THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM TO MID-1958

Created: 4/26/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

5 NIE

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ENERGY PROGRAM TO

lb>ll> lb)|J)

unovn to* PtLtAiE

EATE: 6

The Inttttloenee Autttory Committee eonewrred tn Vrti erttmatet. The FBI Bllllll t, the nojeet being enUtde of IU lurttdtetion.

The fotloving member wniioKont of the Intelligence Adrlton, Committeeth the Central Met-lloence Abenc* tn the preparation of thts ettlcite: The intelligence organUaV^ni of thetate, the Army, thehe Air Force, the Joint Staff, and Ihe Atomic energy CommUiton.

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DISSEMINATION NOTICE

hii copy of thisor the Information and use of <he recipient designated on the front cover and of the Individuals under the JurLtdlctlon of the recipient's office who require the Information for the performance of their official duiicd. Ii will receive no further disL-mlnatlon either written or oral without the concurrence of the Central Intelligence Agency through the Assistant Director for Scientific Intelligence. This document or lis contents must not beoutside the continental limits of the United Stales without specificof the Director of Central Intelligence.

may be either retained or destroyed by burning In accordancejiii"llh ujMii ijiIiIIiiiii or returned to the Central Intelligence Agency byof Collection and Dissemination. CIA.

he overseas dissemination of thuTmv4Ugejice will be limited to aon* year or less, at the end of which time ll wnT&c'TftJtio^fo^rcturned toagency, or permission requested of that agency towilh2 June

DISTRIBUTION iSptclali

Th* PrwJdeiit

National Security Council

Operation' Coordlnallntd

Joint ConiTMatonal Commit Iff on Atomk energy

Denartmenl ot Slale

Office of Secretary of Oelenw

Department ef tne Army Department of the Navy Department o. the Air Force Atomic Enenry rommlnto-Joint Chief* or'ri! Durran of InertHcatkm

Military Uatwna Atomic Enerty Commlwior

katioml zrm^xatKt estjxate

T ATOXIC BEROT DfTEXmElCB CCMUTTSE

THE SOVIET ATOMIC ETTEPOT PR00RAH

5

TbU titlMU ni prepared and agreed upon by tb* Joint Atonic Energy Intelligence Conmlttee vbicbowpoeed of repreeentatlvee of tba Departwente of State, Army, Pevy, Air Force, tba Atoaic Energy CoaHlaaloa, tbe Joint Staff aad tbe Central Intelligence Agency. Tba FBI abatalnwd, tba anbject being oataid* of ita Jorledletloo.

A gronp of expert cooaaltaata working with tbe Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Coawdttee concurred in tbe concLualona. 'Hie eitleate waa approved by tbe Intelligence Advleory Committee aa ofpril

Aval labia svidenee aitabllahaa tba existence In to* USSRigh priority extensive atomic energy program which la continuing toubatantlal stockpile of fissionable atata rials; aad (j) tba capability of producing explosions lo tba raaga fro* tha equivalentav kllotona up tdllotona of TUT. thus, wall* tba exact extent of Soviet capability for quantity production of noclear weapons remains uncertain, the general nature and aoae of the details of tba Soviet etoalc energy progrsai can be assessed.

Evidence receivedk primarily concerns mini nr. and coDcantratlon of uraniua, production ofarly research and developaeot lnsotope separation, tbe testing of veapoas, and military and civilian training andin atonic warfare. All of this evidence confirms the broad outlines of the program aa estimated iand

peraits scsm definition of particular phases of the prograa wltb eostewhat store certainty than was heretofore possible.

3- Tha USSR haa carried out extensive independent research and baa adapted to Its needs atonic energy iaformetlon obtained from espionage activities, German technical assistance, and unclassified scientific and technical literature available froa western countries. The required research waa carried out on high priority which made available outs tend log scientific pei-sonnel, laboratory facilities, and equipment. Top ranking Soviet scientists, both theoretical aad experimental, la all pertinent fields, have been Identified with the prograjB.

It la eetlamtedotal ofons of natural uranium (in terse of recoverable metal) vaa mined* In the USSR and ita satellites, including Eaat Geraeay. While thia figure la subjectonsiderable uncertaintyesult of tbe Inconclusive nature of the evidence oa internal USSR efforts,ons of thia total are estimated to have cose frost Eaat Germany and this Utter figure la considered to be subject to an uncertainty of not store than plus or si5 per cent. Tbek production given above Is tvwe than sufficient to support the fissionable amterlal production estimates for the etao year given ln thia report.

5- Knowledge of the status of the Soviet etoalc energy prograa aa of tbe end* le derivedonsiderable volume ofauch of lt ptripberal. ufficient am cunt is detailed snough toeaecaable foundation for quantitative

aeeaaament. Information obtained by technical aeana on Soviet plutoolum production and weapon teote continue! to be conelatentoraatica obtained through other eourcei. roduction doei not permit aa reliable aa eetlaate aa In tbe caee of plutonlum production, although Soviet efforta in nfaaaea ofroduction are known to be exten-elva. There le alao evidence of the production of thermonuclear Material by tbe Soviet pre-grant.

6. On tbe beele of tbe taet data now available, lt iuthat tbe USSR le capable of producing nuclear veaposa with erploalve power* le tbe rangeev kllotona upliotona.

eatlmated that5 tbe USSR couldtultl-awgaton thermonuclear device vhlch. If aucceaaful, would permit initiation of atockplllag of thermonuclear weapona with vieIda la tbe multi-megaton range by

7. On tbe baala of tbe capability demonatrated by Soviet nuclear teete aod tbe evaluation of the overall Soviet program, lt ia concluded that tbe USSR le actually producing aad etockplllng nuclear weapona. It le conaldered unlikely that tbe USSR would atockpile tberaoauclear weapona or fleaion weapona of radically new dealgnull-acale field teet of the nuclear evploelve ayetew, althoughoaalblllty cannot be completely olecounted.

of weapons tht USSR li etockplling. within tbo atockplllm prlnciplea aad technicalOHtllaad above, military requirements vill probably governalle-^tion or available Soviet flwaionable mater-lal among various typee aad yields of^vaspone.

ahould

be noted, hovaver, that particularly daring th* latter part of thia period, other allocations of flealoaable aaterial to the categorite of small, aedlue and large-yield vaapooa aay belikely.

9- The figures given inre baaed on the most probable flaalonable material stockpile. In vlev of the degree of uncertainty applicable to the estimates of fissionable material production, the

- k

actual figures for the weapons stockpile exampleve(ee veU as other choices tbe USSR cen make) naymet li ote-tnlrd lover or higher. The uncertaintyeeSmte. are projected Into the

figurea say be ea lev ae one-half or aa blah aa twice the flfiuree

/"However, it is "improbable that complete

"eoeversicn or weapona stock-piled will take place during tbe period to

10. Eetleetee of Soviet nuclear weapon capabilities and guide llnee for long-range projectlona of Soviet fissionable Material stockpiles for the85 as well aa examples of possible stockpiles during tbls period are set forth io Part III.

DISCPBSIOB PART I

STATUS OP TBE SOVIET ATOCC CTOCT PROGRAM A3 OP THE PIPb

labia evidence establishes tba ailatone* In tba USSRa high priority ertennlre atomic energy program vhlchubatantlal atockpile of fiaalonable eat*rials;th* capability of producing explosion* in th* rang* fromav kilo tone up tollotone of TfTF.

Thu a, while tb* exact extent of Soviet capability for Quantityof nuclear weapon* remain* uncertain, tbe general nature and aome of tbe details of tbe Soviet atomic energy program can be asseeaed.

received* primarilyend concentration of uranium, production of plutonlum, early

reaearch and development lasotope separation, tb* tasting of weapons, aad military aad civilian training and Indoctrination in atomic warfare. All of tale evidence confirms the broadf tbe program as estimated la FIXad permits some definition of particular ph&aee of the program with somewhat aore certainty than vaa heretofore possible.

e. Knowledge of tbe stetns of the Soviet atomic energy program aa of tbe end* Is derivedonsiderable volume of evidence, much of it peripheral. ufficient amount is detailed enough toeasonable foundation for quantitative assessment. Information obtained by technical means on Soviet plutonlum production and weapon teste continues to be consistent with Information obtained through other sources Information concerningroduction doe* not pirmlt as reliable as estimate ea in the case of plutonlum production, although Soviet efforts in phases cfroduction are known to be extensive. There also evidence of tbe production of thermonuclear material by the P< ^'et program.

4. The locations of tbe principal aitea in tbe Soviet atomic energy program are shown in Figure 1.

Scope of the Progrem

b. Organisation

(1) In5 tha "Piret Chief Directorate attached to tbe Council of Ministers" was organisad, with Berla as responsible minister, to plan and carry out tbe Soviet atomic energy program.

Interest exhibited during World War II was tbuipriority rapport and direction. When,ary extensiveSecond Chiefattached to the Council of Ministers" vaa wganlxed tournnlua) prospecting, mining and basic ore Thia organisational structure continued withoutuntil the downfall of Boris MVS participationextenelveaw atcatlc energy aetlTitlaa includingthe lsrportent atonic snergy installations, control of miningand supervision of tbe activities of German atcale ana Coincident with Berla's arrest the Ministry ofBuilding waa organised and shortly tbereaftar Malyabevaa Minister in charge. Colonel Oeneral A.

key figure ln the atcale energy prograa, vaa subsequently appointed Minister of Medium Machine Building In tha activities of this alnletry have not been publicly defined, but there lathat it la responsible for atart, of tba Soviet atonic energy prograa. It le not known whether this Bialstry or another key organisation Is responsible for the overall adninistration, although the recent appointment of Zeveayegla to replace Malyshev appears to place broader responsibility for atomic energy la this Ministry. The admlalstratIts changes following Boris's arrest do not appear to have adversely affected the progress of the Soviet atomic energy prograa.

b. Research

(l) Tbe USSR baa carried oat extenelve independent research and haa adapted to ita needs atomic energy Information obtained from espionage activities, German technical assistones, and unclassified scientific and technical literature available from veatern countries. Tbe required research vaa carried out on high priority which made available outstanding scientific personnel, laboratory facilities and equipment. Top ranking Soviet scientists, both theoretical andlu all pertinent fields, hero beer identified with the The high caliber of tba individuals involved la evident from their scientific publications aa well aa from the progres* made In the Soviet atomic energy program thus far. Available evidenceSoviet espionage warrants the inference that Soviet atomic researeh, plant design, construction and operation were carried out with considerable knowledge ofnd Canadian atomic energy programs. Although this espionage assisted tbe early Soviet program by at least establishing guide lines for race arch, extensive independent research by tha USSR vaa required to accomplish ita program. Also, it is evident thatumber uf important Instances Soviet practices do not folic* those of the veatern countries mentioned.

nalj.

c. Raw Hater lain nnd Resources

onsiderable body of Information avalctivities related to uranium proepecting, mining andin East Germany and,aseer *xtent, In Much laaa Iw known about thee*a tb* otherstill laaa about activities within tba USSR. It la estimated that

a total of approximatelytons of natural uranium (in terna of recoverable metal) was mined* la tbe USSR and its satellites, including Eaat Germany. While thi* figure is subjectonsiderable uncertaintytrult of tbe Inconclusive nature of ths evidence on Internal USSR efforts,ons ofotal are estimated to hive come from eaat Germany and thi* latter figureonsidered to be subject to an uncertainty of not more than plua or minuser cent. The* production given above Is more than sufficient to support th* fissionable material production estimates for tbe aawe year given In this report.

Estimated annual uranium production and cumulative uranium stockpile* are given In Table XX. Areas of uranium mining in tbe Sleo-8oriet Bloc are shown in figure 1.

Ine> after Germany bad been thoroughly exploitedheavy water, equipment and personnel, tbe conversion andof -quipwnt in an electrolytic hydrogen section in the major amnonla plant within tbe USSR we* begun to provide for tbe production of by-product heavy water for atonic energy purpose*. Additionalmoat of which wars also Installed In synthetic ammonia plants, come into production9 Still further expansion of heavy water production facilities appears to havo taken place Many of the details of this program are known and Itapacity of betweenons per year has bean achieved.

(*) There Is evidence of tbe procurement by tbe Soviet atomic energy program of Uthiem end beryllium, and of tb* availability of baelo material* such a* synthetic graphite, structural andluminum, nickel, and procaea chemicals. There is alsoof Soviet atomic energy Internet In tbe exploitation of heavy sand dopoelta vMch ore knovn to contain thorium, tlrconlun, some uranium and other elements ne-ful In atomic energy activities. of thorlam, slrconlum or beryllium has not thus far been noted. Tbe available enaatittes of tbe neteln mentioned above are substantial, and it is believed that sucha are reejuired for atomic erargy purpoes* would represent only apercentage of tbe total Soviet capacity for producing them and would not Impose any burden on tbe bsaie Soviet economy.

a. yisalonabl*production altei art) located la the Uralsand la Central Siberia. Ibe oratory of th* construction of the plants larolTol laclearariety of eridsoce. isrportaataa In undetermined and thuseasui of uncertainty la tbe estimates of production to the end

(1) Plutonium

Plutonium estimate which follows la baaed *My of evidence.

a large

xa supported by coosi dor able

"Information oo tbe timetable of developments Indicated by teats and

alto construction end the estimated availability of heavy water aad

uranium.

Thestimate given below is baaed on anof Information on Sovie* research on speoiflc processes, the timetable of developments Indicated by testa and site construction, estimated availability of electric power at appropriate sitae aad tha estimated production of nickel wire mesh.

fissionable material cumulative stocsplleaend* are estimated aa folio**:

i9A End*

uncertainty

Plutonium

llogramailograms

llograma

stimated that tha actual figure* for the Soviet stockpile of flsaioemble materiel* consideredhole aa of tb* end* are probably not more than one-third higher or lover than tbe figures given above.

b. Tritium

Production of tbls MterialIrrad-'

lotion of llthluB in reac ion vould compote vltta other production,at initiator Baton ale andor thaat ion ofexcess reactivity.

c.

the flealonablo material produced by neutron Irradiation of thorlun) haa not been employed in the Soviet weapons tests detected to date. Soviet interest ln heavy sand deposits which contain thorium and other elements useful In an atorlc energy prograa Is referred to lna) above, indicating the possible existence of piano to utilise thorium In tbe program. However, there is no evidence that thorium ia, in fact, being ueed in connection with Soviet reactors or that been produced.

k. Military Applications

a. The USSR nowarge atomic energy program ln operation directed tovard the development and production of nuclear weapons. This has been evident ln the form of tbe fourteen nuclear teets which have been detected. Ho clear evidence Is available on the extent of Soviet efforts to develop nuclear power inatallatlons or propulsion for military applications. However, In view of tbe increasing sire of Soviet fissionable retcrlal stockpiles and the interest in the non-mllltary power applications of atomic energy, scare effort Is undoubtedly being expended on the military acpecta of these probleno.

b. Nuclear Weapons Development

(l) The course of Soviet nuclear weapons developmenteasonable estlrrate of the competence and accotspllehments of the personnel Involved can be drawnonsideration of the data on nuclear tests conducted by the USSR. In the lk detected tests.

plutonlum, composite (plutonlum udod boosted types have been exploded. Approximate values of relevant data andphysical characteristics ere kiwisrlsad la Table IU.

be first Soviet ouclear test vas conductedollowed by test series3be9 clearly narkstart of tbe growth of Sovietcapabilities and appears to have been conducted as soonplutoniua vas available, Ibis lyieJded approximatelylj

a tbe four explosions detected ie3 test series, continued development and expansion of Soviet weapon capabilities was evident.

(a) Seven explosions were detected In* teetfirst test occurredew location, Totskoye, eaatand appears to have been tbe detonation of aas partilitary demonstration. Tbe remaining sixat the normal Soviet proving ground in tbe vicinity All of the explosions Involved yields of lesskilotons. I

TbereTia

Tito, aabag others, tbe poeslkilUy that tae USSR, being aware of tbe difficultlee Inherent ln widespread dovn-vind fall-out of radioactive debris, elected not to carryultl-aegaton teet aa part of* teet series at th*ir Seaipelatlnak pro-ring ground.

e. Weapon Stockpile!

On th* baale of tha teat data no* available, it la concluded that the USSR le capable of producing nuclear veapona with explosive power* ln the rangeev kllotona upllotona. It la considered unlikely that the USSR would stockpile theraccuclear weapons or fission weapon* of radically new designull-seal* field test of the nuclear explosive ayatea, althoughossibility cannot be ccarpletely discounted. The lk test* detected to date (See Table III) afford guidance to the types whlob no* aay

be stockpiled, f

- Ik -

(2) Id rlev of tbe developmentamily of weapon type* as Indicated la3* teats, lt la believed that tbe USSR la not restricting Its stockpileingle claas of weapons. However, there Is no clear evidence of tbe numbers of various types of weapons tbe USSR Is stockpiling. Within the stockpiling principles aad technical capabilities outlined above, Military requirements will probably govern tbe allocation of available Soviet fissionable material among various types end yields of weapona.

Tbe figures given above are based on tbe nost probable fissionable aaterial atockpile. In view of tb* degree of uncertainty applicable to tba eetlnate of fiaslonable material

PART n

THE COURSE of THE SOVIET ATONIC DCEPOT PROGRAM

Wen 1M5 TOc&HklD-lWJ

a. Xa taa absence of definite Information on Soviet atonic energy plana, broad Indicators anat be uaed to predict tba direction of future growth. There are several such indicators that ars helpful lu cooaldev log tbe Soviet prograa. such as:

growth of production capability.

Tbe general rev aaterial picture, level of Industrial development, and availability of basic rater lain and electric power, all or any of which are factors that may limit tbe sis* of tbe program at any given time and nay dictate ths direction of development.

The size of tbe scientific and technical ranpower pool, general scientific competence, technical originality, and lugenuity. Ttass factor* are helpful in assessing whether tbe program is likely to follow tbe pattern set by other countries or to branch off in an entirely new and original direction.

b- In estimating future emansion of the Soviet atomic energy program, the range of possibilities is very greet. The upper limit would be set by tbr availability of essential materials, technological development, and th'. easic Indus trial-economic capabilities of the Soviet Union. ower limit would be definedoviet decision to carry out no further expansion beyond Installed capacities at

future Coursu of the Program

*

a. The main emphasis of tbe Soviet program will almoat certainly continue to beilitaryweapona unless thereignificant change in International relations.

/Tbe USSR wiH

probably alio continue work on smell-yield, tamOl-dlmenslonurther developments along both of tbe above lines could be tested

b. It seems obvious that tbe USSR will work toward the developmentlutonlum androduction program consistent with its

Tb* planned balaAca betveeo plutonlum androduction and tn* part thatay play in th* Soviet weapon* prograa arc not known. Research and development required formaterial production will continue, possibly including work oa Tne devtlopcent by the USSR of other aethodaproducing plutoctiua, for exampla, through th* use of accelerators or controlled thermonuclear re act loos, cannot b* excluded, although there Is no evidence of related Soviet research.

C- The USSR has the technical conrpetence and aaterlala required for reiearch aad development ln th* application of atomicgy to submarine propulsion. However, ther*o evidence (other than that relating to tbe existenceower plant utilising atomic energy) that the USSR it engaged ln research or development along these lines. Revert heless, it la considered possible for the USSR torototype propulsion reactor Installedubmarine at any time during the period of this eetlmat*.

d. There la ao evidence of Soviet activities related to nuclear propulsion of aircraft, even ifrogram exist* Itonsidered unlikely, on th* basis of th* estimated status of Soviet atonic energy developments, that the USSR willfl progress beyond tbe research and development stage on nuclear propulsion units for aircraft.

Come effort will undoubtedly continue to be expended by the USSR on tbe peaceful applications of atomic energy, including power applications. However, it is unlikely tbatrogram wouldignificant diversion of efforts or aaterlala from the military applications. Work oa the use of radioisotopes in medical, biological and other research and for Industrial applications will probably also continue. Radioisotopes will continue to be mad* available by tbe USSR to Soviet Bloc countries, and more offers of such aaterlala aa well aa technical aaslatance will very likely be made by them to uncoaeltted countries aad possibly to pro-Western countries during the next several yeera.

3. Research and Development Capability

a. arge number of blah It qualified scientists have beenwith the Soviet atomic energy prograa. Their high caliber la evident from the early accompliabaeat of key phaaea of the program. Their ability to do Independent work ia attested to by the approach taken la certain aspects of both weapon development and fissionable material production. There does not appear to have been any reduction la tbe high priority assigned to atomic energy research and,onsequence, no decrease la expected throughn the number of

3

scientific aad technical Mnoootl assigned to tba program, a. Uranium

Tba auecasa ofFI to data In obtaining noro uranium than itnto flaaloaabla materials raflacta Its ability aod willingness to exploit,argegrade uranium depotIta, and tbue leada to tba conelualoo that uranlun will notniting factor on the growth of tbe program during the period ofestlant*. In fact, uranlun obtained from Eaat Oermeny alone would bare beea asrply sufficient to support the program to data and will probably constitute atubstantial proportion of Soviet supplies for scare tlae to cone. Howewr, even if East German uranium ceased to be available to tbe USSR, no significant impairment of estimated Soviet flas1 enable material production would ensue.

Eaat German uranium output has beea fairly constant for several years and will probe'sly not increase Ineriod. Exploitation of uranium deposits in other Satellites, and China, baa beea Increasing. Figure I, Fart I, shows the areas of Interest in the Soviet uranium mining program. Uranium reserves within the USSR appear to be sufficient touch larger program, but exploitation rates will depend on the balance decided upon by tbe USSR between atomic energy tad other actlvltlea.

In considering uranium availability to tbe Soviet program, tbe possibility of increasing the utilisation of uranium by various methods, in addition to tboss discussed in SectionFart II) above, must not be overlooked. From the Irradiation level of tbe plutonlum utilised In recent tests, there is clear evidence that the USSR baa Increased tbe Irradiation level of uranium In its reactors well above tbe Initial level, end operation Is probably now atrams of plutonlum per ton of uranium. Tbe third test of3 series Indicates at least an interest la the possibility of using even higher irradiationrama of plutonlum per ton of uranium. Furthermore, Soviet Interest in the possibility of reutillsatlon of uranium after pile irradiation must be noted, although evidence le not available on whether tbe USSR has undertaken tbla technique.

b. Heavy Water

Tbe program initiated5 looking toward large-scale production of heavy water byowapability for tbe production of approximatelyear. Tbla program appears to have

basedubstantial plant Investment by tne Plret Chief Mreetorate and, for thia and othert is expected thatof beery enter will continue at least at this rate during ths"O, aad amy posedbly lncreese.

e. Other Materials

Soviet Interest in other aaterlala of significance la atonic applications inferred to in, Part I. Tt* availability of thorium, sireonl urn, lithium, beryllium, and synthetic graphite ia noted to be fairly well established. Tbe USSR posseaaat tbe sclentiflo and technical capability to devise required production-scale purification and processirg techniques to permit utilisation of theae materials for atonic energy pu poses. onsequence, the production ofr trltlun, or the development of reactors fcr power or propulsion, if undertaken, vould not be impededhortage of basic material* during th* period ofl*ate.

5. nuclear Material Production

turn estimate of enrrent Soviet production ofla rvpported by quantitative evidence, there Is no directavailable on tbe scope of Soviet plana for expansion of There are, however, Indications of Soviet intention*their atomic energy program. Por example, It Is known thatpriority provided for the program continued* andactiviilea continued at major technical atomic energyla also estimated that tha USSR ha*apacityetric ton* of heavy water per year aa aa series of construction projects which appear to hav*

It ia est lam ted that6 then will be an increase in plutonlum production rate to0 kilogram* per year aa compared to the rat*ilograms per year which waa probably effeetire during th* periodo Tbla Increase ia not intended to define the maximum capability for expansion of Soviet plutonlum manufacturing facilities, nor can the availability of heavy water beimiting factor in this regard. Expansion is possible, for example, by Increasing the power levels of reactvr* now producing plutonlum. Likewise, the construction of graphlte-mtderated reactors or the development of the other method* for plutonlum production may contribute to further expansion without Increasing requirements for heavy water.

e. 0rutttmw239

There la bo information on Soviet plea* for futureroduction or aa the expansion of presentacllitie*. IsWit loo, la comparison vita current eatlaatea of plutonlun production, the basis for the estimate of currentroduction Is not as fire. Bovever, as Indicated above, tbe Soviet aton la energy progran appears to be an expanding one ia vhlchignificant role.

d. On the basis of the above, it Is setlaated that tba Soviet fissionable aaterial program will continue to expend during tha period of this estimate, that it will follow ths general pattern set la the past and that stockpiles toill be:

*

> kilogram*

ilogram*

Uncertainty

It Is estimated that tbe actual figures for tb* Soviet stockpile of flialonabl* material* consideredhole a* of tbe end* are probably not more thea one-third higher or lower than tb* figures given above, the uncertainty increase* aaare projected into tbe future, but even forbe actual figures nay be aa low aa one-half or as high aa twice tbe figures given.

6. Weapon* Program

tba immediate future" will probablycd tbe general characteristic* and explosive power* ofalready tested. Sovlat weapon research will probably havethe developmeot of weapona with energy yields in exceeskilotons and tba further development of small-yield,

lm eatinated that5 the USSR could teat athermoweleer device which. If successful, would permitstockpiling of thermonuclear weapons with yields In tbe multi-megaton

by

onsidered unlikely thatm row iwnitj ewayuJ* of this type without prior flola teet of the beerinciples involved (Bee Pert II, Section 2althoughoMlbllityompletely discounted.

d. It follovs freei tbe above thnt groat variety can exlat ia tba allocations of fieslonebje mterlale atockplles vhlch any be aade to the various type* of weapons the USSR will be capable ofuring th* period to Actual allocation* will depend upon aenyincluding epectfic application* and delivery systems. Purtberaore,vide rang* of yields say be achieved lo th* yield categories cf saall, medium and large vhlch are within Soviet capabilities.

a. In tbe absence of clear evidence which can aerveuide to the specific type* and nuabvr* of each type of nuclear weapon* vhlch th* USSR will actually stockpile, the nuclear weapons stockpile vhlch follows Is preieated for eoaparlson with the current cstlaate ofstockpile so' forth In Part I,.

should bo noted that during tho latter port of tht

period Motioned other allocation* of fissionable tutorial toBedlua and largo-yleld categories Bay be ror* likely; fortbe allocation given ln Part XXI, Section 7* In addition, other weapon* yield* are or will be within Soviet eapebllitiee and the weapon typo* actuallyay bo chosen accordingly.

f. Tbe figures given in Tabl*r* beaed on tbe nost probable fiaalonabl* notarial atockplle. In vie* of the degree of uncertainty applicable to the estimate of fieelonable notorial production, the flgurea for the weapona stockpile example given above for the end* (aa well a* other choicea tbe USSR can nake) nay be a* such aa one-third lover or higher. Tbe uncertainty lncreaiet aa ettlnatea are projected into the future, and forb* figures nay be aa low aa one-half or aa high ae twice tbe flgurea given./

/ However, it 1*

that conplate conversion of weapons stockpiled will take place during tbe period to

PART XXI

VTAPCn CAPABarfTO AID LOTJO RAJ01

1* Xn thn following sections, estimate* ef various aapvcta ofuclear weapon* capabilities are tabulated. Id addition, guide llnea areforrojections Of SovUt fUSlOnabl* material atockpllea for tb*85 and examples of poaaible Soviet weapon stockpllaa an calculated on tba baaia of thaaa projection*.

The portion* of tb* tabulation* given belev vhlch deal vlth Bovtet flflsloaable aaUrial production capabilities up tor*pon the inforaatlon and tatlam tea given innd IX and th* uncertalntle* tber*r* eppllcabl*. Soviet flsalon-able aaterial production capabilities for tbe perlou beyondre subject to even greater uncertainty in view of tbe lacknforaatlon on long range plana and tbe unpredictability of nevla thi* field.

Conalderleg the complete lack of information on epacific future Soviet plans for veapoot baa been necessary to utilise current and projected u. S. developments and timetable* in thi* field and tbe aaaeasaent of Soviet accompliabment* to tbe end* aa guides in eat lm*ting future Soviet capabllltlea.

*. In using the tables, lt should be noted that various parameter* of nuclear veaponn are interdependent. Diameter* and weight* are

related to energy yields a* aref fi**lonabl* material

or mode of operation.

5. Estimated ranges of yield* for various amount* of fissionable aaterial in various geometries and weight* considered to be within Soviet capabllltlea ar* given la Tabl* V.

b. Tbers ia rx> evidence available to indicate tho courec that the Soviet atomic energy program vill take during the8or arc there any specific parameters to vhlch the growth of the program during this period con be tied. However, thr-estimated set forth lend II of the present reportase from which it is possible to project,eneral voy, tosolblc growth or Soviet nuclear capabilities beyond Long-range extrapolations can be carried out on tbe basis of sooumptlons ofpattern tbe program could follow during tbe period in question. Alternate assumptions, whichange cf growth cepebilities, ere:

Ho expenslon of Soviet fissionable materials production facilities8r,

Continued expansion of Soviet fissionable materials production fecllltiee8 at tbe same rate as estimates for tbe9 tor,

(J) Expansion of the Soviet program8ate which will increase its requirements for uranli< to0 tons per ysar*

7. In view of the broad epectrum of weapon typee which will probably be available to the Soviet Union, it becomes increasingly difficult to make specific eatinatea of the detailed aake-up of the Soviet stockpile as it is projected into the

it ie to behat the above allocation of riBoionable material-reflects poaelble future Soviet capebllltlea for weapon designs,n the amounts of flrslonable materiel uaed and the yields therefrom, for the lerge-yleld and email-yield weapons. Tb* range of yields in the above clesaes of weaponsn tbe on* band, weapon model* designed for specific application* andt delivery systems; aod, on the other band, variations in the amount of fissionable material utilized in specific type* of weapon*. The weight* and dimensions of actual weapon* and verb*ads will be governed by tbeenforced by available delivery systems. These weight and dimensional characteristics will, in turn, determine tbeiven amount of fissionable materialpeclflc type of weapon. (See Table VII).

Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic:

CAPTCHA