages for China under the same imprecise heading. ** Tableollows on The wheat production of Slnkiang is included in thc grainestimate for the first time As this is lessons, interyear comparisons are not significantly distorted by this addition.
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In terms of total grain production the increases in wheat and rice acreage were extremely important in offsetting the adverseof3 growing season- Wheat and rice constituted about two-thirds of total grain production. As long as this proportion of thc total is maintained, the total grain output will tend to remair relatively stable.*
Although the rice and wheat acreage was expanded init is unlikely that any of the other grain acreages expanded Total acreage for the listed grains3 vas7 percent over the prewar average. Moreover, it is difficult to credit an expansion of principal crop acreages larger thanercent expansion that occurred2 Under, these circumstances the grains other than rice and wheat are carried2 acreage levels. Adverse weather resulted in decreased yields and thus in lover production of grains other than rice and wheat. This decrease wasercent.
Grain production'3 also was lower than the Chinese Communists had planned. On '*hou En-Lai in ato the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference stated that the grain production goal3ercent Adverse crop conditions during the spring and Burnerevision (inf this targetercent2 By3 it would seem that even this goal was optimistic. According to CIA estimatea, actual grain production3 was onlyercent2 grain output. Although not all Chinese claims of recent production are known, thc Communists have announced that grain production in northeast China3 was onlyercent of the grain production
B. Problems of Supply aii'i Distribution.
er capita basis the production of grain3ilograms as comparedilograms Thisecrease ofercent and is below the prewar production of grain per capita byercent. * gives per capita production for the various types of grain.
* The acreage, yield, and production of grain in Communist China are givenrewar year and for each year3 inclusive in. 3u, below. ** Tableollows on
Rice production3llograma per capita for the first tine since the Cownists gained control of China. The production of wheat per capita has remained relatively stable at aboutllograaa, or approximately at the prewar level.
It is to be notedonstant population figure wasin calculating these per capita production data. If the census currently being conducted by the Chinese Communiotsopulation growth, the per capita grain output figure will be even less favorable than that shown in
The quantities of grain produced3 do not in themselveseteriorated food position. Food shortagesumber of localised country districts apparently have resulted from adverse weatherut the problems of interprovinclul movement of foodstuffs probably have been made more difficult. Food shipments to urban areas may bo an even greater problem, since tho traditional surplus areas of rice and of. coarse grains were affected To supply tbe urban population, it may have been necessary to draw foodstuffs from areas which normally are more or less bcIf-sufficient.
The government is encroaching to an increasing degree on the food distribution field. Estimates of the numbers of people dependent to some degree upon marketing functions performed by the government ranga as highillion. Because of the government's assumption of marketing functions and delays in its price stabilisation activities, lags in supply adjustment have resulted. ood crop year or asupply of grain tends to obscure the economic strains resulting from controlled prices and inept distribution. The slight fall in' total grain production3 tended to reveal or emphasise theinherent in the Communist practice of controlling prices and supply movements.
In like manner the failure of3 crop of grains to equal or exceed? production probably has reacted unfavorably on the government's storage or reserve program. Storage or reserve plans were likely based on the achievement of thc foodstuffs output goalhich was scheduled toercent Sincedecreased rather, than increased, maintenance of the reserve plan would have further worsened the already precarious food position of the population.
Tbe slie of the reserves that the Coamnists wish normally to carry are unknown. Various indications have pointedoillion tons of grains above commercial stocks. Such reserves, however, are believed to be relatively small as yet, and3 crop does not appear toavorable opportunity for their expansion.
The failure of3 grain crop to increase or even to equal the production2 probably hinders government operations in several ways. Exports to the USSR In payment for industrial capital are made more difficult. Although grain output was not down sufficiently to indicate that the Chinese Communists could not obtain the quantities of grain desired for export, internalwith the regime's procurement and export program would probably have been lessarger grain crop had materialized. Because significant additions to grain reserves are considered to have been unlikelyrice stabilization of basic foodstuffs and the build-up of strategic reserves for military use may have proceededlower than desired pace.
Because the Chinese Communists have firm political control internally, the decrease in grain output3 Is not likely to have significant effects on their intentions. Any plans ofimportance probably will be carried out. Nevertheless, son: delay may result in the implementation of those plansow priority In the economic field.
e tit it
? i. . .
E&SS I! tfi
Soviet Bloc: Per Capita Production of Grains Prewar/
onstant population0 million has been used to establish per capita data.
Europeanrewar,012 million;3 million.
b. 6 pounds.
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I. 8 Production andields. A. Prevar Methodology.
The prewar acreage of the Soviet Union is thc sum ofegional distribution of acreages (republics, krays, and oblast ft adjusted5 boundaries) plusS acreages of each of thc acquired territories (Rumania, Uo/altic States,nd) The acreages of thc acquired territories have been allocated to the new Soviet adminletrativeoundaries) formed after the acquisition of these new territories. The production ln each of the newly acquired territoriesd vas also taken from official sourcen and adjusted to new Soviet administrative regions.
The prewar production of grain for the Soviet Union (other than the acquired territories) was arrived at by multiplying the acreage for each administrative region by an average yield of each grain. This average yield vas formulated by taking the average The following reasons are given in using this average 'for the regional yields (l) The calculated production for the country, obtained by the use8 regional acreagesegional yields, falls between two Independent estimates for the8 production of grain. The calculated total6 million tens is one percent above Jasny's estimate6 million tons" and one percent belovstimateU million tons.
Jaony's estimate for prewar was based on prewar boundaries. His statistic ofillion tonsas adjusted to postwar boundaries by adding on6 million tons produced9 for the acquired territories.
** Volln gives estimates for Uie five major grains hg/ (wheat, rye, oats, barley, corn) for thc prewar territory. Thc differentialbiological yields and barn yields Indicated by Volln for his major spring grains has been applied to the minor spring grain (buckwheat, millet, spelt, and the like) yields and pulse yields (peas, beans, lentils). This implied disccunt ls nearlyercent.
tudy of grain yield trendsyear) indicates no upward trend butlight downward one. For this reason it is felt that the utilisation ofegional yieldsyear averages that can realistically be used as yield averages inrewar production base.
B. Postwar Methodology.
For the postwar period the production estimation problem has become more difficult. In the first place, it is believed that the percentage discount between "biological" (gross) and "barn" (net) yields has increased so that the prewar computed discounts are not valid in calculating the differential between the published "biological" production and actual "bam" harvest.
Apparently the most valid method for estimating postwar grain yields resultsomparison of past yield performance related to weather conditions and the use of these historical relationships to make current yield estimates. These yieldare based not only on current weather data but also on crop conditions reports gathered from field observers and Soviet publications.
After Individual yield estimates are made for the five major grains In each oblast, kray, or republic, the national average yield for each of the major grains is calculated by8 regional acreages to each of the estimated yields. These acreages act as weights in arriving at national averages. To arrive at theof the five major grains for the, the yields obtained by the above method are multiplied by total acreages for each grain.*
The production of the minor grains and pulses is estimated by assuming that the magnitude of departure of thc major spring-sown grain estimated yields from the averagelso
The adjusted production ofillion tons for the prewar territory6 million tons for the acquired territory gives ank million tons from Volin's basic calculations.
* These acreages have either been obtained from Sovietor are estimated.
applies to the degree of departure Iran the average for the minor grains and pulses. Acreages of these grains and pulses are obtained as indicated in footnote, page
II. Eastern European Satellites.
The problem of estimating grain production has become9 when all production statistics were classified as state secrets by the Satellite governments. Inasmuch as there have been no violent fluctuations in grain acreage, the annual problem has been primarily one of determining yields of the individual grain to be applied against acreage data.
Yields have been computed on the basis of current weather data, crop condition reports as available frca field reporting, sndpublications. This information is then correlated against historical information to obtain yearly deviations. The resultield estimate for each of the five major grains. These are applied against acreages to obtain total production.
Changes in acreages of grain crops from year to year areby analyzing government plans and criticism of winter and spring sowing programs. This information is then combined with
what field observation reports are available to make any changes.
Where "spotty" checking or past estimates have been available as
a result of announcements under the "newhe above method
of estimating has proved reliable.
This methodology covers the data which appear in
Explanation of table: Communist Chinaexcludes the Autonomous Regions of Tibet and Inner Mongolia and the Chinese province of Sikang. The province of Slnkiang is excluded from all data except the wheat acreage, yield, and production data Inclusion of Sinkiang3 "heat estimates alters acreage and production data by lessectaresons,
A. Prevar Data.
For China Proper data areverage. For Manchuria data areverage. These averages have been combinedingle prevar average figure.
orn, barley, and oats are Other grains Include millet, proso-millet,miscellaneous grains. All prewar yields are statisticalby dividing production by acreage. Bach grain isbelow for source reference.
illet production for Manchuria
g. Miscellaneoushe miscellaneous grains amount to lessillion tons and are estimated for Manchuria only. They consist of buckwheat, rye, spelt, Bmall quantities of oats and barley, some legumes, and meslin (mixed grains).
3. on-glutenous and glutenous rice. Glutenous rice acreage and production, with the exception of prewar acreage, are In all cases less thanercent of the total.
Estimates of individual grains arc made separately for China and Manchuria. Generally, within the frame of reference provided by prewar acreage and production, the estimates in the postwar years were made on an analysis of Communist claims, weather reports, and reports of refugees. The yieldtatistical yield obtained by dividing production by acreage. Each grain is listed separately below for source references.
?.. Coarsender prewar reference.
- ho -
o information wason which to2 estimate. The estimate carried forthe prewar average.
3. nder prewar reference. C. Data
Estimates for individual grains are preliminary. For rice and wheat, statistical yields were obtained by dividing production by acreage. For the other grains, decreases in yields wereon the basis of,weather reports and Communist production claims. These yields were then applied2 acreages of the various grains. Each grain is listed separately below for source references.
Coarsender prewar reference.
- thc23 crop conditions. Inasmuch as wheat yield was6 percenthe barley yield2 was lowered
5 percent to reflect generally poorer crop conditions. The acreage was maintained at2 level because of lack of information on which tohange.
- acreage, yield, und production
- the23 crop conditions. Moderate to severe3 for various corn growing areas, jji/ Acreageat2 level because of lack of informationhange. Yields were decreased byercent,approaching the previously lowest known yield.
andhe2 dataadjusted to3 crop conditions. Reportsgeneral grain production in Northeast China was down about
- Ul -
7illion/ This decrease was subtracted from millet and kaoliang on the basis of theirfter the previously estimated corn output decrease for the Northeast bad been considered. The net decrease in the production of millet and kaoliangillion tons.
e. creage, yield, and production carried2 levels. TjJ
t. Miscellaneouso information was available on which to3 estimate. The estimate carried3 is the prewar average.
nder prewar re fere
SOUHCES AMD EVALUATION OF SOUIICES
1. Evaluation of Sources.
The sources used in the preparation of this report represent all degrees of reliability.
gives precise current information on acreage, yields, orcrops. Starting from this base of varying reliability andaccuracy. It has been necessary for all analyststhis project to weigh suspect Information against that foundknown to be reasonably reliable and against knownand economic experience. An evaluation of thc sourceon all sources In the following list where it is thoughtof
Some of these data are in published form while others arc worksheets or tabulations.
Evaluations, following the classification entry andave the folloving significance:
Source of Information
Doc.y other sources
ompletely reliable robably true
sually- Possibly true
ot usually- Probably fa%se
ot- Cannot be- Cannot be JudgedOriginal document.