Created: 8/31/1954

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To estimate probable developments'in North Africa.1


chief problem in North Africa is the growing state of tension created by the unresolved conflict between France and the rapidly growing nationalistln French possessions, especially in Tunisia and Morocco. While nationalism has nowhere yet developed the strength toerious threat to over-all French control, an increasing number of North African nationalists have adopted extremist tactics as the path to

The nature of ties between France and its North African possessions and France's determination to maintain these ties make extremely difficult anybetween French interests and nationalist desires for completeAt the same time, the Frenchthe necessity ior further reforms, and over the next few years will probablyegree of internal autonomy, first in Tunisia and later in the short term, the French will not make concessions which will endanger their strategic control of the area or de-

'Th* term Northed In thli paper, recant French North Africa. Spinlsh Morocco.his eiUsiate supersedesProbaole DerelaornenU in Northeptember

stroy the privileged economic position of the settlers of French descent {colons).

Despite any short-termbetween the French and tlie Tunisian and Moroccan nationalists, we consider it almost certain that opposition toFrench controls will continue to grow at an increasing rate, although temporary periods of quiescence will occur. Limited and gradual French reform programs are unlikely to reduce tension more thanor to keep pace with increasing nationalist demands. Extremists areto gain effective control over theof politically active Tunisians and Moroccans within the next few years,in the unlikely event that moderate nationalists are able throughto make progress clearly leadingultimate independence for the two protectorates.

As the strength of the nationaliststhey will, in the absence ofFrench concessions, almostresort to violence. They will intensify their terrorist guerrilla-type activities, and might eventuallyarge-scale uprising. They would anticipateampaign of violence would arouse favorable world opinion and result in po-


intervention, probably through the UN. However, so long as French military capabilities are not seriously reduced, we believe that the nationalists, because of their insufficient organization and their military weakness, will not be able to oust the French by force.

Nevertheless, increasing nativewill probablywithin the next(possibly even within the next three to fiveerious drain on French resources, strain theof the French to maintain theirposition, and impede use of the areaase by France and by the US. Ln the long run France will probably either have to grant independence voluntarily or resort to increasingly costly militaryIn the latter case France may eventually be presented with problemsshort of complete withdrawal from Tunisia and Morocco.

Increasing nationalist resistance to French control in North Africa mighterious threat to the security of US bases in the area, particularly if the nationalist movements shoulda common front with theAs long as nationalist leadersto hope for US support they will try to restrain their followers from attacks on the bases. However, some extremists may not obey their leaders, and, as the situation deteriorates, sporadicand raids against the bases will become increasingly likely.

The growth of organized nationalist activity in Algeria will probably lagthat in adjacent areas. Theof many Algerian nationalists are likely to remain moderate in the next few years, with emphasis on removal of dis-crimiDation and on greater Moslemin government. However,of the large French population and the fact that Algeria is technically part of metropolitan France, the Frenchcertainly will not grant anydegree of autonomy. French concessions are therefore unlikely to be sufficient to prevent the further growth of the nationalist movement.

We believe that the Communists are unlikely to capture control of themovements. However, once the main body of nationalists has come to accept the strategy of violent action, thepartiesnow small, weak, and with little influenceare almost certain to coordinate activities with theand may come to be accepted as allies.

The efforts of both sides to secure US support confront the US itself with major policy decisions and the prospecterious strain on its relations with many nations in the Free World. If the USto favor the North Africanit would probably succeed innationalist-Communistand in assuring the physical security of its present North African basesonger time. By doing so, however, the US would invite serious complications in its relations with France and in itsof these bases. On the other hand, if the US strongly supported its NATO partner, it would almost certainly loseamong the Near and Far Eastern states, as well as be subjected toat the Moroccan bases. Sharpbetween the Arab states and the Western Powers over North Africa would almost certainly lessen the possibility of Arab cooperation with the West in Middle East defense.

ibya will probably remain oriented toward the West, but its economicpolitical immaturity, and unresolved Tripobtanian-Cyrenaican differencesproblems which may threaten itsstability. Such increased internal instability might impede, but almostwould not preclude, use of Libyan bases by tbe US and the UK.




Africa Ls of major strategicchiefly because of Its geographicand its extensive military baseAfricaase tor:he Western Mediterranean and Itsapproaches; (b) invasion operationsthe Mediterranean basin; and (cjagainst Europe, theand the Middle East.

Military. French North Africa, with its population of wellsto France in particular as: (a) aof military manpower; (b) the site of major bases and training areas; andlace to which the French and others could retreat, If necessary, in event of war. Spain utilizes Spanish Moroccoource of native troops andraining area.

According to French standards fortroops, therehysically fit natives of military age tn French North Africa. There are at present0 North African natives in the French Army (approximatelyercent of total Frenchf these,0 are ln North Africa and0 are Ln Indochina. Important French naval bases exist atMers-el-Keblr, Bizerte, and at Algiers, which Is the headquarters of the NATO West-em Mediterranean Command. Morocco is the chief basic training area for the French air force. The US has completed three of the four Moroccan strategic air bases provided for In1 agreement with the French. It also has expanded the naval air base at Port Lyauley, which is operated jointly with

'See appenfllx for population figures.

the French. For at least.theears the strategic Importance of theseair bases probably will not decrease, even though similar base facilities in Spain arefor US use.

Libya's location in the Easternregion gives it considerable military importance. The US and the UK eacha large air base there. Libya also servesritish garrison area, the importance of which has increasedesult of the Suez settlement.

Political. North Africa is politicallybecause it is the scenerowing conflict between native nationalists and the French. The French believe that their power position depends largely on their ability to retain North Africa. French efforts to retain their position, however, will vitally affectreactions toward the West and will have major repercussions upon US-FrenchThey will also Influence Westernwith the Arab -Asian countries, since colonialism in North Africaource of great concern to these governments.

Economic. The predominantlyeconomies of North Africa are relatively poor and underdeveloped, and the area'sdeveloped thus far are not of major economic Importance except to France. The chief mineralsphosphates, iron ore.lead, and zincconstitute asmall portion of Free World supplies but are of importance to France. Aboutercent of French imports (mainly wines, cereals, vegetables, vegetable oils, andcome from North Africa, while aboutercent of French exports go to that area. France provides aboutercent of North Africa's Imports and receives aboutercent

i F. X

its exports. On the other hand. French North Africa's postwar budgetary and trade deficits haveurden on France. The French have developed excellentood transport network.


SPANISH NORTHhe French Position in North Africa. the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco are nominally sovereign states under their own native rulers, the Bey and the Sultan. In practice France controls and administers each country. Algeria isas an integral part of France. French security control of the three regions ls main-tamedarrison ofroops1endarmerie. At the same time, French ability to control Tunisia and Morocco through pro-French native elements is likely to become weakened: (a)esult ofactivities, native officials are likely to attend to their duties with mcreasing fear and reluctance; (b) French-supportedreligious confraternities are likely to lose their fervor and influence as modernism spreads; (c) outlying Berber tribes will be drawn increasingly into the mainstream of nationalist action as more and more of their members migrate to thehe French Government and theesidents in North Africa of French descent (colons) dominate the administration and the economy ln all three areas; most technical and supervisory positions are held by the French.arge majority of these colons strongly oppose concessions to local nationalists, advocate severe repression of nationalism, and haverowingto undertake vigilante retaliation against terrorism. They have considerable influence on the French Residencies in Tunisia and Morocco and on Paris because of their French citizenship and political and financial connections in the metropole. This group thusajor Impediment to the formation and implementationiberal French policy for North Africa.

includes two Infantry divisions now beingfrom France.

he Rise of Nationalism in French North Apnea. The most serious problem in North Africa is the growing state of tension created by the postwar growth of nationalistespecially in Tunisia and Morocco. In Algeria nationalist sentiment Is less intense. Among the Arab and Berber population,the small educated classes, there hasteady Increase ln politicaland sense of national identity, largelyesult of the continuing Impact of Western political, social, and economic concepts and institutions, and the concomitant weakening of belief in the traditions and socialot Islam. The nationalists in general look toward ultimate Independence, but they are split into moderate and extremist factions which vary In their immediate demands Moreover, the nationalist movement inis still internally divided and in some areas of Tunisia and Morocco it has been deprived of effective leadership through However, the nationalist parties Ln the protectorates areonsiderable degree of organization, especially ln Tunisia. Because of French suppression of nationalist activities, the leading parties have been forced to operatelandestinelthough nationalism has nowhere yet developed the strength toerious threat to over-all French control, the inability of moderate nationalists In either Tunisia or Morocco to secure substantial concessions from the French has led to the growth of extremism and to terrorist activities which the French have been unable to repress. The naUon&Lists have been encouraged to press their demands more actively by developments in Iran and Egypt, and by the externaland support they have received. In particular, Arab-Asian efforts to secureN hearing have servedajor stimulus to their cause. Furthermore, France'sand lass of prestige in Indochina haverowing number of nationalists to regard extremist tactics as the path to independence. And, while some nationalist leaders may believe that the outcome indemonstrated the dangers of beingup while collaborating with themany of their followers probably

believe that events In Indochina demonstrated the effectiveness of Communisterrorist Activities. Organized terrorist campaigns have developed during the past two years in Tunisia and sincen Morocco. The rise of terrorism has largely been due to: (a) the inability of moderate nationalist leaders to win concessions from the French; (b) the reaction in Morocco to the Sultan's deposition; (cj French arrest of the recognized nationalist leaders, leaving the field clear for more extremist elements; (d) repressive actions which drove the nationalist parties underground; and (e) the utility of violent tacticseans of attractingattention. There have beenindications that moderate leaders who have rejected violence as their majorof political action are losing control over extreme nationalists. Terrorist operations in both protectoratesonsiderableof general guidance and coordination on ategional level, but specific actions and tactics do not appear to be coordinated and some actions probably are spontaneous in character.

1 An Arabic term for bandits and outlaws.

In Tunisia, the terrorist activities ofnationalists in the cities have been supplemented with raids by organized bands. These fellagah' bands, probably totalingen. are directed by leaders who show evidence of considerable skill andApparently Libya and the Arab League are playinginor role at present in supplying and training these terrorists. The fellagah haveeasure ofout of proportion to their numbersthey represent the first nationalistto create organized armed forces to combat French control of North Africa.

In Morocco, the terrorists initiallypro-French natives, and turned against French nationals only as theirexpanded. Similarly, terroristat first were concentrated mainly in the cities, but they spread to rural areas last spring with the burning of crops and No hostility toward the terrorists on the part of the native population has thus far been evident.

Nationalists in both Tunisia and Morocco have also succeededonsiderable extent in enforcing boycotts against European or modem goods, dress, and methods of farming. This development is In sharp contradiction to the Westem-orlented program generallyby dominant nationalist groups In North Africa. II Is possible that theofovement could lead tofanaticism and indiscriminate hatred of the West, further exacerbating the problem of North African nationalism.

Tunisia. The native society In Tunisia is politically and culturally the most advanced in North Africa and has been allowed, since World War II. some participation inby the French. The principal Tunisian nationalist party, the Neo-Destour, has long had substantial support in rural as well as urban areas, and appears toarge measure ot control over nationalist activities. The Beyess influential factor in the nationalist problem than the Sultan of Morocco. Thus the nationalist problem In Tunisia, although as acute as that inis less complex and lends itself more readily to negotiation.

Th* Mendes-France government isfirst with Tunisia. The program offered Tunisia Is based upon: (a) the grant ofautonomy, to be implementedeterminate period; (b) insistence on the maintenance of Prance's control over foreign affairs, defense, and for some time, finance; and (c) guarantees to protect the position of theew Tunisian Government,several Neo-Destour ministers, formedesult of the offering of this program, is to negotiate Its Implementation with the French.

French Morocco. French ciifficuitles inapprochement with thehave been greatly increased by thestorm of controversy over France's deposition of the popular,n the summeris pliable relative, the present Sultan, has

jut rFfn,j

been accepted by most Moroccans.the reforms imposed on Morocco by the French after the Sultan's deposition have been discredited, and there hasurtherin mutual mistrust between the French and the nationalists. On the other hand, the cotonj and the Berber chieftain, the Pasha of Marrakech, are demanding that France stand firm with the present Sultan and refuseto the nationalists. Much more numerous than their compatriots in Tunisia, the colons in Morocco also have moreeconomic interests andarger role In French political and economic control of the area. The Pasha cannot claim theof most Berbers, who constitute about half the population. Many ot them appear to have been attracted to the predominantly Arab nationalist cause. The Pasha hascollaborated with the French and has aided them to marshal considerable numbers of his tribesmen for "spontaeoustoemblance of native support to French policies.

Support for the Istiqlal, the leadingnationalist party, until recentlyof an educated middle-class minority,opular base largely in urban laboring groups The Istiqlal is now gaining support in the countryside In general, however, the illiterate rural bulk of the population, while it has been aroused byramatic event as the Sultan's deposition, is not easily brought into organized opposition.

Algeria. In contrast to the situation in the protectorates. Algeria has been relatively tranquil since the large-scale uprisingnd there is no Indication of impendingLongest under French control, Algeria has the largest population of French descent. The indigenous population is permitted French citizenship, though participation in government is severely limited by variouswhich insure the political predominance of the French residents. The nationalist movement is still largely factlonalized: anfaction favors violent action to achieve independence,oderate group appears to favor gradual evolution within the French Union.hird group, composed of ulema

(students of Moslem law and traditions) butather modern outlook, has beenactive in trying to unifyunder its leadership and may well have growing success. The Algerian nationalists on occasion cooperate with the Communists on tactical issues, but the latter's frequentto bringloser relationship have consistently failed.

Spanish Morocco and Tangier, Close Spanish controls androops maintain order in Spanish Morocco. The nationalist Islah Party has developed some strength but lacks widely based supportoor region which has had little exposure to Western ideas and technology. As part of Its policy of wooing the Arab States andFrance. Spain has made gestures favorable to native nationalism, but has not materially relaxed its control. While Spain may soon introduce reforms which give titular administrative positions to nationalist leaders, there Is no indication that it intends to grant any significant degree of self-government. However, it probably will continue its attempts to embarrass the French through anlenient attitude toward the natives in Spanish Morocco.

Spain's demands for restoration of lisrole in the administration of theZone of Tangier have been largelyby the other participating powers.Tangier is likely to remain an arena for French and Spanish disagreements. France would like to see stronger measures taken against nationalist activities In Tangier, but Spain will probably seek to use the Zoneafe haven for non-violent, anti-French,operations.

Cooperation between the iNationalistPrior4 the nationalistin French North Africa made only limited efforts to coordinate their activities, largely confining themselves to sympathy strikes and "days of mourning" designed to show Moslem solidarity. However, under the sponsorship of the Arabewfor the Liberation of North Africa was founded in Cairo early4 to supplant an

earlier organization which had been seriously weakened by personal rivalries and disregard of Its directives. Political and personaland conflicts between moderate and extremist elements are likely to continue, but the long-term likelihood of increasing French repression and the need for coordinated action in the UN probably will produce greateramong the nationalist movements.

Communist Influence. The Communist parties of Algeria, French Morocco, andmaintain close liaison with, and areand partially financed by the French Communist Party. The Communist aim6 has been the formationnited front with the nationalists, but to date the small North African Communist partiesembers in Algerian each of the protectorates) have had only limitedon the nationalist movements. With the exceptionimited temporary alliance in Algeria, the knownleaders have consistently refused toany political working relationship, largely because: (a) they realized that such ties would alienate many sympathizers Inareas: (b) the local Communist parties are known to be subject to control byand (c) nationalist financial support comes chiefly from the anti-Communist native upper middle class.

There Is no reliable evidence so far that the North African Communist parties have organized or joined In terrorist activites. The Communists apparently desire to lead anationalist movement rather than "adventurist" factions. They are alsoanxious to avoid arousing antagonism In France by supporting terrorism inime when they are advancing the united front theme emphasizing Uie benefllts of negotiations with the USSR, and the USSR is attempting to separate France from the Western Alliance. There is extensivebetween the French Communists and the North African workers resident In France who are affiliated with the extremist faction In Algeria. This cooperation probably results in the conversion of many Algerian workers to Communism, but so far it does not appear to have facilitated closer relations between the nationalists and Communists in Algeria Itself.

Direct Soviet activity in North Africalimited, and the USSR has never claimed Its seat In the Committee of Control at Tangier. However, although RadioIs still giving little attention to North Africa, greater Communist interest In the area is indicated by the recent inaugurationew quasi-clandestine radio station which transmits in Arable to North Africa viaThis station has given more attention and support to nationalist movements than has the official Soviet radio.

Economic Problems. Large-scaledevelopment In North Africa is limited by the shortage of fuel resources andcapital, by low native purchasing power, and by the low productivity and lack of skill among workers. The growth of secondaryhas been seriously hampered by high production costs and the competition ofproducts on both local anduarter of the arable land is under relatively efficient Europeanbut native agriculture generally is less than half as productive as European. The population of North Africa Is Increasing more rapidly than the Indigenous food supply. If the present rate of food production Is notincreased. French North Africa will be facederious reduction in already low levels of consumption.

French have substantialNorth Africa which represent anof Incomeew French banksand for the colons. The bulkinvestment in North Africa,France or from local sources. IsFrench, and only small amountscapital other than French arearea. Both political and economicfor more rapid development areTherefore, the French havelarger amounts of publicfunds In the post war period. Thogovernment development planlarge-scale public works projectsfollowedrojectstill inoward native agricul-

ture and social improvements. The newestimated to6 billion, represents almostercent of the public investment program of Prance and its overseasThe benefit* of past programs have largely gone to the colons; the lot of most North Africans has not improved materially during the past six years. The new emphasis of the proposed second French plan probably has come too late to enlist the sympathy and cooperation of the native population, whose discontent sterns less from poverty than from the economic and social Inequalities between the natives and the colons.

insecurity and thein Industrial and commercialresultedecline In privatein Tunisia and Morocco. Pubb'cwill have to Increase considerablyare to make up for decreased privateand to avert the consequencespopulation pressures.interest in developingase for French powerstimulate further Increasedpublic funds. But such an increaseon the outcome of forthcomingbetween the French and theand probably would not survive aof extremist actions.


Pressures. Externalisajor and growing partdevelopment of the nationalistNorth Africa. The chief source ofhas been the Arab-Asiannot only sympathize with nationalmovements, but ln the case ofstates have ties of cultural, racial,kinship as well The Arabstates will almost certainlyfurther their efforts to obtainaction on the Tunisian andWhile the small resources of thewill limit their capabilities forthey will probably helpprovide increasing financial aid,in smuggling arms. Over tbe long run.

the USSR may apply greater pressure in the area through Bloc action in the UN andsupport to nationalist activity. The US has not supported North Africanin the UN, but both the nationalists and the Moslem countries will increase their efforts to secure some form of US action which can be construed as support for the nationalists.

It will probably become Increasinglyparticularly if North African disorders continue, for the UN to withstand Arab-Asian pressures for concrete UN recommendations on the protectorates. France probably will not retreat from its basic position that TJN consideration of the Tunisian and Moroccan problems is an unwarranted interference in French domestic affairs. France -probably will ignore or reject any UN recommendations relating to the protectorates, though it will attempt to forestall such recommendations through real or ostensible reforms on its own.

French Policy. The proximity of North Africa to France, the large and well-entrenched population of French descent, and the extensive French investments in the area havenique relationship between metropole and colonial areas and makeof theseajor objective of France. Moreover, the contraction of the French position Ln Indochina and theviolence In Tunisia and Morocco aver the past year have focused French attention on the importance of holding North Africa. The "Eurafrique" concept of France'spower position, according to which the resources of France must be concentrated on strengthening its Europe-Africa power complex as the means of matching aGermany and ofespected voice in the policies of the Western alliance, hasixed element of France's foreign policy. The collapse of French power in the Far East has increased support for thisin all French political parties except the Communist. The unique ties between France and North Africa and France's determination to maintain these ties make extremelyany reconciliation between Frenchand nationalist desires for complete independence.

the same time French governments have recognized the necessity for lurther political reforms Ln North Africa; French policy for the past two years has been based officially on previous pledges to extendautonomy" gradually to theIn practice, this policy has combined suppression of nationalist activities withreform programs Imposed on theThese reform programs have been particularly unacceptable to the nationalists because they provided for participation 'of the colons in the newly created Tunisian andelective bodies under the principle ofhe present Frenchhas shown unusual initiative into satisfy moderate nationalist aspirations. However, it is unlikely that this policy will be continued indefinitely, andFrench governments will probablyto act belatedly In response to external pressures rather than try to reduce the threat of local nationalism by lore-handed reforms.

French policies will vary in Tunisia.and Algeria because of the differing French ties with these areas and theirstages of political development. The program which Mendes-France has proposed for Tunisiaubstantial degree of internal autonomy, and he probably would accept such nationalist proposals as; creationingle, elected all-Tunisian Assembly; the end of certain direct political controls; and "Tunisiftcation" of the civil service.rogram arouses intense opposition not only among the colons, but among many of the Independent-Peasants and Radicals and some of the ex-Gaulllsts in the French Assembly. However. Mendes-France, if he stays In office, is likely toompromise settlement which will attract broad Assembly support and remove the more immediate causes of nationalist violence, while holding out the prospect of further negotiations ondemands.ompromise probably will bring about atemporary respite from nationalist disorders.

France probably will alsi propose new reforms for Morocco in the near future, Lhoughore modest scale. There are Indications that Mendes-France intends such action prior to the scheduled autumn session of the UN General Assembly. We believe that the French will Gist have to remove the present unpopular Sultan becauseultan satisfactory to the majority of Moroccans is essentialrogram of reforms can be negotiated. However, the need to uphold remaining French prestige probably precludes the return of the former Sultan. The enthronement of one of his sons may be the only feasible alternative, provided that the Moroccan populace is convinced that the ex-Sultan favors such action.some of the discredited reforms imposed on Morocco after the last Sultan's deposition will have to be repealed or revised. If these conditions are fulfilled, and if the French have demonstrated good will In the Tunisianwe believe that atemporary halt in nationalist violence will also be secured in Morocco.

Over the next few years Franceegree of internal autonomy, first Ln Tunisia and later In Morocco. However, we believe that future French governments will insistinimum on retaining certan key controls over the protectorates,Ln the fields of foreign affairs andand to some extent public finance and justice Control of defense forces would also give theegal basis for acting In the field of internal security. In addition, France probably will insist on protecting the legal rights and economic interests of the colons through special agreements. Francehopes that In the very long term Tunisia and Morocco could be persuaded to become Associated States in the French Union, or some variant of that status. The French do not contemplate granting autonomy tobut rather completing the integration of Algeria into the metropole. Finally,the extent of French concessions, France probably will not hesitate to use force toany further nationalist outbreaks.

Probable Further Growth of Nationalism in Tunisia and Morocco. Despite any short term accommodation between the French and the nationalists in Tunisia and Morocco, we consider it almost certain that nationalist opposition to French control will continue to

grow at an increasing rate, although periods of quiescence will occur. As the French allow greater native participation in localboth nationalist desires andfor self-government will almost certainly increase. Limited and gradual French reform programs are unlikely to reduce tension more than temporarily or to keep pace withnationalist demands.

Moreover, the very success of their recent terrorist tactics willonstantto the nationalists to revert to violence in order to gain their objectives. Resort to terrorism is likely to increase if moderate nationalist leaders are unable throughto make progress clearly leading toward ultimate independence for Tunisia and Morocco.

If the French should soon grant(which we consider highlyhe nationalists would in return almost certainly accept close military and economic ties with France, although they would not join the French Union as presently constituted.unlessettlement were made within the next several years, the nationalists would accept such ties only with greatand would probably repudiate them as soon as feasible. If the deterioration in French and nationalist relations continues, even the nationalist leaders who have been relatively moderate probably will in timeto seek complete independence byand gradual means. They wouldjoin the extremists in further periodic sabotage and terrorism calculated to attract international attention and put pressure on the French. French countermeasures might temporarily put down aggressive nationalist activity but would probably lead to itsresumption In even more violent form.

As the strength of the nationaliststhey will. In the absence of adequate French concessions, almost certainly resort to violence They will intensify their terrorist guerrilla-type activities, andarge-scale uprising. They would anticipateampaign of violence would arouse favorable world opinion and result In political intervention, probably through the UN. However, so long as French military capabilities are not seriously reduced, we believe that the nationalists, because of their Insufficient organization and theirweakness, will not be able to oust the French by force.

robable Growth of Nationalism tnThe growth of organized nationalist activity In Algeria will probably lag behind that In adjacent areas. The objectives of many Algerian nationalists are ukely tomoderate in the nest few years, with emphasis on removal of discrimination and on greater Moslem participation InHowever, ties with France are so close that the French almost certainly will not grant any considerable degree of autonomy. French concessions are therefore unlikely to be sufficient lo prevent the further growth of the nationalist movement. The conflictthe French and the nationalists inmay In the long run prove most difficult to resolve, particularly If Tunisiaonsiderable degree of

Communism ond Nationalism Thewill probably continue their efforts to exploit nationalist desires forby attempting to capture the nationalist movements, but we believe they will beto succeed. Whilecollaboration may Increase, particularly If France adopts repressive policies andgain control of nationalist parlies, such collaboration on the part of thegroups will probably be undertaken to further their own aims and not because of any basic sympathy for Communismonce the main body of nationalists has come to accept the strategy of violent action, the Communist partiessmall, weak, and with Utileare almost certain to coordinate activities with the nationalists, and may come to be accepted as allies. In that event. Communist sabotage capabilities would be Increased and opposition to theof Western troops and bases In the area would be strengthened.

Effect on French ond US Positions. In the light of the above factors we believe

that the outlook remains one of growingin North. by sporadic crises and disturbances created by the Browing nationalist opposition to French control. While we believe that thecannot oust the French by force alone, increasing native resistance in Tunisia and Morocco will probablywithin theerious drain on Frenchand manpower resources and strain the determination of the French to maintain their dominant position. This ln turn will impede use of the areaase by France and by the US. Moreover, the reliability of French North African troops might decrease under the stimulus of nationalism, reducing the value of this major military asset. In the long run France will probably either have to grant independence voluntarily or else resort to Increasingly costly military repression. In the latter case the time may comeombination of nationalist insurrections and external pressures will present France with problems Insoluble short of complete

Increasing nationalist resistance to French control in North Africa mighta serious threat to the security of US bases ln the area, particularly If themovements shouldommon front with the Communists. As long asleaders continue to hope for USthey will try to restrain their followers from attacks on the bases. However, some extremists may not obey their leaders, and, as the situation deteriorates, sporadicand raids against the bases willincreasingly likely.

If France were involved in war, thewould probably take maximumof the situation. Tunisian andnationalists would demand aof complete independence from France. If they should fail in their demands, they would probably resort to violence andsabotage of North Africa's highlycommunications, though they would probablyeneral revolt onlyast resort.

nternational Implications of NorthDevelopments. The growing conflictthe French and the nationalists in North Africa will also have importantrepercussions. Differences over North African Issues are likely toource ot increasingly serious friction among tbe non-Communist countries. We believe that North African developments willtrong influence on Arab and Asian attitudes toward the West both in the cold war and in event of global conflict. Many Latincountries are also anti-colonial tn outlook and might support the North African

5fi. Differences between the non-Communist powersesult of North Africanwill comeocus in the UN.Arab-Asian efforts to secure UNon North African questions might leadplit In the Western-oriented UN majority which could be exploited on this and other Issues by the Soviet Bloc.

he efforts of both sides to secure USconfront the US itself with major policy decisions and the prospectenous strain on its relations with many nations in the Free World. If the US appeared to favor the North African nationalists, it would probably succeed in deterring nationalist-Communist collaboration and in assuring the physical security of Its present North African basesonger tune. By doing so, however, the US would invite serious compucations In itswith France and In its utilization of these bases. On the other hand, If the US strongly supported its NATO partner, it would almost certainly lose influence among the Near and Far Eastern states, as well as beto interference at the Moroccan bases. Sharp differences between the Arab states and the Western Powers over North Africa would almost certainly lessen the possibility of Arab cooperation with the West in Middle EastThe US might also prejudice itsfor subsequent influence In any North African state which might ultimately receive Its independence.


Prospects for Internal Stability. Libya, independent sinceas thus far been unable to establish firm foundations for political and economic stability. Theand economic underdevelopment of the country, the unresolved TripoLtanlan-CyT-enaican differences, the weakness of theand the bureaucracy, and the limited support for the ruling dynasty, all make for an unstable future. Most important of these factors is the continued cleavage between the Cyrenaicans, who presently dominate thegovernment, and the more advanced and numerous Tripolitanians. who constitute two-thirds of the population. However, thehave not united totrong opposition party, and they are not able to challenge the present regime.

Despite his failure thus far to resolvedifferences and unite his kingdom. King Idris is the strongest political force in Libya. The incapacity of the Libyanthe pobUcal indifference of the people, and the recent resignation of able PrimeMuntasser have all strengthened the King's hand. The transformation of the Libyan Governmentonstitutional to an absolute monarchy will probably continue over the next few years! provided King Idris remains on the throne. Libyan politicalinstead of crystallizing around national groupings and issues, probably will follow the traditional Arab pattern of shifting personal and family alliances.

However, the king isears of age, and his designated successor has neither much political support nor ambition. WhileIdris, many Tripolitanians and some Cyrenaicans only reluctantly pledgedto his dynasty as well. Unless the king survives long enough to consolidate his power, his death might be followederiod of intrigues during which the kingdom might be dismembered. Such increased Internalmight impede, but almost certainly would not preclude, use of Libyan bases by the US and the UK.

The Libyan economy relies heavily upon agriculture to maintain present bare substst-ance standards, and is extremely limited in other resources. Large-scale exploration for oil Is about to be undertaken, but the prospects for extensive discoveries remain unknown. Consequently. Libya has to rely almost wholly upon foreign financial aid and technical assistance In order to carry out even adevelopment program. The UK at present provides over ten million dollarsto Libya, which also receives someaid from the UN and the US.

Probable Trends in Libyan ExternalStrong Western Influence In Libya, based mainly upon direct financial assistance, is likely to persist for at least the next several years. This Influence would probably continue In the separate provinces even If Libya should be dismembered during that period. On the other hand, UK influence, though stuiin Libya, has declined appreciably, and the Libyan Government hasarge number of its British advisors. British policy at present is to remain aloof from Libyan domestic politics. Should the UK continue thatartial vacuum in Westernand economic Influence might develop. However,esult of Its need to station in Libyan bases some troops formerly in the Suez Zone, the UK might Lncrease Its Interest in LibyanK-Libyan basehas been concluded. At the same time. King Idris hasesire for closerwith the US, and has indicated that he would prefer the US to assume the role of chief benefactor and "protector".

The USSR has not yet attempted to open diplomatic relations with Libya. There are virtually no Communists in Libya.

US-Libyan air base negotiations, virtually completed, but not yet approved by Libya's parliament, will provideillion over theear period of the agreement, with Si million to be paid for the use of the base each year4nd one million dollars annually thereafter. In view cf exaggerated Libyan expectations,disappointment over the size of the

US financial contribution may result in delay of ratification, scheduled for the fallowever. Libyan Government pressurewill overcome parliamentary opposition.

Because of strong Libyan resentment over French influence in the province of Fewan and French repression of the Moroccan and Tunisian nationalist movements,l probably be increasing difficulties with France in the near future. Many Libyan .officials have shown open sympathy and tacitfor the Tunisian terrorists.France may succeed In Its efforts toa base agreement with Libya, provided Its financial contribution is sufficiently attractive to overcome anti-French sentiment.

Libya's inclusion ln the Arab League early3 has not resulted in any fundamental change In its pro-Western orientation. Libya uniformly endorses the Arab League'son Israel and on North African nationalism, but playsecondary role in the League and has frequently adopted an independent attitude. Libya has not signed the League's collective security pact.growing Libyan political and cultural ties with Egypt constitute an increasingto the Western position. Nevertheless, Libya will remain fearful of Egypt's greater power. During the past year, Libya has also developed diplomatic and military connections with Turkey, which may come to overshadow its liaison with the Arab League and Egypt if sufficiently attractive Inducements arc offered. Further growth of Turkish influence would probably help to strengthen Libya's pro-Western orientation. In the long' run,Libya is likely to follow the lead of the ether Arab states.




Morocco Tunisia Algeria Spanish

Morocco Tangier



IM (est1








(UN estimate)


a religious classification. Include* non-Moslem nattvei ai well. 'Adjusted lo balance to'.all.

4 MM nativelgerians and Libyans, na not available: Included under "other-.

N.B. Thass out-dated official figures are unreliable In many recpecta. but they provide the only firm foundation for estimate* of present population. The UN Demographic Yearbook estimates the total population of these countries (excluding Libya! Ins aboutooo. Baaed on the trtdely accepted Judgment that tha rate of population growth In tba areaercent annually, the estimated total population of these countries4 is

Original document.

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