NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER
SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS7
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
Submitted RELEASE IN FULL
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTKLL1GENCK The lolloxolng Intelligence organitatloni participated In thi preparation of thU estimate. The Central Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence organization ot the DifOftmnU Ol State, the Army, thi Han. the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Conferred in by the EfTEXJJOEXCE ADVISORT COMMITTEE on IToncurring KVTa Ihe Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department ol State; Iht Aisistant Chlel ol. DepBrfmenr ol the Army; the Director ol Naval Intelligence; the Director o/ IntelUgence. USAF; the Deputy Director lor InteUUtmce. The Jotnt Staff, the Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the HC. and the Assistant u> the Director. Federal Burta* cl Iniestlgatlon.
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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SOVIET GROSS CAPABILITIES FOR ATTACKS ON THE US AND KEY OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONS'7
To estimate gross Soviet capabilities for atlacks on the US and key
In planning the actual scale of attack on the US and key US installationsthe Soviet rulers would recognize that such an attack would inevitably involve general war. Accordingly, some portion ol the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile and delivery capabilities would almost certainly be allocated for use against US allies and for reserve. This estimate does not consider the problem of such allocation, butitself to the gross capabilities for attack on the US and key US installationsas indicated by the estimated state of Soviet weapons, equipment, and facilities during the period of the estimate.
In attacking the US and key US over seas installations Uie major Sovietwould be to: (a) destroy or cripple as quickly as possible US capabilities for nuclear retaliation; (b) deliver such an
attack on urban, industrial, andtargets in the US as would prevent, or at least hinder, the mobilization of US war potential; (c) inflict such destruction on US overseas Installations as would be
Key VS Overteat Installations: fa) United_ strategIc air bases and forces: lb) Westera Europestrategic air base* and forces; lac Ucal an bases and forces for NATO support, basei and touts for support of navalrmy forces, depot and port complexes, major headijuartitr* and key bridges and tunnels- let Fa> Fast (Includingall bases and forces: tactical air support bases aril fotces; naval and naval air forces and army and navy Initallauons: port complexes fo* support of US and allied forces: (d> trench Horthtrategic air bases and forces: naval air facilities. <et PociSc (Including Hawaii and Philippine!)slrategic air bases and forces.
LOC supportrmy bases: naval and naval air bases and forces:iddle laststrategic air bases and foreea; naval air fad It tie* <siAtlantic (including NewfoundlandLabrador. Iceland)air bases unci forces, navel and naval air facilities. LOC support faclllUos; (h) Bermuda-Aiotesskate-die air bases: naval and naval airlaskastrategic air bases and forces, ports: army base: naval air facility; (J) fanamm Ctiwof and CaribbeanLOC link; naval and naval air facilities: and <k> US Fleet t'-iiiofSeventh, Second and First Fleet*immediate threats to the USSK
to hamper or prevent thc US from reinforcing or resupplylng its forces.
The Soviet leaders would probablythat ln order to achieve success such an attack would have to beunder conditions of maximum surprise. Therefore the USSR would probably launch its initial attacks from such bases and under such conditions as would offer the greatest security from
In order to achieve both maximum surprise and maximum weight in anon the US and its overseaswe believe that the USSR would place chief reliance on nuclear airSuch attacks would probablythe highest priority because of: (a) the limited capabilities of naval, ground, and airborne forces against UieUS; (b) the security difficultiesin the delivery of large numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine means; (c) Uie insufficient development of other methods of delivery of nuclear weaponsarge scale; (d) the insufficientof other mass destruction weapons, or handicaps to their large-scale use; and (e> Uie availability of farair bases, from which air operations against the US are least susceptible to
The areas most suitable geographically for launching long-range air operations against the US are the Kola Peninsula area, the Leningrad complex; theand Kamchatka areas inSiberia; and the Baltic-Eastarea The Chukotski. Kola, and Kamchatka areas are particularlyas bases for surprise attacks since great circle routes would initially avoid overflight of nations friendly to the US.
resent Soviet capabiliUes for airon the continental US are limited by dependence on Uieomber, by the apparent lackeveloped inflight refueling capability, and by the relatively undeveloped character of Uie Kola,and Kamchatka base areas.missions or such range extension techniques as inflight refueling would be required to enable Soviet bomber aircraft to strike important targets in UieUS. We estimate Uiat the capacity of air bases in these areas would permitaximum ofin an initial attack against Uie US. If all were cormnitted to one-way unre-fueled missions,ight reach US target areas not considering combat losses.orce couldall or atubstantialof the nuclear weapons estimated to be available to the USSRhile stillortion of the striking force to be used for electronic counter-measures, escort, or diversionary tasks
'The Director of Naval Intelligence and theChief of. Department of the Army, believe thai available Intelligence on over-all Soviet capabiliUes for long-range airis insufficient toinite estimate of the number of alrcralt which might be launched from the Kola. Kamchatka andareashey therefore believe thathould read as follows:
Soviet gross capabilities for air atlack onIn the continental United Slate* are-.iwd by dependence on theomber, by Uie apparent luckevelopedrefueling capability, and by the relatively undeveloped character of the Chukotski and Kola batehe SovieU hav* sufficient TIM'S to attempt the delivery of all or apart ot Iheir atomic stockpile ithcdepending upon types of weapons stockpiled* against th* United Slates from base*Soviet-controlled lerntory. even though some of thereaching target areas probably would not be bomb carriersumber would be used for electronic countermeasuren, escort, oitasks.
Footnote continued on page 3
f the USSR elected to utilize thebases ln the Baltic-East German and Leningrad areas and thus lessen its chances of achieving surprise it couldaximum ofircraft4 in an initial attack on the US. However, the great bulk of these aircraft would have to fly one-way un-refueled missions.ight reach target areas not considering combat losses. We consider such anhighly unlikely.
Assuming an allocationU-4's against the continental US, the USSR could in addition launchedium bombers against such other targets as key US and allied installations overseas. Not considering combat lossesight reach target areas. However, the USSR will probably rely more onet light bombers available4 to attack keywithin operational radius of these aircraft because of the greater capability of the jet bomber to penetrate allied air defenses.
7 we estimate that the USSR could,ajor effort, develop theof the air bases in the Kola.Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas
Footnote continued Irom page S
The implementation of this capability is de-pendent upon:
Ul Their willingness to accept the loo* on one-way missionsubstantial portion of iheir long-range air force.
heir willingness to accept theof allubstanUal portion of theirstockpile and to entrust iu delivery to theire raft
Ui Tho development and employment of range extension techniques.
se of Leningrad hue areas Uiat would considerably decrease the range of alrcrart if surprise is lo be achieved by noi overflying non-Soviet territory."
to permit the launching ofircraft in an initial air operation against the US. If all of these aircraft were committed to one-way unrefueled missions (or two-way unrefueledwheren the orderircraft might reach target areas not considering combat losses. Theof this maximum capability would involve the expenditure on one-wayof most of Soviet Long-Range
e consider it more likely, however, that thc USSR would elect to commit substantially fewer mission aircraft. It might launchircraft, which couldankersaircraft. Ofission aircraft, about two-thirds would possibly be launched from the Kola-Leningrad area and one-third from northeastern Siberiaircraft might arrive overareas not considering combat losses. However, exercise of this capability would involve difficult operational and logistical problems, particularly those pertaining to the creationanker fleet. Moreover, the exercise of this capability wouldthe loss on one-way missions of about one-third of Soviet long-range bomberumber of theaircraft would probably be used for electronic countermeasures. escort, ortasks.
ssuming the scale of attack inbove, the USSR wouldedium and heavy aircraft left for use elsewhere Of thisercent would be immediatelyfor attack against key US and Allied overseas installations, for reattack. or for reserve. Not considering combat losses, approximatelyercent of these
launched would probably arrive overareas. We also estimate that7et light bombers will befor attacks on targets within thecapabilities of these aircraft.
hroughout the period of thisthc Soviet rulers probably would employ other methods of attacking the US or US installations overseaswith or Immediatelyurprise nuclear air attack. They could attack US overseas Installations with guided missiles up to rangesiles and could employ airborne andforces, ground forces, and chemical warfare. Clandestine attack on the US itself by sabotage, biological warfare, and placement of nuclear weapons, might occur against specially selected targets.
he submarine force of the USSR could, at least in the initial phases of an
attack. Inflict serious damage on UScommunications and carry outmining In the shippingto harbors and porls of the US and its Allies, in addition to its potential for launching mass destruction weapons against the US or key US overseaswithin range.
he USSR would probably employ ground, airborne, and amphibious forces in attacks Uiat occur simultaneously with or immediately after the initial attacks Soviet ground forces, particularly in Western Europe,igh capability for attacking Allied forces andlocated in forward areas Theemployment of airborne orforces would enable thc Soviet Ground Forces to attack more distant forces and installations.
AVAILABILITY OF SOVIET MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS
uclear Weapons. The Soviet atomicprogram, directed primarily toward the production of nuclear weapons, will continue to receive special emphasisxtensive reserves of uranium exist within the USSR and current rates of exploitation of domestic and Satellite uranium deposits will probably continue to be more than sufficient to aupport estimated fissionable materialIL is believed that thc other basic materials required for nuclear energy pur-posrs up tore available in sufficient quantity as not to cause curtailment of other important Soviet efforts if nuclear program needs are to be met
n the light of technological capabilities as of the endoviet militarywill govern thc allocation of available fissionable material to various types of weap-
ons, consideration being given to the total energy yields attainable from the weapons stockpile By the end3 the USSR had tested small, medium, and large-yield weapons and had employed thermonuclear boosting principles to produce energy yields in the range of the equivalentew thousand to at least one million tons of TNT. During the immediate future, the types of weaponswill probably have the generaland the explosive powers of weaponstested. On this basis, one of the ways in which thc USSR might allocate lis slork-piic of fissionable material is as follows: '
' In view of the range of error applicable to etc "tiiniU of Sonet fiialonabk material produr-lion, the actual figures foray be as muchne-third lower or higher tlian thegiven above. Uncertainty increase* as mi-mates are proiected Into the future and the Actual figure foray be as low as one-half or as high aa twice thc figures given in tne
Large-yieldT each) Medium-fieldT each) SS ZSS Small-yield weaponsT each)
USSR will probably conUnueweapons wllh equivalent yields wellof one million tons of TNT as wellsmall-yield and small-dimensiondevelopments along these linestesteduch developmentsmore flexibility ln the use ofWe estimate that7 thenave weapons with the followingyields:
Large-yield0 KT or mote Medium-yieldT SmaU-yleld weaponsOST
Warfare. It ls mosttechnological reasons, that the USSRable to stockpile militarilyof radiological warfarethe period of this estimate.strictly within the category ofthe significance of radio-activefollowing large nuclear explosionsas the yield of nuclear weaponsTills factor should be consideredwith Soviet capabilities toln the megaton range.
iological Warfare. The USSR Is inof all the necessary basic knowledge for the production of most BW agents anddissemination devices. If thc Soviets chose to do so, they would be able to construct and operate plants for BW agent production and devices for dlssemlnaUon could bein adequate numbers. However, there is no evidence that the USSR is engaged in BW agent production or possesses production facilities designed specifically for BW agents. There is also no evidence of Soviet stockpiles of BW agents or munitions. Since It is not feasible to stockpile large quanUUes of most BW agents in prolonged storage, most opera-tional requirements would have to be supplied directly from producUon facilities.
hemical Warfare. We assume that the stockpile of standard agents and munitions accumulated during World War II has been maintained and will be available for usethc period of this estimate. Intelligence indicates that the Soviets could have been producing at least one of the nerve gasesnd we esUmate that the USSR will be capable of employing nerve gases during the period of this estimate.
II. DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAL ANO MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY AIRCRAFT
he TU-4. Soviet Long-Kange Aviation constitutes the long-range striking force of the USSR. It consistsirn thc Far Eastn the western USSR,orps of undetermined subordination In the western USSR. Theedium bomber, which was copied from thes the only bomber available to the Soviets in large numbers and capable of carryingweapons to distant targets. Asotal ofU-4's was estimated to be available In operational units (Table of Equipment Strength of Soviet air regiments known to be equipped with or in process of being equipped withircraftut theegiments areestimated to be at onlytrength.) AsU-4's (eight regimentstrength) were located in lhe Soviet Far East. It Is believed that deliveries of TU-4's to operational units have virtually ceased and that with the gradual phasing out of these aircraft as new jet models become availableill remain in operaliomil units by
et Medium Bomber. In the past four months there have been conclusive indicationset medium bomber equipment program has been initiated In Soviet Long-RangeDuring4 Soviet May Day fly-by and the rehearsals preceding1 twin jel medium bombers, designated by.jjihedas thearticipated Sub-
sequent intelligence has associated this typenown Soviet Long-Range Aviation unit. We estimate that as4 at ieast two regiments of Soviet Long-Range Aviationtrength ofircraft were in process of equipment with Typeet medium bombers. Total actual strength of these units is estimated at approximatelyircraft. Scries production of the Types estimated to have begun innd total production as4 is estimated at aboutircraft. Byt isLhat Soviet Long-Range Aviation will contain an actual strengthet medium bombers.
et Heavy Bomber. Thehich was initially observed on3 and later observed in flight on seven different occasions in connection with4 May Day celebration,wept wing, four-engine, jet heavy bomber with an estimated gross weightounds. The aircraft, con-
summarv of estimatedthsoviet long-ran or aviation""
sidered presently to be in the prototype stage, is expected to appear ln operational units by the end6 building up to an actual strength of aboutircraft by
lass Heavy Bomber. Theresome evidence of the existence of adesignated then thepresent evidence. It Is highly doubtfulsubstantial re-equipment ofunits with Typelass aircraftlo date, though possiblyeen introduced. Thc Long-Rangere-equipment program to replaceis more likely lo be accomplished byof the Jet bomber aircraftnow appeared, and theill not be Introduced inestimated radius/range of this aircraftnautical milesoadauticalound bomb load.
Aircraft Characteristics of Soviet Long-Range Aircraft
adii/ranges of Sovietbombers are shown inndicates capabilitiesin accordance with US militaryTable II Indicates maximumunder combat conditions.
TViliBunlj W! il BT
F SOVIET LONQ-HANOE AIRCRAFT (Calculated in accordance with US Miliiary Mission profiles)
Combat Radius/ Range (nm)
b Com speed
combat Cetant <rt)
The performance^figures shown lor the Typeere calculated on the basis
* 'lMdaince recalculauonaximum gross take-off weightno
I9S7 MAXIMUM PERFORMANCE UNDEROF SOVIET LONO-RANOE AIRCRAFT
Combat Radius/ Ranee (nm)
Combat Ceiling <It!
pound take-on weightounds of fuel.
Refueling. We have nothat the USSR is actuallyrefueling. However, inflighttechniques do not impose seriousand the USSR has had access totechniques and equipmentthe US In this field. The USSR isnave evinced interest in Westernof refueling techniques, andmethods have been discussed inliterature. It Is thereforeconsider the eflect of inflight refuelingthe range of Soviet bomberfleet of tanker aircraft, appreciablein their operational use, and theof mission aircraft fuel systems,necessary before two-way missionsUS could be conductedargeestablishment of tanker units wouldthe conversion of TU-4's ornew tanker aircraft. Since TU-4operational units is estimated tothe present figureoufficient TU-4's could befor conversion to tanker aircraftperiod of this estimate. With onethc combat radius/range of USSR'saircraft could be increased as showntable.
Base Areas for Direct Air Attack on the US
areas within Soviet dominatedare most suitable geographicallylong-range air operationsUnited States: the Kola PeninsulaLeningrad complex; the Chukotskiareas in northeasternmo Baltic-East German area.Kola, and Kamchatka areasadvantageous as bases forattacks since great circle routesinitial overflight of nations friendlyUS. The extension of bomber rangeswill not be great enough toenemy to dispense with these areas iftargets in thc whole of theare to be reached on other thanmissions. It Is therefore reasonablelhat at least until the end ofof this estimate any large-scaleinvolve use of these areas.
Chukotski Area. This area Is not known to contain any bases suitable forake-offs at maximum gross weightsoundsfoot obstacle, but does have at least four bases which have undergone post-World War II runway development which would probably make them suitable forunder conditions of either reduced take-off or acceptance of lower safety margins. Among these are:ndvailable Intelligence does not permit conclusive determination of the current status of these facilities. It does Indicateew hard-surfaced runway was built at Tanyurer after World War II,ateet in length. Available Intelligence also indicates thatwork occurred at Markovo,oot runway extensibleaximumeet existedue to this limitation on extensibility of this runway, however, piston medium bomber operations from it would be severely restricted. The runway at Provldeniya/Urelik was developed to its present length ofeet between the spring2irfield development work has also beenon at Velkal and at some other locations in the Chukotski area in thc postwar period. Such work could be carried out in thc area without detection. It Is estimated that the construction capability of elements presently in the Chukotski area could provide oneimproved0oot runway) each year between now" Construction of permanent-surfaced tunways suitable for long-range bomber operations may have been retarded in this area due lo the perma-trost problem, but the USSR piou-ably has learned to solve this difficulty through frozen soil studies conducted since World War II. The Soviets have had ainterest in lec and snow-impacted runways.
Long-range air operations from thoarea would encounter many difficulties because of basic logistic limitations andclimatic conditions. However, the USSRund of Arctic flying experience
which could be exploited (or operations from this area. Logistlcally, the area ls served principally by sea-lift limited to the Ice-free months of the year. The status of basesupport facilities In this area isThe supply problem Inherent in the support of air operations in the Chukotski area would be difficult; however, theof the supplies necessary to sustain limited air operations could be accomplished prior to Initiating such operations. Cold, wind, snow, and fog In the area would make air operations difficult and hazardous atlimes of the year. The lack of modern navigational aids would also hamperbut there are Indications lhat the USSR is steadily improving its air operationalin this area through the installation of modern radio navigational facilities. It isthat no long-range bomber units are presently stationed in this area, althoughights have been made to thc area.
ola Peninsula Area. The Kolahas six known bases which would befor operations of the standard and/or modified versions of thet maximum gross0 poundsoundsrovided the Sovietsa reduced safety margin. These are Muimansk/Vayenga,,oot graded earth surfaced runway; Alakurtti.oot concrete surfaced runway; Nautsl,'foot graded earth surfaced runway. Ponoy.oot graded earth surfaced runway; Pechenga.1OO foot concrete surfaced runway; and Nlvskiy,. where recentis believed to have provided atoot hard surfaced runway Thereack of recent intelligence on the current stalus of runway surfaces at the above fields other than Nlvakiy. although there have been some indications of runway development at several of these installations
n addition to these six airfields there aie olher fields in the area which could beand which may already have beento accommodate medium/heavy bomber operations. Such development could
now be in progress or could have beenout without detection. We estimate that construction elements in the area would be capable of completing at least one improved Installation each year between nowermanent surfaced runways can bewithout difficulty throughout the Kola area as it is relatively free ofPrevailing climatic conditions,estrictive factor on air operations, aremore favorable In this area than ln other portions of the Soviet Par North.routes by rail and sea are open to thc Kola Peninsulaear around basis. The status of base logistical support facilities which would be required to conduct long-range nuclear attacks from airfields in this area is unknown. At least four of the six fields named above are now used by other Soviel air components. These units would have lo be relocated to permit maximum use of the fields by long-range bomber aircraft However, the airfield system in the Kola area would permit such relocation if required.
tenmgrad Area. This area, in which long-range bomber units are probably now based, contains at least one known airfield,oot concrete runway. In addition, at least lour airfields in the area,al-dtafclE) have runwayseet. Seven additional airfields in the area have runways in excesseet. Operations from this area by strikewould offer advantages of launching an operationemperate climate with good logistic supjwrt. However, if overflight of Scandinavia were to beogleg course over the Kola Peninsula would be nfccssary on an attempted attack againsi the United States.
Kamchatka Area At present, airfields in the Kamchatka area arc not considered to be suitable forake-offs atts weightoundsfoot obstacle. However, there arc four airfields in thc area which would permit ground runseet and could be used by modifiedof theroviding lower safety
margins were accepted. These arend
altic-East Qerman Area. This area, which Includes the Soviet zone of Germany and Poland, now has at leastirfieldsfor long-range bomber operations. These bases are lavorably situated with respect to communications and weather and areserved by existing transportationajor disadvantage is that great circle routes to the United States from these bases pass over portions of Western Europe or Scandinavia, and any attempted air strike would probably be detected early enough to provide warning. In addition, security of preparations would be lower ln this area than in other forward base areas.
he capabilities of Soviet bombersfrom these base areas against the US and key US overseas installations are shown in the charts annexed to thisavigation and Bombing Accuracy. long-range aviation has available through open sources virtually complete target and navigation data on North America and ils approach routes. It is even probable that in the eventurprise attack, certain Weslern electronic navigational aids would be availa ble during at least part of the flightmeteorological reports. Including pro flir data at all altitudes, are regularlym the United States and Canada Incipher. We estimate that Soviet blind-bombing and navigational radar equipment is ra|iable of equal or better performance thanS World War II equipment which the USSR acquired. s also possible that clandestinely placed navigational beacons may lie used for aircraft homing. TheSoviet training program points to con-tlnuing Improvement in air crew proficiency. In view of these factors and Soviet ability toime of attack with respect to favoi--ibic unite and target weather conditions,lmost cettam that Soviet air crews would be able to navigate with sufficient accuracy Id reach the major population and industrial renters of the United States and in bombing
to achieve CEP accuracieseet for visual bombing0 feet,eet for radar bombing from the same altitude. However, the effectiveness of attack delivered by radar alone might bereduced by defensive electronic
vailability and Abort Rate. of Soviet aircraft, although below US standards, has improved since World War II. By the end7 the Soviets should be capable of achieving in the forward stagingerviceability rate ofercent for an initial, deliberately prepared surpriseagainst North America. The sustained serviceability rate for bombers is estimated al aboutercent for normal operations. Cold weather operations might cause someIn the foregoing figures. In addition, some ot the aircraft taking off would abort and fail to reach target areas for reasons other than our air defense activity. The allowance for aborts and for all causes other thanattrition is estimated at abouterceni for nonrefueled andercent for refueled missions.
eplacement RaU. No appreciableof TU-4's arc believed to exist al the presentanker fleet is created, or TU-4's are converted for other specialappreciable numbers of TU-4's, phased out ot operational bomber units during Ihr pavtOd of this estimate, would probably not be availableeserve. There wilt be no appreciable reserves of anyes ol ait craft introduced during the period of Ihis estimate.
eather. The USSH has for many years devoted considerable emphasis to both short-period and long-period meteorologicaland hasigh degree of success In this field. We believe lhat the USSR has the forecasting capability tolong-range air operations. This capa-bility plus extensive experience inresearch in the extreme northernweather reporting facilities in Siberia, and constant access to current Northweather reports and forecasts shouldthc USSR to predict both route and target
with reasonable accuracy. Wethat Soviet capabilities in upper air research and in the more complex phases ol meteorological instrumentation are somewhat less than those ol the US; however, the Soviets have the technical capability to overcome these deficienciesew years.
lectronic Countermeasures. The USSR has had accesside variety of World War II US defensive radar and to some USequipment. It is apparently well aware of the tactical advantage to be gained by jamming defensive radar and otherWe believe that thc USSR is now technically capable of producing limited quantities of ground based and airborne jamming equipment to cover frequencies0 megacycles, and, by use of ground-based equipment, can seriously dis-rupl long-range radio communicationsthe continental US and its overseas facilities. We further believe that the USSR will increase the effectiveness of its jamming equipment as well as the proficiency andof its trained personnel throughout the period of this estimate. Airborne counter-measures are likely to be available for use against defensive radars and ground/air fighter control communications in use at the present time for the defense of North America. The efTectiveness of the future Soviet counter-measures will depend on their degree ofin analysts of signal radiations and in other means of obtaining technical data on the defense radar that will then be In use. The USSR has probably produced sufficient electronic countermeasures devices to equip some aircraft, but we do not know howthose devices would be against US de-Ictisive radar. Use of jamming equipment probably would require the employment of extra aircraft equipped specially for this purpose.
Aircraft Available for Attacks Against Key
US Overseas Installations
he long-range aircraft discussed above could also be used for attacks on installations overseas. In addition, thend Type 35
jet light bombers are estimated to be capable of carrying out attacks on many of theseThes the standard light bomber of the Air Force of the Soviet Army. It is powered by two centrifugal flow gaseach deliveringounds thrust.ormal bomb loadounds andallon external wing tanks the high altitude combat radius istoautical miles.ow level atlack bomber its radius Is estimated toautical miles.
Types believed to bein Soviet Naval Aviation into thehis aircraft is believedspecial features to permit itout naval missions such as torpedoand mine-laying as well as highThe Types believed toby twoentrifugal flowrated at approximatelyIts combat radius carrying abomb load is estimated
ESTIMATED JET LIOHT BOMBER STRENGTH IN OPERATIONAL UNITS
Air Force of Soviet Army
he USSR may also have anjet light bomber with improvedcharacteristics. This aircrafta twin-turbojet swept-wing bomberautical milesangenautical miles carrying aload. Moreover, the performance ofand Typeircraft may improvethe period of this estimate because ofof higher-thrust engines.
ESTIMATED IW-lfM PERFORMANCES OF SOVIET JET UGHT BOMHERS
Radius/Range/ Load <nm/nm/lbi>
Imp. Jet Utnt1
Combat CelUng (ft)
Areas for Direct Attack on Key US Installations Overseas
oviet Base Areas. In the Soviet Union, the European Satellites, Communist China, and North Korea, there areirfields with hard-surfaced runwayseet or over which are estimated to be suitable for operations by Jet light bombers, medium bombers, and heavy bombers. Of thisapproximately one-third are located in the European Satellites and one-fourth in Com-mumst China and North Korea. Theare located chiefly in the western and southern USSR and in maritime provinces of the Soviet Far East In addition, there arcirfields In thc Soviet Bloc which are estimated to be potentially capable of accommodating jet light bomber andand heavy bomber operations We believe that llw iatge numbersutUbw airfields available could adequately support Soviet bomber *lUcks ^nst most key USations.
M Sonet Capabilities lor Attack on Key US From bases in East ON many. Soviet jet light bombers onons could reach the entire North Sea L'Kit* northern and western a loaches (including therance
s IV, Tle'n northeastern Spain Fromungaryfeach the Mediterranean area up
-raWn om bases in the southern USSR, they could
reach an area north of an arc Crele-Israel-Kuwalt. Jet light bombers based in thc Vladivostok and Dairen areas could reach al! of Japan. To reach Okinawa and Luton on two-way missions, they would have to singe from bases in Communist China.
rom bases In the USSR. SovietTU-4's on two-way missions couldUS installations ln the UK. WeslernIceland. Greenland, lhe Asores.Africa, Libya, lhe Middle East.Alaska. Guam, and the To reach key installationsthese areas, TU-4's would have toinflight refueling or one-way missions.bombers from bases in thereach all the above areas exceptGieenland (marginal against Thule).Ouam, and the Philippines. Inheavy bombers on two-way missionskey US installations in the UK WesteiFar East including Okinawa.Africa-Libya. the Philippineiddle East. Greenland.the norlheastern coast of Labradorand Alaska. Thcnd Jetcould reach the Panama Canalmissions only if inflight
argeting and Bombing Accuracy The factors discussed in Paragraphor long-range operations apply equally to Soviet air attacks against key US installation overseas In addition, it has been established that radar
bombing byet light bombers has been carried out using equipment withsimilar to the USype radar.nits in Eastern Oermany are known to have practiced bombing at night and during Instrument weather conditions and such practice Is probably Included in other Jet light bomber units. In the absence of definiteon Soviet radar and visual bombing proficiency, It is assumed that accuracies for trained unils approach the limitations of the equipment. It is estimated, therefore, that Jet light bomber crews could achieveeet for visual bombing0 feet,eet for radar bombing from the same altitude.
Abort Rate,The factors discussed infor long-range bombers attacking thegenerally to bomber aircraftUS installations overseas. Arate ofercent byorfrom other than the forwardis considered possible because offacilities and logistic support inThe sustained serviceability ratelight bombers is estimated to be aboutNo reserves of jet light bombersto exist at present, nor do weappreciable reserve of this typo ofexist during the period of this estimate
Countermeasures. Thecapabilities discussed in Paragraphalso to bomber attacks against keyinstallations. However, Sovietfor ECM would probably beol thc less elaborate defensesof these Installations and therequired to penetrate defensesare reached Space and weightwould probably preclude Soviet Jetfrom carrying ECM equipment(or Chaff) in addition to bombthe USSH has the technicalto produce andet lightboth passive listening and activeelectronic equipment No evidenceof Soviet intention* in this regard.
III. PROBABLE MAXIMUM SCALE Of SOVIET AIR ATTACK4 Attack Against Continental US with
Maximum Effort to Achieve Surprise
oviet capabilities for air attacks on the continental US arc presently limited byon theomber, by thelackeveloped Inflight refueling capability, and by the relatively undeveloped character of the Kola. Chukotski, andbase areas. These three base areas are the closest to thc US and are so situated as to offer the best possibilities for launchingwithout allied detection. We believe, therefore, that If the USSR attempted aattack against the US. aircraft would probably be launched from bases in the Kola, Chukotski, and Kamchatka areas. 4 the estimated capacity of air bases in these areas would permit launchingircraft In an Initial attack against the US. If all these aircraft were committed to one-way unrefueled missions,ight reach target areas, not considering combat losses.ortion of these aircraft would probably be used for electronic counter-measures, escort, or diversionary tasks. If the USSR were to use Inflight refueling tothe radius/range of some of the mission aircraft, the size of the striking force from forward bases would be reduced by theof tanker aircraft launched from these bases*
'The Director of Naval Intelligence and the Auuianl Chief of. Department of the Amy. believe Uiat available intelligence onSoviet capabiliUes for long-range air attach ii insufficient toinite esUmate of the number of aircraft which might be launched from the Kola. Kamchatka and Chukotski areashey therefore believe tii.it paragraphhoutd read as follows:
Soviet gross capabillUei for air attack on lar-gr ts in the continental United States arclimited by dependence on theomber, bv ihe apparent lackeveloped inflightcapability, and bj Uie relaUvelycharacter of the Chukotski and Kola toic areas The SovieU have sufficiento silempt ih* delivery of allubstanUal part
Footnote eonUnued on Papc 15
In the Leningrad area couldused to launch additional long-rangeon one-way missionsurprisethe US4 provided aircraftnorth of Scandinavia. However,these bases by the USSR Is unlikelycapacity of the more advanced baseestimated to be adequate to launch aofubstantialperhaps all. of thc estimated Sovietof nuclear weapons.
Full-Scale Attack Against Continental US
thc USSR elected to utilize thebases in the Baltic-East German andareas, thus lessening chances ofit could, using Its entireaximum ofaircraft in the initial attack on thepractically all of these aircraftto fly one-way missions.might reach target areas, notlosses We consider such anunlikely, since It would involve thepractically th* entire Soviet long-rangeand since thc considerably smallerof aircraftaragraphpiobably be great enough to deliveratubstantial proportion, of tne
olc continued from Pace 14
iheir atomic stockpile llhe numberype, of weapon, stockpiledi sgainst Ihetates from bases In Soviet.centioiled lenlloiy. even though some of theeh-InfJ target areas probably would not beumber would be used foror divanlonary
ot tM* e-
Their willingness to accept the low onay nmiionsubstantial portion of their lone-range sir force
Their willingness to see.pt .he expendi-
rbwi to entrustthe
- nd employment of -wc eatemwn uxhniquea
ngrad base areas that would
r.,^ c,*ftM ircraft if
nuclear weapons available to the USSRf the USSR should wish to do so.
Attacks Against Overseasurprise attack against the continental US as outlined in paragraphbove, the remaining force ofedium bombers inig-Flange Aviation would be available for re-attackfor attacks against targets In other areas, and for reserve. If the USSR made no provision for re-attack or for reserve il could launch all remaining serviceable mediumgainst key US and allied installations overseas. Notcombat lossesf these mission aircraft might reach target areas. In addition the USSR could employ jet light bombers to attack those keywithin the operational radius of these aircraft. In fact, thc USSR would probably rely more on jet light bombers than on piston medium bombers to attack such installations because of thc greater capability of the jet bomber to penetrate allied air defenses. Soviet jet light bombers would also be engaged in close ground support,air superiority, and mining and torpedo missions in support of other Soviet campaigns, the USSR could probablyulRcien: number ofel light bombers available4 to attempt to neutralize or destroy with HE or nuclear weapons selected allied forces and Installationsgc.
IV. PROBABLE SCALE OF SOVIET AIR ATTACK IN
f the USSRurprise attack against the USll alrcralt could be launched from bases in the Kola. Leningrad. Chukotski, and Kamchatka arens In order to reduce thc possibility of detection Wethat7 the USSR could,ajor effort, develop the capacity of the air bases in these areas to permit the launching ofircraft in an initial air operation against tlie US If all of thesewere committed to one-way unrefueled missions (or two-way unrefueled missions, wherehe magnitude of the attack
I JUl Fl IHI
night be on the orderircraft reaching target areas not considering combat losses. This would probably be the maximum Soviet long-range bomber capability against the US and its exercise would involve theof one-way missions of most ofLong-Rangeumber of these aircraft would probably be used for electronic countermeasures, diversionary, and escort missions.
e consider it more likely, however, that the USSR would elect lo commit substantially fewer mission aircraft. It might launchircraft, which couldankers' mission aircraft. Ofission aircraft, about two-thirds would possibly be launched for the Kola-Leningrad area and one-third from northeastern Siberia.ucraft might arrive over target areas not considering combat losses. However, exercise of this capability would Involve difficultand logistical problems, particularly those pertaining to thc creationanker fleet. Moreover, the exercise of thiswould involve the loss on one-way missions of about one-third of Soviet long-range bomberumber of the mission aircraft would piobably be used for electronic counter-measures, escort, or diversionary tasks.
Aitack Against Koy US Overseas Installations
inning the USSR launched abomber attack against the USl.OOO aircraft (mostly on one-way missions withoutess thanercent of
Ofission aircraft aboutercentoe used in one-way aiUooru itotal ofomber* in-.Iikimib TO TU-4'sould befrom CnuKoUkl and Kamchatka boarof ibis number approximately IIS wouldrom the Leningrad nnden*l the SM mission aircraft fluid be launched Of ihu numberm be0s. andype tr*ission aircraft launched Irom thel Leningrad areas about SM woaM be one-wayThis dislribuUon shows one of severalit irpresenu what might be'ded as the- optimum Urlking force lo insure Itlrget coverage ir. various US areas.
Soviet long-range bombers would remain and these would probably not be Immediately If, as we consider more likely, the USSRission aircraft against the US. it wouldong-range aircraft available for re-attack, for attack In other areas, and for reserve. Assuming nofor re-attack or reserve, the USSR could launch all serviceableagainst key US and allied Installations Not considering combatercent would probably arrive over target areas. Since the probable number of long-range aircraft estimated to be Involved in initial air attacks against the US7 would stillajor portion of Soviet Long-Range Aviation available for other uses, it is considered unlikely that the estimated force striking the US would be decreased to make available additional long-range aircraft to attack key US Installations overseas. Such diversion of long-range aircraft is alsoin view of the great number of jet Ugh', bombers which could be employed against key installations within their radius.
We estimate that7 the USSR will haveet light bombers which could also be available for attacks against key US and allied installations within thc operational capabilities of thcac aircraft. We believe that the USSR couldufficient number of these jet light bombers to attempt toor destroy with HE or nuclear weapons selected allied forces and installations within range.
Soviet air attacks against key US and allied overseas installations could achieve varying degrees of surprise depending on lhe location of such installations with respect to base areas from which the USSR could launch attacks Soviet aircraft attempting iokey installations in Western Fiance, Spam, the UK. North Africa, and the Asores would initially have to overfly tho Western Tones of Germany or Austria or other friendly aliird areas and it is probable that defenses would be alerted some time before aircraft reached target areas. Therefore, surprise would piobably notrimaryin determining the scale of attack against installations in these areas, since allied de-
lenses would probably be alertedmall as wellarge number of attacking aircraft. On tlie other hand key installations InGreenland. Labrador, andcould be reached from Soviet base areas without overflying areas friendly to the allies. Attacks against key US installations in the Middle East could probably be launchedfrom thc southern USSR but might be detected approaching or over Turkey, Iraq, or Iran. From bases in the Soviet Far East the USSR could make direct attacks across thc open Pacific against Midway, Wake, and Guam. To attack Okinawa andirect course from bases in the Vladivostok area, Soviet aircraft would have lo overfly early warning radar areas in Japan and South Korea.
V. DELIVERY OF CONVENTIONAt AND MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS BY OTHER MEANS
ative Soviet guidedand development program isexist. The extent of Soviet exploitationGerman wartime guided missilecom|>arable to their exploitation ofpiogiams as electronics andwe are unable to assess theihc Soviet guided missile programweapons programs, or to assess theaccorded the various guidedwithin this program.that the Soviet exploitation ofmissile developments resulted iniicnuiringhoroughwill, the German program and that"-'hi thc USSR was capable ofguklcd missile development,!the field ol advanced guld-
systems. The types and
imstics or the missiles whichiccd by the USSR would deoend ujxmassessment of military require-
rei studies ot this subject arc currently. andvidc the basis ol6 ;Wi capabiliUes and Probable1 Guidedcheduledueuon In the third quarter1
ments and upon the allocation of priority among the many possible types which might be developed. To avoid spreading Its talent thinly, the USSR may be concentratingmall number of missile projects.it is well within Soviet capabilities to develop numerous types of missiles within the period of this estimate.
reseni Capabilities. We believe that the USSR could now have an improved version of theulse-jet winged missile with ranges upautical miles,oundsEPautical miles. The USSR also could now have an improved version of theith ranges upauticalarheadounds,EPautical miles. Such missiles could be launched from advanced bases in Communist territory against key US installations in West Germany. However, we have no firmthat the USSR has these weapons avail-able in operational quantities. In addition thc USSR is now technically capable oftargets within the US with rocket-propelled glide bombs launched from long-range aircraftype missiles from submarines; however, we have no evidence that the USSR has developed these capabili-ties either as to production of the missiles or as to conversion of submarines to missile launchers.
apabilitiesntelligence confirms that at least as early8 lhe USSResearch and developmentfor guided missiles. The dale; a; which various missiles arc estimated Lo become avail-able in future are based on thc assumptiononcerted and continuous effort started8 These dates or estimate;!am the earliest probable dales a: which each missile type could be brough; by the USSR into limited operational use.7
:operational use" is defined ro: ihc pur. poses of this estimatetage of deviopmciti whore small quantities of guided rmsjiiv system* have boon produced and are in the hnnds of trained personnel of at least onenil.
he USSR could have lnuse anypoa rangeautical0 pounds,KPo 3Subsonic, turbojet poweredmissilesaximum rangenautical milesarhead ofcould also become available Infrom advanced Bloc bases inEurope, such weapons could be usedtargets in Weslern Europe as farLondon. Paris, and Rome. In the Farlaunched from Soviet or North Koreanthese weapons could be used toin Western Japan; if launchedterritory, they could be used totargets in the Ryukyu Islands.lottcss-aire raft missiles could aliofrom submarines against the USUS overseas installations within range.
believe thathe USSRin limited operational use singlemissiles capable of ranges up tomilesoundandEPoaunched from Bloc bases, suchcould reach all of the UK, France,and Turkey. In the Far East,from soviel or North KoreanIhcsc weapons could reach all ofislands, and if launched fromcould teach all of Luzon.
C Ion dint ine Delivery
iuh'iir IVcujtom. We have no evidence us lo any Soviel plans or preparationsidcsliiu- delivery of nuclear weaponsthe US However, during the period
ttrrlm of Intelligence, USAF, believes this
be in limited operational use in
IMS. millalllsUc missileange olOuUI bo in limited operational ii-J This belief is based on Intelligence nlSoviel exploitation in Germany, onir.terrst in guided missiles up through IM2 -iml Uie demonstiated ability to follow aUcitianmenl piogram as witnessediopmenl* in aircraft, armament, andtvlmtka(lie pnsl ti years. It is abolli.it ntcuracics belter than those quoted will uu within Soviet capability.
of this estimate thc USSR will be capable of producing nuclear weapons which could be smuggled into the US either as complete assemblies or as component parts or These could range from small-yield weapons (equivalentons of TNT or less)ew hundred pounds to larger-yield weapons (possibly up to the equivalentons of TNT) weighing less than ten thousand pounds. Their size could range from thatackage small enough to fit into the luggage compartment of an automobile to thatacking case large enough to contain an automobile. All of these weapons could be designed to break downumber of relatively simple and readily transportable components. Thosetoelatively low yield would not require much labor or technical training assemble. Somewhat more labor andwould be required to assemble weapons designed to give high yields, and, oncethey would be more difficult to It is conceivable that only thematerial, in small pieces, need beinto the US. since other components could be fabricated or procured In this This scheme, however, would require careful advance planning and coordination by supervisoiy personnel with engineering skill und familiarity with the US sources of needed components, and wouldonger time to carry out. It would probably result in ayieldiven amount of fissionable material It would alsoubstantially greater security risk than the clandestineof all components.
onsidering the known limitations of the means ol physical detection, the USSR could probably introduce into the US and detonate inonsiderable number of nuclear weapons by clandestineariety of nietltods o( clandestine delivery suggestAssembled weapons could be dropped by apparently friendly aircraft, detonated in the holderchant ship, or sown asmines. Either components or assembled weapons could be brought in under diplomatic immunity, smuggled across land or seaintroduced through normal Importoi brought in as bonded merchandise
transshipment. The selection of the method of Introduction and of transport and and assembly within thc US would depend on the Soviet objective and the risk of detec-Uon which the USSR was willing to accept. Satellite agent* and merchant ships could be utilised for such attacks as could Communists in other countries. There are atommunists in Mexico0 in Canada together with thousands of other personsto Communist led labor unions and front organisations that could be instrumental in clandestine attacks against the US. In addition, Mexico israffic center for Communists in North and South America giving Communists from other countriesto the US borders. Although theseelements of other countries could be used, it is doubtful if the Soviets would incur llie risk of using them in surprise clandestine aitack against the US prior to overt military atUck.
n introducing nuclear weaponsinto the US. however, the USSRlo take into account not only thechances of detection, but also theo( sucli detection in forfeitingof surprise in any Intendedand provoking US counteraction.number ol weapons clandestinelywas Increased, the risk ofincrease This increased risk woulda function of US capabilities forthen of thr scope and complexityrlaiKli-stme operations, particularlyas larger numbers of Soviet agentsConsidering the consequences ofof security, the USSR wouldunwilling lo risk the use of evenlruined agents in such numbers asinvolved ui Die clandestine delivery ofui nuclear weapons WeHint although clandestinenucli-aioccur against
selected taffetaupplement todriivciy by air. such atiack. with large niiiubcis ol weapons, would probably be pre-HiKlcd by security considerations
Wcapcmt, Most biologicaliBW) ngrnis aie pctuliaily adaptable to
clandestine utilization, since the introduction of small amounts of BW agents would beto detect Small-scale employment of biological warfare agents against livestock could be highly effective. BW attacks against key personnel concentrated in selectedcould be effective. There Is littlethat effective anticrop BW operations can be carried out clandestinely.
hemical Weapons. CW agents are not easily adaptable to clandestine use. They are easily identifiable by their immediate effects and it probably would not be feasible to build up sufficient supplies or to procure the means clandestinely in the required areas for their dissemination against large populationThe most practicable use would be against personnel in key installations, bui even this would be difficult.
VI. ATIACK WIIH CONVENTIONAL FORCES
Attacks by Ground Forces and Tactical Air Forces
any key US installations overseas, such as those in Western Europe, the Middle and Far East, are subject to attack by Soviet ground and lactical air forces. Suchhowever, would almost certainly be an integral part of the over-all Soviet campaign in these areas, and it would be impossible to separate lhe specific scale of attack on key US installations from the over-all scale of Soviet campaigns.'"
ho jKacelime establishment of UieAi my piobably will continueand supporting troops, which can be expected Io Ix? combat-readyay.ins force can be expanded toine divisions. These forces would be capable o' overrunning large areas of Weslern Europe, thc Middle East, and Far East However, toigh capability forof most key US installations in these areas the Soviet Army probably would have io be reinforced in peripheral areas or toairborne or amphibious forces in cornice-
-See. "Soviet Capabilities amiCourses of Action throughi Soviet ground and tactical air capabilities
tlonround attack. It ts estimated that tor air support of these attacks4 thc USSR has an actual strengthombat aircraft in the Air Force of the Soviet Army and Naval Aviation. Of this total,re Jet aircraft7 actual combat aircraft In operational units it estimated at0 of which0 will be Jets.
oviet submarine forces could, at least in the initial phases of an attack. Inflict serious damage on US overseas communications and carry out offensive mining In the approaches to harbors and ports of the US and IU allies, mi addition to its potential for launching mass dcstiuctlon weapons against the US or key US overseas installations within range.thc poi led of this estimate thc Sovietforce will probably bo enlarged and strengthened by the addition of aboutong-rungc submarines per year,imited mod-erni/nlion of older classes (Includingoind by the possiblenl submarines to missile launching. It is rMinmlrd that4 the Soviet Navy willotalong and medium-liingc .submarines, of whichill bel boats of thc long-range typesince World War II.aximum I'lfiirl ttn manyf the long and medium-rniipi submarines located in the Baltic-Xorlhcm Fleet and Pacific Fleetould be made available im ,ill.uks against the continental USvy installations overseas.heMlity of long and medium-rangein lhe two Soviet fleet areas would IrHTtwa tondespectively. Amumlng that egress from the Black Sea wuutd be denied Soviet submarines at least in llie initial stagesar, the Black Sea mlHrarlnc force Is not considered an immc-'li.iti- Ihicat to US installations.
he capabilities of surface naval forcesultacfc on the US are tow. The Soviet Airfare fleet is geographically divided, lacks wttann bases md does notporadic raider operationsbut the surface fleet, in general.
lacking aircraft carriers, is unsuitable for transoceanic naval attack on any significant scale.
of the lack of long-rangetype vessels and aircraftSoviet amphibious attacks willto areas where air cover can befrom Communist-controlledamphibious raids byforces for the purpose of attemptingor neutralization of key USinstallations are possible0 miles from Soviel submarineassault against the(excepteyond SoviclIn assaults against Alaska,weather, and the requirementcover would probably limit the scaleof such attacks to raids in forceor neutralize US Installations InInlands or along the BeringAmphibious attacks against keyInstallations, except In thc Farprobably be limited to amphibioussubmarine-borne forces. Amphibiousin considerable force could heUS installations In Japan,Formosa.
USSR has approximatelyparatroopers, organizedodivisions, plusreserves. The capability ofto seize and destroy key USoverseas is limited by theliansport aircraft. The USSRwo-engine transportslift0 paratroopers mInitial assault andive-day assault operationEurope. The operational radiusassaults would bemiles. This capability will7 with the addition oftransports The most likelyof airborne assaults would be theof key US installations, thebases, and the securing of important com-
munications feature! ln Western Europe, Japan, and Alaska Because of air transport limitations, the USSR will not be capable of launching major airborne operations against the continental US during the period of this estimate. However, small, highly-trained assault groups probably could be delivered to some targets in the US.
Vll. SOVIET CAPABILITIES FOR SABOTAGE OTHER THAN BY CLANDESTINE PLACEMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION
The USSR is capable of widespreadin the US through the use of existingelements and the placement of foreign agents. However, such sabotage effortswould not be initiatedarge scale prior to an all-out attack on the US since such efforts would nullify the advantage of surprise. Large-scale sabotage of USindustrial, and communicationsand miliiary installations could be expected with and immediately followingattack by the USSR. Communist party members and adherents are capable of organi-zing saboteur unils or teams of varying sizes equipped with small arms and other suitable material which could strike at especially se-Uvtcd and widely separated targetsand without warning. Whether such atlacks would be timedurpriseJitlack or carried nut after such anwould he dependent upon the Sovietol thc relative advantages of such action.
Soviet capabilities for widespread sabotage atlacks against key overseas bases are greater limn against llie continental US, because of Ihv much larger percentage ofih-nis uidespicad political discontent, anddequate securily measures in certainnations- Those areas in whichnubilities are now greatest are France. Italy.and the Philippines. However, in lUniH-rous other countries lhe Communists almost certainly have capabilities for acts of sabotage. The populations of these areasi ienred In such operations and sabotage
efforts timed with large-scale military attacks could materially reduce thc capability of US military forces overseas.
VIII. PROBABLE SOVIET STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND METHODS OF ATTACK
Probable Soviet Strategic Objectives
n determining the scale and type ofattacks on the US and key US overseas installations to be adopted In event of general war. the Soviet leaders would be influenced by the following factors:
power of the US is the mainFree World opposition to theand the main obstacle todomination. The USSR wouldthat If US war-makingbe sufficiently reduced tnar, organizedthroughout thc world wouldcollapse.
chief Immediate threat to theevent of general warS strategicThe Soviet rulers havetheir sensitivity to the danger ofatlack with nuclear weapons by thewhich they have given to theof defenses against such an attack.the substantial progress alreadybuilding up their defenses. It Isthey would regard their defensiveas adequate to preventof attacking aircraft fromtarge's In the USSR
c The major proportion of faclbtles,and forces which together constitute US nuclear capabilities are located in theUS. Soviet destruction of all key US installations and forces overseas whichapability for employing nuclear weapons would greatly handicap but would not prevent the delivery of nuclear weapons on targets throughout the USSR.
d. At the same time, however, certain key US installations overseas nre essentialaximum strategic air offensive against Ihr USSR. The Soviet leaders would piobably calculaLe tnat destruction or neutralization ci
Ihese installations, as well as those ln Uie US, would be essential to neutralize the USair capability.
e. Soviet leaders also must realize that other US forces and installations, as well as those of US allies particularly in Eurasia, present formidable obstacles to Soviet success InUiat will occur simultaneously with or Immediately after the initial attacks.
n view of Uie above factors it is likely that the USSR in attacking Uie US and key overseas installations would have thomajor objectives: (a) to destroy swlfUy or cripple US capabiliUes for nuclear retaliation; (b) to deliver such an attack on urban.and psychological targets In the US as would prevent, or at least hinder, theof the US war potential and its pro-JcrUon overseas; and (c) to Inflict suchon US overseas installations as to hamper or prevent US reinforcement andsupport of overseas forces. To achieve these objectives we consider it almost certainortion of the Soviet nuclear stockpile would be employed against certain key USoutside the continental US. We believe lhal these Soviet objectives wouldIhc same throughout the period of thisallhough Soviet capabiliUes for iichtcvlng them will obviously increase llinm .1
"a. ticwabddy of Sitrprise. In order to be siirivvsfui. an attack on US nuclearwould have to be accomplished with almosi complete surprise. It Is therefore probable lhat lhe USSR would launch Initial aii.u'k. .lyiiinst the US and key overseasize arKjsC ttreas which wuuM oflfi ihe greatest security from detecwith attacks by other forces against other ami* iiiui the element of surprise had lost its
A maximum Soviet attack on the cor.li-<i- mai US. and key overseas installations,uUHution of all or moat of the capa-
iscufsed in this estimate, would re-
u.uh picpmaiiuns that would almostresult In the loss of surprise. Therefore.lu> USSR attempts to achieve maximum
surprise it will probably be forced to accept the following major limitations: (a) no large-scale mobilization of additional units; (b) no large-scale redeployment ot Soviet air, naval, or ground forces to reinforce peripheraland (c) no unusual movement of Soviet air. naval, or ground forces in such areas as would likely to indicate Uieof attack.
Proboblo Methods of Attack Against the US
Nuclear Attacks by Aircraft. In view of the desirability of achieving both maximum surprise and maximum weight in any attack on thc US, we believe that Uie USSR would place chief reliance on nuclear air attacks. Among the forces and weapons available. Uie USSR's greatest capability lies in overtattack with nuclear weapons delivered by long-range aircraft. It is probable lhat such altack would receive the highest priority becausea) the limited capabilities ofnaval forces, ground forces, andforces against the US; (b) the security difficulties Inherent in the delivery of large numbers of nuclear weapons by clandestine means: Ic) thc Insufficient development of other methods of delivery of nuclear weaponsarge scale; (d) the insufficientof olher mass destruction weapons, or handicaps lo their large-scale use; and (e) the availability of far northern air bases, fiom which air operations against Uie US are least susceptible to detection.
Other Methods of Attack. The Soviet rulers might, however, employ other methods of attacking thc US concurrently withurprise nuclear air atuck Soviet capabilities for airborneand chemical and biological wai fare, against thc continental US, appear to beslight Clandestine atlack in the form of sabotage, biological warfare, or use ol nuclear weapons might occur againstselected targets. Guided missiles could be launched from submarines againsi US ports and coastal installations.
Probable Methods of Attacks Against Key US Overseas Installations
he USSR woulduch wider range of capabilities for effective attack on many key US installations overseas than on Uie US Itself because of the shorter ranges, greater possibilities for clandestine action, and oilier factors involved. However, welhal If the USSRurprise attack on the US itself, it would time Its attacks on US installations overseas so as not to compromise the achievement of surprise against lhc US. Thus initial attacks on these installations would probably take place simultaneously with or shortly after theon lhc US. and prior detectablewould be avoided to the maximum extent. These considerations wouldaffect the scale and timing of thc attacks discussed below
estern Europe and the Middle East. Attacks on the majority of key USin these areas (except the UK and Spam) piobably could most profitably beout pnmarily by ground and tactical air fotves. Tlie Soviets have the capability lo launch attacks on these areas from Soviet-controlled territory without increasing their rnrwa. bui might elect to carry out at least lethal mobilization to insure the decisive ttttrtsrsa oi the operations.
;i1 Other Overseas Installations. Except for Japan. Okinawa, and Formosa. US Installa-Iwms in oilier areas would be subjectui an attacks with nuclear andiiiMiiiai weapons Sufficient Soviet Jetiii bomlwis are now available in peripheral arvu* occupied by or under Uie influence of
the USSR to permit large-scale attacks on installations in the UK, Turkey, and theEast. Attacks In considerable force could be launched by amphibious and airborne forces against Japan, Okinawa, and Formosa. Overseas installationsiles of Soviet submarine bases could be subjected to amphibious raids by submarine forces and virtually all overseas installations are subject to nuclear attacks by long-range aircraft. In addition the Soviets possess the capability of making attacks on selected overseasby special small airborne teams and could mount large-scale airborne attacks on installationsadiusautical miles of Soviet bases.
ikelihood of Change in Primary Methods of Attack throughovietfor all methods of attack will increase considerably byesult ofaircraft, an enlarged stockpile ofweapons, increased naval strengthpossible utilization of submarine launched guidednd ground forces piobably supported by weapons employing nuclear warheads. However, the choice ol primary method of attack will be unlikely to change materially because the Improvement of Soviet capabilities in any particular field will probably not be sufficient to guarantee success against the US or key US installations overseas. If anything, Soviet capabilities for large-scale nuclear air attack on the US will increase more during this period than Soviet capabilities for use of any olher weaponsagainst the US. In addition, however,7 the USSR could have substantially Increased eapabililies for use of guided mis siles, particularly against US coastal areas and key installations overseas
TYPEND TYPE 37
TANDARD AND MODIFIED
From bW KoU
TANDARD AND MODIFIED
From the Bakk-Ettt GermanP
TYPEND TYPE 37
From thtt Btllic-Easi Gtrmsn
LAkABlLIIIbb AGAINST KEY US OVERSEAS INSTALLATIONSOriginal document.