POLITICAL TRENDS IN SAIGON

Created: 5/6/1955

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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HSSORAKDOM FDR THE DIRECTOR OF CBHTRAL THTELLIGEHCB SUBJECTi Political Trends in Saigon

Dai is continuing bis efforte to retain hisas Chief of State and nownew" plan,slightly fron. previous plans, which he may presentand US offiolals in Paris. This plan may receivefrom the French, but it would alrost certainlyto practically all elements in Vietnam. of the past two weeks have practically eliminatedinfluence in Vietnam. There is little remainingfor his retention, evenonstitutional monarch. his supporters almost certainly vould not now agree toruined by Bao Dai, and particularly one containingBuu Hoi, and the Cao Dai Pope. Any effort to "sell"to Bien would almost certainly be rejected,

the nr>ment, Dien, and within the Frenchleast the French Foreign Office, appear to agree thathas little influence and that probably he will be They elso appear to agree that this should be

accorplished pvduelly bMelatively orderly fasaion. Mea'a approaeh involves baring tba estate* Oanaral (aof rroTiocdal and local official* convoked by Diesay) approve tba following atapet (a) Bao Dai to proclaia that be restore* all powers to Dieaj (b) bao Dal to give all naoeeaary powersational assembly ones it is constituted' by free eleotlonei and (a) Bao Dai to guarantee that he will aet attorgtt to change the gDvernaant, withdraw power* froar otherwise Interval* in internalffaire psaatingy th* aaevbly. The French For sign Office re* tarda thl* approach as providing th* beet prospecttling ta* present crisis rod for curbing th* Asvolutlotery Council which they regardtngerou* asnse*. Mehate-*ly will have the power to rsnovt Bao Dal] lt is net clear that the French bavs gone thi* far.

t th* seaent, it appears that Dlsa is in control of th* situation. Although tha self-styled RevoluUonsr? Council as* appear* to ba competing with Freed er Die* for political leadership in Southt lanified group, and its opportunistic creation wa* primarily th* work of three eeet geaare.lt who planned to rally nationalist support and, possibly, to feres Dien to aradical eouree. Dice appears

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to be using the Estates Generalounterweight to thoTiflsuroo orlglnattng fror. tho JWnrolutionary Council, Dion's scvsrnaont appears to hare tho loyaltyulk of tho Vistaaccsa Uatioial Amyhleh lo thoalaaant la tha Saigon area, and he probably could disperse tha Cbuncil If It offered an isnsdlat* throat to tb* governaent. w* bslievs that provided h* rwalves US and French support, Diaa can retain control of the situation at least until the nationalt*.

h. Althougholutlcnary Council offers an inviting target forinh Infiltration and exploitation, there is aa yet ae conrlndnf evidence fror, French or other eouroso that tb* Council, is no* being influenced by Viet Minh agents. 'Moreover, the principal souro* of power of the Council, the sect troops behind certain Council leaders, ar* the-iaslreo strongly sctl-Coscranist. Finally, Dian ia vail svare of the danger of Coasiunlot infiltration of the Revolutionary Council, although be states he has n* evidence of such activity at this tine.

$. Diaa is also concerned over the possibility of enti-FraBch incident* in Saigon, which vouldrave situation, as states that he desires the French to ash* gestures of support

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fargwciiawmt ao what taa pravatrt hit* degree of euaplaien af French motive* and aetlona In the recent orlele -ay he aeaoratod and the ehenoce of antt^reoch aaaifeetatione redneed.between Wan and General Ely have beecae teearing the reeent crlala that aa believe It unlikely that Sly eeuld cozrrlnoe Warn that the French were giving fir* voapert ta Dim.

4. The coetlblUty reaalna that Maa will be naable tothe aetata*nd that this body will oonblne with tbeCc-iocU In twaMtdlng theo*iag of Bao fiat. Tn tbia event, Wan will probably feel It eeeentlal to go along, la he haa explained to lmbaeeadore believe* "everyone* la ageintt Bao Dal, and h* would probably believe that toarther would eerioualy prejadlo* hla inilitj to retain control of the situation.

7, Bao Dal'* abdlcaUon In favor of M* eon probably voold act reduce preeeare* la favor of the dissolution of the wmarchy.

I. If *eo Dalulckly denoted, extronltt element* would have lacreaeed their power. In the caaettled conditions which ensued there would b* increaeed opportunities for dlaeident aad Tietadnb activity. There night alao be aooe defectlrr* in

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