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TABLH OF CONTENTS
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD
Page
I. SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES
Basic Soviet Scientific and Technical Capabilities
Soviet Exploitation of Uie German
Organizations and Facilities In the Soviet Program
II. SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO DEVELOP GUIDED MISSILES
Surf nee-to-Air Missiles
Alr-to-Alr
Air-to-Surface
Surface-to-Surface Pilolless
.Surface-to-surface Ballistic
III. OTHER FACTORS AFKECITNG SOVIET MISSILE CAPA-
]IT!
Soviet Capabilities to Produce Guided
Effect of Soviet Nuclear Capabilities on Missile Use
Probable Missile
Soviet Capabilities in Geodesy and
logistic. Personnel, and Training
IV PROBABLE SOVIET INTKNTIONS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE
Surf ace-to-Air Missiles
Alr-to-Alr Missiles
Air-to-Surface Missiles
Submarine-Launched Surface-to-surface Missiles
Ground-Launched Surface-to-Surface
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
Allocation of Priorities Within the Soviet Missile Program
' Oe* footnote to paragraph t.
TABLE OF CONTENTS APPENDICES
Page
ANNEX A. Organizations and Facilities in the Soviet Missile
ANNEX B. Soviet Economic Capabilities for Missile Production . . 34
ANNKX C. Estimated Nuclear Weapons Yields Available for Soviet
Guided Missiles (RESTRICTED
(to be Issued separately)
BHGBBE
SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROBABLE PROGRAMS IN THE
GUIDED MISSILE FIELD
THE PROBLEM
To estimate Soviet capabilities and probable programs in the field of guided
FOREWORD
In preparing this estimate we have had available conclusive evidencereat postwar Soviet interest in guided missiles and indications that the USSRarge and active research and development program. However, we have no firmintelligence on what particular guided missiles the USSR is presently developing or may now have in operational use. Therefore, In order to estimate specific Soviet missUe capabilities we have been forced to reason from: (a) the available evidence of Soviet missile activity, including exploitation of German missile experience; (b) our own guided missile experience; and (c) estimated Soviet capabilities in related fields. In addition, we have analyzed such factors as: (a) Soviet Industrial resources and economic capabilities; (b) Soviet nuclear capabilities in relation to guided(c) the estimated reliability of missile systems; (d) various logistic andfactors; and (e) Soviet capabilities in geodesy and cartography. Finally, in the absence of current evidence on specific Soviet missile projects, we have estimatedintentions on the basis of probable Soviet military requirements, within theof probable Soviet capabilities in this and other weapons fields. Therefore our estimates of missile characteristics and of dates of missile availability must beas only tentative, and as representing our best assessment ln the Ught ofevidence andew and largely unexplored field.
CONCLUSIONS
CONCLUSIONS
e believe that the strategicof the USSR wouldajor effort in the field of guided missiles, and the evidence which we have concerning large number of personalities andbelieved to be involved in the current Soviet missUe program leads us to the conclusion that it is an extensive one.
However, our evidence Is insufficient toore precise estimate as to the magnitude of this program.
n the basis of our extensiveof Soviet exploitation of the wartime German missile experience and ourof Soviet capabilities in related fields, we believe that the USSR has tlie basic scientific and technical capabilities
obon-ft'g-
toomprehensive missileand development program,
The USSR also has an adequatebaseizeable missileprogram. However, because of the limited capabilities of the Sovietand precision mechanismsand other competing demands for their output, the USSR will almostbe unable to produce In thc desired quantities all of the missiles for which it has an estimated military requirement, except over an extended period of years. Consequcntly, the USSR will probably concentrate over the next few years on those missiles for which it has thc most urgent military requirements.
Over thc next several years tliesize of the Soviet nuclearand thc larger yields estimated to be available from nuclear warheads will make missiles an increasingly practicable means of nuclear attack, despite their limitations in reliability andevertheless, because of these limitations we believe that the Soviets will placereliance on aircraft delivery ofweapons so long as the Sovietremains limited and Allied aircan be penetrated withoutlosses. We recognize, however, that these considerations would notearlier employment of nuclearwhen the advantages of surprise or other factors so dictate,
Although we have no evidence toor deny current Soviet missilewe believe that the Allies willrowing Soviet guided missile threat within the next several years. This threat will probably appear first in
Anne* c. ItcitrMtd Data, for esUmalcs ot Umc-phased warhead yield*.
increased Soviet air defense capabilities, together with or followed by improved Soviet capabilities against US and Allied coastal areas and sea lines ofand in tactical operations. Later the threat will probably extend to all Allied base areas in Eurasia, and ultimately to the entire US. The following dates for specific missile capabilities give theprobable dates when we estimate the threat could begin, but it should bethat an additional varying period of time would be required for theseto be available in large quantities.
SPECIFIC MISSILE CAPABILITIES
urface-to-Air Missiles. Tbe Soviets will probably devote highest priority to producing surface-to-air missiles totheir serious air defense deficiencies. We estimate that they could now have an all-weather improved Wasserfall design andurther improved version
"Tlie estimated dates given ln this esUmate aie the earliest probable years during which small quantities of missiles could have been produced and placed In the hands of trained personnel of one operaUonal unit, thusimited capability for operational employment. These dates are based on the assumpUon that aand continuous effort began in IMS. If no major delay* of any sort were encountered and an Intensive effort of the highest order of priority were undertaken, tbe earliest posslblo dates of availability could be on the order of one to two years earlier, or as much as three years In the ease of the "Intercontinental ballistiche above dates are those around which thecould have been operationally tested and be ready for series production. However, anperiod (which would vary according to missile type! would be required before missiles could be produced In quantity and the necessary units trained and deployed. We esUmate that at least an additional six months would normally be required for shllt or conversion from pilot plant to series producUon, and an addlUonal period to reach the planned producUon rate. Someonths to two years would probably be required for Individual and unit training of eachunit, although this period could to aextent overlap the producUon period.
with semiaclive homing.hey should be capable ofuch better missile with terminal homing0 yards slant range0 feetThe low yield nuclear warhead probably available for this missile8 would greatly increase the kill
MissUes. Because of itsweaknesses, the USSR willalsoery high prioritymissiles. We estimate thatdevelopuided rockethoming andnversion with greater range.their guidance system wouldtail cone attacks under generallyconditions at theheew all-weather missile.
Missiles. Thewould almost certainly seek toin quantity any precisionfor effective HB antishipFor this purpose It could nowand would probably produceglide bomb,to good visibility conditions. of its extensive bomberdo not believe that thc USSRa long-range air-to-surfacefor attacks on Allied ports andthe next several years. other hand, when we estimate thatair-to-surface missilewarhead could be ready forthere will probably be aSoviet requirement for athis type because of the increasedof Allied air defensetarget areas.
ubmarine-Launched MissUes. The will almost certainlye-
quirement for submarine-launchedfor nuclear attacks on US and Allied coastal areas. It could alreadyypes with nuclear warheads.5 the USSR could have ready for seriesurbo-jet pilotless aircraft1 with improved range, speed, and accuracy, and8 itswarhead yield could approachwith its estimated accuracy and greatly Increase its effectiveness.
round-Launched Surface-to-Surface Missiles. The USSR could also use the above pilotless aircraft from ground-launchers. However, we believe that it would favor ballistic missiles because of their relative Immunity to presently known countermeasures and their greater capability for achieving surprise. The USSR probably could have available: (a)4 anypeautical miles rangeEP of two nautical miles' or anype or native design with less rangearger warheadmaller CEP; (b)5 anypeiles rangeEPiles;7 (or at the earliest possible dateingle stage ballistic missileiles rangeEP of three-four 'The Assistant Chief of, Department of the Army, the Director of Naval Intelligence, and the Deputy Director for InlemgeBoe. The Joint Staff, believe that use ot the term "plloUessto define lhe broad category of guided mUslles which are not balasUc In principleisleading In Uiat It gl*e* the Imprison Uial all such missiles are conventional aircraft which have been modified to thc extent thai the human pilot has been replaced by the guidanceand which an Intended lo relum lo their bases and land. They believe Uiat the term "nooballUtlc guided missile" would moredescribe this category of missiles and should be used In lieu of "ptlotleM aircraft" wherever Uiat termEP {Circular Probable Erne) means SO percent hlU within lhc staled radius. All CEPs and ranges are given In nautical mile*.
nd (d)9 (or at the earliest possible datewo stage missileiles rangeEP of three-fourowever, the accuracy of all these missiles would probably be markedly inferior to that obtainable by either visual or radar bombing, and their range, is inferior to that of Soviet bombers. Therefore, until Allied air defensesgreatly, we believe that the USSR will rely primarily on high performance bombers, except for all-weather use in the ground battle.
n view of growing Allied tacticalcapabilities in Europe, Uie USSR will probably give high priorityallistic missile for support of its field forces. Aside from this missile, Soviet efforts over thc next several years will probably be concentrated more on ballistic missilethan upon quantity When tlie USSR estimates thatAllied air defenses will soonajor threat to successful delivery by aircraft, it will probablyeavy investment in these missiles.thc limited nuclear yields nowfrom such warheads and the limited accuracy and reliability of these missiles point toward use of aircraftetter
means of delivery at leastoreover, by this time estimatedIn the Soviet nuclear stockpile and ln nuclear warhead yields should have greatly reduced the significance of the limitations of missile accuracy or re-liabUity.
ntercontinental Ballistic Missile (IBM). We believe that thc USSR,forwarderiod, possibly In the next few years, when long-range bombers may no longereasible means of at-tacking heavily defended US targets, willoncerted effort to produce an IBM In this event it probably couldeady for series production in3 (or at the earliest possible daten IBMiigh yield nuclear warheadEP of roughly five nauticaldvent of the LBM would create annew type of threat to the US. upon the launching sites arc the only countermeasures now known or In prospect. If the USSR should developissile and produce it innumbers before thc US developed adequate counterweapons or counter-measures, the USSR would acquireilitary advantage as to constitute an extremely grave threat to US security.
SOVIET SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL RESOURCES
rained Ma
Basic Soviet Scientific and Technical Co pa bi lilies
npower. The rising general
level of technical ability in the USSR and the Increasing number of scientists and engineers available provide the manpower potential nec-essaryjoarge guided missile program.
'Sec footnote to paragraph 8.
At the end of World War II, the USSR had an acute shortage of trained manpower end to help alleviate this condition broughterman scientists and technicians to the USSR. Beginning at the same time, graduations from Soviet science andinstitutions were greaUy Increased.
footnote to paragraph fl. but not* that In the rase ot. operaUonal firing of limited numbers might be conducted by factoryat the assembly alia, and Um fullonths to two-year training period tot missile units would not be required.
S
relumed Qermans report that by the time they left the USSR tho quality and quantity ot Soviet scientists had markedlyAt present the USSR has0 science and engineering graduatesIn thetr specialities, nearly as many as the US. and is increasing this poolreater rate than tlie US.
esearch Equipment. In the Immediate postwar period lack ol adequate research equipmentandicap to any Soviet guided missiles program, but70 there was also reported to be aImprovement In this respect. In view of the demonstrated Soviet ability to equipprograms ln electronics, aircraft, and nuclear energy, we believe that the USSR could now have equipped laboratory and test facilitiesarge scale guided missileprogram.
IS. Materials, Including Propellants.of materials taken from operational Soviet aircraft, electronic, and other equipmentSoviet ability to produce unique materials for special applicationuality generally comparable to their USCurrently published Soviet literature reveals advanced research in auch fields as metallurgy and chemistry. We have no knowledge of special materials developedfor guided missiles but we believe that the Soviets can develop the materialsto canyuccessful program. For example, tho Soviets are cognizant of German missile propellants through their exploitation of German scientists, facilities, and specialized equipment. Based on this knowledge,with demonstrated native capabilities, the Soviets appear capable of developing those propellants required.
vailability of US Data. Tho unclassified information available to thc USSR on the US guided missile program discloses Indetail the extensive US program in this field, the relative emphasis accorded various types of US missiles, and many of thecharacteristics of the missile systems being .developed. Both Tass and the Four Con-'tlnent Book Corporation haveast number of US publications for transmittal to
the USSR. Soviet officials In this country have overtly obtained Information on the US missile program Including, for example, motion pictures of the Matador and Nike taken Inhile we cannot assess the degree of success obtnlned by Soviet covert activities in this field, wc do know thaimaterial was available in the early postwaroviet defector, whosehas proven generally reliable, stated that7 heecture on the latest US missile developments includingof the US Gorgon II missile (which was classified confidential In thelie Julius Rosenberg spy ring Is believed to havesome guided missile Information to the USSR
It. Therefore, proper evaluation of the US guided missile information available to the USSR could indicate the course, nature, and many of the details of our guided missileand development efforts, provide anof our successes and failure, save Uie USSR considerable time and money, andIt In establishing Its military
Soviel Exploitation of the German Program
Hie USSR had no known guided missile program at the close of World II. However, the Soviets thenhorough andexploltaUon of German guided missile personnel. faciliUes, and equipment. Theyfour general results: (a) theof operational and prototype missiles,and producUon facilities andandissile(b) completed studies of Germanpriorc) Uie familiarisation" of Soviet personnel with German techniques of research, developmenl, testing, andof missiles and their components; and (d) further technical studies and limited hard-ward development performed by German We believe that the Sovietprogram was an effort to acquireand techniques peculiar to the guided missile field In which Uie Soviets had little or no experience.
ndications are lhatesult of Iheexploitation the Sovietshorough familiarity with Uiend were capable of conducting some Independent guided missile development.0 they were phasing out the Germans and apparently felt themselves capable ofa naUve program, with the exception of some advanced guidance and controlOf thenown German guided missile specialists used by the Soviets, onlyainly guidance and control specialists, still remain In the USSR,
Organizalions and Facilities in Ihe Soviet Program
In addition to our knowledge of Sovietof German resources, we haveIntelligence leading to thc conclusion that numerous Soviet facilities and personnel are probably engagedissile program. These facilities arc spread through seven all-union ministries, and their work is supported by certain personnel and departments of the Academy of Sciences, USSR (seee believe that the USSR would tend toentrally controlled and supervised program, with emphasismall number of missile projects. Such an emphasis would tend to conserve technical and scientific resources,at the expense of Increasing theof errors In Judgment
The controlling authority of the Soviet missile program was, and probably stillpecial Committee of the Council ofThis conclusion Is based on the known existence ofommittee6nd on tlie fact that the CouncU ofnormally charges committees of this nature with thc responsibility for theof special weapons. Stalin reportedly participatedeeting of the6 whichroposal for an Intercontinental rocket bomber as set forth during the war by German scientist Bugen Sanger (US scientists and German engineers in the USSR evaluated this proposal asunsound and the USSR probably came
Intelligence on these fadllUes ls listed tn Annex A.
to tho same conclusion, but It Is significant thatroposal apparently received early high-level consideration).
esponsibility for conducting andatart of the program has been delegated to the Ministry of Defense It has subordinate to It the largest number of the Installations known to have been involved In missile activities. Ina Scientific Technical Council (NTS) has been describedelumed Germanas the highest technical authority on guided missiles. Its location In thestructure and Its continued existence9 are not firmly established. The chairman was the Director ofieknown guided missile InstallaUon under thc Ministry of Defense Industry. Whether the NTS was set up solely to direct theactivity (Uie US handled Its German scientists Inr whether lt also has an active part in Uie nativets not known. It was composed of aboutembers from the military, variousministries, unlverslUes, and various institutes of the Academy of Sciences; its func-Uon was to discuss specific projects beforedevelopment was undertaken, and to allocate funds.
apustin Yar Test Range. Wc also have considerable intelligence on what we believe lo be the principal Soviet guided missile test range, located southeast of Stalingrad.Germans, some of whom visited Uie rangeescribed equipment either located there or Intended for such use. Although the range head was then only ln the early stages of construction, the Soviets apparently planned an extensive permanent Installation. Firm Intelligence on the present status of Kapustin Yar Is lacking, but we believe that it is nowodern, well-equipped range. While it ls believed to have extended onlyiles eastwardt could be extendediles eastward oriles to Uie southeast. have been conducted here7 and It Is believed tobecurrenUy ln activeoperation.
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Summary. In thc light of the aboveas to basic Soviet scientific andcapabilities, thc systematic Sovietof aerman missile experience, and the numerous personnel and facilities engaged in missile activities, together with probable Soviet military rcquliements, we conclude that the USSR has an active and extensive guided missile program, at least In theand development phase.
II. SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO DEVELOP GUIDED MISSILES
contrast to the amount ofIndicating thc existenceoviet missile program, currenton tho particular missiles underis almost nonexistent. following descriptions of missilesbe available to thc USSR have had toon: (a) the available evidence onwork for thc Soviets; lb) our ownexperience; (c) Soviet capabilitiesfields; (d) probable Sovietandew scattered bitsdata. We recognize lhat thenot necessarily base Its missiles onor other foreign designs. It Islo note that the missilesare typical of those which wethc USSR Is capable of developing,those which It will In fact develop.
estimated dales given forarc tho earliest probablewhich small quantities ofhave been produced and placed inof trained personnel of onethusimited capabililyemployment These dateson the assumptiononcertedeffort beganf noof any sort were encountered andeffort of the highest order ofwere undertaken, the earliest possibleavailability could bo on the order of oneyears earlier, or as much as threethc ease of the IBM.'
'See footnote to paragraph fl.
Soviet Capabilities In Sorfaee-fo-Air Missiles
he Soviels exploited in Germany all the Important German surface-to-air missiles under development during World War II.roup of Germans wasto reconstruct Wasserfall, Schmetter-ling, and Rhelntochter, and In one Instance toew design, Fluse, Uponto thc USSR Inhey were directed to continue work on the first three missiles but to drop Fluse. Work on Schmet-terllng and Rhelntochter appears to have been continued by lhe Soviets, but the Germans were gradually phascd-out except for one group who continued to work on ground guidance system computers untilhe capabilities of Schmclterllng andwould probably limit their useuidance lest or as training vehicles, but the computers and. In general, their control and guidance systems could have served as the basis for continuing advances.
Germans report continuingof Wasserfall up to thc time offrom classified workrojects undertaken by one Germana semiactive homing head design,for Wasserfall. It operated Inwavelength region, had adiameter ofentimeters, andscan techniques. It was to haverange on the order ofauticaltracking tests utilizing ana ground basedadarand illumination purposes, andof lhe homing head, are reportedbeen conducteduccessfully only to seven tomiles. Four laboratory modelsconstructed and taken over byIn
that time another group ofset loew missile basedgained from WasserfalLy thelo overcome some of Wasserfall'sand to Introduce someas equipped with two mldwlngs
TOP aBCRBT-
ihree tail control surfaces and was tocoordinated turns as In piloted aircraft. Its designound warhead located in the nose. It utilized thc standard Wasscrfall enginelight Increase In thrust Thc German work3 did not progress beyond the paper-design stage.the Soviet specifications for It were more rigorous and more closely supervised than were those for other German design projects.
resent Soviet Capabilities. Although we have no evidence of any Soviet operational missiles, assuming that the Soviets would make use of the German work we can estimate the availability of these designs. Wherethc estimated performance cJinracteris-tlcs arc based on recalculations of the fixed parameters supplied by the Germans. Taking into account Soviet exploitation of thc Wasser-fall missile guidance, propulsion andfuels, and tlie general status of Soviet electronics, thc USSR could now have anall-weather version of WasserfalL The chief improvements couldound increase in motor thrust and useround guidance system utilising two radarsomputer. Wc doubtoming head could be available at this lime which would permit utilization of the maximum range0 yards) of the missile. Assuming the use of conical scan radars of an Improvedype andoptimum conditions, an over-all system accuracy of one to two mils could be obtained, resulting In an effective slant range00 yards0 feet altitudearhead ofounds. adar command technique or proximity fuse could be employed to detonate the warhead.
uture Capabilities. The projectsby the Germans while InR also offer the only firm bails for extrapolating into the future. The Soviets will probably strive to Increase the effectiveness of Wasscrfall and could have an improved missilehe semlactlve homing head under development by the Germans could be employed to provide effective accuracies atards maximum range. Warhead weight might be reduced to make room for the homing head.
but this would be compensated for by Uietn accuracy.
e estimateewpossibly Including some features of Uiedesign study, could be ready for series producUon. It could Incorporate terminal homing,aximum effective range0 yards0 feet alUtude, andarhead on Uie orderounds.8 the USSR could develop low yield.nuclear warheads suitable for this
lthough the above surface-to-air missiles are Uie only ones for which we have some base in existing Intelligence or on knownwe believe Uiat Uie Soviets will endeavor lo develop Improved missiles with ranges In Uie orderautical miles. However, due to Uie many technical dlffleulUes involved, It ls highly unlikely Uiat the USSR could develop such missiles until some tune
Soviet Capabilities in Air-Io-Air Missiles
he Soviets acquired such German alr-to-alr missiles as, HsllTH, androup of German scientists was also cm-ployed In Uie USSR on recoostrucUon andof some of Uie German World War II solid propelled rocket designs,umber of thc more promising Rhelnmctall-Borsig ungulded rockets and at least one guided rocket, designated Sokol This group worked on Uie guided rocket project only through Uie paper design stage, at which point Uie work was turned over to Uie Sovietsts design calledolid propellant rocket motor of conventional design end an optical track radio command guidance
lthough Uiere Is considerable evidence of Soviet interest In Infrared devices, we have no firm evidence of Its application to missile guidance systems. Tlie Soviets exploitedWorld War II infraredissile homing head called Juno. One source reports that work on this homing head was continued in the USSRocation known to have been engaged In other Infrared activities. However, there Ls otherInformation concerning Uie exact nature
P tHt-ET
10
these activities. Nevertheless, we believe that the USSR has sufficient capability In tho Infrared Held for the development of Infrared guidance systems.
Soviet Capabilities.limited effectiveness of Sokol and theWorld War II alr-to-alr missiles,could have served only as testWe have no reliable information ofSoviet activities or Interest, but Ifhad decided8 to put anguided missile Into operational use, asolid propellant missilenow be available. It could utilize anhoming head andards05 toound warhead andweight ofounds.would vary somewhat according toat which fired.issUelimitedail cone attack underfair weather conditions at tho
Soviet Capabilities. Despiteof any rollable evidence on Sovietwo believe Uiat sometime duringthe range of the above missile couldto0 yards,might not be limited to tallompletely new supersonicguided missile could be ready forThis missile could have anrange of0 yards,weight ofarhead weight of aboutThe guidance system woulda semlactlve radar homingthf missile does not appear until theoferiod, thc likelihoodof an active homing head
Soviet Capabilities in Air-to-Surface Missites
ie Soviets acquired manyGerman alr-to-surface missiles anddata on all German alr-to-surfacethese were theuidedand thenderiesglide-bombs. informaUon was also ob-
tained on German air launching of. The Soviet Navy and Army Air Forces followed the usual pattern of exploitation of these guided missiles; German scientists were employed In toe reconstruction of missing dala and assembly of missiles. Both Soviet services reportedly continued to follow air-to-surface developments after the Germans were taken to the USSR Inne group of Germans, formerlywith Uie Soviet exploitation of alr-to-surface missiles In Germany, arrived lnbyowever, their known work In Leningrad consisted largely ofon surface-to-air computers. Riga was Identifiedoviet defector7 as the probable locaUon for naval tesUng of alr-to-surface missiles. He also reported that both the Navy and Army Air Forces werefor this class of missiles.
We have evidence Uiat research Instituten Moscow, predominantly staffed bypersonnel, until recenUymall group of German engineers to do research on guidance components for an antiship missile. Among their tasks was Uie development ofand guidance system which was to use midcoursc beam ridingemiacUvehead. The Germans were once toldinged missile, which they saw from adistance suspended from Uie wingourenglncd plane, was the missile on which they were working, and Uiat It was toange of aboutiles and fly atiles per hour.
Wc have fragmentary evidence of Soviet work on Uie German television homing system Tonne, whkh Uie Germans originally tested with theissile during World War II. Soviet exploitation of tliis system took place In Germany, and aboutoets are reported to have been shipped to the USSR Inevelopment work Is believed to have been continued by Uieba, Leningrad. However, we have no evidence which would connect this workpeclflc guided missile system.
Present Soviet Capabilities, There is no evidence of Soviet operational employment of Uie German Worldissilesnd
K-Bi-
whose ciTccllvo range would beshort. On the basisrobable Soviet requirement for additional range and greater warhead weight and known Sovietof thee believe that the "USSR could now have ready for seriesan Improved rocket-propelled glide-bomb. Its estimated characteristics would bo: range ofautical miles; speed of; gross weightounds; and aor HE warhead. The guidance system could utilize television target presentationadio-command link and be capableRT? ofardseadily Identifiable target.ystem would be limited to good visibility condlllons.
Future Soviet Capabilities. We estimateilotless aircraft could be ready for series production. with ranges up toauticalpeed ofross weight of0 pounds,ound warhead. The guidance system could be either:omingadio command linkEP ofards;assivehead for use with clandestine beaconsEP ofards; orand beam-riding system withterminal homingEP of roughlyardsldp target.n acoustic homing torpedo suitable for use in this missile might be available.
We also estimate that, If the Soviets so desired, thay could have ready forupersonic missile weighing0 pounds capable of carrying awarhead under all weather conditions to land targetsangeautical miles. The guidance system probably wouldidcourse radar-track radio-command system capable of CEPs on the order of one to two nautical miles. Clandestine beacons would Increase this accuracy.
Surface to Surface Pilotless Aircraft
for Soviet improvement of, wc have almost noon Soviet work on pilotlessThc major portion of thc knownGorman missile research work
was devoted to ballistic types. However, the USSR could hii been pursuinga substantial pilotless aircraft program which escaped Herman detection. German specialistsreliminary design study,5 project,am-Jetpilotless aircraft toound warheadauticaloviet air force officer who defected0 reported, as second-hand Information, that workadio-controlled pilotless aircraft roughly7 size was Initiatedut ceased when the aircraft crashede alsoeport of questionable reliability that Soviet experiments were conductedemotely controlled TU-4. Advancements in the Soviet aircraft Industry since Worldndicate an over-all capability ofa comprehensive program for pilotless aircraft research, development, and
roduction facilities,components, and scientists andwere moved from Germany to the USSR. One German reported that several's were assembled at Khimki, but that serieswas not attempted. Olher Germans reported seeing betweenndissiles being assembled at one time.our or five sets of tools, jigs, and manufacturing machinery forere shipped from Khimki to an unknown destination, while at least one complete set was retained at Khimki The Germans also worked on anontrol system elsewhere In the USSR It Is reported that six units were built
Work on Improvement of the pulse-Jet engine was also conducted. The Germans observed Soviet workersion ofsing two pulse-Jet engines. One German reports Uiat aboutoissile bodies having twin pulse-Jets were assembled at Podberesye8 andGerman reportedifferent twinl Khimki. Whether any of these developments culminated Inmodels Is not known. No indications of producllon of tho twin pulso-Jet missile
have been -detected, and there Is no evidence thatype ls In operational use.
A low-frequency, ground-based,type navigation system has beenby the Soviets (designated "Moon" by Alliedhile no connection of "Moon" with missiles has been detected, It could be adapted for use with winged .types.
Present Soviet Capabilities. While we have no Intelligence that any pilot]essare In operational use, we estimate that the USSR Is presently capable of having:
Pilotless Turbo-jet Aircraft Acould bo modified for useuidedand wouldecided speed,and range advantage over aA modifiedypehaveangepeed of;00 feet; andounds. For guidance It"Moon"imilar radio-controlledThc CEP could vary from less thanas much asautical miles. Ansystem could achieveautical miles at amile range, thus providingto bring the missile within rangeclandestineithin the rangetracking, up toa CEP on the order of onecould be achieved.
ype Missile. Althoughulse-Jet missile isthaturbo-jet missile and It Isobsolete weapon. Its simplicityand light weight may haveto the Soviets. It Is believedSoviet capabilities to haveype missilesheyan over-all weightpeed ofa flight altitudeeet,0 nautical miles. With an Inertialsystem they couldEPthree nautical miles.adar-
'A clandestinely placed low power beacon In the target area. If effecUvelj coordinated with the attack, could materially Improve the accuracy of this and other pilotless aircraft.
tracking radio command range ofautical miles (limited by flighthey couldEP ofautical miles If ground-launched, and roughly one to two miles If launched from submarineson the navigational aids and techniques used to fix thc submarine's position).
Twinype, If theso desired, thoy probablyissilet coulda weightlightpeed ofangenautical miles;ange ofautical miles (limited byThe guidanceround based system thatmissile and transmittedautical miles the estimated CEPa system would bo on the order ofmiles from land bases and onenautical miles from submarinesupon the navigational aids andused to fix the submarine's position).
ype,that the USSR could at presentof launching either of the abovefrom submarines. The feasibilitytechniques has beenthe US. However, no modifications orchanges ln the configuration ofwhich might Indicatefor launching guided missiles have
uture Soviet Capabilities. Despite tho absence of intelligence on Soviet development of pilotless aircraft other thanype, the Soviets nevertheless appear capable ofadvanced aircraft type missiles Ii they so desire. Their principal problem would be that of guidance, since development of Inertial components suitable for the time of flight Involved probably has not reached the stage required for Inclusion ln pilotlesshaving moro than aboutinutes flight duration. However, use of high yield nuclear warheads would tend to compensate for the Inaccuracy of Inertial guidanceon flights of longer duration.
S-KT-
-Interest In low frequencyhas been considerable, and the "Moon" navigation system demonstrates theirIn this field. "Moon"imilarIf designed for missile use could be used for winged missiles for ranges upautical miles. Accuracy would dependupon azlmuthal orientation of thewith respect to the base line, and the CEP could vary from less than one to as much asautical miles. However, missiles using such navigation systems would be especially vulnerable to countermeasures.
There Is little Information concerning Soviet development efforts on ram-Jets. The Germans did some work on the ram-Jetfor the Soviets, but little Soviet interest has been detected. We assume that theare conducting such research at arate.
Short-Range Pilotless Aircraft. The USSR, couldubsonic turbo-jetaircraft suitable for launchingt could be in thelass, weigh in the order0 pounds, andoundauticaladar-track radio-command guidance system could be used only up to rangesiles.by employing advancedautical miles of target, this missile could be launched from as fariles away and still achieve from landEP of roughly one nautical mileangeiles,autical milesangeiles. From submarines these CEPs would be somewhat greater, depending on the accuracy of navigation. An inertial guidance system could also be used, but its accuracy would be much less.
Medium Range, If the Soviets so desired, we estimateubsonic pilotless aircraft could now be In the prototype testing stage. It couldautical milepeed of about00 feet cruise altitude and0 pounds payload.issile could be ready for scries productioncould be providedow frequency hyperbolic system; Its CEPautical
miles could vary from less than one to as much asautical miles.
Pilotless Aircraft.view, there is little likelihood thatwould devote the required amountto developing such missiles.US programs for Snark and Navahothe types which could bespeculative estimates ofseries production wouldnark type2 fortype. Soviet capabilities foradequate guidance systems by thesequestionable. An Inertial systemerminal syslem for homingclandestine beacon could possibly be used.
Surface-lo-Surfaca Ballistic Missiles
While extensive Information ls available on German work done for the USSR onmissiles, It does not necessarilythe actual Soviel program.oviet defector whose Information has proved highly reliable reported that7 the USSRevelopment program aimed at making such Improvements Inand range ofs would be possibleelatively short tune, rattier than to wait for greatly Improved designs which could not be ready for manyong-term research program was to beconcurrently, but the source believed that It would suffer from tho urgencyto the short-term work.
In the fallhe Sovietsissiles. Reports Indicate that possibly six of theseadio beam method for ozunuth control. They used the German-developed Lcltstrahl system, which wasby the Soviets. One significant Improvement accomplished by the Germans for the SovieU was the modification ofngine which Increased Its thrust rating fromoons'* WeUiat: (a)ofon thrust were produced at Khimki; (b)ofon thrust were produced there In
thrust ratines bi this esUmate are given In metric lor*
B efcR-T-
cats, believed to be missile carriers, firstat Kaliningrad
resent Soviet Capabilities. We have no evidence of any ballistic missiles available for operational use. Nevertheless, based on Uie above Intelligence and our analysis of basic Soviet capabilities, we believe that tbe USSR could now have operational short-rangemissiles of the followingperformance characteristics:
issile of0 pounds gross weight that couldistanceautical miles witha CEP of two nautical miles. Thesearc based on improvements that could be made, Including useton thrust engine. Increasing tbc length to provide additional fuel capacity, and use of an Improved Inertial and radio controlled guidance system.
horter-range missile capable oflarger warheads.issile couldomewhat smaller CEP than tho one above, and could use nitric acid or liquid oxygen as the oxidizer. Use ol nitric add would reduce the logistic problems for avehicle. Somo reports indicate Soviet interest In short-range tacticalne report0 nautical milemissile.
uiure Soviet Capabilities. SovietIn the development of long-range weapon systems Is Indicated by: (a) early high-level Soviet Interest in the Sanger proposal forrocket bombers;f high-thrust rocket engines andpropellants; (c) studies of heat transfer In boundary layers; (d) research on ballistic missile guidance system components; (e) upper atmosphere research; andn geodetic mapping.
uidance systems suitable for ballistic missiles were under development by German specialists In Uie USSR. These Inertial and radar/radio-cominand fuel cutofT type guidance systems arc potentially capable of Improving the accuracies ofmissiles over theuidance system and have been used In the following estimates. Development of control tech-
IS
servomechanlsms. airframeaerodynamics configurations, highmaterials, and other necessaryfor continuationong-range guided missile research and developmentare also believed lo be within Soviet capabilities.
erman wartime development oftonocket engine and subsequent modlflealions and improvements In the USSR which produced5 ton thrusthave provided the USSR with on adequate rocket power plant for ballistic missiles of ranges In the orderautical miles. For greater range, larger engines or clusters ofton thrust engines would be required, and the Soviets apparently have chosen to develop larger, engines for this German specialists at two locations within the USSR worked lndependcnUy on designs for rocket engines with thrusts on the orderons. Wc know that the Soviets continued work on at least one of these designs; we believe thattatic test stand was to have been available, they could have commenced static testingon thrust engine.
lthough other lines of development arc possible, our estimates arc based on theconception of an orderly, step-by-step program Involving optimum utilization of these enginesikely course of further development: (a) utillxatlon ofton thrust engineingle stage missile; (b) utilization ofon thrust enginearger single stage missile; end (c) utilisation of combinations of tho above engines Into two stage missiles of medium and long ranges. The range of any specific missile would vary with the warhead weight chosen.
fedium-Ranoe MUiQes. Continuedof theesign for optimum utilization ofton thrustcould resultalllsUc missile with0 pounds over-allarheadangeautical miles;KPautical miles using an inertial and radar-tracking radio-command guidance system. We estimate
that this missile could be ready for series production
f guided missile design studies wereat the timeon thrust engine was being designed, It ls conceivableoviet single stage missile using this engine could now be in the flight test stage.issile couldange ofauticalross weightoundsound warhead,EP of three to four nautical miles. Dependent upon reasonable success of component developments and on early flight tests, thc earliest probable date at whleh this missile could be ready for series production wouldlthough It Is possible that this missile could appear as early5 (see.
he Soviet-directed 'German research activities disclose some interest In missiles with ranges on the orderautical miles. Two proposals,2 andere made by the Germans at the request of the Soviets. 2 projecteries of feasibility studieswo stage balllsUc missile ofile range,arhead ofounds. Thc Hi- project, which was carried to adesign stage, was toingle stage missileoundautical miles. Sovietof those design studies ls unknown. At the most, they represented preliminary design studies with practically nowork accomplished to support Uiedata. However, those studiesa logical stepallistic missile program.
wo stage missile utilizingon engine as the booster andton thrust engine coulduided missileange In the orderautical miles. We estimate thatissile would weighounds, couldound warhead, andEP of three to four nautical miles Assumingwas Initiatede estimate that Uie earliest probable date at which thiscould be ready for series production would be someUmelthough It Is possible
thatissile could be ready as early7 (see.issile could alsoesearch vehicle for obtaining stage separation, high-speed and high-temperature, and other data pertinent to an intercontinental ballistic missile.
Missilej.on thrust engine probablyinterest In longer-rangeong-range, Intercontinental(IBM) would be within SovlotIt couldoostertwo oron thrust engines,second stage utilizing either theengine or two ortona missile would have an estimatedthe orderautical miles,ounds, carrypound warhead, andEPfive noutlcal miles. However, evenUSSR decided8 to devote aefiort leading to this type, thcmodel probably could not beseries productionllhoughpossible that It could be ready as early(see.
III. OTHER FACTORS AfFECTING SOVIET MISSILE CAPABILITIES
Soviet Capabilities to Produce Guided Missiles
of Evidence on Current SeriesA survey of the availablereveals no firm evidence loor deny Soviet series productionguided missile at this time. The fewavailable could apply toexperimental and test purposes or,to production for other weaponsWe have evidence thatB themight have been planning series(secor theropulsionreported to have been sent from KhimkiSoviet technicians6 In Khimki Intimated thatto set up series production atbut we have no confirmatorytesting of propulsion units nearhas also been reported. Liquid oxygen
units and special transportation equipment were sighted,
Tlie Soviet electronics industry Isspecialized Items which arc essential to guided missiles, but because such Items have applications In other electronic systems they cannot bo regarded as In themselves Indicating missile production. Examples of Soviet products employing these specialized Items include: (a) microwaveradar; (b) microwave airborne blind-bombing radar; (c) microwave radar(d) microwave ground and shipborne fire-control radar; (e) microwave ground and shipborne early-waralng/ground-contfol-ln-tercept radar; (f) microwave communications systems; (g) long and short range pulse type radio navigational systems; and (h) airborne automatic dlrecUon-ftading equipment.
Most of the above examples have appeared In quantity, although none of these products or tbc specialized Items Involved have been specifically connected with missile production. Recent trends Lo production show Increased attention to severe operating conditions as would be particularly Important in airborne and guided missile applications, such asminiaturization, ruggedization. and tolerance for high temperatures.
There areew possible indicators in the precision mechanism field.13 the Zeiss Plant at Jena produced Schlicrcn Instruments, some of which wereshipped to the USSR At least one lot of elnetheodolites was sent to the USSR from tho Mcopta National Corporation. Prague Nusle, Czechoslovakia. Both the aboveare used primarily In research but could also be used for production testing.
Industrial Resources Available. We have surveyed the evidence concerning severalplants in the Soviet Bloc because they arcype which could contributeissile program. The results of this survey were: confirmednconfirmed ornd no. However, the num.
"The Indleauons nl many of these plants are listed In Annex A.
TOP OECIiET
ESTIMATED SOVIET CAP ABILITIES TO DEVELOP QUID ED kCESEES'
DtU ol
18SOM)
DtllUbc niialie (H*
DaUliUc <w* para. XT)
m
f--K* (at* na.
jn
MioUaii aircraft (im)
yp* (mo para.
Twinyp*
am am
HOm
0*
i4CvCco n*
tDO.OXWOO^OO Ibi.
ba
3m
Lataoth atm
IMS
IM
IBM
Th* mlttMei described ara typical of thoae which weh*apabla ot developing; bewtrer, w* hav* no firmoamiaallaa thaoplng or maj now have in operaUonal an.
'Tha animated data* glean ara tea tarUiit probesri during whleh (mall quanUQai of|ag*>a* couldapUeed In tha hand* of trained peraonnal of oca OparaUooal unit, Urni eoojtliuUngfor operaUonal em-
ployment.ala* ara baaad oa 'ha aarompUooaocerted and eonttnuooi affart began In IMS. If no major OUyi of any aort wex* eneounUrad and anffort of tn* highest order of priority war* enfiertaiea. earlier: paitOU Late* of availability ceroid b* on th* order ot oc* to two year* earner, or bj mnch aatan ln the com cf to* DSX.
SECRET
19
of facilities surveyed suggests the general magnitude of the Industrial resources which might be used toissile program.
f thclants possibly developing and/ or producing missile components, there are some In most of the Industries which would normally contributeissile program" These plants indicate the existence of ancomplex capable of engaging Inand development or missileTwenty-one plants are believed to be manufacturing electronic Items which might be used for missile guidance. There Is some evidence that the other plants might beother guidance and controlliquid oxygen or oxygen generating equipment, launching and transportation equipment, propulsion units, and missile
omether plants have been reported, usually by repatriated prisoners, to be engaged in missile or component production, buthas indicated either that thesewere baseless or that missile activity Is no longer being carried out there. In some instances, missile production has beenonly by geographic area; all such areas were studied with negative results.dditional Installations, believed suited to production of missile airframes, propulsion units, equipment, or components were also surveyed, and arc apparently not associated with the missile program. In addition, ail ammunition loading, underwater ordnance, shipbuilding, battery, iron and steel, chemical, petroleum-refining, explosive, locomotive and car, automoUve, tractor, and heavy equipment plants and research, development, or testing facilities were surveyed.
mports. There Is little evidence thatmissile activity currently utilizes anyquantity of Imports, either from the Satellites or from the western nations.the USSR, which imports about one-third of Satellite electronic output, must rely on these sources for some test equipment andInstruments. There are also reports that the USSR has been receiving liquidgenerators from Satellite countries, but
we have no evidence that these importsmissile activities.
Analysis of Soviet Economic Capabilities. To provide some measure of Soviet capabilities for series missile production and possiblerates we have setypothetical Soviet missile program Although thehypothesized took into account the "general state of the art" lt was based only on estimated military requirements, without consideration of research, development, orlimitations. We analyzed: (a) the rate at which these missiles could be turned out at capacity production; (b) the labor and materials input required; and (c) thecost ofrogram (seehe results of this illustrative study, while not to be taken as providing estimates of actual Soviet production rates or stockpile goals, do indicate ln broad terms what the USSR could da
Our analysis leads to the conclusion that ln general the USSR is rattier well endowed with the skilled labor, raw materials, and plant capacity required for an extensive guided missile program, except possibly in the fields of precision mechanisms and electronic equipment. Indeed our analysis points up the absolute smallness of over-all missilerequirements, except possibly for liquid oxidizers.ecided qualitywould also exist. In aggregative terms asizeable missile program would be well within Soviet capabilities. For example. In the three yearurmissile program would represent aboutercent of estimated Soviet defense outlays.
The chief bottlenecks In any extensive Soviet production program would almostHe in the precision mechanisms and electronics Industries. Although our estimate docs notrecise measurement. It suggests that If our Illustrative program were pursued as rapidly as possible, it mighta large share of Bloc electronics output over an extended period. This share could be reduced somewhat by greater capitalThe problem would be most cUfllcult In the earlyhen anone-half of the Soviet electronics out-
might be required for the IllustrativeAlthough the air defenseof the Satellites were not specifically considered In establishing our hypothetical air defense requirements (the surface-to-airaccounts for three-quarters of the total program In the earlyt Is believed that they would In fact contribute appreciably to any missile program, particularly ln thefield. Tlie Illustrative program would require About two-fifths of the estimatedelectronics output of the USSR and the European Satellites
I this guided missile electronicswere to bo met, availability for other uses would have to be sharply cut, although all other programs would probably not be equally curtailed. Nevertheless, In view of the Importance of many of the competingfor Soviet electronic output (nonmlll-lary electronics, aircraft, early warning radar, fire control, airborne navigation, bombing, and Intercept equipment) It seems unlikely that the USSR would allocateigh proportion to actual missile programs.
ore serious limitation lo satisfying the guided missile requirements may well exist In thc precision mechanism sector ln view of the tolerances Involved and the skilled laborFor example, tho average annual missile requirement for gyroscopes In the early yeais of our illustrative program may betwo-thirds of the gyroscopes allocated by the USSR to new3 (we have no estimate of3 Soviet production of gyroscopes).
Effect of Sovr'ot Nuclear Capabilities on Missilo Uso
e have Indicationsossiblebetween tho Soviet missilo program and thc Soviet nuclear program. Almost ail tlic missiles wtilch we estimate tho USSR Isof developing could be fitted with nuclear warheads. However, our estimates of thenuclear stockpile Indicate that for tlie
" See Annex c. Restricted Data, for an esUmate of Soviet stockpiles and time-phased warhead yields.
next several years It will bo Inadequate to meet probable military requirements and that reliability and accuracy ofill be primary factors ln tho Soviet choice ofvehicles. The yield of thc nuclearwhich we esUmate would be available at present for Soviet missiles would not be sufficient to compensate for the lack ofwhich we estimate these missiles would have. The yields available from suchwill progressively Increase, but thebetween estimated warhead yield and estimated missile accuracy ls such that tbe effectiveness of nuclear delivery by guided missiles. In terms of levels of targetwill not approach that obtainable by aircraft delivery for the next severalhis factor obviously does not preclude earlier employment of nuclear missiles where other considerations so dictate, but It does suggest primary Soviet reliance on aircraft delivery of nuclear weapons so long as the Soviet stockpile remains limited and Allied aircan be penetrated withoutlosses-Probable Missile Reliabilities
nother major factor affecting the Soviet choice between guided missiles and other weapons systems, parUcularly for nuclearwill be n. reliability,heof likelihoodissile fired will actually reach the target area. We do not behove that missile reliability for unopposed delivery will for Uie foreseeable futurelhat of aircraft. US experiencethat tho "stale of the art" of missile development is suchystem reliability factor of the orderercent might presenUy be expected.1*
Soviot Capabilities In Geodosy and Cartography
he USSR has succeeded Inodern effecUvo geodeUc orgonizaUon whose scientific and technical personnel are capable of dependable and adequate support ln all aspects of geodesy and cartography re-
"USAF reservaUon.
ft
quireduided missile program. The high level of Soviet geodesy has resulted from early recognition of the basic Importance of geodesy and cartography to Soviet economic development and military operations, which ledeodetic and cartographicprogram on an unprecedented scale.
e estimate that the Soviet' can now achieve relative geodetic positioning of targets from fixed predetermined launching sites In the USSRircular probable erroreet for most targets In the US, provided they have connected their trlangulatlon across the Bering Strait with the North American datum. In the absence of such connection, thc CEP for US targets would He closereet The error for targets In Western Europe ls estimatedeet Against coastallsslle-launcldng Soviet submarine out of sight of land could determine Its position by celestial observations, day or night, within one to two miles. By using other navigational aids and techniques, positions accurate toiles could be obtained.
he USSR can be expected to Improve Its geodetic positioning capabilities during thehrough extensiveand connections with the geodeticof adjoining areas.unar and electronic methods of connecting thcwill reduce the geodetic CEPiles to not moreeet Tills anticipated Improvement lnaccuracy may result either from Soviet geodetic, astronomic, or gravimetric programs, or more likely from Western programs, ifof these programs continue to be made available to the Soviets through open
Logistic, Personnel, and Training
Requirements
ogistic Requirements. We estlmato that for each missUe In the basic allowanceield unit, an additional two to three missiles would have to be produced for testing,replacement of defective units In the stockpile, and pipeline requirements. If TJS experience Is any guide, Soviet vehicular re-
ivn
qulrements for the support of mobile missile units will also be considerables Fororporal battalion requires an Impressive number of very heavy trucks, trailers, and otber vehicles. MissUes In excess0 pounds gross weight would create majorproblems. Such long-range missiles as the IBM probably would have no mobUlty but would have to be launched at or near thesite. However, In general we believe that transport would noterious limiting factor on any Soviet missUe program,this program would naturally compete with otber Soviet transport requirements.
ersonnel. The complexity of guidedand related test and guidance equipmentigh premium on technically trained personnel in operational units. Theprogram envisioned In Annex B, for ex-amplo, might require ln the earlytrength of as many, andelatively highly trained specialists to test, maintain, and operate the varioussystems. We bcUeve, however, that as with other complex programs the Soviets :ould train personnel of the required calibre toissile program, althoughsuch personnel needs wouldajor effort and would naturally compete with other personnel demands.
raining. On Uie basis of US experience, we estimate Uiat roughly one year would be required for tho Individual training of certain key missUe personnel. Subsequent unitand training would require from six monthsear. In some cases the USSR might find lt difficult to train and acUvate such units as rapidly as lt could produce tho missiles, in which case training wouldimiting factor on Soviet missile capabilities. On Uie other hand, once missUe personnel were trained, the transition from early to later reissue types would be facilitated by tho basic similarity of guided missile systems.
IV. PROBABLE SOVIET INTENTIONS IN THE GUIDED MISSILE FIELD
ecause of the lack of Intelligencewhat specific missiles may be ln the current Soviet missUe program, our estimate
probable Soviet Intentions Ls based prlmarl< ly upon an assessment of probable Sovietrequirements within the context ofSoviet capabilities In this field. Wc have assessed the probable militaryof the various guided missUes which we have estimated tbe USSR is capable of and compared them with other weapons systems whleh It could develop In the same period. In our view the USSR will seek to develop these missile systems which provide or promise toetter means ofSoviet military requirements than other weapons systems available to It, and willln quantity at least some of these
Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAGMs)
ital Soviet strategic objective In event of general war will be the defense of the USSR against strategic atlack. The USSRery high postwar priority to alr
" The rstlmaied dates given for missileaie the earliest probable years during whichnUUei of missiles could have bean produced and placed In the hands of trained personnel of one operaUonal unit, thusimited capability for operaUonal employment. These dates are based on the assumptiononcerted and continuousbegan by IMS. If do major delays of any sort were encountered and an Intensive effort of the highest order of priority were undertaken, the earliest possible dates of availability could be on thc order of one to two years earlier, or as much as three year* In the case of the IBM. The above datea are Uiose around which the missile could have been operationally tested and be ready for series production. However, aa addlUooal period (which would vary according to missile type) would be required before rota-could be produced ln quanUty and the necessary units trained and deployed. We eaU-mate that at least six months would normally be required for ahlft or conversion from pilot plant to teriei producUon, and an additional period to reach Ihe planned production rale. Some IS months to two years would probably ba required for Individual and unit training of each operaUonal unit, although this period couldonsiderable extent overlap the production Thus, depending on thc missile type and the priority given loarying period beyond the datea given In this esUmate would befor Uie developmentlieable Soviet threat.
defense. However, the eaed limitedof present Soviet air defenses against lilgh performance bombers and under poor visibility conditionserious air defense deficiency. Thus, the most urgent Soviet defensive need Iseapon which will provide an effccUve defense against high performance bomber attacks under conditions of poor visibility.
e have estimated Uiat the USSR Isof having ready for series producUon4 an all-weather improved Waster]all de-sion with an effective slant rangeards, and3 an improved version with semiactive homingards cffccUvo slant range. We believe that thc USSR will make every effort to develop such missiles because of their early availability and the fact Uiat even Uie first. If employed ln quanUty. would radically Improve Soviet all-weather air defenses. However, Its short range would limit Its useoint defense, and numerous peripheral launching sites would be required for effectively defending major target areas. This weapon wouldalso have sharply limited capabiliUes against multiple or low altitude targets. The Improved version would be loss limited ln range and its homing head would be moreagainst multiple targets.
-
23
thus also Imp tore the effectiveness of elr defenscs generally, Including airborne
Air-to-Air Missiles (AAGMs)
ecause of Its air defense weaknesses, the USSR probably alsoigh priorityfor AAGMs. As Soviet Interceptor performance Improves and as the speed and altitude of attacking bombers also increase, improved weapons will be necessary because of the limitations of conventional aircraft armament.
have estimated that the USSRready for series productionropellant rocket withard range, and duringimproved version0 yardstwo designs have thc advantage ofbeing readily adaptable to existingHowever, owing to theirsystem they could only be used forattacks. Nevertheless, use of thiswould considerably enhance Sovietcapabilities against Jet bombers.we believe that tlie USSR wouldpriority to Its production as amissile.
The neto AAGM with semlactlve radar homing which wc estimate the USSR could developould have ancapability and be an essential supplement to the expected Soviet all-weather fighter. Therefore,issile would almostbeery high priority.he USSR could probablyissile with an active radar homing head. By this lime missiles will probably be the primaryInterceptor armament
Potential Military Threat.ginnlng5 thc solid propellant rocket began coming into general use In Soviet Interceptors, their kill probability agabist Jet bombersfair weather conditions would probably be substantially Increased. The AAGMs with which most Soviet Interceptors could probably be equipped0 would greatly enhance Soviet all-weather defense.
Air-to-Surface Missiios (ASGMs)
formidable and growing Sovietfleet and surface navy Indicateemphasis on interdicting theof communication on which lheAs Allied capabilities for defenseand ports grow, the USSR willweapons for this purpose.Improvements In the air defenses offorces will probably make aircraftattacks Increasingly hazardous,conventional bomb deliverythe accuracy necessary for useTherefore, we believe that thealmost certainly produce lnprecision weapon available forships with high explosive (HB).
estimate that the USSR couldavailableoundbomb withautical mile range andpound HE or nuclear warhead (seeC, Restricted Data). Sinceeans of deliveringattacks against point targets such aswould probably be adopted, even thoughtracking would limit lt to goodHowever, since the range ofwould still be so short as to affordsecurity to the parent aircraft, theprobably would continue to considerweapons might bo more effectivelydirectly by aircraft, and wouldthis missileuclearprobable availabilityfacoustic homing torpedo couldincrease the effectiveness of this weapon.
e also believe that for the next several years the USSR will rely primarily on Its growing high performance bomberfor attacks on key Allied bases andHowever, at some time in the future tbc growing effectiveness of Allied air defenses willrowing Soviet requirement for an improved weapon to penetrate thesewithout excessive bomber losses. At this time the USSR will probably seek toan alr-to-surface missileuclear warhead for attacking Allied nuclear bases and facilities and other heavily defended
24
he USSR probably could have ready for series production0 pound subsonic pilotless aircraft withautical mile rangeuclear warhead. However, except In case ofoming beacon in the target area. It would be limited to use In fair weather or against ship targets. While Its range might enable parent aircraft to stay beyond the range of Allied defensive missiles, theaircraft itself would be vulnerable toIts sire and weight would also restrict the performance of the parentand It could be carried only by heavy and medium bomber types. For theseand because direct bomber delivery will probably still be effective, we do not believe that the USSR would produce this weapon in quantity, If at alL
However,hen we estimateupersonic all-weather ASOMmile rangeuclear warhead could be available, thc USSR would probably expect Allied defenses around key targets to be such as gravely lo limit effective direct bomber delivery of nuclear weapons. Any limitation on the reliability of this ASOM wouldbe' more than offset by the Improved likelihood of penetrating target defenses.oreover, the size of the Soviet nuclear stockpile is likely to bo audi as to Justify allocation of nuclear material for this weapon despite thc reliability factor. By tlus time, progress In Soviet nuclear technology could also be such as toigh yield warhead. In which case the weight of the missile and the limitations on Its accuracy would be of less significance (see Annex C. Re-trictedherefore, we believe that the USSR would undertake quantity production ofissile. If available, for use by heavy and medium bombers against Well defended target areas.
Pofenflol Military Threat. Should the USSR put Into use an antiship weapon like the rocket-propelled glide bomb. It wouldstrengthen the Soviet challenge to Allied senpowcr in Eurasian waters. If an all-weather supersonic ASOM began coming Into use, it would greatly
Increase the Allied air defense problem and probably dictate primary reliance upon long range Interception of the parent aircraft.
SubmarineSurface-fo-Surfaco Missiles (SSGMi)
The USSR, with Its growing submarine fleet, will almost certainly develop thcfor using submarine-launched SSGMs to attack Allied ports and bases ln coastal areas. Including those In the US. The USSR might consider such missiles to havevalue against key Industrial areas and military bases along the US seaboard.
We have estimated that0 the USSR could have had available anypeigh explosive warhead, andarger twinype.4 both missiles coulduclear(see Annex C, Restrictedhese weapons wouldapability forattacks on US coastalto supplement Soviet nuclear air attacks. Their accuracy would probably be sufficient for use against largo cities and base areas.
Tha improved range, speed, andof the subsonic pilotless aircraft SSGM which could be ready for scries production5 would greatly increase thc number of good targets for submarine-launched attack. In8 the estimated nuclear warhead yield will approach compatibility with the estimated accuracy of the weapon system and would greatly increase the likelihood of Its use against such targets as air bases and coastal ports fsclUUes.
Potential Militaryoviet capability for submarine-launched nuclear missile attacks, which tho Soviets could now have, wouldubstantial threat to the US and Its global security Interests.hen higher nuclear warhead yieldslikely, all SAC overseas bases and some within the US Itself would be within range of effective surprise attack. Tlie chiefof submarine-launched missiles Is that the likelihood of Interception Is remote. Primary defensive reliance would have to be placed on antisubmarine measures.
25
Surfoce-lo-Surface Missiles
HO. In the light of probable Soviet strategic objectives, the USSR probablyeries of requirements for Improved weapons to: (a) neutralize Allied nuclear delivery capabilities at their launching sites (air bases, carriers, missileb) provide an all-weather tactical nuclear capability In battle areas, particularly in view of growing Alliedin this field; (c) attack Allied ports and vital centers, and neutralize such key Allied base areas as the UK and Japan. These requirements might be met by missilebut major deterrents to their use during the next few years would be the factors of reliability, accuracy, and yield, which might lead the USSR to consideretter means of delivering Its limited nuclear
The USSR could use from ground-launchers, with somewhat improved accuracy, the three pilotless aircraft whose use from submarines was discussed inbove. Since they would be ofaccuracy and their vulnerability would approach that of piloted aircraft, however, we believe it unlikely that the USSR would choose to develop any significant operationalof this type. We believe that thewould favor ballistic missiles because of their relative Immunity to presently known countermeasures.
Wc have also estimated that the USSR could have ready for series production theballistic SSGMs: (a)4 anypeound HE warheadautical mile range; (b) alternatively,4 anrdesign with much less rangeound warhead and greater accuracy; (c)5 anypeound warheadautical mile range; (d)7 (or at the earliest possible dateon thrust SSGMile rangeuclear warhead; and (e)9 (or at the earliest possible daten SSGMautical mile rangeowever, the accuracy of these missiles would be markedly Inferior to that
which the Soviets could probably obtain by either visual or blind bombing. Moreover, all targets within range of tho first three missiles would be within the combat radius of Soviet Jot light as well as medium bombers. The last two missiles would bo markedly Inferior In range In tho new Jet medium bomber. The chief advantages which these ballisticappear to offer Is their relativeto Interception and theirfor surprise attack.
To counter growing Allied all-weather nuclear capabilities in Europe, the USSR will probably give high priorityissilefor support of Its field forces.r native design estimated to be now available would satisfy this requirement, If considerably Improved accuracy could be attained. In this case, considerable effort might be devoted to Its production.
However, aside from this missile, wethat the Soviets would seek to produce ballistic SSGMs in quantity only If theythe kill probability of Allied airto be so high that such missiles would provide more certain delivery than pilotedWe believe that over the next several years the Soviets will rely primarily on high performance bombersore assured means of delivery. Therefore, for the next several years the Soviet surface-to-surface missile effort will probably be concentrated more upon development of Improved balllsUc missiles than upon quanUly producUon oftypes. When Uie USSR estimates that Improved Allied air defenses wul soonajor threat to successful aircraft delivery. It will probablyeavy investment In SSGMYie estimated growth of Uie Soviet nuclear stockpile and Uie larger warhead yields probably available would have reduced Uie significance of any limitations which Uie accuracy or reliability of such missiles systems might have placed upon their earlier use (see Annex C, Restricted Dala).
Potential Military Threat. Thus the chief Soviet ballistic missile- threat In the next several years Is likely to arise from aSoviet effort lohort-range
RBT
to counter Allied tactical all-weather nuclear capabilities In Europe. Later, tho USSR mightallistic missilefor neutralizing Allied bases on theperiphery. For example,ile ballistic missile which could probably be ready for series production9 could reach all present US air bases In Europe, theAlaska, Iceland, Japan, and North Africa, with the exception of those in Morocco.
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (IBM)
A major wartime objective of tho USSR would undoubtedly be to effect the maximum practicable disruption of the war effort of the US. The presently estimated scale of the Soviet jet heavy bomber program suggests that the USSR intends to rely on this weapon and considers that It willseful means of delivery for several years to come. However, In view of US emphasis onair defense, the Soviets musteriod when long-range bombers may no longereasible means of attackingdefended US targets. They may also be aware of thc possibility of eventual Allied capabilities to atlack the USSR with anballistic missile, against which there Is no presently known defense.we esUmate that the USSR will almost certainly undertake. If It has not done sooncerted high priority effort to acquire an intercontinental ballisUc missile. As with nuclear weapons, the USSR willestimate that Its security will depend upon having such weapons to counterbalance any capability on thc part of the US.
We have estimated that In this event, the USSR could have ready for serieshi3 (or at thc earliest possible daten IBMigh yield nuclear warhead (see Annex C, Restricted Data)EP of roughly five nautical miles.18 oviet missile could be used
"See footnote tout note that In the case of the IUM. operaUonal firing Innumbers might be conducted by factory technicians at the assembly sites and themonth to two-year training period for missile units would not be required.
against large Industrial complexes. However, Its effectiveness against such point targets as airfields or US missile launching sites might be marginal. Given the likely growth of thonuclear stockpile bys, adegree of unreliability might beto Uie USSR
Threat ta the US. AdventIBM would create an entirely newthreat to the US. Attacks upon thesites are the only possibleknown or In prospect. If thodevelopissile and produceconsiderable numbers before tho USadequate counterwcapons orUie USSR would acquire suchadvantage as to constitute angrave threat to US security.
Allocation of Priorities Within lhe Soviet Missilo Program
Our knowledge of current Soviet missile activities Is so meager as to provide little basis for any firm estimate ol Uie nature, scaleor even existenceof an actual Sovietprogram. However, we believe that from the standpoint of currently urgent militaryand estimated early operational availability, the USSR will give highestIn Uie periodo the development and production of surface-to-air and air-to-air missiles to meet urgent airneeds. In our view it wouldigh priority toubmarine-launchedhort-range tactical ballistic missile,hort-range air-to-surf ace antishipIn that order, although priorities might vary according to when designs becameavailable. Other typos probably would not be produced In quantity over the next several years.
Meanwhile, further research andln Uie above missile categories, as well asong-range ASOM and various
ballistic missiles (especially theould probably go forward under high priority. The
Interdependence of developmenl work on all
these missiles Is such that It Is not feasible to differentiate among the priorities they would receive- At some time0
top o
of the long-range ASGM, Ifwould "probably be undertaken under highest priority, followed by the medium-range ballistic SSGM's. Production of the IBM would probably be undertaken at the earliest practicable date.
he relative production empliasls and quantities of the above missile produced could vary widely, depending on such factors as Soviet strategic planning concepts, the dates of availability of various missiles, Soviettechnology and stockpiles, Sovietcapabilities, and the competingof other Soviet weapons systems. As noted, the capabilities of the Bloc electronics
and precision mechanism Industries appear toajor Urnlttng factor on any extensive missile program With respect to Sovietconcepts, primary emphasis on airwould suggest an all-out effort on sag Ms and AAGMs at the expense of other categories, while primary emphasis onthe US from its allies would point toon missilesigh potential against shipping or portefinite time-table for-war might leadutting down of effort on all missiles whose operational availability In quantity could not be anticipated by theay.
ANNEX A
ORGANIZATIONS ANO FACILITIES IN THE SOVIET MISSILE PROGRAM
of Iho Aircraft Induslry
entral Aero-Ilydrodynamtc Instituteoscow. One of the most Important Soviet aeronautical research Institutes. TsAGI does research In all basic and applied sciences associated with aeronautics and Isajor source of aerodynainlc data for the missile program. For example, TsAGIwind tunnel data toesign bureau In Putllovo known to have beenwith missile activities (see. Nilnd Itst Ostashkov (seere known' to have sent models to TsAGI for aerodynamic tests. TsAGI also had representatives at NTSat
Experimental Factoryodberez'ye. This factory Is known to have been uUHzed for exploiting German aeronauUcal scientists, engineers, and technicians. The workmainly research and development on new aircraft butome work was devoted to aerodynamic test vehicles designated aseries. The results of such work could be applicable to design of missiles as well as aircraft. Although thework here was not principallywith propellants, some developmental work was done on I'ENAropellantmetallic sodium suspendednd on combinations of hydrogen pcroxlde/hydrazlne hydrate and petroleum/white fuming nitric acid. While apparently for rocket powered Interceptors, this work could also be applicable to missile power plants.
Improvements to tlie pulse-Jet, started ln Germanyere continued at Factorynd9 apparently resultedulse-Jet engine with an estimated thrustounds smaller than the Germanhere arc also reports of workwinypo missile.hisactedubcontractor for
known missile installation (sec. Equipment delivered consulted of cigar-shaped fuselages, wingseters longhordeters) accelcrome-ters, altimeters, dynamic pressure recorders, deflection recorders, and angle of attack
Factoryuybyshev. The principal work of this factory is the fabrication, assembly, and experimental testing of new and modified Jet engine designs, but there arc Indicationsmall part has also been engaged In the research and development on certainused In missiles. The Askanla group of Germans assigned here continuedon the Patln automatic pilot, triaxial gyroscopes,ontrol mechanisms which they had worked on Inhis group reportedly overhauledontrol systems and modified six systems for electric Instead of pneumatic controls. In tho fallost of thc group joined other German missileat Post, Moscow
Flight Test Instituteamenskoye. This Institute, located at Ramenskoye airfield, probably handles most,of tho flight research and testing for the Ministry of AircraftBeginningerman prisoners of war reported seeing winged objects attached under the wings ofombers. Tho most recent observation was made during13 by German electronic specialists who, as prisoners of war, were forced to work at Post. Moscow (see. One source was told lhat the "missiles" attached to the TU-4's were an alr-to-surface type for which the Germans at Posterea guidance system.
Scientific Research Institute7 two members of this Institute wrote an article on determination of the temperature and coefficient of complete com-
bustlon In the chamber of aZhRD (liquid fuel rocketwo other persons affiliated with this Institute were reportedly Interested in the German Sanger projectong-range rocket bomber. Other scientists, formerlywith this institute, have appeared attnown missileOne of these men, Glushko, was interested In thc development ofon thrust propulsion system as earlynd became head of this project when work was started In
Ministry of Chemical Industry
Physiochemical Institute {menl Karpov, Moscow. This Institute's main function is to conduct, supervise, and/or serve as aagency on technical chemical research of Industrial Interest. It is reported to have been engaged In research on hyperbolic fuels. Small scale Ignition lag tests by the drop method were conducted.0 two rocket fuels, trlethylamine and acetonlne, had been developed to the pilot plant stage.
State Institute of Applied Chemistryeningrad. The chief function of this institute is tho study of the problemsIn thc most efficient utilization ofresources. Propellant research was carried out, with particular emphasis on aminefor use hi hyperbolic fuels. Thisappears lo be related to that carried out at the Karpov Institute.
.OKA Chemical Plant, Dzerzhinsk. In thc summerroup of six Germans from the Karpov Institute were transferred here and concentrated on developing rocketbased on amines with nitric acid as the oxidising agent. The adjoining Plants the only known producer of hydrogenIn thc USSB. Reports indicate thatercent hydrogen peroxide was available at
oscow. This factory hasplants, one for acetonlne and oneHyperbolic fuel mixtureshere from the Karpov Institute andchemical plant for extensive Bobyshev, the manager, was for-
merly supervisorerman team working on hyperbolic fuels at Leuna, Germany. He has also been Identified at both the Karpov Institute and the OKA chemical plant.
Ministry of Defenso
Academy of Artillery Sciences, Moscow. Tills Academy was established on0 to further the development of artillery weapons. Voronov, Chief Marshal ofScience and honorary president of the academy, was the commander of the Special Purpose Rocket Brigade formed0 from thoraining unit In Germany, and reported to have goneuided missile test range in the USSR. Although the Institute was under the Soviet Army and had astaff of artillery ofOccrs, officers of the Army Air Forces and the Navy were attached toommission on rocket techniques was also established by tho academy.
The Bolshevo Artillery Institute nearis thought lo be subordinate to theInoads of unidentified "special machines" were presumablyto this institute from Lehesten,the site ofombustion chamber static test facilities. Tikhonrovov, said to bo associated with this Institute, was aof the Scientific Technical Councilnepresentatives from thisobtainedets of the German mlsslle-bomc receiver, Strassburg. fromsee. Earlyovietallegedly from the Bolshevo Institute went to Ostashkov loroup of German engineers ln the field of guidance and control devices. This group of Germans was later moved to Post, Moscow
Zhukovskiy Academy, Moscow. Thistrains aircraft designers and engineers, and ts probably thc most Important Soviet school of Its type. Several high level members of the academy have been reported to beon guided missile problems,esign study of wings for supersonic long-range SSGM'sissile trajectories, guidance, and stabilization.
3J
of. lhe Defense Industry
Scientific Research Institute (Nil)nd Factorythealiningrad. Theomplex ls the most important Soviet facility known to have been Involved lndevelopment Its Initial task wasot standard's for test Urine at the Kapustin Yar test range inlieomplex worked on Improvingnd was also Involved ln work on Wasscrfall and Uchmetterllng.
Other Indications ot Its importance arc as follows: (a)8 It received guidance and control equipment from Gema Haus In Berlin, when this organisation was dissolved; (b)ndon thrust propulsion units wero shipped here from, Khimki; (c) thc Director of Nilas chairman of thc NTS, which held its meetings here; (d) flight simulators were sent here from Ostashkov9e) existenceind tunnel has been reported, andelowto the design of several components of thislongated boxcars have been observed here beginning0 and as lateg) results7 firing trials held at Kapustin Yar were evaluated hero in the springh) representatives of Nilave appeared at other Installations known to be Involved in missile activities;ontrol actuators were reportedly produced here at the rate ofer monthJ)8 constructionpecial building was begun, which the Germans reported was to be used for vertical tests ofphotos confirm completion of this building; (k) another neweel In length and throe stories high, was erected sometimetatic propulsion tests have taken place at Iho complexith the last reported test In
fstashkov was tho destination of tho German scientists who wero transferred from theomplex.erman scientists were assigned here, the largest number known to be located at any Soviet InstallationIn missile research Members of this group have supplied considerable Information,
as Indicated by the following list of principal projects proposed by them to the Soviets:0 projecta design study for amissile systemangeautical milesarheadounds;2 projecta series of Investigations of two-stage ballisticange ofautical milesarheadounds;4 projecta preliminary design studyallistic missile systemange ofautical milesarheadounds;S projecta preliminary design proposal for an aircraft type, supersonic ram-jet missile systemangeautical miles carryingounds;fJ project - reliminary design studyurface-to-air missile system0 yards slant rangearhead ofounds; (f) an ultrahigh frequency radio command guidance system for balllsUc type missiles; (g) afor bleeding combustion chamber gases from liquid rocket engines to run tho fuel pump turbines; (h) investigation of Uie (or-maUon of colloidal suspension of metals iu fuels which could be applied toesign, construction, and operationupersonic wind tunnel; andf analogue computers to be used as flight path simulators for determiningand aerodynamic data applicable to guided missile designs.
There appears to be another branch of theomplex at Bolshevo, although nowith Uie Bolshevo Artillery InsUtute ls known. One German worked at this branchonthnd otherhave stated tbeir belief Uiat Niladranch.
, Khimki. Tills factory,to be subordinate (sinceo thc Ministry of Defense Industry,evelopmental plantroduction plant. OKB was charged with:oviet technicians In thcassembly, testing, and operationombustion chamber and propulsion(b) mcreaslng the thrust ofromoon thrust; (c) design
ii BT-
thrust propulsion unit; nnd (d) designon static test stand. Thc production plant was charged with; (a) assembly and production's (reported total production estimates run as high as severalb) preparation for pilot productionombustion chambers; and (c) manufacture of certain consumer goods.
ropellant research was also conducted here, and had two basic trends, namely, tests for ethyl alcohol and liquid oxygen, and testsitric acid oxidizer. The latter Included small scale experimental engine testa. This factory is known toest facility foron thrust propulsion units (test stand, observation bunker, underground fuel storage dump,iquid oxygentorage facilities for hydrogen peroxide, atest stand, nnd equipment for dynamic balancing of turbopumps. It was reported that inype propulsion units, jigs, and tools were packed and shipped out. possibly to Kuybyshev.
apuatin Yar Test Range. This range is located aboutiles east-southeast ofGermans, some of whom visited theescribed equipment either located at the range or Intended for use there. Thc basic telemetering equipment used was the German Messina The range was also equipped with Askanla cine theodolites, radar (Including the Americantatic test stand,ather elaboratetest check out stand. Other test equipment which could now be In useecond telemetering system, called Messina IN, developed by the Germans after Worlds part of the Soviet exploitation program. Itulse transmissionusinghannels. It Is known that,talin Prixe was awarded to Soviet engineers for the further development of this equipment The Soviets were also Interested Inoppler radar system for range Instrumentation. Work was started as earlynd continued by the Germans att this time allwere shipped out to an unknown destination, and thc Germans were assigned other projects. From brief descriptions. It is
believed that the system would consist of rangehead transmitters and both rongehead and down-range receiving stations.
esignostoscow. This organization has also beento as an electronics research Institute. As earlyerman prisoner of war technicians worked hereuidancefor an ASGMange of aroundautical miles. It Is believed that the main part of the German guidance and control group, the only German group still Id the USSR working on missiles, are Involved in the work of this Installation, while another part Is believed to be workingomplete SAGM system at an unidentified Installation near Khimki The main body of the group ls known as the Buschbcck/Kitienbcrgcr group and was formerly atnd its branch at Monlno (see. Germans fromf NUt Ostashkov, from2 in Kuybyshev, and from prisoner of war camps were also merged Into the group.omplete picture of the activity ats not available, Uie Soviets werevery interestedadar guidance system, describedldcourse beam-rldcr with xe ml active homing, being developed there. Inasmuch as this system would be adaptable ln whole or In part to various types of missiles,ould be of considerableIn the Soviet program.
, Krasnoyarsk. Two phases of the acUviUes of this factory appear to be applicable to missile research and(a) Uie repair and limited producUon of various types of theodolites (Including Uie Askanla KTlneUicodolites, Uie type used at US missilend (b) experimental work with PbS photoconducUve cellsto Infrared detectors. This latter work is believed to be related to Uie development of Uie "Juno" mlssUe-ecekcr head developed in Germany during tho war. Additionalresearch here consulted of: (a) research and production of PbS photoconducUve cells; (b) work oorystals, including
omblntuon of thallium bromide and Iodide developed by Zeiss during World War tL Itow attenuation In Uio (wo to approximatelyicron band.
32
of tho crystals and the grinding of lenses and-'windows (the only known use for these crystals Isuperiorc) the use and fabrication of black bodies for research; and <d) work on Infrared filters (probably for photographicho appearance of representa' Uvea of Nilnd thciwith repairs being made on theodolites also Indicates probable missile work.
esignvtilovo. This Installation is known to have worked on the development of an AAGM referred to ast and thc nearby Sofrlno Proving Ground appear to functionroup of Germans worked mt82 on development of powder-propelled ungulded rockets for air-to-air, air-to-surface, anduse, and on antitank rocket There appears to have been aInstitute In Moscow working on projects related to the German work atsurface-to-air guided missile engineer from Nils known to have visited the Sofrlno Proving Ground several times. The instrumentation at Putilovo is known to include an intermittent supersonic wind tunneltatic test standaunching rails,mall weather station. Measurements were to range and dispersion patterns. There were no facilities for trajectory data.
Ministry of the Heavy Machine Building Industry
odemnik Factory, Moscow. Numerous POW reports indicate that special vehicles were being produced hero upheindicate that the vehicles were similar to the Meilerwogens. special trailers used by the Germans to transportto the launching site. This factory specializes In building mobile cranes and Is therefore well equipped to produce missile transporting and handling equipment.
Ministry of the Radio Technical Industry
cientific Research Institute (Nil) SXS. Moscow. This institute's activities Included the reconstruction and Sovletlzlng of the
Lcltslrohl azimuth guide beam system, the Messina IN telemetering equipment, doppler voloclty and position measuring equipment,lectrical system, and an electrical checkout stand and firing console Inreports Indicate some workelestial guidance system.ranch of this Institute, Specialt Monlno. worked on design and developmentemiactive radar homing headAOM.
's relationship with other missile Installations Is Indicated by the fact thatfor library books not available atnd/or requests for consultation with members of thc Academy of Sciences. USSR, had to be submitted throught is also known to have furnished abouttrassburg receivers to the Bolshevo Artillery Institute. At least one German fromasat7 firing trials at Kapustin Yar.0 German personnel, principally those connected with the homing head project, were transferred to Post, Moscow.
cfenfijtc Research Institute, Leningrad. An electronics Institute engaged in the development of civilian and military television equipment.s composed of two branches. Its Secret Department wasconcerned with developmental work based on Tonno0 centimetertelevision apparatus designed by thc Germans during Worlduidance system for theD air-to-shlp missile There Is as yet no evidence of aconnection between tho activities of the Secret Department and the octivities of other missilo Installations. There are reports that an unspecified institute at Odessa has done work similar to that of, and engineers from Odessa are known to have visited.
Ministry of the Shipbuildingcientific Research Instituteeningrad. Activities of this Institute fromo3 Included development of ground computers for SAGMs andyrosUblUzed platform for Inertial guidance systems. It reportedlyepartment con-
I*
with development of radar equipment Our Information Is scant, but radarof three andentimeters have been Indicated. The reconstruction and So vieof the Wasscrfall computer was completed sometimend the resulting computer was reportedly sentange for testinghe Nilaboratories, whose research apparently paralleled the work of thealsoomputer for the Wasscrfall reported to have been tested at the same lime as the German modeL
Academy of Sciences, USSR
epartment of Technical defences,This department contributes to themissile program by providing basicresearch In aerodynamics, propellants, communications systems, computer design, servo mechanisms, mechanical components, and fundamental mathematical Investigations of external ballistics. It contributed to the development of components In the field of "modelling computers" (probably flightalthough sources state that thiswas In Its Infancyregulating mechanisms, and gyroscopic
stabilizers. Individuals and groups from this department liave been associated with other missile activities.
SO. Institute of Automatics andMoscow. Ihis Institute developsdevices such as servomcchanlsms,stabilizers, and electronic controlIt InvesUgates theoretical phases of mechanics such as nonlinear oscillations, as well as pulse modulation, automatic frequency correction systems, and medium high andfrequency generators. One member has published research papers on combustion chambers, propulsion units, andof liquid flow through pipes. Thisis reported to haveervodrive system for the direction finding antennas ofF radio guidance system developed atft Is also reported toopied and supplied this Branch with small Markgraf gyroscopes to bo used ln the0tandardithand In missile trajectoryoviet physicist of this institute, A. A. An-dranov, who died inas declared by the Soviets to have been theguided missile expert ln tho USSR.
34
ANNfcX B
SOVIET ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES FOR MISSILE PRODUCTION
order to estimate the rough order of magnitude of Soviet economic capabilities for series missiles production and tho economic impactajor Soviet missile program' we have set up an illustrative Sovietand analyzed Soviet capabilities to carry It out. Our illustrative program ts wholly hypothetical; it ls basedet ofSoviel military requirements which are not necessarily Indicative of an actual Soviet program, although we have attempted lo make them realistic.
Our analyses of Soviet productionare admittedly imprecise. Thoy are based on estimates of production capacity,estimated US costs, ruble conversion ratios, and other factors which are subjectonsiderable margin of error. However, even though our estimates do not permitmeasurements, they do permit some broad conclusions as to what thc USSR could do li It chose.
I. HYPOTHETICAL SOVIET MISSILE REQUIREMENTS
first step was toetSoviet missile requirements.missile type which we estimatedwould desire to produce, we havethe number which It would needInitial wartime stockpilethe program hypothesized tookthc "general state of thotonly on estimated militarywithout consideration of research,or productionenerous one, designed tooffensive and defensive missileof the Soviet Union, bul It doesprovide for the air defense ofor the equipping of Satellite forces.
o believe that these illustrativeserveeasonable basis forwhat sort of production program the
USSR could undertake. For costing purposes, since we have no Soviet missile costs, we have translated Into rubles the estimated costs of roughly counterpart US missiles. For timing, wo have taken the earliest probable date at which It has been estimated that each missilo of the above type could be operationally tested and ready for series production. In lino with US experience we believe that It would take on the average, an additional six months between this time and the time at which tooling up for series production would be completed and production models would begin coming off theherefore, we selected -theyear following as the one In which the USSR could begin series production. The selection. Including reference to discussion of the classification of these missiles inf this estimate, was as Indicated ln Table I.
US
Coat
Falcon
(scaled
Bomare
Petrel
Rnscal
Reeulus
(ccaled
(sealed Corporal)
AUaj
ECONOMIC REQUIREMENTS FORSOVIET MISSILE PROGRAM
n estimating thc production capacity that the above missile program might require, we have assumed that no series production oc-
See paragraphnd lla footnote.
TOP P.ST
TABLE n
ASSUMED PRODUCTION OP MISSILE AND MISSILE SPARES FOR HYPOTHETICAL PR CO RAM (Number of ICssUM)
1-1
1-3
in addition to stockpile missiles, production schedule includes training missiles and missile spares expressed as eculralent NsMl
TOP DUORET
FtDT
earlier than Thc (act that we have no Intelligence on series production lends some credibility to this assumption. Table II presents an estimated time pattern In which the missiles could be produced to satisfyThese producUon estimates have been derived from US data by assuming that: (a) the Soviet missiles would be produced In plants roughly equivalent ln size to the plants producing thc US counterparts; (b) thoy would bo produced at rates compatible with these plant sites; and (c) the USSR wouldcapacity operation, Le, multiple shifts. Ii one shift operation were used the time pattern would naturally be substantially changed and extended. No attempt was made to adjust the US data for differences in US and Soviet production techniques because the size of such factors are unknown and because most of Uie US data arc based, not on actual producUon experience, but on producUon plans.
III. SOVIET CAPABILITIES TO SUPPORT THE ASSUMED PRODUCTION PROGRAM
vailable Industrialurvey Of available intelligence of Soviet Industrial facilities available to fulfill missilerevealed no Likely restrictions on Uie assumed program, except in precisionand electronics (see Some capacity ln the airframe industry (now devoted to consumer goods and other items) could be used In tho missilo program. Moreover, since missile framo producUon Is not restricted to airframe facilities, theplants of Uie Ministries of Defense Industry or Automotive, Tractor, andMachine Building probably could readily be used; particularly for Uie smaller missiles. Similarly, It Is estimated that3 Soviet Jet engine factories operated at onlyercent capacity producing0ype turbojet engines. No In-formaUon Is available on the production of liquid rocket engines, but liquid rocketare not peculiar to any one type of Launching and handling equipment and packaging are not specialized, and would represent no foreseeable producUon problem to the USSR.
Labor and Material Input Requirements. The input requirements necessary to meet Uie assumed producUon schedules werewhere possible, on the basis of Input data for Uie counterpart US missiles. Where such data was not available, as for certain assumed Soviet surface-to-surface missiles,were determined by scaling theInputs by the ratio of the weight of Uie estimated Soviet niisslle component to Uiat of Uie respective Corporal component. Similarly, Nike was scaled by weight for Uio Soviet SAGM.
If the USSR followed Uie assumedschedule, Uie program at capacity scale of efiort would require0 people by tho third year. The peak requirementould be reached Ln aboutears. This peak labor requirement would0 technical workersanagerial personnel. In Uie light of the growth of pop-idatlon, skilled labor, and engineering and technical manpower In the Sovietanpower limitations seem unlikely to place any generalon Uie assumed program. Someproblems, however, might develop.
slmUar determination of basicpoints up their smallness,possibly for liquid oxidizer. Materialsbulk problem dearly would not be amajor concern. Our examination ofaspects of the materialsthat for the most partfor missiles are available to
IV. AGGREGATE ECONOMICAND CAPABILITIES
to this point our calculationsbased on assumed Sovietmissiles themselves. How ever, thesystem requirements must be addedmissile needs or Soviet capabilitiesseriously overestimated. In view ofof an over-all missile systemgreat variety of Individual elements Inthis problem was approachedmoney terms. (Wemoney calculations arc on Imprecise
IJ A
UC
of Assessing Soviet production costs and capabilities, but It doeseneral order of magnitude.)
ur calculation of system costs Is It Includes such requirements as: (a) special equipment, construction, andmodifications; (b) the Initial wartime stockpile missiles; and (c) training missiles, missile and special equlpmont spares, and drone aircraft modifications. We huvethat certain other requirements are not properly chargeable to the missileor. more accurately, are part of other programs and can therefore be eliminated from our calculations. These Include theand handling costs for the warhead, organizational equipment, and "Inherited" items such as ships, submarines, andsupport and drone aircraft. Nor hava we Included such "common use" Items as the early warning network and alrbasca. Theand superior command structure, and thc cost of providing and maintaining troop housing, subsistence, etc, are also
hc entire program4nder our assumption, would require cumulative outlays of1 rubles,'* or somewhat underillion rubles
-In theof Intelligence, wc have been compelled to calculate Soviet missile coats lo tonus of the dollar costs of US counterparts with appropriate nud Id cations, which were thento rub'es byuble-dollar ratio. We recognise that Uie OS dollar costs used are themselves baaed on DS estimates of planned producUon costs which might themselvesubstanUal margin of error. TbeOf the system costs were similarly derived on Uie assumption Uiat the Sovieis could not cut any considerable "comers" without relaxingcharacteristics. An examination of the economic sector origin of Uie bulk of Uie missile components revealed Uial: (al lheconcerned are those In which the ruble-dollar ratios approximate thai which describes the over-all relaUonshlp between Soviet and US prices; and (b) the pattern of coals In theof these sectors seems to be about lha same as In Uie US. Por these reasons It was possible la select the naUonal ruble-dollarublea to the dollar) and apply It generally withouterious misstatement ofcosts.
a year and an annual carrying cost thereafter of aboutillionear (see Table Ul). The initial rapid buildup reflects the
USSR's estimated present capability toupon certain programs, particularly In the shorter range surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles.
he estimated Incremental costs of our hypothetical missile program were from four cost categories. Time patterns for research and development costs were developed for each system category and phased ln prior to the year it was estimated this activity would have been completed. The coifs of missUes produced was then calculated on thc basis of multiple shift operations. Costs of each category of missiles andspares were calculated, givingto the cost reduction effects of applicable labor progress (learning) curves it was assumed lhat trained operating units were the goal of the program. As soon, therefore, as sudlclcnt missiles became available from production, an operating unit was scheduled for activation and provided with itsof slcekpile missiles and Initial missile spares and supplied thereafter with training missiles and maintenance spares.
This activation schedule became the basis for phasing the initial system costsime pattern. It was assumed lhat lhecostsiven unit would be Incurred during the year prior to the unit's receipt of its complement of missiles and spares. To obtain the system operating costs, theactivation schedule was used as tho basisnit operation schedule for each missile category.
Soviet Capabilities to Meet AboveIn value terms the above program wouldubstantial but not Impossible burden upon the Soviet economy. It wouldotal burden near two percent of estimated GNP4hoexpenditures necessary prior4 would consist primarily of research andoutlays and. If charged to the defense budget, would equal only about two percent12 and four percent3 estimated defense expendllurea. As-
T-
TABLE ID
TOTAL COSTS OF IUX'STHATIVK PROORAM (UUQOD1 Rublei)
Year
Development, tnd r< iilnf
and MUOte Spares
System Cost
OpeiaUns; Cost
System Costs
i
000
.
i
docs not necessarily add, due to rounding.
missile outlays beginning4 would be considerably greater. In the three yearhey would equal aboutercent o( estimated dofense outlays.3 Soviet defense expenditures1 rubles) are estimated to have Includedillion rubles for aircraft procurement.illion rubles for armored vehicles,illion rubles for navalissileof the assumed magnitude would on the basis of total cost by no means be impossible However, the impactrogram of this magnitude would be considerable; either other military outlays or consumption would have to be reduced, or the rate of Investment, and correspondingly the rate of economic growth, would bo retarded.
lectronic Equipment and Precision Mechanism Costs. One Important aspect of any missile program cost not revealed In thc above over-all analysis Is its substantialupon the electronic and precisionindustries. In all phases of thethe requirements from these industries were heavy, and they accounted for aboutercent of the total cost of the program.rocedure parallel to that used for deriving total costs, we have estimated the value of electronic equipment and precision mechanisms involved In our Illustrativemissile program (see Tableheagainst these two interrelatedof the program could not readily beand we have no estimate- of Soviet production capabilities ln the precisionfield. However, some notion of the magnitude of such demands on the Soviet electronics Industry can be gainedirst approximation, that the entire requirement ts for electronic equipment On this basis, the requirement would amount to aboutercent of USSK electronics output for thc entire period of therercent of the combined USSR and European Satellite producUon for the same period. During Uiebout two-thirds of total estimated USSRproduction would be required, or about half of the combined producUon of the USSR and the Satellites (surface-to-air missiles ac-
IV
ELECTRONIC AND PRECISION MECHANISM COSTS OF THE nj-USTHATrVB PROORAM (MiUlons of 1MI Rubles)
Year
Dorelopment, and Testing
anil Ml Mile Spams
System Cost
Operating
Coat
System Costs
j
.
00
..
Total does not necessarily add, due lo roundine.
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1 and then fallingor the remainder of the period. In addition, the qualitative differences between ordinaryequipment and equipment oftolerancesuided missile program might retard the rate at which expansion could occur below the rate applicable to the electronic equipment Industry In general. The problem Is essentially one of dealing with super tolerances. The relaxation of CEPpermitted by use of nuclearwill mitigate this problem In some cases, but will not eliminate It
osttble Associated Costs. While we have confined our analysis to Incremental costs (see, any program like that assumed might Involve additional costs. For example, while In general the assumed missile program could be accommodated In. existing capacity by displacing lower order utilization of this capacity, It cannot be assumed that all the tooling.nd fixtures would be on hand. It Is difficult to esUmate how muchouUay would be required for this purpose, but not all of theould necessarily be availableowever, In relation to Uie probable total planned Soviet Investment in any given year the Investment required seems negligible
c have also excluded maintenance costs for thc basic unils, vessels, and planes using missiles and their Intermediate (tactical) and superior command structure. Includinghousing, maintenance, pay, subsistence, and allowances. In addition, tho program willonsiderable number ofhighly trained specialists to service, test.
maintain, repair, and operate Uie various systems. We estimate Unit in brood terms Uio assumed program might requireuch specialists. Moreover, Uie bulk of this requirement would arise early in Uie program. The requirements45 came toen, which could aggravate Uie possible qualitative manpower problems noted Inbove
Drone aircraft costs have been excluded on Uie assumption that obsolete planes would bo used for targets. Only the modification costs to convert aircraft to drones wereHowever, Uie requirements for drone aircraft rise steadily under Uie assumedfrom4nd5 and each year thereafter.
Tho fuel cost of primary Importance seems to be thc oxidizer. We have no estimate of Uie oxidizer the Soviets are likely to use Moreover, each oxidizer seems to have unique economic problems associated with It Thus, wc cannot provide an esUmate ofosts or their import, but wo believe Uiat tbeproblem may prove another botUeneck in any Soviet missile program.
Considerable motor transport willbe required as organic equipment to most units. In addition somo units will require mobility. Conservative requirements for Uie assumed program might be on Uio order of0 standard trucks, and an equal amount of special trucks and trailers. These requirements are roughly equivalent to Uie organic motor transport ofround divisions.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ERRATA
NLE SOVIET CAPABILITIES AND PROTlABLE PROGRAMS IN TBB GUIDED MISSILE FIELD
I. In the tabic on "Estinated Soviet CoppoiLitles to Develop Guided, tbe paragraphn the first coluian should all be changed as follows;
a.
N
S>. Id the oarxe table on pogoa the colunn on "Woeoer-fall type"5 pounds" vhlch io given os the grocs velght.
Infn, the paragraph references ln the first column should (Ol be changed aa follows!
h.
c.
d.
56
58
2 38
a. forubatitute
32
f.
8*
h. 1.
09
Original document.
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