74
-GCCRlT"
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE
ARAB STATES
Submitted by the
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL KTELLIGENCE
The following Intelligence organizations particrpated In the preparation of this estlmctt: The Central Intelligence Agent? and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, tha Itavy. the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.
Concurred in by the
INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
oncurring tnere the Special Assistant Intelligence. Department of State; the Assistant Chief of. Department of thehe Director of Naval In-icHioence; the Director of Intelligence, VSAP; tht Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff. The Atomic Energy Com mission Representative to the IAC and the Assistant to tha Director. Federal Burea* of Investigation, abstained, the
subject being outside of their jartsdlctton.
COPT HO.
FOP THE CHIEF.IVISION DEPT.OF STATE
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ST
PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARAB STATES
THE PROBLEM
To analyze basic trends in the domestic and foreign affairs of the Arab states, and to estimate probable developmentsL
CONCLUSIONS
For purposes of UJi estimate Bm Arab staUiEgypt. Iraq, Syria, Lebanon. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, the prinelpaliUes of the Arabian Peninsula, and the Sudan. The Sudan Isalthough only lta northern half Is Arab and Moslem, because of Its special relaCooihlp with Egypt. Libya Is omitted became It laInM. -Probable Developments In tforth Airiea.-Note: (a)Cc=dldcni and Trends In the Middle East Affecting OSndProspectsiddle East Defease Grouping and Proeable Consequence* of4 deal with subjects related bo this estimate.
(blontains comparative data on the principal Arab ita-ea.
Political instability, both regional and national, in the Arab states may beto extend into the foreseeableArea political problems mainly grow out of the unresolved conflict between Western culture and the traditionaland institutions of the Arab world. The Arabs have not yetative solution to this conflict, but they have found expression for their discontent and frustration in nationalist and otherwhich, at least in the short run, Increase general instability. Anothercontributing to political instability Is the intense preoccupation of Arabs with the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Indigenous leadership has shown little ability to cope with the problem ofproduction sufficiently to meet the requirements of growing populations and the need for improved standards of living. It is probable that economicwill become an increasingly important factor for social and political instability. As economic problemsgreater importance relative to or become identified with political problems, there will be an increasing tendency to seek extremist solutions of the right cr left.
he governments of the Arab states will continue to be unstable and subject to change. The most serious threats to their tenure will come from the extremist elements of the right and left The key to the maUitainingegree ofstability in the area during the period of this estimate is the power of the established governments to maintainof the armed forces and to prevent the moderate opposition from joining with the extremists.
hile current conditions and trends in the Arab world on the whole are adverse to the continuation of special rnilitary, political, and economic positions for the West, settlement of the Suez issue with the UK and prospects for US military and economic assistance mayew
l
for Arab-Western collaboration. However, Arab collaboration with the West will be influenced by the extent to which Western policies are brought In line with the most fundamentalhe elimination of the Bntish position in the Near East currently based on "unequal" treaties, further change in US treatment of the Arab-Israeliand,esser extent, change in France's policy towards its North African possessions. Arab resentment of British "imperialism" and the reduction in the British world power position will continue to limit the effectiveness of British
The petroleum producing countries are Likely to press the Western oil companies for further benefits, but such pressures are not likely to lead to nationalization during the period of this estimate, except possibly in Saudi Arabia.
Official relations between the Arab states and the Soviet Bloc have beenbut most Arab governments are probably not anxious to engage in closer relations with the Bloc. However, they might do so on occasion if they believed they could thereby bring pressure upon the Western Powers.
Communist activity in the Arab states has Increased noticeably over the past year, and continued instability in the area willurther increase inactivity and strength. However, within the period of this estimate it Is not likely that Communists will takeof the government of any Arab state. Improved relations with the West would probably eliminate some of the political appeal of Communist and pro-Soviet propaganda and improve the ability and willingness of Arab governments toto correct the conditions which contribute to Communism's appeal. However, the elimination of factorsCommunism and pro-Soviet attitudes willlow process.
The idea of Arab solidarity against the rest of the worldtrong appeal among Arabs, but the Arab League will probably continue to function effectively only for such negative purposes asto Israel. Moreover, there arerivalries among the Arab states, and Egypt and Iraq are vying for leadership. Effective military cooperation among the Arab states is unlikely during the period of this estimate, even under their own Arab Collective Security Pact.
The Arab states will probably continue the economic and political boycott of Israel and will refuse to meet with Israel for the purpose oformal peace settlement. However, in dealing with specific problems of Arab-Israelshorteneral peace settlement, some Arab leaders have recently appeared less intransigent. On the other hand, the Israeli policy of "active defense" and the redeployment of Arab troops to border areas increase the danger that border incidents could lead to extensive armed conflict. If such conflict took placethe period of this estimate, it Isthat the comparative militaryof the two antagonists would prove to be much the same as they were at the time of the Palestine War.
Egyptian RevolutionaryCouncil's (RCC) short-termof maintaining itself in powerThe Wafd Party and theBrethren will remain capable ofserious trouble for the regime,such efforts would probably be aided
CDd T
the Socialist and Communist groups'. Moreover, the RCC laces serious political and economic problems upon the solution of which will depend its longer term tenure.
raq's traditional nuing oligarchy will probably remain in power during the next two or three years, but Its effectiveness would decline if Nuri Said were jemoved from the scene. Iraq's policies toward the other Arab states will continue to be influenced by the conflict between itsto achieve Arab leadership against the opposition of Egypt and Saudi Arabia and its desire for continued ArabIraqi leaders are aware of the Soviet threat and favor joining some sort of regional defense organization which the US would support.
audi Arabian relations with the US Government and ARAM CO deteriorated over the past year. There are currentthat Saudi Arabian relations with the West arehange for the better. However, if the general deterioration of relations which took place during the past year should continue, the US Government might have difficulties when the Dhahran airbase agreement comes up for renewal
DISCUSSION
REGIONAL PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS
Area political problems mainly grow out of: (a) the social and historical relationships in the Arab world itself, and (b) theconflict between Western culture and the traditional values and institutions of the Arab world. This conflict is reflected in the century-old struggle on the part of the Arabs to strengthen themselves in order to prevent their political, cultural, and economicby alien forces. The psychological state created in the process has given rise to ambivalent attitudes toward Europe and the US which are reflected in the general attitude toward the Soviet Bloc and the West.
There arc certain trends and conditions common to most of the Arabor at least three decades, society in all but the most remote parts of the Arab world has beenan increasingly profound andviolent revolution. The political,and cultural impact of the West has led to the decaying of traditional Arab values and institutions andasic factor In Arab world instability. Arabs have becomeresentful of the special interests and
' SeeConclUons ana Trends In theEast Affecting US5
privileges of Western nations in ArabMoreover, with the end of British and French tutelage, the responsibility ofhas shifted to indigenous elements often ill-prepared to assume it. Finally, theeconomies of the Arab states have felt for some time the disruptive effects of contact with Western commerce and Industry. The Arabs have not yetative solution to the conflict between new conditions and old systems that would restore the foundations of stability.
Despite their common Islamic religious and cultural heritage, diversitytronger characteristic than uniformity among the Arab states. Their political development varies widely, from the Arab traditionalism ot Saudi Arabia's absolute monarchy to the partially Westernized governments of Iraq and Lebanon and the reform-minded military regime in Egypt. In addition, there are great differences between the states with respect to their social and political stability, economic resources and needs, and military andimportance.
The widespread discontent andin the Arab world have foundin nationabst movements. The doctrines
of nationalism are not well-defined, andnationalists emphasize differentIn general, however, the nationalists seek: (a) the removal of the last vestiges of imperialism and the recognition of thesovereignty of the Arab slates;nd economic reforms in the interest of public welfare and the Increase of national strength; (c) cooperation among all Arab states and peoples for common ends.satisfaction of Arab grievances against Israel, andevival, In varying'degrees, of their past glories.
ationalism Is strongest among theof the growing Westernized middle sector of Arab societyurban Intellectuals,military officers, small businessmen, and government employees. II also hasmass emotional appeal, especially in the cities. Its Influence on governmentis most apparent in states like Egypt and Syria, where the governments are susceptible to the Influence of public opinion and mass pressure tactics.
IS. Nationalist movements espouse bothand authoritarian political forms. In all stales, however, the spread ofdoctrines has tended to weaken thepower of the landlords, tribal leaders, and wealthy merchants who previouslymost Arab governments with theof interested Western powers, in most cases the UK. At least In the short run, this trend increases the likelihood of Instability.
Internal Problems of the Arab Slates
olitical stability. The governments of the Arab states will continue to be unstable and subject to frequent change. The key to the maintainingegree of govemrr.er.Ui stability in the area during the period of this estimate Is the power of the establishedto maintain control of the armed forces and to prevent the moderate opposition from joining with the extremists. Long-range prospects for stability will depend upon the success of Arab leadership in satisfying popular aspirations by moderate andreforms and In providing relatively efficient government.
The most Important threat to political stability will come from the fanatic anti-Westerners and the Islamic traditionalists on the right and from left-wing elements often under Communist influence. In some cases these extremist groups may unite against the conservative or moderate nationalistand may even be joined by disaffected members of the old ruling class. While such an alliance is unlikely to be durable, it might gain control temporarily in some states.
Economic problems. Serious and tn many cases apparently insuperable economicwill contribute to instability in all Arab states during the period of this estimate. In most of the Arab states, production isto support the growing population; in some, such as Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon, the production potential is so severely limited that future prospects arc discouraging. Even those countries which get substantial rev-enues from oil are finding it difficult to adjust themselves to new techniques, machinery, social changes, and opportunities rapidly enough to satisfy the sometimes exaggerated expectations of the public,
Indigenous leadership has shown Utile ability to cope with the problem of increasing production sufficiently to meet theof growing populations and the need for improved standard* of living. Whileattention has been paid to the need for development planning, governments have allowed themselves to be diverted by excessive preoccupation with such political issues as anti-imperialiam and the Israelihortage of technicians and competentis also an important limiting factor.
Communism in the Arcb Stores
Communism has in thea comparatively small effort in theand has as yet wonmallCommunist parties are illegal,operate clandestinely ororganizations. During the pastthere hasoticeableCommunist activity in the area.national organizations are to be
found In Syria. Lebanon, and Iraq. The Syro-Lebanese group is the key party in the area. Tbe Communists in Iraq have been very active recently, but government countermeasures may reduce their strength. The Jordanian party, although very small, has shownstrength during the last few months. Several Communist groups operate In Egypt, but there appears to be no unified party there. Palestinian and Jordanian Communistsart in the strike of Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO) employees In Saudi Arabia inhe leaders of the strike were Saudi Arabs, none of whom arc known to be Communists. There is notbat an organized Communist party exists in that country Arab Communistssupport from the Soviet Bloc through Soviet and Satellite diplomatic missions, with chose in Cairo and Beirut being the most active.
On the whole, the strength of themovement in tbe Arab states lies not in the appeal of its ideology but in Its ability to relate Itself to existing dissatisfactions and adjust Its propaganda to exploit nationalism and the grievances of ethnic and religious minorities. Communists rely heavily on the successful agitation of the general hostility toward vestiges of Western imperialism,of the established authorities, anddissatisfaction with prevailingand social conditions.
Local and international efforts to expand Communist Influence in the Arab statesthe next few years will almost certainly continue to encounter numerous difficulties. Arab governments and peoples will conUnue to regard Communism as an alien and hostile influence. Strong family, tribal, and religious ties will make difficult the organizationopular front against existing regimes and Western Influence Although Communism's chances of acceptance are greater among the Westernized elements, It is precisely here that it has to compete most strongly withwhere the foreign orientationerious disadvantage.
t the same time continued instability in the area will favor some increase Instrength- The Communists may beto continue to seek "popular front" alliances with various nationalist or minority opposition groups. They will emphasize Communist and Soviet support of nationalist opposition to Israel and to Westernthey will Join in attacks on theof the traditional ruling class; and they will exploit the grievances of minorities and the poor. Local opposition groups will probably seek and receive Communist support in efforts to oust existing regimes but, ifwould probably attempt tothemselves from the Communists. Within the period of this estimate thewill have some capability to incite, abet, and influence mob demonstrations and other mass pressures on weak or vacillating governments. In the longer run. themay be able totrongerposition byubstantialin the ranks of the Intelligentsia,labor, and certain religious andminorities.
uture Communist prospects will be greatly influenced by relations between the Arab states and the West The effectiveness of Communism's attempt to arouse hostility toward the West among non-Communist Arabs would almost certainly decline ifbetween the West and the Arab states improve. Improved relations with the West would probably eliminate some of the political appeal of Communist and pro-Sovietand Improve the ability and willingness of Arab governments to attempt to correct the conditions which contribute toappeal. However, the elimination of factors aiding Communism and pro-Soviet attitudes willlow process. Nationalist distrust of the West is sufficiently strong that any Arab cooperation with Western powers will provide some propaganda capital to the Communists and furnish the USSR withIncentives to step up its effort In tbe Arab world.
Relations Among the Arabhe Idea of Arab solidarity against the rest of the wor'dtrong appeal among Arabs. The principal expression of Arab
unity ls the Araboose association of tbe Arab stales (except the Sudan and the Arabian sheikhdoms) which functions as:eeting ground for the representatives of the Arab states;enter from which toommon Arab line onof external poucy that jointly concern the Arab governments; andecretariat for the implementation of Arab policy toward Israel, particularly the Arab boycott. Egypt has sought to maintain the character of the League as an association of sovereign states; Iraq, on the other hand, has shown interest in federation or union. Egypt has also tried to assume the position of leader, but It is unlikely that the League will becomeingle state or that itederation or superstate of any kind. As in the past, it will probably beto act where differences exist among izs member states and will continue to function effectively only ln areas of agreementopposition to Israel. Its activities are likely, therefore, to continue to be largely negative in character.
The member states of the Arab League (except Libya) are also associated in the Arab Collective Security Pact which provides that an attack on the territories or troops of any of the signatories willeeting of the member states inecision passedwo-thirds majority vote will be binding on all members. The Pact specifically states that any armed aggression against onewould be considered as directed against them all, but it does not provide for automatic mutual defense. Attempts have been made to unify defense efforts, and inierarchy of cornrnlttees was established.
However, it Is unlikely that the ArabSecurity Pact will lead to effective joint military organization or to Joint war orplanning. The original motivation for the Pact was political rather than military. The objective of Its founders was to convince the Arab public that the Arab governments were taking action to counter the Arab defeat In the Palestine War. Subsequently the Pact has been advanced by the Arabs as anto the organization of regional defense under Western sponsorship. Despite itscomplete lack of military significance, the Pact may prove to be an obstacle to the organization of regional defense under West-em sponsorship. Arab leaders who areto maximize Arab control over anydefense organization will probablyto urge that the Arab CollectivePact be made the basis of all futuredefense organizations.
practice the Arab states have beento cooperate effectively on any Issue,on the boycott of Israel, becauseforces in the Arab world haveproven stronger than theAlthough Arab leaders willsupport the idea of unity in public,policies toward other Arab statespowers will be dictated by theirnational and dynasticthe dynastic rivalry betweenand Saudi Arabia will almostto hinder cooperation amongstates. It also appears likely thatEgypt will engage In increasinglyfor leadership of the Arab states,have an important bearing uponto organize regional defense.*
Arab Relations with Israel
. "Prospects for Creation of aEast Defense Grouping and Probableof2
and fear of Israel will continuea fundamental force ln Arab thoughtand the question of relationswill have high priority in ArabThe Arab policy toward Israel Is(a) the argument that the Westerncreated the Jewish state and mustresulting problems themselves, andgrowing conviction that time ls onside. The latter belief lsexaggerated ideas of the harm whichInflicts upon Israel, and by theUS policy ls becoming pro-Arab andmilitary aid to the Arab states willgive them military superiorityand the power to achieve ato the Arabs
Arab leaders are likely to be extremely cautious about offending public feeling on the Israeli question and will probably not befor some time to risk negotiation and compromise on the most important issues Arab policy toward Israel will probablyalong the lines developed in the Arab Leaguehe Arab states willcontinue the economic and politicalof Israel which has been and probably will continue to be the outstanding example of unified Arab policy. They will refuse to meet with Israel for the purpose ofoutstanding issues unless Israel meets conditionsacceptance of existingasis for negotiationwhich the Arabs are reasonably sure Israel will never agree to
In dealing with specific problems in Arab-Israeli relations shortormal peacesome Arab leaders have recentlyless intransigent. Examples of this have been recent Arab reception of proposals on the regional development of Jordan VaLey water resources and of Tripartitefor improving the border situation. The Israelis have not, however,ike tendency to reasonableness and compromise.
In line with their general policy offor time, as weU as out of fear of Israel's military superiority, the Arab states havesought to avoid border clashes with Israel which might lead to war. The Arab governments, however, and particularlyhave been unable to control their borders and considerable infiltration of Israelihas taken place. Israel's policy has been one of "activencluding reprisal raids into Arab territory by sizeable Israeli military forces. There is no evidence that any present Arab Government is supporting or countenancing the infiltration of Israeli territory or plans to Initiate an armed attack on Israel within the foreseeable future. However, recent Urge Israeli raids have led the governments of bordering Arab states to deploy their military forces inay as to make them available for an immediate counterattack against any Israeli raid. In the prevailing state cfinor border
Incident could lead to extensive armed
In thef extensive armed conflict between Israel and any of the Arab states, the latter would employ all diplomatic means to persuade the signers of the Tripartite(US. UK, and France) to Intervene against Israel, and Jordan, if attacked, would seek to invoke its treaty of alliance with the UK. The signatories of the Arab Collective Security Pact would probably vote to take Joint military action against Israel, but little substantial or effective united military action would be likely to follow. The Arab states would probably declare war on Israel, mobilize their own forces separately, and deploy them In defensive positions near the Israeli frontier. Most Arab states, with the possible exception of Jordan, would probably seek to avoidtheir troops In offensive action against Israel.
If extensive armed conflict took placethe Arab states and Israel during the period of this estimate, it Is probable that the comparative rnilitary capabilities of the two antagonists would prove lo be much the same as they were at the time of the Palestine War. Since the Palestine War Israel has concentrated on improving its armed forces through reorganization, intensive(both of regular and reserveuild-up of reserve stocks of militaryThe Arab armed forces have improved in some respects and declined in others. It is unlikely that they would be able to cooperate more effectively than they did in the Palestine War.
Arab Relations wiih ihe West
Arab attitude toward the West iscontinue to be an ambivalent one.many of them In high position,of Western values andand believe that the best chance forof the Arab stales lies inwith the Western Powers,men are aware of the popularthe West and hesitate to express theirMost Arabs are profoundlyby the anti-imperialist and neutralist
doctrines ol nationalist movements and blame the Western Powers for the existence of Israel and for most of the other ills of the Arab world- They are continually drawn in the directioneutralist policy by the belief that the struggle between the West and the Soviet Blocontest for world domination in which small nations have no part and by the parochial and exclusive character of Arab culture. Yet many Arabs who are convinced anti-Westerners are none the less anxious to obtain for their countries the advantages of cooperation with the West.
While current conditions and trends in the Arab world on the whole are adverse to the continuation of special military, political, and economic positions for the West,of the Suez issue with the UK andfor US military &nd economic assistance mayew basis for Arab-Western collaboration. However, the extent of Arab collaboration with the West will be influenced by the extent to which Western policies are brought In line with the most fundamental localhe elimination of theposition in the Near East currently based on "unequal" treaties, further change in US treatment Of the Arab-Israeli question, and,esser extent, change in France's policy towards Its North African possessions.
US prestige and influence are currently greater in the Arab world than those of any other great power, despite the stigma of the US relationship with Israel and the twopowers, the UK and France, The potential availability of US economic andaid. and the reputation of US technical, industrial, and military competence provide strong bases for the preferred position of the US ln the area. However, US relations with the Arab states will be determined primarily by political factors. An importantwill be the degree to which the USindividual Arab states against their rivals or aids such rivals.
Arab attitudes toward the Europeanare strongly influenced by the past and present activities of those nations in the Arab area. The UK retains military facilities,enterprises, and financial investments, and exerts Important influence tn Iraq,and the Arabian principalities.Arab resentment of Britishand the reduction in the British world power position have greatly reduced theof British influence in the Arab states. Completion of the Anglo-Egyptian agreement on the Suez Canal Base and the revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, perhaps along similar lines, will lessen Arab hostility but will not restore the UK's former prestige. France's influence tn the area is negligible, even in Syria and Lebanon, and its North Africancontribute to anti-Western sentiment. On the other hand. West Germany's position ln Lhe area Is Improving rapidly. Arabsadmire German Industrial andstill and are not apprehensive of German political designs
oil companies operating lnwill almost certainly be subjectedpressure to enlarge the Arab shareReactivation of the Iranian oilwill cause concern in the ArabIt lead to reduced production tn ArabThe Saudi Government willthe way in demands forodification of the profit sharingand It is likely to use threatseans of obtaining itsand Kuwait are unlikely to attemptdrastically the presentthe near future, but anythe agreement with Saudi Arabia willcertainly have to be matched by theoperating in the other Arab states.
Relations with Asian and African Stales
feel an affinity for the peoplesand Africa and many believe thatstates should seek to cooperateand African states in the UN andfields of international politics.Arabs respect Pakistan because it isstate and because of thevigor and strength it has shown sinceIndependent, there has beencontact between Pakistanis andmany of their problems and interests Pakistan's adherenceefense agree-
t-fW-
with Turlccy favored by the West has, however, made the whole Ideaegional defense organization slightly more palatable for most Arabs.
ost Arabsrudging respect for Turkey but few like the Turks or look tofor leadership. Many distrust Turkeyof Its former dorninatton of the area. Its recognition of and trade relations with Israel, Its secular institutions, and Its close relations with the West. Turkey's strength and prosperity are,otent lesson to the Arabs on the advantages of cooperation with the West.
India's Prime Minister Nehru Is respected in the Arab states, where his neutralist. AsU-for-Asians doctrinestrong appeal. Nehru will continue to have some Influence among the Arabs, but Arab Interests andare likely to remain provincial Inand to be Influenced only peripherally by India.
The Arab states will almost certainlytheir efforts to help nationalist causes In North Africa, especially through continuing efforts to obtain favorable UN action on the Tunisian and Moroccan cases. The smallof the Arab states will limit their capabiliUes for material assistance, but they will probably help North African nationalist exiles, provide increasing financial aid. and assist In smuggling arms.
Relations with the Soviet Bloc
official Soviet relations areJordan, the Sudan, or the ArabianSoviet diplomatic missions arein the remaining Arab states, andthe principal Arab center of SovietEgypt is the only Arabhas sought closer economicthe Soviet Bloc, and It has done so asof the decline of the WesternEgyptian cotton and as part of ato lessen economic dependence onMost Arab governments areanxious to engage In closer relationsBloc, though they might do so onthey believed they could thereby bringupon the Western Powers. The twoRussian vetoes in the UN Security Coun-of resolutions favored by Israel andthe Arabs Impressed many Arabs asof Soviet opposition to imperialismfor peoples who had sufferedThe Arab response has also beento recent Soviet efforts to improveon the diplomatic level, as well astalk of Increased trade between thethe Arab states. Trade between theBloc and the Arab states has not,significant in the past, except forof Bloc wheat for EgyptianArab states would probably be
to Soviet Bloc trade proposals. It isthat any of the Arab statesa Soviet program for aid andand the Arab states would probably dis-any closer relations with thethan they deemed necessary to put
sure on the West
II. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN EGYPT
affairs. The members ofCommand Council (RCC)political experience rapidlytwo years in power. As politicalthey have had to resortextemporization and have madeshifts. They have relied uponmethods and have resisted ato parliamentary government largelythe principal opposition groupsnationalist Wafd Party and thetraditionalist Moslemorganized popular followings. The
RCC has not had notable success in developing
its political party (the liberation Organiza- *
Hon)trong organ of popular support.
In recent months the RCC haserious
effort to build up support for Its policies
among urban laborers and the peasantry, but
at best it will he some time before It can rely
upon its supporters to defeat the opposition
at the polls.
RCC* short-term prospects ofitself in power are favorable(a) its control of the armed forces,and all media of communication; (b)
the credit it gained by the recent agreement with the UK on the evacuation o( the Suezlong-time goal of Egyptianand (c) popular hope that the RCC's reform program will ameliorate the poverty and end the corruption andassociated with the former monarchy. However, the RCC faces serious political and economic problems upon the solution of which will depend its longer term tenure of power and the continuationelatively stable situation ln Egypt.
fundamental economic probleminadequacy of the country's resourcesdemands of its large and rapidlybecome an increasingThe RCC is placing greata program of land reform and hasplans for and some start onprograms which include aabove Aswan, land reclamation onfringes, and industrialization.measures may eventually result inin Egypt's gross nationalare inadequate to make possible aof living, and will probably nota declining one In the period
Wafd Party and the Moslemremain capable of causing seriousthe regime, and any such effortsbe aided by the Socialist andgroups, as in February-Marchopposition groups united behindNagib. If the RCC cooperates withPowers for regional defense andpurposes and accepts aid fromthe Wafd will be able to arousethe extreme nationalists who areto any kind of collaboration withThe RCC's secular policies and itsto accept the guidance ot thewill keep the Islamicthe opposition camp. All oppositionagitate for popular elections and willfrom elements, such asand students, which want aparliamentary government. Anyreplaced the RCC would probably beincluding military elements,reflect the outlook and experience of the growing middle group in Egyptian urban society.
External affairs. Egypt will endeavor to maintain Its position of leadership among the Arab states and will seek to extend itsto ihe south and west on the African continent Egypt has less direct Interest in the Arab-Israeli problem than have some other Arab states, and is likely to become more amenable to the regularizatlon of relations with Israel If andnal agreement on the British evacuation of the Suez Base Isand L'S aideality. It will probably not assume leadership in urgingIntransigence, and in the case of Jordan Valley development will probably urge the Arab states directly involved toolicy of "realistic" bargaining. Nevertheless, Egypt ls likely to continue to resist any formal peace settlement with Israel, if only to avoidthe other Arab states.
The4 Anglo-Egyptian agreement in principle on the Suez Canal Base. wlU. if formalized and implemented, associate Egrpt with Western defense plans for the area and may result in cooperation with the Western Powers for regional defense and otherThe extent of Egyptian cooperation will depend largely upon the smoothness with which the Suez settlement is implemented and upon the nature and extent of US and other Western military and economic assistance to Egypt- The period of this estimate willifficult and delicate one in Egyptian relations with the West. Egypt will not only seekterms for itself in such matters as foreign aid, but will also attempt toWestern arrangements with other states of the area inanner as toor promote Egyptian leadership of the Arab states and secure Arab militaryover Israel For example, Egypt willseek to make the Arab Collective Security Pact the basis for the organization of regional defense.
The RCC will probably continue to believe that Egypt's advantage lies In cooperation with the Western Powers. This belief is based
morealculation of the comparative advantages likely to be attained than upon ideological preference for the West orof the need for defense against the Soviet Bloc. Egypt will seek to increase its trade with the Soviet Bloc, particularly to increase exports ot cotton, but Egyptian relations with the Bloc will be fundamentally cautious. More extensive relations with the Bloc, even if mainly in the commercial sphere would seem certain to raise the morale of the few thousand Egyptian Communists andsympathizers and provide opportunities for Soviet espionage.
ROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SUDAN
Sudanese stability faces severe teststhe remainder oferiod of transition from Anglo-Egyptian condominium to self-government and to self-determination of the Sudan's future status. Considerable progress has been made to date: (a) Inthe transfer of executive power from the Governor-General to the Sudanese cabinet and parliament, elected innd (b) in replacing British administrative personnel with Sudanese. The process can probably be completedonstitutionalalthough frictions will probably develop and serious crises are possible.
Among the sources of tension is thebetween the opposition Umma Party,expression of the Ansar sect of Islam, which favors Sudanese independence with some UX ties, and the incumbent National Unionist Party, supported by the Khatmiyah (orthodox) Moslems, which Inclines toward closer relations with Egypt. The strugglethese two groups, involving bothand religious rivalry, has led to violence before and, especially as the restrainingof the British Is withdrawn, couldin serious Instability or even civil war.
Another source of tension is the deepethnic, and religious cleavage between the Moslem. Arab (zed North, and the pagan. Negroid South. The backward South fears Northern domination as it loses the protection heretofore given it by the British admlnistra-tors.
he clash between Egyptian and UKforhe Sudan may also create serious problems. The UK would like to have the Sudan opt for independence and conclude defense and commercial agreements with tbe UK. The UK is prepared toIts orderly withdrawal, although It will seek to maintain existing commercial andties, it may also attempt to counter Egyptian influence by encouraging thoseelements which oppose Egyptian Egypt would prefer completeof the Sudan with Egypt, but such ais opposed by practically allelements and would arouse the violent hostility of many. Although the Ukeuhood of serious UK-Egyptian conflict over thewill decrease as the UK continues tocontrol, both nations' hopes forposition In the Sudan may embroil them, and their respective Sudanese proteges, in contests over the Sudan's future status and orientation.
believe that the Sudan is likelyindependence, althoughand military relations withlikely to become Increasingly close,Sudan will probably tend to followIn intrarcgional and foreignpresent Sudanese Governmentwish to maintain friendlythe UK butormal treatyto maintain the UK's special position.
IV. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN IRAQ
affairs. Iraq's traditionalcomposed primarily oflandlords, wealthy businessmen,poUticians. will probablypower at least during the next two orProspects for evolution toward agovernment in Iraq werethe Throne's support betweenand4elativelyrefom-rnlnded government underof Dr. Fadhll Jam all, but Jamfell for want of organizedsupport, and the Old Guard appearsback in control. The conservativeNun Said and his colleagues in the ruling
oligarchy will probably Intensify theof moderate reform-minded elements and may increase the likelihood of mass demon-strations and other pressure tactics byof the right and left.
However, no opposition party orhas yet shown sufficient strength to threaten Nuri Said's personal following in Parliament. The National Front, whichthe forces of the extreme nationalist Istiqlal and the Communist-infiltrated 1Democrats for the4 elections, appears to be in process of dissolution. Should the aging Nuri Said be removed from the scene, the effectiveness of the old ruling group would greatly decline.
Iraq's economic prospects are theof any Arab state because of its large oil reserves and extensive tracts of unused but potentially arable land. Seventy percent of Iraq's oil revenues, expected to average0 yearly over the next Ave years, are earmarked for the Iraq Development Board. Despite manifold political pressures, the Board appears to be moving aheadeasonable and far-sighted program. Over the long run, this program is capable ofimproving economic conditions and thereby lessening some popular grievances. In the short term, however, the fact tbat most of the big development projects cannotrapid and easily perceived results will limit the program's effectiveness as afactor.
External affairs. Iraq's policies toward other Arab states will continue to beby the conflict between: (a) itsto achieve Arab leadership against the opposition of Egypt (and Saudihile strengthening itself militarily by ties with the West, and (b) its desire for continued Arab solidarity on the Issues of Israel, Imperialism, and colonialism in North Africa. Iraq will support publicly the Arab League and Arab Collective Security Pact, vigorously oppose settlement with Israel, and perhaps lead in Arab-Asian efforts to bring the French-North African problem before the UN. Iraqi leaders will probably continue to foster the idea of Arab union or federation, which often leads to tampering with the internal politics of Syria and Jordan.
raq will be less influenced by the concepts of neutralism than any other ArabIraqi leaders are aware of the Soviet threat and favor joining some sort of regional defense association which the US wouldHowever, they will approach this move slowly and cautiously from fear of the popular reaction at home and opposition from the other Arab states. This attitude is evident in Prime Minister Nuri Said's latest proposal for broadening the Arab Collective Security Pact to Include non-Arab countries. Iraqis believe that the US shows undue favoritism toward Israel, but look increasingly to the US forThe present ruling group, however,ealistic view of the need for some UK support, and will almost certainly seek aand extension of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of alliance (due to expire. If the attempted extension is to have any chance cf success, however. It will have to go at least as far aa the Suez agreement in meeting the aspirations of the Iraqi
v. probable developments in syria
nternal again. We believe that Syria will continue to be politicaUy unstable.the overthrow of Shishakhed to reinstltutlon of civilianafter four years of military control of Syrian affairs, conflict between the civilian authorities and the armyonstant danger.
The continuation of moderate civilian regimes will depend In large part on theof the two major conservative parties, the Populists and the Nationalists, toorking alliance. Conservative prospects are weakened by the lacktrong leader acceptable to all conservatives, the resulting struggles for power among lesser figures, and the long-standing cleavage between theof Northern Syria, especially Aleppo (stronghold of thend those of Damascus (center of Nationalist strength).
The Syrian Array, whichecisive role In politics9emains a
serious potential threat to the civilian regime. The probable role of the Army is difficult to estimate, since no single leader now appears dominant and the Army itself ls divided into factions somewhat parallel to civilian political divisions. However, an army coup is possible, particularly if decisive civilian leadership fails to develop. In addition, the Army's power givesacit veto In raa)or politica;Tor example, an effort toyrian-Iraqi union, which many Populists favor, would probably result in firm counter-measures or possibly another coup by the Army.
Conservative disunity has enhanced the appeal and bargaining position of extremist elements drawing support from thepolitically conscious urban middle group. The most significant of these Is the left-wing, strongly anti-Western ArabParty Of Akram Hawrani, which advocate; social and politicalHawrani, who accepted the support of Syrian Cornmunists. also enjoys the supportumber of Influential army officers and has the sympathy of atew leading members of the volatile Druze community in southern Syria. With this support. Hawraniairly good chance of increasing his power and influenceovernment of divided conservatives. He would, however, have to have Army support to seize control of the government.
Syria's Living standards arc low, but there are no immediately critical economicand it has an economic resource Inand unused land.
External affairs. Syriarize inbetween other Arab states to expand their influence, rather thanajor force in Arab affairs. Syrian policies and stability have been generally affected by: (a) the Internal conflict between Syrianand Arab unity, and (b) the overt and covert attempts of Iraq and Saudi Arabia to win Syria to their respective sides. During the period of this estimate Syria will probably waver between the Iraqi and Saudi-Egyptian camps. Although Syria would almostjoin the other Arab states against Israel if war broke out. it fears Israeli militaryand is not likely to initiateHowever, if confronted with unilateral Israeli resumption of the Jordan Riverproject in the demilitarized zone at Banat Yaacov, Syria would almost certainly feel compelled to take strong measures short of war to protect its water interests, and might be driven to desperate steps which could easily bring on hostilities.
Syria's policy toward the US and UK,its attitude toward cooperationegional defense arrangement, is likely to be determined by what Iraq and Egypt do in this respect. While many of the old-Line Syrian leaders privately favor cooperation with the West, their present weakness in the face of nationalist pressures and Arab League policy will probably continue to prevent thefrom making pro-Western moves unless and until the stronger governments of Iraq and Egypt take the lead. French influence in Syria is now limited to the cultural field and will have little effect Ln deterrnlning Syria's relations with the West.
Syria has recently been more responsive to Soviet diplomatic and commercial moves. The Soviet Union has expanded its diplomatic and propaganda activities in Syria and Soviet Bloc countries have stepped up commercial efforts, particularly since the present regime came to power. The conservative leadership is likely to continue to maintain the present superficially cordial relations with the Bloc, partly for reasons of trade and partly toSyria's bargaining position with the West. However, the conservatives' basic fear of Communism and of the USSR would almost certainly limit relations with the Bloc.of power by some combination ofmight make Syria more receptive to Sonet influence, and would probably increasetendencies. However, the Army,whose supportegime couldnot last, would be likely to oppose any strongly pro-Soviet policies.
VI. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN LEBANON
political stability ismeanseUcatc balance of power be-
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twcen Moslem and Christian religious groups. The Lebanese will probably continue to accept the present modus vivendi .'or the next few years. The rigidity of the system, however, and the fact that the Moslem population is increasing faster than the Christian willendanger political stability. Inwith other Arab states, Lebanon faces the problems resultingecayingstructure in conflict with the rising political consciousness and power of restless urban elements The latter are nowfragmentized, but their resentment of the old-line leadership, whose monopoly of wealth and power has seriously impeded social and economic progress, has contributed toof the right and left.
Lebanon's strong desire to be accepted as part of the Arab world, its military weakness, and dependence on regional trade willto Influence its policy in favor of close relations with the other Arab states and atuperficial adherence to Arab League solidarity. Lebanon Is anxious to avoidin inter-Arab disputes, such as the Hashernile-Saudi struggle, in order to keep friendly relations with all. The Lebanese are more tempted than other Arabs by thepossibilities of an Arab-Israelibut they will continue to follow the general Arab line in this respect.
Lebanon's large Christian population, and its cultural and commercial ties with the West also make it the most strongly pro-Western of the Arab states, and it feels the need for Western support to protect its peculiarConsequently, while its outlook will continue to be somewhat ambivalent. Its present leaders would probablyeneral development of closer Arab-Western relations and would be glad of theto follow the lead of Iraq or Egypt in securing US military and economic aid.
VII. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN SAUDI ARABIA
Arabian stability depmds uponof the personal authoritySaud, who lacks the prestige, skill,of character of his father,ing Saud ismost of his father's domestic policies. In the short run, at least. Saud can probably retain the support of the numerous royal princes, the chief officials, and the tribalif he Is able to continue the costlyon which their loyalty depends.his administration Is weakened byand corruption, an extreme dependence on oil royalties for Its revenue, and failure to recognize growing resentment of theof the royal family and government officials.
Saudi Arabiaeculiar influence in the Arab world because it possesses the most important Moslem holy places, because it is the last stronghold of certain aspects of traditional Arab culture, and because the King has personal control o( substantial revenues with which he subsidizes elements In other Arab states on behalf of Saudi interests. King Saud is ambitious toeading role In Arab affairs and has been activelyto forestall Iraqi expansion and theof Iraqi prestige. He has sought to maintain Arab intransigence on the question of Israel, and prevent Arab states fromtoo closely associated with the West-em Powers. He will probably try to obstruct moves to regularize the relations of Arab states with Israel. However, King Saud probably overestimates his influence among the Arab states, and he will probably not be able to persuade any other Arab state toove which it does not independentlyadvantageous.
Partly Influenced by his anti-WesternSaud has been generally less friendly toward the West and particularly toward the US than was his father. Saudi relations with the US deteriorated seriously in the past year, as evidenced by Saudi rejectiontandard MDAP agreement with the US andof US technical assistance to theSaudi relations with ARAM COesult of the government'sfor increased oil revenues and services from the company, and Its conclusion of an oil tanker arrangement with the Argentine-Greek shipowner, A. S. Onassis. which violates the terms of the AltAMCO concession.
There are current Indications that Saudi Arabian relations with the West area change for the better. However, if the general deterioration of relations which took place during the past year shouldthe US Government might havewhen the Dhahran airbose agreement comes up for renewal6 and ARAMCO might Gnd it difficult to maintain satisfactory relations with the Saudi Government. The Saudis might consider nationalizing their oil industry, but extreme dependence on large and uninterrupted oil revenues wouldmake them hesitate to nationalize, even if their relations with ARAMCO do not
The strike of3 gave evidenceonsiderable increase inamong the employees of ARAMCO and the USAF Dhahran airbase in Eastern Saudi Arabia, where tribal values are being more quickly destroyed than in other parts of the country. Another strike, perhapsby violence,trong possibility. The Saudi Government hasabor committee in Dhahran and may beevised labor law for the kingdom.these new arrangements probably would not stand up under the strain of serious labor trouble.
audi relations with the UK may Improve somewhatesult of the recent agreementolution for the Buraiml boundaryIn addition, an influential element in the Saudi Government hopes to introduce British oil interests into the kingdomever against ARAMCO.
VIII. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS INordan's political atmosphere will beby tension between political leaders of the relatively well-educated andformer Arab Palestinians and the old-line leaders of Transjordan. The Palestine Arabs will probably continue to increase their power within the government. They willto orient the government towardArab nationalism and away from UK influence,
However. British Influence will probably remain strong in Jordan because of UKto the impoverished kingdom. Tbe Anglo-Jordanian Alliancewenty-yearassistance pact signed ins likely to remain Ln effect as the cornerstone of Jordan's external relations. Jordan will continue to lack confidence in Great Power guarantees or the UN machinery as effective barriers against Israeli attack. Anti-British feeling Ls growing, as Ls the tendency ofgovernment leaders to act morebut neither government norleaders have found any practicalfor the UK subsidy which3 constitutedercent of the country's total revenues. The whole relationship, however, would probably be wiped out should Israel attack In force and the UK fail to respondordanian appeal under the treaty, or if the Arab Legion were restrained by its British officers fromajor Israeliwith sufficient vigor.
Almost half of the nearly one million Arab refugees from the former territory ofwhich Is now in Israel live In Jordan. Unlike the smaller refugee groups ln other Arab states, who lack influence ln the host countries, the refugees In Jordanource of serious political and social unrest. They will continue toajor political problem and an economic factor In Jordan.
Jordan will continue to need and desire US economic and technical aid. However, the Jordanians, especially the formerdeeply resent past US support of Israel and continue to believeruly impartial US policy Is impossible because of US Internal political pressures. US efforts to maintain peace ln the area and to strengthen the Arab states may eventually lessen this resentment but, for the present. Jordanians suspect US motives and feel that an attitude whichthe ttatusless favorable than the UN partition planctually favoritism toward Israel.
umber of regional rivalries, oftenbut of ^determinate strength, center around Jordan. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and
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each for its own reasonsaxeto prevent amalgamation of Jordan with Iraq, and the cx-rauftl of Jerusalem is intriguing to keep Jordan Isolated In line with his personal ambition toeparate state in Arab Palestine The Palace and the British maneuver to keep the ifaruj quo. Within Jordan itself the Palestinians are more receptive than are the Transjordanians to talk of amalgamationeighboring state.
IX. PROBABLE DEVELOPMENTS IN YEMEN AND ARABIAN PENINSULA PRINCIPALITIES
Yemen seems likely to remain the most isolated and the least influential of theArab states. The Imam Ahmad will probably be able to control such opposition as the "Free Yemeni" movement, butisossibility. There wincontinue to be friction with the UK. stemming mainly from border disputes with Aden.
Kvutait. While Britain's legal position In Kuwait is unlikely to change, Britishhave not been firmly exercised in recent years and the trend seems likely to continue. The outlook is not favorable forapable and responsible Kuwaiti ruling group able to All any vacuum left by-con traction of the British position. Thereew manifestations of nationalism, mainly insistence that Kuwaitis shouldigger share in the control and benefits of business in Kuwait. The scale of Kuwait royalities in relation to population is many tunes that of neighboring oil-producing countries and will continue to play an Increasingly Important role in the economy of the country. Such revenues provide the present weak butand pro-British rulerniqueto mitigate the effects of many of the social and economic problems contributing to political instability. However, KuwaitIn the long run escape the upsettingof radical economic and social changesonservative Arab society, andpropaganda is already increasing Inin an attempt to exploit the situation against the West.
ther British-controlled Arabian areas. The UK position will continue to be the key to short-run stability in the principalities of the Arabian Peninsula. The British willattempts to strengthen their position, particularly in the Aden Protectorate and the Truclal Sheikhdoms. With British backing, the ruling families of the principalities will probably be able to maintain themselves In power. The UK will also probably continue to defend vigorously the interests of its client-rulers against Saudi Arabia and Yemen. The construction and operation of the new refinery in Aden will assist the local economy, and In some prtnclpabties economic benefits may also result from continued oil explorations.
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1 III
COUNTRY (continued)
tea
Population
Annual Population Growth Agrtc. Land Perain Crops
Main rndustrles
Main Exports
Per Capita ONP Literacy Rate Hallruads Roads
Slfiiir. Qaslc Resources
an. m.
)0 Palestine refugees
ercent IUNRWA)
cres (excluding refugees)
wheat, barley, matte, millet, tobacco, olivet, grapes, other fruits, vegetables
small Industries processing agricultural products, cement
limited quantities of agricultural products, phosphate rock
)
0 percent
ltei
all-weather roads, SSO;ites
flomo mineralsphosphates. Iron ore. man-gnnese. andtheir far from markets and isolated by lack of transportation. Dead Sea source potash and chromium.
q.I0SJ)
ercentcres
wheat, barley, olives, tobacco, fruits, and vegetabloi
cement, textiles, and other consumeril refilling
citrus fruit, apples, onions
IMS iles
iles;iles
Deposits low quality lignite. Evidence Iron ore deposits. Major natural resource; Utanl River, whleh can be developed for water and power.
Currently usable agricultural land.
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Original document.
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