POSSIBLE DOWNWARD REVISION OF SOVIET FIFTH FIVE YEAR PLAN GOAL FOR ELECTRIC POW

Created: 8/11/1954

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HtLEASEAS SANITIZED

CENTRALLLIGEKCE JJsTJCI Office of the Chief, Eoonomio Research Office of Reeearch and Reporte

upport kemarar.dua

ugust iSSk

Soviet

SUBJECTi Poeaible Downward Revision of/Fifth Five Tear Planor Electric Power Generating Capacity

Indication that the current Fire Tear Hen goalgenerating capacity by the end$ will

not bo folflllod, although five Tear Ple/electric peer production goale will probably be overfulfilled. The desenda of tha newcods program, and the greater disposition to discount an early -hot war" with the attendant needarger reserve of Installed oapacitv are possibly Both contributors to this failure to neet capacity goals. ore Important cauee of this failure, however, probably is that the large, coatly,ctric stations, such as Kuybyehev and Stalingrad, proved to be sorerain on available reaourcea than antloipatad, and that plannedof enaller thermal eleotrlo po-ar planto was cat back ln favor of attempted on-schedula cocpletion of tho "grandiose construction projects."

Vf.ervukhla, foraer Miniater of the Ministry of Eleotrlo Power Stations and Electrical Induetry, cade tho following atateeeat in aa election speech lnI11

"For the purpose of providing oloctrio power for tho aoeds of industry, agriculture and town ooonoay, which are beingrandloes programs* of aleetriflcatioa is being carried out here according to the Fifth Five Tearower stations are being built and extended, after the completion of the construction of which the total oapacity of the power stations of the DSSR will increase 1/

This statement ia not without its ambiguities, but ths moat probable interpretation is that th* statedercent lacrosse la oapacity refsrs to the period of the eurront Pive Tear Plan. hisubataatial drop from the original goal of doubling the installedercent increase. %J It would soem, however, that the revised goal le attainable.

There have been other indicators, besides this recent one, that ho Soviets wore experiencing difficulties ia meeting the original goal of *'

doubling ths0 oapacity ofillioa W, neeeaa Hating ar. average annual increase ofnllion DT. illion CT were added during the first year of the Five Tear Plan.illion tl KW wore addod h/ illion KIT .ore addedlans were underfulfillad coring theoe yoara. It waa adalttod iab that "tho plan for putting Into operation of production3 has boon greatly underfulfliled by tho Miaiatry of Electric Po"er Stations and Electrical7 Construction and lnotallation piano of tho ninietry were also undorfulfUled1/ Approximately Ii million AT are scheduled to be added to existing capacity co plans for Installed capacity were undorfulflllednd since only aboutillion XV will bo installed1t, the large increments of capacity duo to bo Installed5umber of largo hydroelootrio otattono are echoduled for completion)** will not, even if completion date plans areistbsillion CT capacity noeeoasry to fulfill the original goal of tho curreat Five Tsar Plan.

One of the reasons for this uaderfulflilnent may bo that Soviet planners revised thoir estimate of the possibilityhot*war" commencing In the near future, thereby reducing the urgency ofizable reserve generating capacity This is tho cost speculative and is without substantiating evidence, however, it ahould be noted hare that the plan for production of electric power has been fulfilled so far andaxe that tho production goal of the Fifth Five Tear Plan will ba9/ This means that the existing installed capacity io still being 'pushed' and annual hours of operation of plant equipment remainigh

She Fourth Five Tear Plan goalillion CT by* the end0 is not believed to havo been achieved, ia spits of tho fact that reference la sad* to this plaa figure ia Soviet publications During the period, statements were made ln the Soviet proas relative to serious undorfulfillment of tho plan for putting new plants into operation. However, tie amount of oapacity Installed at the end0 is unknown, with BBtlaateo ranging fromoillion Kff. An estimate ofillion JTW, considered toaxiaua attainment, is used in this report.

he major hydroelectric stations scheduled to go Into operation

(not necessarily at full oapacity)re Hated as follows!

yolotov on

Oorodeto on tho

Suybyshev on the

oa tho Dnieper

level, possibly deferring maintenance and repair. In order to satisfy the ever-increasing demand for power, "here le probably very little reserve capacity that could be used to aatlafy the increased demand which would resultapid industrial conversion to wartime production. the Soviet planners called for electric power generating capacity reserves ofoercent by the end of tbe prewar Third Five Tear Plan, which was, of course, interrupted by the German The Fifth Five fear Plan, as originally reported,onsiderable Increase in reserve capacity Thatercent increase in capacity with only an BO percent increase in production was called for.

It is also possible that the new policy of stepping up consumer oods production may have resulted in current lower priorities for power plant construction. Investments in th* electric power industry, it is true, lagged behind the annual planut it la planned to lnveatillion rublaa for the construction of electric power plants and networkau,1 percent increase, (An Increase ofercent in Investment haa been reported for tho first halfu over the first half In fact, since the Implementation of the new consumer goods program in tha springonstruction of all major hydroelectric stations then under construction was continued, or speeded up, in spile of the reported abandonment of several large canal and irrigation projects, lj/

The main factor for this underfulfillnent may he that theof the Kuybyshev, Stalingrad, and other major hydroelectric atationa resulted in sorerain on reaourcea, manpower, and on the electrical machinery industry than anticipated. Under theee circuaatancsa, theof planned, smaller, "run-of-the-mill' thermal electric power plants may have been curtailed In favor of an all-cut attempt to complete the much publicised grandloaa hydroelectric plants on schedule. This third hypothesis, including tha possibilityarked Chang's of policy12 favoring to an even greater extent the Soviet policy of esphaeltlng the construction of hydroeleotric planta at tha expense of thermal electric power planta, seems at thia time to be the moat likely. Pervukhin stressed this further, in an election apeech in Aprilby devoting severalto reasons for "the necessity to extend in every way the construction of hydroeleotricli/ .

Vhlle not totally discounting other poeaibilitlea stated, it is believed that the Inability or Indiaposition of the Soviete to Install new generating capacity as originally outlined in the Fifth Five Tear Plan la due principallyubaequant decision to concentrate available resources on the oonatruction of large, ooetly hydroelectric stations whichonger time for construction, rather than smaller thermal electric power planta. This does not mean that little thermal electric power plantla, or will be, undertaken, but that eome planned oonatruction has been deferred or canceled.

Coordinated withi

SECRET

SOVP.CE LIST

Pravda, zi April 5lt, p. b>

Draft Directivee of the Fifth Five Tear Plan of the Soviet Onion, transmitted by TASS,fficial Uee Only.

Dally Report, USSRtem Europe, Ko.fficial Dae Only.

h. Elektrichesklye,u, p..

Itstated thatercent more capacity was introduced n KW uaa reported added into the above atatementillion KB (The percentage figure may refer to Ittniatry ofPlanta atationa only, but theae account for atnstalled oapaoity and the figure may be applied to totalolittle error.) This le to be consideredaa

it ia pceeible, although not probable, that the figure Bay be as highillion IK.

FBIS Daily Report, USSR and Eastern Europe,arch Official Uae Only. (Addresa by II.ervoiohln.)

FBIS Daily Report, DSSR and Easterneb $k, Offioial Uae Only. (Statement by the Central Statistical Administration of the USSR Council

of Ministers.)

EleJctricheskiye Stanteii,lektricheeklye Stanteii,. 3-

Pravda,pril ft, p. U-

to, S.

FBIS Dally Report, USSR and Eastern Europe,t, Official UaeDaily Report, USSR and Eastern Europe,3 "

FBIS Daily Report, USSR and Eastern Europe,3

Economic Geography of tbe USSR,.

Pravda,pril ft, p. U.

FBIS Dally Report, USSR and Eastern Europe,fficial Use

Pravda,6 Feb ft. Ut< Pravda,pril ft, p. it.

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Original document.

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